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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 As one of Aristotle’s most significant medieval interpreters, St. Thomas Aquinas 
adopted many of the Philosopher’s fundamental philosophical notions, including his 
hylomorphic doctrine that substances, especially living substances, are composites of 
matter and form.1 It should not be surprising, therefore, that a digital search for every 
single use of hylomorphic terminology, either the words, form or matter, or their 
variants, in the text of his Summa theologiae, a mature and unfinished work dating to the 
end of St. Thomas’s life, reveals that he appealed to hylomorphism whenever he wanted 
to interrogate the metaphysical structure of different realities, including God (STh I.3.2), 
angels (STh I.50.2), human beings (STh I.76.1ff), the human intellect (STh I.88.1), the 
human soul (STh I.90.2), the union that is the incarnate Word (STh III.2.1ff), and the 
sacraments (STh III.60.6ff). What may be surprising, however, is the analogical use of this 
matter-form language when St. Thomas discusses what today would be called his moral 
theology found in the Secunda Pars of the Summa. 
 A search of the ethical and theological literature reveals that no one has looked at 
the overall hylomorphic structure of St. Thomas’s moral theology, though scholars have 
                                                
1 “Hylomorphism” has also been spelled “hylemorphism.” For a fascinating history of the 
term, “hylomorphism,” and its eventually association with the matter-form doctrine of 
Aristotle and his commentators, see Gideon Manning, “The History of ‘Hylomorphism’,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 74 (2013): 173-187. As Manning amply catalogs, Aristotle 
put matter-form terminology to many uses in his corpus. For example, Aristotle 
differentiated the sublunary world from the celestial one by noting that celestial objects 
had forms, but no earthly matter; he identified the form of living things as their soul and 
their body as their matter; and he understood sensation to result when a form was 
received by the sense organs without any concomitant matter from the object being 
perceived. For a recent study of Aristotle’s hylomorphic doctrine, see Sean Kelsey, 
“Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics,” Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 107-124. 
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investigated his use of matter-form language in a select few areas of moral inquiry. In this 
thesis, I will make the case that St. Thomas’s conviction that creation is fundamentally 
hylomorphic in constitution carries over to his moral theology. To be ignorant of this fact 
is to be ignorant of a crucial epistemological and organizing principle of the Secunda pars 
of the Summa. In contrast, as I will show in the chapters that follow, to be aware of this 
feature of St. Thomas’s moral theology is to be equipped to interrogate, to penetrate, and 
to advance his theological synthesis. I will also propose that developments in 
contemporary biology, specifically in systems biology, provide us with a conceptual 
framework that can rehabilitate classical hylomorphism in the face of the critiques of the 
philosopher-scientists of the early modern period. This conceptual framework – which I 
call systems hylomorphism – validates that hylomorphic analysis of Thomistic moral 
theology that makes up the bulk of this thesis. 
In Chapter One, I will begin by summarizing St. Thomas’s hylomorphic account 
of matter and form as he described it in his De principiis naturae, a youthful work written 
when the Angelic Doctor was still a bachelor of the sentences at the University of Paris 
(1252-1256), or even earlier. I then turn to two separate but complementary discussions 
on the nature of prime matter and of substantial form as St. Thomas conceived them, to 
lay down the basic ontological principles that we will use throughout the thesis.  
To see how St. Thomas most famously used matter and form language in his 
theological synthesis, I move next to a summary of his description of the human agent, an 
account that is presupposed by the moral analysis that takes up the bulk of this 
dissertation. Finally, I close with an overview in broad strokes of how the hylomorphic 
character of reality is a recurring theme that runs throughout the mature theology of St. 
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Thomas in his Summa theologiae, with a particular focus on how this ontological 
framework, analogously understood, is foundational for his moral theory in the Secunda 
pars.  
In Chapter Two, I begin a series of four philosophical and theological 
investigations of the hylomorphic structure of Thomistic moral theology with a look at 
the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas to ground his theory of action. I open 
with his description of a human act from two complementary perspectives before moving 
to a discussion of the moral specification of an act as being either good or evil. Moral 
specification is undertaken by the agent himself when he deliberates the most prudent 
means towards attaining his end. To deepen our analysis, we then turn to objections to 
the Thomistic theory of action described in this third chapter. I focus on the criticisms 
proffered by two contemporary Thomists, Fr. Martin Rhonheimer and Steven Long. 
Rhonheimer is representative of those moralists today who emphasize the primacy of the 
end in the moral specification of a human act, while Long is representative of one of two 
groups of moral theologians opposed to this view.  
I close with a close bioethical analysis of a much-publicized abortion case 
involving a placentectomy – a medical intervention to extract the placenta, the 
fetal/maternal organ that connects the developing fetal child to the uterine wall – to end 
the pregnancy of a woman with pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH), performed at a 
formerly Catholic hospital in Phoenix, AZ. This chapter will illustrate how an 
understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s theory of 
human acts can clarify and resolve disputed questions in contemporary moral theology. 
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In the third chapter, I interrogate the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas 
to understand the passions in order to bring the Thomistic tradition into conversation 
with our present-day biological understanding of the emotions. I begin with his 
description of a human passion as a hylomorphic reality with the appetitive movement as 
its formal and with the bodily reaction as its material principles, situating it within his 
anthropological understanding of the human person as a hylomorphic substance. I then 
focus on St. Thomas account of fear, which he claims, of all the other movements of the 
soul after sorrow, has chiefly the character of a passion. Next, I move to St. Thomas’s 
hylomorphic account that relates the acts of the intellect and of the will, the acts involved 
in our ability to know and to choose, to the movements of the sensitive appetite, the acts 
involving in our ability to feel, as form is related to matter.  
I then propose that this hylomorphic understanding of the passions is an antidote 
to the current problem faced by neuroscientists, accurately described by world-renowned 
investigator, Joseph LeDoux, of describing fear without falling victim to a dualistic 
understanding of the emotions. To demonstrate its explanatory power, I illustrate how 
this hylomorphic theory of the passions can explain the phenomenology of fear in a 
manner that is compatible with the best data of contemporary neuroscience. This chapter 
will illustrate how an understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. 
Thomas’s moral theology can clarify contemporary questions extending beyond theology, 
in this case in the neuroscience of emotions, which have a direct impact on moral 
theology because of the impact that passions have on our intellect and on our will. 
In Chapter Four, I move on to the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas to 
understand the virtues. I begin with a narrative of the Angelic Doctor’s hylomorphic 
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account of the essence of virtue and of the species of virtues. I will focus on his 
categorization of the virtues according to their material cause and then of their efficient 
cause. I move next to a hylomorphic investigation of the relationship between individual 
virtues before turning to an exploration of the cooperative interaction between the 
acquired and the infused moral virtues. For the latter analysis, I will summarize and 
evaluate two proposals by Fr. George Klubertanz, S.J., and Sr. Renée Mirkes, O.S.F., who 
use matter-form language to describe this cooperative interaction, and conclude that the 
first account is the better of the two as long as it is revised in several ways.  
I build on this analysis and conclude this chapter by exploring the relationship 
between the acquired and the infused intellectual virtues, precisely to determine how 
grace alters the life of the mind. I propose that the theological virtue of faith takes the 
place of the infused counterparts for acquired understanding, acquired sure knowledge, 
and acquired wisdom. Therefore, I argue that only a Christian in the state of grace can do 
theology, properly understood. Like Chapter Two, this chapter will illustrate how an 
understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s moral 
theology can clarify and resolve another disputed contemporary moral questions as well 
as illuminate other dimensions of St. Thomas’s theological synthesis. 
In the fifth chapter, I undertake a hylomorphic investigation of the structure of 
human speech acts to argue that not all spoken falsehoods constitute lies because not all 
spoken falsehoods involve disordered speech. I begin with a detailed analysis of St. 
Thomas’s understanding of lying as a vice contrary to truth with a particular focus on the 
hylomorphic description of speech acts that he uses to evaluate their morality. At the 
heart of his claim that all intentionally spoken falsehoods are lies is his belief that speech 
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has only one function, and that this is its declarative function. In response, I propose that 
St. Thomas failed to appreciate that human vocalizations have multiple ends in the order 
of nature, including functions that do not involve signification, a claim supported by 
evidence from studies of primate vocalization and by evidence from studies of 
contemporary speech act theory in the philosophy of language.  
To reconcile the Angelic Doctor’s philosophical and theological synthesis with 
recent developments in the linguistic study of context-dependent meaning known as 
pragmatics, I then propose that to properly investigate the morality of human speech acts 
from the perspective of the Thomistic tradition, we must recognize that the human 
speaker is an efficient cause who is capable of informing the same material cause of the 
speech act with numerous formal causes to attain a particular final cause. Finally, I close 
by using this Thomistic theory of speech acts to grapple with three disputed questions in 
contemporary moral theology, the perennial lying-during-espionage case, the classic 
lying-to-the-Gestapo case and the recent lying-to-Planned-Parenthood case that has 
perplexed Catholic moralists. This chapter will illustrate how an understanding of 
hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s theory of speech acts can allow 
us to develop his moral theology so that it can incorporate insights from comparative 
physiology and analytic philosophy. 
Finally, in Chapter Six, the last substantial chapter of this thesis, I describe a 
theoretical framework that seeks to rehabilitate a classical Thomistic account of matter 
and form within the realm of contemporary biology. How are we to talk about a “form,” 
“nature,” or the “disposition of matter” in the 21st century? However, before I do this, I 
think that it is important to understand and to respond to the scientific objections to 
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hylomorphism that were raised by the philosopher-scientists of the early modern period. 
Why did these philosophers, whose lives spanned the seventeenth century, think that the 
rejection of classical hylomorphism was necessary for the scientific revolution that they 
helped to trigger?  
I then move to an overview of systems biology, an emerging field of scientific 
investigation, which in my view is inherently open to a hylomorphic account of creation 
because of its own hylomorphic structure. I close the chapter with an account of the 
human organism that is not only consonant both to classical hylomorphism and 
contemporary science but is also corrective of the scientific objections of the early 
modern philosophers. This systems account is a conceptual framework that validates the 
hylomorphic analysis in moral theology that has been the focus of the earlier chapters of 
this thesis. 
In sum, this thesis will demonstrate through a series of four philosophical and 
theological investigations that acknowledging the hylomorphic framework of St. 
Thomas’s moral theology will allow us to interrogate, to penetrate, and to advance his 
theological synthesis in conversation with other, often rival, intellectual traditions, 
philosophical, theological, and scientific. It also validates matter-form language by 
rooting the classical hylomorphism of St. Thomas in a systems biology that is inherently 
open to a hylomorphic account of creation. In doing so, it opens up a space in 
contemporary discourse for the recovery of a more robust understanding of nature, 
understood as the source and the foundation for an organism’s species-specific activity.  
 
  8 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Classical Hylomorphism of St. Thomas Aquinas 
 
 
Introduction 
Hylomorphism is a philosophical theory about the nature of matter and of form. But 
what is matter, and what is form? In a recent scholarly paper, Leo P. Kadanoff, who is a physicist 
and a philosopher of physics, makes it clear that in his view and in the view of his colleagues in 
the contemporary academy, matter should be understood as aggregations of atoms that are made 
intelligible by the theory of statistical physics and by the theory of phase transitions.1 In a second 
scholarly paper, Nadya Morozova and Mikhail Shubin, who are both mathematicians working on 
biological problems, have proposed that form should be understood as the geometrical shape of a 
developing organism specified by biological information encoded in that organism’s cells.2 Both 
views are commonplace today. However, neither is the matter nor the form associated with 
classical hylomorphic theory. Neither is the view of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
In this chapter, I will begin my investigations of the hylomorphic structure of Thomistic 
moral theology by summarizing St. Thomas’s own account of matter and form as he described it 
in his De principiis naturae, a youthful work written when the Angelic Doctor was still a bachelor 
                                                
1 Leo P. Kadanoff, “Theories of Matter: Infinities and Renormalization,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy of Physics, ed. Robert Batterman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 141-
188. 
2  Nadya Morozova and Mikhail Shubin, “The Geometry of Morphogenesis and the 
Morphogenetic Field Concept,” in Pattern Formation in Morphogenesis, ed. Vincenzo Capasso, 
Misha Gromov, Annick Harel-Bellan, Nadya Morozova and Linda Louise Pritchard (Berlin: 
Springer, 2013), pp. 255-282. 
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of the sentences at the University of Paris (1252-1256), or even earlier.3 As John F. Wippel has 
convincingly shown, this text anticipates much of the analysis in St. Thomas’s later works 
concerning matter and form, including his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics.4 
It also has the added advantage in that this text is an independently written work with its own 
integrity and coherence, rather than an Aristotelian commentary that is shaped and governed by 
the concerns of the Philosopher. Nonetheless, I will supplement the De principiis text with 
citations from the Summa theologiae, to illustrate the continuity of his hylomorphic theory over 
the course of St. Thomas’s academic career. I then turn to two separate but complementary 
discussions on the nature of prime matter and of substantial form as St. Thomas conceived them, 
to lay the foundations for the contemporary account of systems hylomorphism that will be 
described and defended later in this thesis. To see how St. Thomas most famously used matter 
and form language in his theological synthesis, I move next to a summary of his description of 
the human agent, an account that is presupposed by the moral analysis later in this dissertation. 
Finally, I close with an overview of how the hylomorphic character of reality is a recurring theme 
that runs throughout the mature theology of St. Thomas in his Summa theologiae, with a 
particular focus on how this ontological framework, analogously understood, is foundational for 
his moral theory.  
                                                
3  Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume 1: The Person and His Work 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 48-49. 
4 John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2000), p. 296. In his recent summary of Thomistic hylomorphism, 
Jeffrey Brower chose to focus his discussion on the philosophical framework found in the De 
principiis naturae as well. See his “Matter, Form, and Individuation” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 85-
103. Brower notes that in most cases, parallel passages in the De principiis can be found in St. 
Thomas’s Sententia super Physicam, which is the Angelic Doctor’s other main discussion of 
change.  
  10 
The Thomistic Theory of Hylomorphism in the De Principiis Naturae 
As Aristotle had done centuries before him, St. Thomas Aquinas posited the theory of 
hylomorphism – the proposal that corporeal things of a natural kind are composed of two 
principles of corporeal being, matter (hyle) and form (morphe) – primarily to explain the reality 
of change, what the ancients called the processes of generation and of corruption.5 Accordingly, 
in his De principiis naturae, St. Thomas begins by noticing that in the natural world, corporeal 
beings can change because they can exist in numerous ways.6 They can exist though they do not 
yet exist, and these are said to be in potentiality, while others can exist and they do exist, and 
these are said to be in actuality. He moves on to point out that there are two kinds of actual 
existence, two ways in which something corporeal can actually exist. First, there is substantial 
existence, which is to be a kind of corporeal being simply, and then, there is accidental existence, 
which is to be a kind of corporeal being in a qualified way. To illustrate this distinction, St. 
Thomas explains that when a man exists, he exists simply, and this is called his substantial 
existence, while when he exists as a white man, he exists in a qualified way, and this is called one 
of the ways he has accidental existence.  
In a parallel manner, St. Thomas notes that there are two kinds of potential existence. The 
potency to substantial existence, he calls prime matter, the materia ex qua, the “matter out of 
                                                
5 However, as John Wippel explains, if one is to properly appreciate the scope of the Angelic 
Doctor’s thought regarding matter and form, this approach to understanding Thomistic 
hylomorphic theory from the perspective of the philosophy of nature needs to be complemented 
with a metaphysical analysis that examines the explanatory links between the theory of matter 
and form and the nature of predication by denomination. Given my particular interest in 
locating hylomorphic theory within a philosophy of nature informed by contemporary systems 
biology, this kind of a metaphysical analysis falls outside the purview of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
for further discussion, see his The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 303-312. 
6 The summary of the De principiis naturae presented here is indebted to the lucid analysis and 
interepretation of this opusculum by Joseph Bobik: Aquinas on Matter and Form and the 
Elements (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998). 
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which” a corporeal being comes to be, while the potency to accidental existence, he calls a 
subject, or elsewhere, secondary matter, the materia in qua, the “matter in which” that corporeal 
being comes to be in a particular way. Finally, corresponding to both kinds of potency, there are 
two causes of actuality, which are called form, where that which causes substantial existence is 
called substantial form, and that which causes accidental existence is called accidental form.  
Next, St. Thomas moves to distinguish the two types of change that occur in the natural 
world, where change, as he defines the term elsewhere, is the process whereby “something should 
be otherwise now from what it was before.”7 Change that involves the coming into existence is 
called generation, while change that involves the going out of existence is called corruption.  
Moving even closer to the object of his investigation, St. Thomas then observes that there 
are two kinds of generation, generation simply and generation with respect to something or 
other. Generation simply involves motion to substantial form. It is the corporeal being coming to 
be simply. It is the kind of change that involves a radical alteration in the very nature of the thing. 
Using an outdated scientific example, St. Thomas uses the transformation of sperm and 
menstrual blood into a human being to illustrate this first kind of change, which is called 
substantial change: “For when a substantial form is introduced, something is said to come to be 
simply. Thus, we say that a man comes to be or that a man is generated.”8 In contrast, generation 
with respect to something or other involves the motion to accidental form. It is the kind of 
change that involves an alteration in some aspect of the corporeal being. St. Thomas uses the 
                                                
7 STh I.42.2 ad 2: “Nam de ratione mutationis est, quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et 
prius.” Thus, change here has to be seen in contrast to the processes of creation and of 
annihilation where there is no subject that perdures through the process of transformation. 
Rather the subject is either created from nothing or annihilated to nothing.  
8 De prin., no. 4: “Quando enim introducitur forma substantialis, dicitur aliquid fieri simpliciter, 
sicut dicimus: homo fit vel homo generator.” 
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example of a dark man who becomes white to highlight this second kind of change, which is 
called accidental change: “Thus, when a man comes to be white, we do not say simply that the 
man comes to be or is generated but that he comes to be or is generated as white.”9  
Finally, given that the process of corruption is opposed to that of generation, St. Thomas 
acknowledges that there are also two ways of ceasing to be that are observable in the natural 
world. There is corruption simply, whereby one kind of thing changes into another kind of thing, 
and then there is corruption with respect to something or other, whereby an already existing 
subject ceases to be either this or that. Though corruption is opposed to generation, it is 
important to acknowledge, however, that every process of generation involves corruption and 
vice-versa, for corruption of one kind of thing means the generation of another kind of thing, 
and vice-versa. 
 After his observations on the different kinds of change in the world, St. Thomas moves, 
from Chapter 2 of the De principiis naturae onwards, to provide an account that explains the 
reality of this change. How can we explain the nature of either generation or corruption? This 
account begins with a description of the three principles of change and ends with a description of 
the four causes of change.  
First, there are the principles, the three constituents of change, where a principle is 
defined as something from which something else begins or takes its origin, whether the existence 
of the second thing follows from the first thing or not.10 St Thomas has already discussed two of 
these principles. There is matter, which is the potency towards actual being. It is the starting 
                                                
9 De prin., no. 4: “Sicut quando homo fit albus, non dicimus simpliciter hominem fieri vel 
generari sed fieri vel generari album.” 
10 De prin., no. 18. For discussion, see Bernard Wuellner, S.J., Summary of Scholastic Principles 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), pp. 1-5. 
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point of change – the terminus a quo, the end from which – because it is the point from which 
generation begins or departs. Then there is the form, which is the constituent through which the 
potency is realized in an actuality. It is the ending point of change – the terminus ad quem, the 
end to which – because it is the point towards which generation ends or arrives.  
For completeness, however, as Aristotle had done before him, St. Thomas introduces a 
third principle, a third constituent, to his explanation of change, a principle which he and the 
other ancients, called privation. While matter, according to St. Thomas, can be said to be being in 
potency, i.e., the nonexistence of being in general, privation is the nonexistence of a particular 
actuality in being. Both principles of being exist in the subject prior to the change but they differ 
in description. To illustrate this distinction, St. Thomas points to a lump of bronze that is 
transformed into a bronze statue. Before the change, the lump of bronze is in potency to 
becoming a statue generally. Thus, it can be said that at the level of accidental being, the lump of 
bronze is said to be the matter understood here not as primary but as secondary matter. 
However, the lump is also without a particular shape as a statute. Before the change, it is in 
potency to becoming a replica either of a David or of a Statue of Liberty or of a potentially 
infinite number of other statues. This absence of a particular shape as a statue in the lump of 
bronze is its privation for that particular shape. As we will see in more detail below, these three 
principles are needed to explain change, because one needs to explain how this specific thing 
becomes, not a generic other thing, which is impossible, but another specific thing with its own 
particular identity and nature.  
Significantly, St. Thomas explains that of these three principles of being, the first two, 
matter and form, are principles of nature per se, i.e., in themselves, while the third, privation, is 
only a principle of nature per accidens, i.e, in and through another. To put it another way, to 
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explain how things are and how they undergo change, matter and form, according to St. Thomas, 
must be real principles that have actual existence in every existing material thing. Take a bronze 
Statue of Liberty that one can buy on Fifth Avenue in New York City. At the level of accidental 
being, the statue is made of bronze, which is its matter – properly speaking its secondary matter – 
that is organized in a particular Statue-of-Liberty way, which is its form. Both are necessary 
constituents of the thing. Both need to exist if the statue is to exist. Both need to exist in 
themselves, per se, for the composite, the statue, to exist. Without either one – without the bronze 
or its particular shape – the Statue of Liberty could not be what it is now as an existing thing. In 
contrast, privation – what something is not at this point in time, but what it could become at 
some later point in time – is not a necessary constituent of a thing. Returning to our example, the 
existence of a bronze Statue of Liberty can be fully explained without referring to all the other 
kinds of statues that this lump of bronze could have become in alternate universes. As St. 
Thomas explains this distinction in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics:  
Matter is almost a thing and exists in some way because it is in potency to a thing 
and it is in some way the substance of the thing, because it enters into the 
constitution of the substance; but this cannot be said about privation.11  
Thus, privation – the potency towards a particular kind of being – only has existence through 
another, per accidens. Its existence depends on the real existence of the matter, the more radical 
potency to being, which exists in the thing. Nonetheless, privation is still important for a 
complete description of change, because as I already noted above, one needs to explain how this 
                                                
11 In Phys. I Lect 15, no. 4: “Materia est prope rem, et est aliqualiter, quia est in potentia ad rem, et 
est aliqualiter substantia rei, quia intrat in constitutionem substantiae: se hoc de privatione dici 
non potest.” 
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one specific thing becomes, not a generic other thing, but another specific thing with its own 
particular identity and nature. 
Finally, St. Thomas rounds out his explanation of change with a description of the four 
causes of being first articulated by Aristotle. He does this to explain how the potency of matter is 
actually actualized by a particular form to become this particular thing here and now. Returning 
to our example, he does this to explain how does this lump of bronze actually become the bronze 
Statue of Liberty that I bought from a sidewalk vendor on Fifth Avenue.  
At this point, let me note that St. Thomas has a radically different definition for a cause 
from the one commonly used today. In the mechanical worldview that is prevalent in our own 
day, which as we will see in Chapter Six is a worldview that we inherited from the early modern 
period in the seventeenth century, causes are the forces or powers that are responsible for the 
activity and the behavior – often understood as the motion or the movement of something from 
one place to another – of a material thing. In contrast, in the substantial worldview of the 
ancients, causes are principles of explanation that account not only for the behavior of, but also, 
and more importantly, for the very existence of the things that are in the world. As St. Thomas 
explains it: “It is said that a cause is that from which existence follows from another.”12 In other 
words, within the Thomistic framework, causes explain how a thing comes into being, how it 
remains in being, and eventually, how it ceases to be, by becoming something else.  
                                                
12 De prin., no. 18: “Unde dicitur quod causa est id ex cuius esse sequitur aliud.” Therefore, by 
definition, the causes are all principles but not all the principles are causes. Matter and form are 
causes because the existence of a thing depends on them, but privation is not a cause because the 
existence of a thing does not depend on a prior potency that explains what it could have become. 
Nonetheless, we can say that a privation is a cause per accidens, in as much as it accompanies 
matter, which is a cause per se. 
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Given this definition of cause, it should not be surprising that for St. Thomas, as it was for 
the ancients, matter and form are causes. Both are required for a corporeal being to exist. They 
explain the existence and change of corporeal things. As I noted above, matter is a potency to 
exist as something, while form is the actualization that brings a potential existing thing into 
existence as a particular kind of thing. Thus, St. Thomas explains that both of these causes – 
matter and form – are intrinsic causes: They are the principles that constitute a thing from 
within.13 In addition to these causes, St. Thomas, like Aristotle before him, posits the existence of 
two more causes to explain the coming to be of an existing something. Third, there is the efficient 
or agent cause.14 This is the cause that realizes the potency of the matter by educing a form from 
within it. In our example, the sculptor is the efficient cause who shapes the lump of bronze into 
this Statue of Liberty. He reveals a form, in this case, an accidental form, that had only existed 
potentially in the bronze. According to St. Thomas, one needs to posit the existence of an 
efficient or agent cause to explain change because what is in potency cannot bring itself into a 
state of actuality.15 In other words, matter cannot bring itself into being. What does not exist 
cannot bring itself into existence. Form too cannot bring matter into being for it does not exist 
until after the change is complete. Thus, to adequately explain change, one needs to posit a third 
principle of change in addition to the material and to the formal causes, which exist at the 
beginning of the process of change to bring about the change in the matter when it is informed 
by the form. This third cause is the efficient cause, which the ancients also called, the agent cause. 
Finally, there is the fourth cause that completes St. Thomas’s explanation for change, the 
cause he calls the final cause, the end or the purpose that moves the efficient cause to realize the 
                                                
13 De prin., no. 17. 
14 Ibid., no. 15. 
15 Ibid. 
  17 
form in the matter. As the Angelic Doctor points out, if an agent cause was not inclined, either by 
its own choice or by its own nature, towards the fulfillment of its actions, then no action, no 
change, would take place. Thus, the final cause is the explanation for the very existence of this 
inclination that precedes change. It is the cause that moves the agent to act as an agent. For a 
voluntary agent cause, the final end is the purpose for which the agent is acting. A man knows 
and deliberates about the ends of his actions. He is then able to know and choose from among 
the means available to him to achieve those ends. In our example, it is the idea of the Statue of 
Liberty that motivates the sculptor to shape the bronze into this particular statue rather than into 
that other statue. In contrast, for a non-voluntary agent cause – what St. Thomas calls a natural 
cause – the final end is determined by its nature. Dogs are inclined to chase cats by their nature, 
while cats are inclined to chase mice by theirs. They do this without deliberation. Thus, as the 
Angelic Doctor explains, to say that a natural agent intends an end is to say that it is naturally 
inclined towards those actions that will allow it to achieve the end that is predetermined by its 
nature.16 In contrast to the material cause and to the formal cause, these final two causes – the 
efficient cause and the final cause – are extrinsic causes because they act from outside the thing.  
To summarize, in De principiis naturae, St. Thomas Aquinas proposes a hylomorphic 
theory to explain the different commonsensical kinds of change observable in creation and the 
different kinds of things that result from these changes. His four Aristotelian causes provide an 
account for how a thing – the hylomorphic compound that Aristotelians and Thomists call a 
substance – comes into being, how it remains in being, and how it actually goes out of being, 
becoming something else. With this overview of Thomistic hylomorphism in mind, I now turn to 
                                                
16 Ibid., no. 16.  
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more focused discussions of the nature of the two intrinsic and per se causes of substantial being, 
prime matter and substantial form.  
 
The Thomistic Theory of Prime Matter 
From my conversations with my scientific colleagues, of the two intrinsic causes of being, 
matter and form, Thomistic “matter” is probably the more mysterious of the two.17 Recall that 
matter, as St. Thomas and the ancients had understood it, and more properly, prime matter, is 
potency to being. As such it should not be confused with the modern conception of matter – a 
view originating with Descartes in the seventeenth century18 – as the “stuff” or the “materials” 
that constitute those physical objects with extension, i.e., those objects with length, breadth, and 
depth. In contrast, Thomistic matter is not a particular thing but is only a potency to be a 
particular thing that is present in another particular thing.19 Thus, properly speaking, Thomistic 
matter is not a thing. Rather, it is a principle of being by which a thing exists. Or to put it another 
way, it is a non-substantial but really existing metaphysical principle of being that is involved in 
the constitution of a thing of a natural kind.20   
                                                
17 For a comprehensive discussion of how the understanding of matter has changed throughout 
history, see Ernan McMullin, ed. The Concept of Matter (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1963). 
18 Cf. Rene Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy, Part Two: The Principles of Material Things,” in 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, 
and Ougald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 223-247. 
19 In DA, II Lect 1, no. 5. 
20 For an excellent discussion of this distinction see Francis McMahon, “Being and Principles of 
Being,” The New Scholasticism 17 (1943): 322–339. See also J.A.J. Peters, C.Ss.R. “Matter and 
Form in Metaphysics,” The New Scholasticism 31 (1957): 447–483. Thus, it is important not to 
repeat the mistake of Suarez who posited that form and matter are imperfect or incomplete 
substances. For discussion, see David M. Knight, S.J., “Suarez’s Approach to Substantial Form,” 
Modern Schoolman 39 (1962): 219–39; and Helen Hattab, “Suarez’s Last Stand for Substantial 
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 As I explained above, according to St. Thomas, there are two kinds of matter, two kinds 
of potency, which correspond to the two kinds of change observable in creation. First, there is 
prime or first matter, which is the potency that is actualized during substantial change and 
remains as a constituent of substantial being. Then there is secondary or second matter, which is 
the potency of a substantial being, already determined as a thing of a natural kind, to further 
accidental determinations that Aristotelians and Thomists called the thing’s qualities. In our 
statue example, prime matter is the potency to bronze, while second matter is the potency of the 
bronze to a particular shape, in our case, the shape of the Statue of Liberty. Of the two, as its 
name suggests, prime or first matter is the more important. It is one of the intrinsic causes of 
being. It is one of those metaphysical constituents that makes a corporeal thing a corporeal thing 
that exists. 
In contrast to the views of many of his contemporaries who had thought that prime 
matter enjoys some actuality in itself21, St. Thomas proposed that prime matter is pure potency: 
“The act to which prime matter is in potency is the substantial form. Therefore, the potency of 
matter is nothing else but its essence.”22 Thus, according to St. Thomas, prime matter is utter 
formlessness: “Created matter is formless so that it may be accommodated to different forms.”23 
                                                                                                                                                       
Form,” in The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 100-118. 
21 For details and discussion, see Allan B. Wolter, “The Ockhamist Critique,” in The Concept of 
Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, ed. E. McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1965), pp. 124-146. 
22 STh I.77.1 ad 2: “Actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est substantialis forma. Et ideo 
potentia material non est aliud quam eius essentia.” 
23 STh I.47.1: “Materia creata est difformitas, ut esset diversis formis accommodata.” 
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Elsewhere, he notes that prime matter is pure potency and as such is farthest, metaphysically 
speaking, from God who is pure act.24 By its very nature, prime matter is radical potency.25  
Three metaphysical conclusions follow from the claim that prime matter is radical 
potency. First, as pure potency, prime matter does not and cannot exist by itself. It can only exist 
in conjunction with a substantial form that actualizes its potency. As St. Thomas explains it, 
“prime matter has substantial being through form…else it would not be in act.”26 Or again, 
“matter is being in potency and becomes being in act through the coming of form, which is the 
cause of its being.”27 Or again, “Matter cannot exist in the nature of things unless it is formed by 
some form. For whatever is found in the nature of things exists actually, and actual matter comes 
to a thing from its form which is its act. Therefore, in the nature of things, matter cannot be 
found without form.”28 Indeed, according to St. Thomas, God Himself would not be able to 
create prime matter without form because this would involve an inherent logical contradiction:  
For if formless matter preceded in duration, then it already exists in act, for this is 
what duration implies, since the end of creation is being in act, and that which is 
in act itself is form. Therefore, to say that matter proceeds without form, is to say 
that being is in act without act, which is a contradiction.29 
                                                
24 STh I.115.1 ad 2. 
25 For discussion, see Norbert Luyten, O.P., “Matter as Potency,” in The Concept of Matter, ed. E. 
McMullin (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 122-133. 
26 STh I.84.3 ad 2: “Materia prima habet esse substantiale per formam…alioquin non esset in 
actu.” 
27 De spirit. creat. a.1 ad 5: “Materia est ens in potentia et fits ens actu per adventum formae, quae 
est ei causa essendi.” 
28 DP, q. 4 a.1 co: “Materia non potest in rerum natura existere, quin aliqua forma formetur. 
Quidquid enim in rerum natura invenitur, actu existit, quod quidem non habet materia nisi per 
formam, quae est actus eius; unde non habet sine forma in rerum natura inveniri.” 
29 STh I.66.1: “Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim 
duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. 
  21 
Prime matter can only exist as a constituent of the substance of which it is an intrinsic cause. It is 
inseparable from the form that gives it its being. Properly speaking, therefore, it is co-created 
rather than created.30 
Next, as pure potency, prime matter cannot be known in and through itself. According to 
St. Thomas, things of a natural kind are and can be known only insofar as they are in act. As 
such, prime matter cannot be known except through the substantial form that actualizes its 
potency: 
Since each thing is intelligible as it is in act, as it is said in the Metaphysics, it must 
be that the nature or the quiddity of a thing is understood either as it is an act, as 
in the case of forms themselves or of simple substances, or through that which is 
its act, as in the case of composite substances through their forms, or through that 
which is in the place of its act, as prime matter [is known] through its relationship 
to form and a vacuum through the absence in a place.31 
In another context, however, St. Thomas adds that prime matter can also be known either by 
analogy or by proportion, in that prime matter is related to form in the same way that wood is 
related to a bench:  
Prime matter is considered to be the subject of all forms. But it is known by 
analogy, that is, according to proportion. For in this way, we know that wood is 
                                                                                                                                                       
Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat 
contradictionem.”   
30 STh I.9.2 ad 3.  
31 In DT, q. 5 a. 3 co: “Cum enim unaquaeque res sit intelligibilis, secundum quod est in actu, ut 
dicitur in IX metaphysicae, oportet quod ipsa natura sive quiditas rei intelligatur: vel secundum 
quod est actus quidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et substantiis simplicibus, vel secundum id 
quod est actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae per suas formas, vel secundum id quod est ei 
loco actus, sicut materia prima per habitudinem ad formam et vacuum per privationem locati.”  
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other than the form of a bench and of a bed, because sometimes it underlies the 
one form and sometimes the other. When therefore we see that air sometimes 
comes to be in the form of air and sometimes in the form of water, it is necessary 
to say that there is something that exists sometimes under the form of air and 
sometimes under the form of water, and as such is something other than the form 
of air, as in wood there is something other than the form of a bench and other 
than the form of a bed. This something that is related to these natural substances 
as bronze is related to the statue, and wood to the bed, and anything material and 
unformed, to form, this is what we call prime matter.32  
As John Wippel notes, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. They point to the reality 
that prime matter is pure potency. According to St. Thomas, even God cannot know prime 
matter directly. Instead there is a divine idea for matter but one that is not distinct from the 
divine idea of the substance that is the composite of that prime matter and a specific substantial 
form.33 
Finally, as pure potency, prime matter can function as the principle of individuation that 
distinguishes one individual thing from another individual of the same natural kind.34 According 
                                                
32 In Phys. I Lect 13, no. 9: “Materia autem prima consideratur subiecta omni formae. Sed scitur 
secundum analogiam, idest secundum proportionem. Sic enim cognoscimus quod lignum est 
aliquid praeter formam scamni et lecti, quia quandoque est sub una forma, quandoque sub alia. 
Cum igitur videamus hoc quod est aer quandoque fieri aquam, oportet dicere quod aliquid 
existens sub forma aeris, quandoque sit sub forma aquae: et sic illud est aliquid praeter formam 
aquae et praeter formam aeris, sicut lignum est aliquid praeter formam scamni et praeter formam 
lecti. Quod igitur sic se habet ad ipsas substantias naturales, sicut se habet aes ad statuam et 
lignum ad lectum, et quodlibet materiale et informe ad formam, hoc dicimus esse materiam 
primam.” 
33 STh I.15.3. 
34 For discussion, see R.A. O’Donnell, “Individuation: An Example of the Development of the 
Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 49-67; Joseph Owens, 
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to St. Thomas, prime matter is what ultimately explains the distinction among material objects 
belonging to the same natural kind. In his commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius – John 
Wippel has shown convincingly that this is the fullest statement of St. Thomas’s view on 
individuation35 – the Angelic Doctor explains that the diversity in individuals of the same species 
can be attributed to the form that is received in matter.36 However, since matter in itself lacks all 
differentiation – recall that for St. Thomas, it is pure potency – matter can individuate the 
received form only insofar as it itself bears some distinguishable mark. Therefore, “for form is 
not individuated by being received in matter, but only insofar as it is received in this distinct and 
determined matter, here and now.”37 St. Thomas concludes that prime matter  
is the principle of diversity according to genus inasmuch as it is the subject of a 
common form, and so likewise it is the principle of diversity according to number 
inasmuch as it is the subject of indeterminate dimensions. Because these 
dimensions belong to the genus of accidents, diversity according to number is 
sometimes reduced to the diversity according to matter and sometimes to the 
diversity according to accidents.38  
                                                                                                                                                       
“Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle,” Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 
279-310; Kevin White, “Individuation in Aquinas’s Super Boetium De Trinitate, Q.4” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 543-556; and Christopher Hughes, “Matter and 
Individuation in Aquinas,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (1996): 1-16. 
35 Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 360. 
36 In DT, q. 4 a. 2 co.  
37 Ibid.: “Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur 
in hac materia distincta et determinata ad hic et nunc.” 
38 Ibid.: “[Materia] est principium diversitatis secundum genus, prout subest formae communi, 
ita est principium diversitatis secundum numerum, prout subest dimensionibus interminatis. Et 
ideo cum hae dimensiones sint de genere accidentium, quandoque diversitas secundum 
numerum reducitur in diversitatem materiae, quandoque in diversitatem accidentis.” 
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To summarize then, two individuals of the same kind, say two oak trees, are informed by the 
substantial form that defines their kind, the substantial form of oak tree, making them oak trees. 
However, they are constituted as individual oak trees by the distinct prime matter that gives each 
of them the capacity to occupy a place and to possess extension in three dimensions. Since prime 
matter cannot exist apart from form, properly speaking, it is their prime matter under 
determinate dimensions (dimensiones determinatae vel terminatae) or dimensive quantities 
(quantitates dimensivae) that truly distinguishes one individual from another. It is this oak tree's 
prime matter, with this particular shape, height, and color, that truly distinguishes it from the 
second oak tree, with its own distinctive prime matter with its particular shape, height, and color. 
To conclude, for St. Thomas, prime matter is the metaphysical co-principle that specifies 
the potencies of a particular existing thing. It is also the principle of individuation that 
distinguishes one individual thing from another individual of the same natural kind. 
 
The Thomistic Theory of Substantial Form 
 If prime matter is the metaphysical principle that specifies the potency inherent in an 
existing thing, then substantial form is the correlative metaphysical principle that specifies the 
actuality of that thing. It is form that makes a thing of a natural kind, what it is. More specifically, 
substantial form is the principle that explains the determination, the nature, the operation, and 
the unity of a composite thing. It is also the principle that specifies the end of a thing of a natural 
kind, the principle that makes a thing tend by nature towards its perfection.  
 First, substantial form is the principle of actuality. As we noted above, according to St. 
Thomas, prime matter as pure potency does not and cannot exist by itself. It is substantial form 
that actualizes prime matter’s potency, determining it so that both matter and form together can 
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constitute a substance. It does this by giving prime matter the determination that makes it the 
proper subject for the reception of the act of existing: “It is proper to a substantial form to give to 
matter its act of existing simply for it is that through which a thing is the very thing that it is.”39 
Or again, “For through form, which is the act of matter, matter becomes an actual being and this 
particular thing.”40 Indeed, it is substantial form that gives matter its very act of being, i.e., its esse, 
making the composite exist as a particular kind of thing: “For we find that the relationship of 
form and matter is such that form gives esse to matter.”41 
 Next, substantial form is the principle of the essence of a thing of a natural kind. It gives a 
thing of a natural kind its specific nature. According to St. Thomas, in corporeal things, 
substantial form determines its essence, while in spiritual things, substantial form is identical 
with its essence: “In this case, the essence of a composite substance differs from that of a simple 
substance because the essence of a composite substance is not only form but comprises both 
form and matter. In contrast, the essence of a simple substance is form alone.”42 Or again, “But 
the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things or it is the constituent of the 
nature of the thing as in those things composed of matter and form.”43 Thus, properly speaking, 
                                                
39 DA, q.9 co: “Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter; 
ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est.” 
40 De ente, cap. 1: “Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc 
aliquid.” 
41 De ente, cap. 3: “Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat esse 
materiae.” For discussion see, John Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), pp. 172-193; and Cornelio 
Fabro, Participation et causalite selon S. Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain-Paris: Publications 
Universitaires de Louvain,1961), pp. 349-362. 
42 De ente, cap. 3: “In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiae simplicis 
quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et 
materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est forma tantum.” 
43 STh III.13.1: “Forma autem vel est ipsa natura rei, sicut in simplicibus, vel est constituens 
ipsam rei naturam, sicut in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma.” 
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the human being is not his substantial form alone, a form that is more properly called his soul. 
Rather, because he is a composite of matter and form, i.e., prime matter and soul, both have to be 
included in the definition of his essence, which is his humanity. 
 Third, substantial form is the principle of operation for a thing of a natural kind. In other 
words, since the form makes a thing of a natural kind what it is, it is also the form that gives a 
thing the powers that it has as a particular kind of thing. According to St. Thomas, “since the 
same form that gives esse to matter is also a principle of operation, for everything acts insofar as it 
is in act, it is necessary that a soul, just like any other form, is a principle of operation.”44 Thus, 
according to the Angelic Doctor, an eagle is able to fly, and a lion is able to roar because of their 
respective substantial forms that make them the animals that they are. Notably, St. Thomas 
explains that different kinds of forms confer different powers of operation to things, where 
higher forms, because of their perfection, will be able to confer greater powers of operating on 
things: “But we must consider that corresponding to levels of forms in the order of perfection of 
being, there are levels of form with respect to their power of operating, for an operation is an act 
of an agent in act.”45 These powers of operations are assigned to different parts in a more 
complex thing: “Indeed, in living bodies that have nobler forms, diverse operations are assigned 
to diverse parts. In plants there is an operation for the root, another for the branches, and 
                                                
44 DA, q. 9 co: “Sed quia eadem forma quae dat esse materiae est etiam operationis principium, eo 
quod unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu; necesse est quod anima, sicut et quaelibet alia 
forma, sit etiam operationis principium.” 
45 DA, q. 9 co: “Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi 
est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu.” 
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another for the trunk. And the more perfect the living bodies are, the greater is the diversity of 
parts found in them because of their greater perfection.”46 
  Fourth, substantial form is the principle of unity that explains both the oneness and the 
wholeness of a thing of a natural kind. For St. Thomas, a substance has a unity that makes it one 
unqualifiedly (unum simpliciter) distinguishing it from an accidental aggregate of parts. This 
substantial unity is especially evident in living organisms: “Since the body of a human being or of 
any other animal is a natural whole, it will be called one because it has one form which perfects it 
in a manner unlike that of the aggregation or of the composition that is seen in a house or in 
other things of this kind.”47 For St. Thomas, form explains the unity of the substantial whole: 
“Nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence, because a thing 
has existence and unity from the same source.”48 Or again, “for each individual thing is one in so 
far as it is a being. And each individual thing is an actual being through a form, whether 
according to substantial being or according to accidental being. Thus, every form is an act and as 
such it is the reason for the unity whereby a thing is one.”49 In other words, for St. Thomas, a 
thing of a natural kind is a single unified whole precisely because its substantial form with its 
                                                
46 Ibid.: “In corporibus vero animatis quae habent nobiliores formas, diversis operationibus 
deputantur diversae partes; sicut in plantis alia est operatio radicis, alia rami et stipitis. Et quanto 
corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri 
maiorem diversitatem in partibus.” 
47 DA, q. 10 co: “Cum enim corpus hominis, aut cuiuslibet alterius animalis, sit quoddam totum 
naturale, dicetur unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua perficitur non solum secundum 
aggregationem aut compositionem, ut accidit in domo, et in aliis huiusmodi.” 
48 STh I.76.3: “Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, 
ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una.” 
49 De spirit. creat. a. 3: “Unumquodque enim secundum hoc est unum, secundum quod est ens. 
Est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam, sive secundum esse substantiale, sive secundum 
esse accidentale: unde omnis forma est actus; et per consequens est ratio unitatis, qua aliquid est 
unum.”  
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single act of existing unifies its parts by giving these parts the same act of existing. Being and 
oneness are convertible.  
Finally, substantial form is the metaphysical principle of finality that explains the 
directedness, the teleology, of things. As St. Thomas explains in his commentary on Aristotle's De 
Anima, the soul is the final cause of the body: “In the same way that the intellect acts on account 
of an end, nature does as well, as was shown in the second book of the Physics. But the intellect in 
those things that are done by art, orders and disposes matter on account of a form. So also does 
nature. Therefore, if the soul is the form of the living body, it follows that it too must be its 
end.”50 Or again, “a soul is not only the form and mover of the body, but also its end.”51 In other 
words, by making a thing a particular kind of thing of a natural kind, a substantial form makes it 
a particular kind of thing that is perfected in a particular way. Therefore, it is the soul of the 
eagle, making it an eagle, which gives the eagle its species-specific powers that allow it to fly, to 
see keenly, and to eat meat, so that it may survive and thrive. 
 Three significant metaphysical claims follow from the Thomistic proposition that the 
substantial form is the principle of actuality, nature, operation, unity and directedness of a thing 
of a natural kind. The first deals with the question of whether a thing of a natural kind has one or 
many substantial forms, the second answers queries regarding the location of a substantial form 
within a thing of a natural kind that has multiple parts, while the third gives primacy to 
substantial form over prime matter in the context of the composite. A contemporary re-
articulation of St. Thomas’s hylomorphic theory like the systems hylomorphic account that will 
                                                
50 In DA, II Lect 7, no. 13: “Sicut enim intellectus operatur propter finem, ita et natura, ut 
probatur in secundo physicorum. Sed intellectus in his quae fiunt per artem, materiam ordinat et 
disponit propter formam: ergo et natura. Cum igitur anima sit forma viventis corporis, sequitur 
quod sit finis eius.” 
51 DA, q. 8 co: “Anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis.” 
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be described in Chapter Six, would have to explain and to take these into account if it is to be 
faithful to the Thomistic tradition. 
 First, according to St. Thomas, a thing of a natural kind has a single substantial form. In 
contrast to many of his Aristotelian contemporaries, who had argued for a plurality of substantial 
forms in a substance to account for the different levels of perfection present in complex beings 
like human beings52, the Angelic Doctor countered by noting that by definition, a single thing of a 
natural kind can only have a single substantial form. Any other form, again by definition, would 
have to be an accidental form: 
That it is impossible for there to be several souls in one body is proved as 
follows…[I]f several substantial forms belong to one and the same thing, either 
the first of them causes it to be this particular thing or it does not. If it does not, 
the form is not substantial; if it does, then all the subsequent forms accumulate to 
what is already this particular thing. Therefore none of the subsequent forms will 
be a substantial but only an accidental form.53 
Moreover, according to St. Thomas, a plurality of substantial forms would undermine the 
fundamental integrity of a thing of a natural kind, because two substantial forms cannot combine 
with one another to constitute a being that is integrally one: 
                                                
52 For a historical discussion of the debate over the numerical nature of substantial form in a 
substance, see Daniel A. Callus, O.P., “The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,” The 
Thomist 24 (1961): 257–85; Emily Michael, “Averroes and the Plurality of Forms,” Franciscan 
Studies 52 (1992): 155–83; and Sander W. De Boer, The Science of the Soul: The Commentary 
Tradition on Aristotle’s De Anima, c. 1260-c.1360 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013), pp. 
36-43. 
53 CT, no. 90: “Quod autem impossibile sit esse plures animas in uno corpore, sic probatur…Si 
igitur plures formae substantiales sint unius et eiusdem rei, aut prima earum facit hoc aliquid, aut 
non. Si non facit hoc aliquid, non est forma substantialis. Si autem facit hoc aliquid, ergo omnes 
formae consequentes adveniunt ei quod iam est hoc aliquid. Nulla igitur consequentium erit 
forma substantialis, sed accidentalis.” Cf. DA, no. 9. 
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In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were 
several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing 
has existence because a thing has existence and unity from the same source. 
Therefore things which are distinguished by various forms are not absolutely one; 
as, for instance, “a white man.” If, therefore, a human being alive by one form, 
namely the vegetative soul, and animal-like by another form, namely the sensitive 
soul, and human by another form, namely the intellectual soul, it would follow 
that a human being would not be absolutely one.54 
Importantly, however, St. Thomas also taught that higher forms, precisely because they are 
higher, and therefore more perfect, are able to contain the perfections found in lower forms:  
There is no other substantial form in the human being other than the intellectual 
soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so 
does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the 
imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in 
brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more 
perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.55 
                                                
54 STh I.76.3: “Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae 
plures. Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab 
eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis 
formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod 
sit vivum, scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, scilicet ab anima sensibili; 
et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum 
simpliciter.” 
55 STh I.76.4: “Nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod 
ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores 
formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum 
de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis 
perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum.” 
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In other words, for the Angelic Doctor, the lower forms are present only virtually, i.e., by virtue 
of their power, and not actually, in the higher form.56 Thus, the original powers or qualities of the 
lower forms come to exist in some way in the higher form so that, for example, the single 
intellectual soul that is the substantial form of a human being, also has the powers found in the 
animal, vegetative, and elemental forms that it perfects. 
 Second, according to St. Thomas, a substantial form is fully and actually present not only 
in the whole but also in every part of the whole. This follows from his definition of the substantial 
form as the principle of existence that gives actuality to a thing of a natural kind and perfects it: 
Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but also each part. For since 
a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to 
each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such 
as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial 
form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also 
of each part.57 
Moreover, in St. Thomas’s view, the substantial form is fully present in every part of the 
substance. This is because the substantial form, or in the case of a living thing, the soul, qua form, 
does not have quantity: “Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, 
nor accidentally, as we have said, it suffices to say that the whole soul is in each part of the 
                                                
56  For discussion of St. Thomas’s doctrine of virtual presence, see Christopher Decaen, 
“Elemental Virtual Presence in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 271-300. 
57 STh I.76.8: “Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. 
Cum enim totum consistat ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, 
est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus, et talis forma est accidentalis. Anima 
vero est forma substantialis, unde oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet 
partis.” 
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body.”58 The Angelic Doctor, however, makes a further distinction that a substantial form is 
present fully in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and essence, but not of power: “[I]t 
is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of 
essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of 
its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so 
forth.”59 In other words, the soul is fully present in every part of the body precisely because it is 
the principle of actuality that makes that part of the body, a part of the body, but the soul’s 
specific powers can only manifest in and through those parts that are ordered towards the 
manifestation of those powers. 
 Finally, in the context of the composite, substantial form has primacy over prime matter 
in the order of perfection. As I explained above, for St. Thomas, substantial form is the principle 
that gives actuality to prime matter thus constituting the substance as a particular thing of a 
natural kind. This is only possible because prime matter exists for the form, and not vice versa: 
“The union of soul and body is for the sake of the soul and not for the body, for the form is not 
for the matter, but the other way around.”60 Or again: “Since the form is not for the matter, but 
rather the matter for the form, it must be that matter is what it is from the form and not the other 
way around.”61 Because of this, according to St. Thomas, all substantial forms, other than the 
                                                
58 STh I.76.8: “Sed quia anima totalitatem quantitativam non habet, nec per se nec per accidens, 
ut dictum est; sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis.” 
59 Ibid: “Sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem 
perfectionis et essentiae; non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis. Quia non secundum 
quamlibet suam potentiam est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, 
secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis.” 
60 STh I.70.3: “Unio animae et corporis non est propter corpus, sed propter animam, non enim 
forma est propter materiam, sed e converso.” 
61 STh I.76.5: “Cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia propter formam; ex 
forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis, et non e converso.” 
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rational soul, which can exist in itself,62 pre-exist in prime matter in potentiality. They are there 
in potentiality because matter is ordered towards them. However, properly speaking, substantial 
forms are not created per se, but come to be when the composite substance is created and comes 
to be:  
The form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. 
Therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly only to a subsisting 
thing alone, as shown above, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be 
created, but to be concreated.63 
Significantly, however, all composites of matter and form, other than the incorruptible heavenly 
bodies, retain their potentiality to other forms: “For in things that are corruptible, the form does 
not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter because the potentiality of the matter 
extends to more things than are contained under this or that form.”64 A substantial change occurs 
when the potentiality of the prime matter constituting a particular composite is altered by an 
agent cause in such a way that its potentiality towards a novel form is greater than its potentiality 
to its current one. At this point the novel form to which prime matter is now more predisposed is 
educed from it so that a new composite, a new substance, comes into being. It is a process that 
involves both generation and corruption. As an example, St. Thomas notes that the intellectual 
soul has to be united to a body that is predisposed to it and the manifestation of its powers, in 
this case, its sensitive powers. In fact, according to the Angelic Doctor, the difference in 
                                                
62 STh I.90.2 ad 2. 
63 STh I.45.8: “Forma naturalis corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est, et ideo, cum fieri 
et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri 
neque creari, sed concreata esse.” 
64 STh I.55.1: “Et inde est quod in rebus corruptibilibus forma non perfecte complet potentiam 
materiae, quia potentia materiae ad plura se extendit quam sit continentia formae huius vel 
illius.” 
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intellectual ability among different individuals can be attributed to the predisposition of matter 
to form where more intelligent individuals are intelligent because their matter is better disposed 
to an intellectual soul:  
For it is clear that the better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted 
to it, which clearly appears in things of different species. The reason is that act and 
form are received into matter according to the matter’s capacity. Thus because 
some men have bodies of better disposition, their allotted souls have a greater 
power of understanding.65 
Thus, the intellectual soul cannot be united to a more imperfect body or a body that is not fitting 
for its end: 
An intellectual soul does not need a body by reason of its intellectual operation 
considered as such but on account of its sensitive power, which requires an organ 
of unflappable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to 
such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body in which fire was in 
excess. Otherwise there could not be an unflappability of temperament.66 
This mechanism of predisposition and subsequent eduction of form explains all substantial 
change except for the substantial change involving the subsistent rational soul: 
                                                
65 STh I.85.7: “Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem 
sortitur animam, quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt secundum speciem diversa. Cuius ratio 
est, quia actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitatem. Unde cum etiam in 
hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris virtutis in 
intelligendo.” 
66 STh I.76.5 ad 2: “Animae intellectivae non debetur corpus propter ipsam intellectualem 
operationem secundum se; sed propter sensitivam virtutem, quae requirit organum aequaliter 
complexionatum. Et ideo oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, et non simplici 
elemento, vel corpori mixto in quo excederet ignis secundum quantitatem, quia non posset esse 
aequalitas complexionis.” 
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The production of act from the potency of matter is nothing else but something 
becoming actually that previously was in potency. But since the rational soul does 
not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the 
capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen, it is not educed from the potency of 
matter.67 
In the end, the possibility of substantial change can be explained by prime matter’s inherent 
openness to a potentially infinite number of substantial forms.  
 To conclude, it is important to emphasize that for St. Thomas, substantial form, like 
prime matter, is not perceivable by the senses. One can only see the accidental qualities that 
inhere to a particular substantial form. As such, one cannot actual directly observe a substantial 
change. Rather, one can only see the accidental changes that gradually alter the predisposition of 
prime matter so that it is now predisposed to a novel substantial form. Thus, it is not surprising 
that according to the Angelic Doctor, accidental differences are commonly used to indicate 
substantial differences: “Since substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are 
known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidental for 
substantial differences.”68 Substantial forms forever remain hidden from sight veiled by the 
reality of accidental forms. 
 
                                                
67 STh I.90.2 ad 2: “Actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, 
quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia 
corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum 
est; propterea non educitur de potentia materiae.” 
 
68 STh I.77.1 ad 7: “Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, 
innotescunt per accidentia; nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum 
substantialium poni.” 
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A Classical Hylomorphic Account of the Human Agent 
 To see how St. Thomas most famously used matter and form language in his theological 
synthesis, I now move to his description of the human agent.69 Significantly, this anthropological 
account is presupposed by the moral analysis later in this thesis, and we will return to it 
repeatedly in the course of this dissertation.  
As an Aristotelian, St. Thomas thought that the human agent is best described as a living 
substance of prime matter and of substantial form, a body-soul composite. However, as he 
himself emphasized, “the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul and not 
in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has a relationship to the soul.”70 In sacra 
doctrina, the soul has priority over the body.  
As a substantial form, the human soul is the first act of the body making that body exist as 
a living body.71 It is also the body’s principle of motion.72 In contrast to the other souls found in 
creation, the human soul is immaterial and subsistent, because it has per se operations of 
rationality that cannot be attributed to the body.73 Essentially, it is the principle and cause of 
human nature. Since inclination follows from every form, the human soul is the basis for the 
                                                
69 For a contemporary commentary on St. Thomas’s philosophical anthropology, see Robert 
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
However, I do not think that Pasnau correctly understands St. Thomas’s doctrine at the 
beginning of life. For a correction, see John Haldane and Patrick Lee, “Rational Souls and the 
Beginning of Life (A Reply to Robert Pasnau),” Philosophy 4 (2003): 532-540; and Pasnau’s reply: 
“Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to Haldane and Lee),” Philosophy 78 (2003): 521-531. 
70 STh I.75 (Prologue): “Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte 
animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad 
animam.” 
71 STh I.75.1. 
72 STh I.75.1 ad 1. 
73 STh I.75.2. 
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natural inclinations in the human organism, which St. Thomas had begun to identify.74 These 
inclinations are constitutive of human nature. We will discuss these inclinations in greater detail 
in the next chapter. 
The human soul has five basic powers, where each power is a potency in the soul to some 
perfection of the form. Each power is defined either by an object, which is that reality that 
reduces the power from potency to act in the same way that color moves the power of sight to its 
act, or by a term or an end, which is the reality to which the power moves, depending upon 
whether it is a passive or an active power, respectively.75 Or to put it another way, a soul’s powers 
have a connatural teleological ordering towards either their objects or their ends.76 
Most fundamentally, the rational soul has vegetative powers ordered towards its 
secondary matter, which is the human body itself. These are the powers responsible for the 
organism’s biological capacities to nourish itself, to grow, and to reproduce.77 These are powers 
the rational soul has in common with the souls of all living things.  
Next, the rational soul has a sense powers ordered toward the sensibles, five exterior 
senses actualized by those sensibles like color, sound, odor, flavor, and tangibility that allow the 
human organism to perceive his surroundings78, and five interior senses actualized by integrated 
sense data, by particular forms, by memories, by phantasms, and by non-sensible intentions that 
indicate if the sensible object is good or evil for the person. Of particular importance for this 
dissertation is the cogitative sense in human beings whereby the human agent is able to perceive 
                                                
74 STh I-II.94.2. 
75 STh I.78.1. 
76 STh I.77.3. 
77 STh I.78.2. 
78 STh I.78.3. 
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individual things precisely as individual particulars at the level of sense cognition. We will return 
to the cogitative sense in greater detail in Chapter Three.  
Third, the rational soul has a locomotive power ordered to the term of the body’s 
operation and movement. This is the power that allows a man to move his body not only in place 
but also from one place to another. These sense and locomotive powers are shared with the souls 
of the other animals.  
Fourth, the rational soul has appetitive powers that move the organism towards realities 
that it apprehends as desirable.79 These are natural inclinations that follow from knowledge, and 
as such, they are superior to the natural inclinations that follow from all natural forms.80 For St. 
Thomas, there are three distinct appetites in the rational creature.81 First, there is the intellective 
appetite, also called the will (voluntas), that moves the human organism towards intelligible 
goods and away from intelligible evils.82 We will consider this power in greater detail in Chapter 
Two when we will describe the two acts of the will that constitute and specify the human act. 
Next, the concupiscible appetite moves him towards the beneficial and away from the harmful 
simply, while the irascible appetite moves him towards the beneficial that is hard to attain and 
away from the harmful that is hard to avoid.83 Importantly, these latter two powers are appetites 
associated with sensible goods, i.e., particular things perceived as concrete instances of goodness, 
and as such are shared with the brute animals who are instinctively attracted to and repelled by 
different things. They will figure prominently in our discussion of the passions in Chapter Three.  
                                                
79 STh I.80.1. 
80 STh I.80.1. 
81 STh I.80.2. 
82 STh I.82.1-2. 
83 STh I.81.2. 
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Lastly, the rational soul has powers of intellectual cognition, composed of the active and 
the passive intellects, that are ordered towards universal and conceptual knowledge.84 The active 
intellect abstracts intelligible species from the phantasm derived from sense knowledge. This 
intelligible species is then imposed on the passive intellect to form a concept that is the formal 
sign of the nature grasped by the intellect.  
In sum, these five categories of powers together as a whole distinguish the rational soul 
from all the other kinds of souls in creation. This is especially true because the rationality of the 
human agent pervades all of his other lower powers, ordering them to his proper end.85 However, 
as St. Thomas explains, the intellective and the appetitive powers are of particular interest to the 
moral theologian because of their link to the virtues: “Next we consider the powers of the soul 
specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual 
and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside.”86 In contrast, the nutritive, locomotive, and 
sense powers cannot be the subject of virtue.87 Therefore, they will only play an ancillary role in 
this dissertation on moral theology. 
 
The Analogous Use of Hylomorphic Theory in Thomistic Moral Theology 
 Finally, we now turn to St. Thomas’s analogical use of matter-form terminology in his 
moral theology, in greater detail. To illustrate what I see as the fundamental hylomorphic 
                                                
84 STh I.79.1. 
85 STh I-II.24.1 ad 2. As we will discuss in greater detail in Chapter Three, where the brute animal 
has an estimative sense that apprehends the beneficial and harmful character of things they 
perceive, by instinct, the rational animal has a cogitative sense that apprehends particular 
intentions, by instinctual reason. Cf. STh I-II.78.4. 
86  STh I.78 (Prologue): “Deinde considerandum est de potentiis animae in speciali. Ad 
considerationem autem theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et 
appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur.” 
87 Cf. STh I-II.56.5. 
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architecture of Thomistic moral theology, I describe five instances of this leitmotif taken from the 
major treatises that comprise the Prima secundae, with specific examples taken from the Secunda 
secundae, when they are available. Four of these will be discussed in greater detail later in four 
individual chapters of this thesis.  
 Before we begin this analysis, however, we need to deal with two preliminary topics. First, 
it is important to sketch St. Thomas’s rich doctrine of analogy and analogical predication to set 
the backdrop for the narrative that follows.88 For the Angelic Doctor, analogical predication, 
where two different but related meanings are predicated of two subjects, sits midway between 
equivocal predication, where different and unrelated meanings of a term are predicated of two 
things, and univocal predication, where one distinct meaning of a term is predicated of two 
realities: 
[Analogical predication] is a mean between pure equivocation and simple 
univocation. For in analogies the idea is not one and the same as it is in univocals, 
nor is not totally diverse as in equivocals. Rather the name that is thus used in a 
multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing. Thus “healthy” 
applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health but applied to medicine 
signifies the cause of the same health.89 
                                                
88 The scholarly literature investigating St. Thomas’s use of analogy and analogical predication is 
large. The most important contributions from recent years include the following: David Burrell, 
C.S.C, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Have: Yale University Press, 1973); Ralph 
McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1998); Gregory P. Rocca, O.P., Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2004); and Steven A. Long, Analogia Entis: On the Analogy 
of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2011). My 
discussion of analogical predication that follows is heavily indebted to these monographs. 
89 STh I.13.5: “Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem 
univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; 
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Note that in this view, all analogical predication occurs according to and because of a relation 
that refers back to a single reality. For example, citing the health example used above, St. Thomas 
says that one can speak of the “health” either of medicine or of urine only because of the relation 
of medicine and urine to the health of the patient:  
But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or 
proportion, then it is one in both as the health that is in medicine or urine is 
derived from the health of the animal’s body, for health as it is applied to medicine 
and to urine is not distinct from health as it is applied to the health of an animal, 
which medicine causes and urine indicates.90 
As Gregory Rocca, explains, “the various meanings of an analogical term are one insofar as the 
different relations signified are referred ‘to something one and the same’.”91 The primary reality 
or prime analogate, the “one and the same” to which the analogical predication refers back to – 
which in the case cited above is the health of the animal – receives the primary signification of 
the analogical term. The secondary realities receive their significations because of some 
relationship they have to the prime analogate.  
 Next, before moving to St. Thomas’s theology in the Secunda pars proper, I also think 
that it is crucial that we examine the use of hylomorphic language in his discussion of good and 
evil in the Prima pars, as this is presupposed in the moral analysis that comes later in the Summa. 
                                                                                                                                                       
nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat 
diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis 
animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.” Also, STh I.13.10. 
90 STh I-II.20.3 ad 3: “Sed quando aliquid derivatur ab uno in alterum secundum analogiam vel 
proportionem, tunc est tantum unum numero, sicut a sano quod est in corpore animalis, 
derivatur sanum ad medicinam et urinam; nec alia sanitas est medicinae et urinae, quam sanitas 
animalis, quam medicina facit, et urina significat.” 
91 Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, p. 140.   
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Like Aristotle and many of the other ancients, the Angelic Doctor begins his discussion of the 
distinction between good and evil by defining good as that which is appetible, i.e., that which is 
desirable.92 Thus, he will conclude that the perfection of any nature is good, “since every nature 
desires its own being and its own perfection.”93 Since good and evil are opposed, it follows then 
that, for St. Thomas, “by the name of evil is signified the absence of good.”94 Later, he makes the 
further distinction that not every absence of good is evil but only those in a privative and not in a 
negative sense.95 Thus, the Angelic Doctor explains that a man would not experience evil if he is 
not as strong as a lion – which is the absence of something he would not have had by nature – 
but he would if he is blind – which is the absence of something that he should have had by 
nature.96  
When he applies this ontological account of goodness and evil to the moral world, i.e., the 
realm of good and evil acts that are intentionally willed and performed by the agent cause, St. 
Thomas will teach the following: 
Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive 
their species from the end, which is the object of the will, upon which morality 
depends. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are 
specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of a 
fitting end.97 
                                                
92 STh I.48.1. 
93 Ibid.: “Omnis natura appetat suum esse et suam perfectionem.” 
94 Ibid.: “Quod nomine mali significetur quaedam absentia boni.” 
95 STh I.48.3 
96 Ibid. 
97 STh I.48.1 ad 2: “Bonum et malum non sunt differentiae constitutivae nisi in moralibus, quae 
recipiunt speciem ex fine, qui est obiectum voluntatis, a qua moralia dependent. Et quia bonum 
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For the Angelic Doctor, the morality of an act is determined by the object of the will, where a 
good will is rightly ordered towards a due end in accord with reason, and an evil will is wrongly 
ordered towards an undue end that by definition falls short of that which is truly perfective of the 
will: “But in voluntary things, the defect of the act proceeds from an actually deficient will, 
inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. However, this defect is not a fault, 
but fault follows when the will acts with this defect.”98 In more metaphysical terms, St. Thomas 
will explain that an agent commits an evil act when he chooses one form that necessarily leads to 
the privation of a proper and due form: 
Evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by 
the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect either in the agent or in 
the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when 
there follows on the form intended by the agent, the necessary privation of 
another form.99 
In summary, good acts are those acts willingly intended by the agent to cause a proper form to 
come to be, while evil acts are those acts willingly intended by the agent to cause a form to come 
to be that leads to the privation of a proper form in a thing, where a proper form is that form that 
perfects that thing’s nature.  
                                                                                                                                                       
habet rationem finis, ideo bonum et malum sunt differentiae specificae in moralibus; bonum per 
se, sed malum inquantum est remotio debiti finis.”  
98 STh I.49.1 ad 3: “Sed in rebus voluntariis, defectus actionis a voluntate actu deficiente procedit, 
inquantum non subiicit se actu suae regulae. Qui tamen defectus non est culpa, sed sequitur 
culpa ex hoc quod cum tali defectu operatur.” 
99 STh I.49.1: “Malum autem in re aliqua, non tamen in proprio effectu agentis, causatur 
quandoque ex virtute agentis; quandoque autem ex defectu ipsius, vel materiae. Ex virtute 
quidem vel perfectione agentis, quando ad formam intentam ab agente sequitur ex necessitate 
alterius formae privatio.” 
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Returning to the hylomorphism of St. Thomas’s theological framework in the Prima 
secundae of his Summa theologiae, he makes analogical use of matter-form terminology to 
describe the structure of at least five realities in his fundamental moral theology, the human act, 
human passion, human virtue, human sin, and grace. As we have seen, St. Thomas describes 
these realities by drawing upon his analysis of prime matter and substantial form, which as we 
saw above, come together to form a composite substance. In my view, the guiding principle for 
the Angelic Doctor’s analogical use of hylomorphic terminology is succinctly summarized in his 
observation that “whenever two things concur to constitute one thing, one of them is formal in 
regard to the other.”100 Therefore, as we will see shortly, it is not surprising that the five realities 
in fundamental moral theology described with analogical reference to prime matter and 
substantial are realities composed of two more fundamental realities that can come together to 
make up a whole.  
 First, St. Thomas uses hylomorphic language to describe the structure of the human act. 
He deploys matter-form terminology here in several ways. For instance, he describes the 
relationship between acts of will and acts of intellect in the context of a human action, in 
hylomorphic terms: “That act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, 
through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an 
act of the reason.”101 Elsewhere, St. Thomas describes the relationship between the end, which is 
the object of the interior act of the will, and the object, which is the object of the exterior act 
commanded by the will, as one analogous to form and matter:  
                                                
100 STh I-II.13.1: “Quandocumque autem duo concurrunt ad aliquid unum constituendum, unum 
eorum est ut formale respectu alterius.” 
101 Ibid.: “Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo 
quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem 
rationis.” 
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Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the 
part of the external action because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments. 
External actions do not have any measure of morality except in so far as they are 
voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with 
regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action.102 
As we will see in greater detail in Chapter Two, recognizing the hylomorphic structure of the 
human act can illuminate and advance the current debate over the proper specification of a 
human act. 
 Next, the Angelic Doctor compares the structure of human passions to matter-form 
composites. For St. Thomas, a passion is “a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily 
organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation.”103 He will then describe 
the relationship between the movement of the appetite and the change in the body, in this case 
with reference to the effects of the passion of love, as one analogous to form and matter:  
And this is said of love in respect of its formal element, which is on the part of the 
appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, which is a 
                                                
102 STh I-II.18.6.: “Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex 
parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis; neque actus 
exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii. Et ideo actus humani 
species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum 
exterioris actus.” 
103 STh I-II.41.1: “magis proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui fit 
cum aliqua transmutatione corporali.” For recent discussions on the passions/emotions in St. 
Thomas Aquinas, see Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); and Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., The 
Logic of Desire: Aquinas on the Passions (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2011). 
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certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful because this change being 
excessive.104 
He uses the same analogy in his characterization of the effect of the passion of anger on the 
acting subject: 
The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, 
which is the formal element of anger. But the passion of anger distracts from the 
perfect judgment of reason as though it listened imperfectly to reason, on account 
of the commotion of the heat impelling it to instant action, which is the material 
element of anger.105 
St. Thomas also explicitly uses hylomorphic terminology to describe the proper relationship 
between the bodily change and the appetitive movement, which together constitute a passion: 
In all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material 
element is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, 
which is the formal element, just as in all things matter is proportionate to form.106 
 For the Angelic Doctor, analogously speaking, a human passion is a reality composed of formal 
and material components. As we will see in Chapter Three, St. Thomas’s hylomorphic theory of 
                                                
104 STh I-II.28.5: “Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, 
quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, 
quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum 
immutationis.” 
105 STh I-II.48.3 ad 1: “A ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est 
formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte 
rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae est materialis in ira.” 
106 STh I-II.37.4: “In omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis 
materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in omnibus 
materia proportionatur formae.” 
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the passions still has much to contribute to contemporary debates on the nature of the emotions 
in ordinary life and in neuroscience. 
 Third, St. Thomas uses matter-form language to describe the architecture of human 
virtues and vices. For the Angelic Doctor, a virtue is an ordered disposition of the soul, an 
operative habitus, which disposes the agent to the production of good acts.107 In numerous places, 
St. Thomas compares a habitus to a form.108 More specifically, he compares a habitus to a quality 
or a form that adheres to a power inclining it to acts of a determinate species.109 Thus, it should 
not be surprising that St. Thomas also posits the existence of a material principle in virtue:  
Now virtue has no matter “out of which,” as neither has any other accident; but it 
has matter “about which,” and matter “in which,” namely, the subject. The matter 
“about which” is the object of virtue, though this could not be included in the 
above definition because the object assigns the virtue to a certain species, and here 
we are giving the definition of virtue in general. Therefore for material cause we 
have the subject, when it is said that a virtue is a good quality of the mind.110 
As we will see in greater detail in Chapter Four, acknowledging the hylomorphic architecture of 
St. Thomas’s account of virtue can ground a novel proposal for the ontological relationship 
between the infused intellectual virtue of faith and the acquired intellectual virtues of 
understanding, of sure knowledge, and of wisdom in the Christian living in the state of grace. 
                                                
107 STh I-II.55.3.  
108 STh I-II.53.2; STh I-II.54.1; STh I-II.54.2; STh I-II.55.4. 
109 STh I-II.54.1. 
110 STh I-II.55.4: “Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet 
materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est 
obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum 
determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde 
ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.” 
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 Fourth, St. Thomas will use hylomorphic theory to explicate his understanding of sin. 
Following St. Augustine, for example, he includes two things in his definition of sin, first, the 
sinful deed, and second, the disordered will behind that sinful deed.111 Significantly, however, the 
Angelic Doctor relates them to each other as matter and form, in a way that Augustine never did: 
Accordingly Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin; one, 
pertaining to the substance of a human act, which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, 
when he says “word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the nature of 
evil, which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, “contrary to the eternal 
law.”112 
This novel development will allow St. Thomas to “correct” and “improve upon” Augustine who 
sometimes defined sin in reference to the will alone, without any reference to the precise act of 
the sinner:  
The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which 
alone is sin to be found. Hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in 
reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of 
sin through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to 
include something referring to external action.113 
                                                
111 STh I-II.71.6.  
112  Ibid.: “Et ideo Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo, unum quod pertinet ad 
substantiam actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, dictum vel factum vel 
concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, 
cum dixit, contra legem aeternam.” 
113  STh I-II.71.6 ad 2: “Prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quae imperat omnes actus 
voluntarios, in quibus solum invenitur peccatum, et ideo Augustinus quandoque per solam 
voluntatem definit peccatum. Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam 
peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit quod in definitione peccati 
poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad exteriores actus.” 
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Later in the Secunda secundae, this distinction between the formal and material components of 
sin will allow St. Thomas to analyze those sinful acts that are not fully willed by the sinner who 
performs them. For instance, the Angelic Doctor will distinguish two different false statements 
that can be involved in perjury: 
If the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as 
related to the will. If something false be accepted as false, it will be false both 
materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be 
materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions 
required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of 
falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in each thing is of greater 
importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it is 
true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it is 
false.114 
As we will see in greater detail in Chapter Five, acknowledging the hylomorphic architecture of 
St. Thomas’s description of lies, which he defines as disordered, and as such, sinful, speech acts, 
in light of contemporary discoveries on the nature of primate vocalizations and of speech acts 
can explain and justify the common intuition that not all intentionally false speech acts constitute 
lies, properly so called. 
                                                
114 STh II-II.98.1 ad 3: “Et ideo si falsum apprehendatur ut verum, erit quidem, relatum ad 
voluntatem, materialiter falsum, formaliter autem verum. Si autem id quod est falsum accipiatur 
ut falsum, erit falsum et materialiter et formaliter. Si autem id quod est verum apprehendatur ut 
falsum, erit verum materialiter, falsum formaliter. Et ideo in quolibet istorum casuum salvatur 
aliquo modo ratio periurii, propter aliquem falsitatis modum. Sed quia in unoquoque potius est 
id quod est formale quam id quod est materiale, non ita est periurus ille qui falsum iurat quod 
putat esse verum, sicut ille qui verum iurat quod putat esse falsum.”  
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The analogous use of hylomorphic terminology will also allow St. Thomas to discuss the 
ontological and causal relationship between venial and mortal sins:  
Venial and mortal sin are divided in opposition to each other, as though they were 
species of one genus…but as an accident is distinguished from a substance. 
Therefore, where an accident dispose to a substantial form, so can a venial sin 
dispose to mortal.115 
Later in the Summa, St. Thomas will use hylomorphic terminology to precisely describe original 
sin as “concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.”116 Again, as I noted 
in the outset, the principle that governs the use of the terminology here is that whenever two 
things concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to the other. Thus, properly speaking, 
with this definition, the Angelic Doctor teaches that original sin is neither concupiscence nor the 
privation of original justice. Analogously speaking, these realities are principles of original sin 
where the privation of original justice explains the concupiscence, as form specifies the matter 
within a composite. 
Finally, St. Thomas uses matter-form terminology to describe the nature of grace. 
Notably, he defines grace as an accidental form that inheres to the soul: “Grace, as a quality, is 
said to act upon the soul, not in the mode of an efficient cause, but in the mode of a formal cause, 
as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.”117 Or again, “Inasmuch as grace is a certain 
accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness is said to 
                                                
115 STh I-II.88.3 ad 1: “Peccatum veniale et mortale non dividuntur ex opposito, sicut duae species 
unius generis…sed sicut accidens contra substantiam dividitur. Unde sicut accidens potest esse 
dispositio ad formam substantialem, ita et veniale peccatum ad mortale.” 
116 STh I-II.82.3. 
117 STh I-II.110.2 ad 1: “Gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam non per 
modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et iustitia 
iustum.” 
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make a surface white.”118 With this definition in place, the Angelic Doctor can talk about the 
disposition of a person to grace as the disposition of matter to form: “Now taking grace in the 
first sense [as a habitual gift of God], a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form 
cannot come to be except in disposed matter.”119 Once again, the analogical use of hylomorphic 
language allows the Angelic Doctor to do sacra doctrina, where “all things [– including in this 
case the nature of grace –] are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God 
Himself or because they are ordered to God as their beginning and end.”120 
 
Conclusion 
This summary of hylomorphic theory and the overview of its analogous use in the moral 
theology of the Summa theologiae should make it clear that the notions of matter and form are 
foundational aspects of the thought of St. Thomas. In the next chapter, we continue our 
investigation in more detail by seeing how matter and form are used analogously in the analysis 
of human acts. It will illustrate how an understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous 
use in St. Thomas’s theory of human acts can allow us to clarify and to resolve disputed moral 
questions in contemporary moral philosophy.  
                                                
118 STh I-II.111.2 ad 1: “Secundum quod gratia est quaedam qualitas accidentalis, non agit in 
animam effective; sed formaliter, sicut albedo dicitur facere albam superficiem.” 
119 STh I-II.112.2: “Primo igitur modo accipiendo gratiam, praeexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae 
praeparatio, quia nulla forma potest esse nisi in materia disposita.” 
120 STh I.1.7: “Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse 
Deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem.” 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Is a Placentectomy to Resolve a Crisis Pregnancy a Virtuous Act? 
A Hylomorphic Investigation of Human Acts 
 
Introduction 
There has been much debate among Catholic bioethicists surrounding a much-
publicized abortion case involving a placentectomy – a medical intervention to extract the 
placenta, the fetal/maternal organ that connects the developing fetal child to the uterine 
wall – to end the pregnancy of a woman with pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH), 
performed at a formerly Catholic hospital in Phoenix, AZ. Catholic moral theologian, M. 
Therese Lysaught has argued that the controversial intervention was morally licit because 
it constitutes an indirect abortion where the death of the unborn child was only an 
unintended consequence of a procedure meant to save the life of the mother who was 
dying from her PAH. She has concluded that the former Catholic hospital “acted in 
accord with the Ethical and Religious Directives, Catholic moral tradition, and universally 
valid moral precepts.”1 This claim and the argument that gave rise to it have not only 
been affirmed but have also been rejected by Lysaught’s peers.2 
                                                
1 M. Therese Lysaught, “Moral Analysis of a Procedure at Phoenix Hospital,” Origins: 
CNS Documentary Service 40 (2011): 537-549; p. 548. 
2 For a sampling of the published scholarly work in favor of Lysaught’s conclusion, see 
Patrick McCruden, “The Moral Object in the ‘Phoenix Case’: A Defense of Sister 
McBride’s Decision,” Christian Bioethics 18 (2012): 301-311. For opposing views, see the 
following: Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B., “Vital Conflicts and Virtue Ethics,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10 (2010): 471-480; Thomas A. Cavanaugh, “Double-Effect 
Reasoning, Craniotomy, and Vital Conflicts: A Case of Contemporary Catholic 
Casuistry,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (2011): 453-464; Martin 
Rhonheimer, “Vital Conflicts, Direct Killing, and Justice: A Response to Rev. Benedict 
Guevin and Other Critics,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (2011): 519-540; 
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As even a cursory read of the scholarly literature will show, the controversy 
surrounding the Phoenix case is a dispute about how we are to describe and to morally 
specify a human act: Is a placentectomy to resolve a crisis pregnancy, a good or an evil 
act?3 In this chapter, I investigate the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas to 
ground his theory of action. I begin with his description of a human act from two 
complementary perspectives. I then move to a discussion of the moral specification of an 
act as being either good or evil, a procedure that involves two closely linked steps. First, 
one has to specify a human act, i.e., one has to describe the act in a way that distinguishes 
it from other acts. Next, one has to determine the moral character of that specified act. 
Moral specification is undertaken by the agent himself when he deliberates the most 
prudent means towards attaining his end. To illustrate this theory of moral specification, 
we will then apply it to the act of self-defense. 
To deepen our analysis, we then turn to objections to the Thomistic theory of 
action outlined in this chapter. I focus on the criticisms proffered by two contemporary 
Thomists, Fr. Martin Rhonheimer and Steven Long. Rhonheimer is representative of 
those moralists today who emphasize the primacy of the end in the moral specification of 
a human act, while Long is representative of one of two groups of moral theologians 
                                                                                                                                            
Kevin L. Flannery, “Vital Conflicts and the Catholic Magisterial Tradition,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (2011): 691-704; Gerald D. Coleman, “Direct and Indirect 
Abortion in the Roman Catholic Tradition: A Review of the Phoenix Case,” HEC Forum 
25 (2013): 127-143; and my essay, “Abortion in a Case of Pulmonary Arterial 
Hypertension: A Test Case for Two Rival Theories of Human Action,” National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly 11 (2011): 503-518. This chapter develops my initial arguments in this 
earlier essay.  
3 In my view, from their essays listed in the previous footnotes, Fr. Martin Rhonheimer, 
Steven A. Long, and Fr. Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., among others, would agree with me that 
the central point of dispute in the Phoenix case involves the proper moral specification of 
a placentectomy to resolve a crisis pregnancy. 
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opposed to this view. Finally, I close with an examination of Lysaught’s theory of action. I 
conclude that her analysis is flawed because it fails to acknowledge the proper role of the 
exterior act in the moral specification of the human act. A placentectomy when the fetal 
child is pre-viable is repugnant to right reason and therefore to the natural and to the 
eternal law because it involves an unjust attack on innocent life. It cannot be undertaken 
even to save the life of a sick and dying mother. This chapter will illustrate how an 
understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s theory of 
human acts can allow us to clarify and to resolve disputed moral questions in 
contemporary moral philosophy. 
 
The Hylomorphic Structure of the Human Act: Two Complementary Perspectives4 
 As we begin our discussion of the hylomorphic structure of Thomistic moral 
theology, it is fitting that we are starting with an investigation of the structure of human 
acts, for as St. Thomas explained in the prologue of the second part of the Summa 
theologiae, his moral theology concerns the acts of the human being as made in the image 
and likeness of God: “Now that we have spoken of the exemplar, namely God…it remains 
for us to consider His image, that is the human being, inasmuch as he too is the principle 
                                                
4 For descriptions of the moral act similar to the account described here, see the following 
essays: Steven Jensen, “A Long Discussion regarding Steven A Long's Interpretation of the 
Moral Species,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 623-643; Steven Jensen, “Do Circumstances Give 
Species,” The Thomist 70 (2006): 1-26; Stephen Brock, “Veritatis Splendor 78, St. Thomas, 
and (Not Merely) Physical Objects of Moral Acts,” Nova et Vetera 6 (2008): 1-62; 
Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas, Rhonheimer, and the Object of the Human Act,” 
Nova et Vetera 6 (2008): 63-112; and Kevin F. Keiser, “The Moral Act in St. Thomas: A 
Fresh Look,” The Thomist 74 (2010): 237-282. 
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of his actions, as having free-will and power of his actions.”5 Concretely, this means that 
human agents attain their beatitude – they return to their Father’s house – through a life-
long series of human acts ordered towards their ultimate end, where the end of a single 
act can become a means to a further end, and so forth: “Since human acts are necessary 
for the attainment of happiness, we must consider human acts so that we may know by 
which acts we may obtain happiness, and by which acts we are prevented from obtaining 
it.”6 
 For St. Thomas, human agents can engage in two different categories of action. A 
human act (actus humanus), properly so called, is an act that has the human subject as its 
principle such that he acts with perfect knowledge of the end, which “consists in not only 
apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it as an end, and its 
relationship to that which is ordered to the end.”7 It is also called a voluntary act: “Since 
man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, the voluntary is especially 
found in his acts.”8 In contrast, an act of a man (actus hominis) is an act that does not 
proceed from the agent’s deliberate will.9 This category includes all reflexive, instinctive, 
and subconscious acts. 
                                                
5 STh II-II (Prologue): “Postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo … restat 
ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum 
operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.” 
6 STh I-II.6 (Prologue): “Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est 
pervenire, oportet consequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus 
actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via.” 
7 STh I-II.6.2: “Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res 
quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur in finem 
ad ipsum.” 
8 STh I-II.6.1: “Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum, 
in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.” 
9 STh I-II.1.1. 
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 From one perspective, for St. Thomas, the structure of a human act can be broken 
down into six alternating yet interpenetrating movements of the intellect and of the will, 
which relate to each other as matter and form.10 I will focus here on the acts of the will 
given its central role in the voluntary, though I point out at the outset that at every step, 
the act of willing can only occur if the intellect presents some end to it as something 
desirable.11  
As we noted in Chapter One, the will is the human agent’s rational appetite. It is 
that power of the soul that moves him to an end apprehended precisely as an intelligible 
good: “For the will to tend to something, it is required not that this something be good 
truly but that it be apprehended as good.”12 As such, the human agent can desire 
particular ends under different formalities (rationes). For example, he can desire a peanut 
butter and jelly sandwich as nutritious, as pleasurable, or even, if he is allergic to peanuts, 
                                                
10 For instance, when St. Thomas describes the intellectual and volitional components 
involved in the will act of choice, he uses hylomorphic terminology: “That act whereby 
the will tends to something proposed to it as good, through being ordained to the end by 
the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason.” STh I-II.13.1: 
“Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod 
per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter 
autem rationis.” For further discussion on the dynamic relationship between the intellect 
and the will in St. Thomas, see Daniel Westberg, “Did Aquinas Change His Mind About 
the Will?” The Thomist 58 (1994): 41-60; Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., By Knowledge and By 
Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005); and Lambert Hendricks, Choosing 
from Love: The Concept of “Electio” in the Structure of the Human Act According to 
Thomas Aquinas (Siena: Edizioni Cantagalli, 2010), pp. 277-328. 
11 cf. STh I-II.13.1. For recent discussion on the intellectual and volitional stages of the 
human act, see the following: Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp.119-135; David M. Gallagher, “The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, 
qq. 6-17)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002), pp. 69-89; and Joseph Pilsner, The Specification of Human 
Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 9-17. 
12 STh I-II.8.1: “Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit 
bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.” 
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as poisonous. Since for St. Thomas, the end is either an action or a thing13, the human 
agent could also desire the eating of food or the consuming of poison. Nonetheless what 
is important is that the end is both the motive for and object of the will.14 Indirectly, 
however, it is the intellect that moves the will by apprehending a thing or an act, and by 
presenting it to the will as an intelligible good, whether real or apparent.  
The first movement of a human will in a human act, called simple willing (velle), 
involves the attraction of the human agent to a possible end, apprehended by the intellect 
as a intelligible good.15 As an example, a student realizes that she is hungry and conceives 
of nutritious food as a desirable end. This is followed by the will act called intention 
(intentio), which is the willing of that end as something attainable via some means, 
understood here as those things ordered towards the end (eorum quae sunt ad finem).16 
Here the agent commits himself to the particular end. Our student decides that she is 
going to eat nutritious food. Next, there is the third movement of the will, called consent 
(consensus), when the agent’s will approves of all possible means as options that will allow 
him to attain the particular end that he desires.17 The student decides that she has enough 
money for a cheeseburger or for a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, but not for both. 
Fourth, this is followed by the will act called choice (electio) which is the willing of one 
means in preference to another means precisely as ordered towards attaining the end.18 
Our student chooses the PB&J. Then there is the fifth movement of the will, called use 
                                                
13 STh I-II.13.4. 
14 STh I-II.7.4. 
15 STh I-II.12.1 ad 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 STh I-II.15.3. 
18 STh I-II.13.3. 
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(usus), when the agent wills to command some operation, usually through the exercise of 
the interior powers of the soul, the parts of the body, or external objects, so that the 
means are realized until the end is finally attained.19 The student removes cash from her 
wallet, buys the sandwich at the cafeteria, and eats it. Lastly, the will rests in its possession 
of the end. This is the movement of the will called enjoyment (fruitio).20 Our student 
savors the sandwich contentedly at her cafeteria seat.  
 Finally, and importantly, though the human act understood from this first 
perspective can be decomposed into distinct volitional steps, these distinct movements or 
acts of the will are unified into a single act of the will by the end. It is the end, as an 
intelligible good, that attracts the will as it moves from simple willing through the 
intermediate volitional steps of the human act until it rests in the enjoyment of the end. 
To put it another way, each intermediate step is willed by the human subject precisely as a 
means towards attaining the end: “In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle 
space and the end as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural motion sometimes stops in 
the middle and does not reach the terminus, so sometimes one works with the means 
without gaining the end. But in willing, it is the reverse, for the will arrives at the end 
through willing that which are ordered to the end.”21 Or again: “As the will is moved to 
those things that are for the sake of the end, as an end, … the movement of the will to the 
end and its movement to those things that are for the sake of the end are one and the 
                                                
19 STh I-II.16.1. 
20 STh I-II.11.4. 
21 STh I-II.8.3 ad 3: “In executione operis, ea quae sunt ad finem se habent ut media, et 
finis ut terminus. Unde sicut motus naturalis interdum sistit in medio, et non pertingit ad 
terminum; ita quandoque operatur aliquis id quod est ad finem, et tamen non 
consequitur finem. Sed in volendo est e converso, nam voluntas per finem devenit ad 
volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.” 
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same thing.”22 Our student considering, choosing, buying, and eating the PB&J is engaged 
in a single human act that satiates her hunger. As we will discuss in greater detail below, it 
is important to acknowledge that for St. Thomas, it is the proximate end of the moral 
action and not its remote ends that specifies a human act, where a proximate end can be 
ordered to disparate remote ends. 23  Our student’s desire to satiate her hunger by 
acquiring nutritious food, and not her desire to go to the gym, which may be why she is 
satiating her hunger at this time, is what moves her to consider, choose, buy, and eat the 
PB&J. The end initiates, unites, and integrates the act of the will. From here onwards, 
when I refer to the end, I am referring to the proximate end of the will that specifies the 
act. Also notice in the just-cited text above that St. Thomas compares the movement of 
the will to natural movement. As the will moves towards the end through the 
intermediate means, so does a body in motion move from one original place to its final 
place, its terminus ad quem, through all intermediate places. This analogy will feature 
prominently below when we consider the question of how one specifies a human action.  
 From another complementary perspective, whose hylomorphic relationships are 
summarized in the accompanying figure on the adjacent page, for St. Thomas, the 
structure of the human act can be broken down into two principles, an interior act of the 
will and an exterior act, which are related to each other as form and matter. The interior 
act of the will is the act that is elicited from the will by the end that is presented to it by 
the intellect as an intelligible good.24 It is the movement of the will from simple willing 
                                                
22 STh I-II.12.4: “Voluntas fertur in id quod est ad finem, propter finem. Et sic unus et 
idem subiecto motus voluntatis est tendens ad finem, et in id quod est ad finem.” 
23 STh I-II.1.3 ad 3. 
24 STh I-II.18.6. 
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through enjoyment of the end described in the first perspective of the structure of the 
human act discussed above. As we will consider in greater detail below, the object of the 
interior act of the will, which I will designate as the objectinterior act, is the end itself, the 
intelligible good that is presented to the will by the intellect as desirable, and willed by the 
will as such.25 Recall from Chapter One that the object is understood to be that reality that 
reduces the power of the soul from potency to act in the same way that color reduces the 
external sense of sight from potency to act. As we have already seen, it is the end that first 
attracts and then moves the will so that the human agent will attain his end. 
  
                                                
25 STh I-II.10.2. 
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 In contrast, the exterior act is the act that is not elicited, but is commanded by the 
will. This is the act that is chosen by the will in the movement of electio when the human 
agent chooses one means in preference to another means to attain his end.26 Our student 
chooses to buy and to eat the PB&J rather than to buy and to eat the cheeseburger. These 
were two alternative exterior acts. Notice that the exterior act is also the same act that is 
commanded by the will in the movement of usus, when the human agent commands 
some operation, usually through the exercise of the interior powers of the soul, of the 
parts of the body, of external objects, or combinations of these, so that the means are 
realized until the end is attained. The student actually takes money out of her purse, buys 
the sandwich, and eats it. As we will discuss in more detail below, where the object of the 
interior act is the end, the object of the exterior act, which I will designate as the 
objectexterior act, is that upon which the agent acts, what St. Thomas calls the matter about 
which (materia circa quam)27 or simply, the matter (materia) of that exterior act28. It is the 
non-action upon which the commanded powers of the soul act. I will designate this as 
matterexterior act. In this case, the materia circa quam of the exterior act is the sandwich. It is 
the sandwich that the student buys and eats. As St. Thomas explains, “food when 
transformed is the effect of the nutritive power but food before being transformed is 
related to the nutritive power as the matter about which is related to its operation.”29 The 
                                                
26 STh I-II.13.5 ad 1. 
27 STh I-II.18.2 ad 2. 
28 STh I-II.20.4 ad 2. Cf. STh I-II.20 aa 1-4. 
29 STh I-II.18.2 ad 3: “Sicut alimentum transmutatum est effectus nutritivae potentiae, sed 
alimentum nondum transmutatum comparatur ad potentiam nutritivam sicut materia 
circa quam operatur.” 
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matterexterior act is the matter as object that specifies the exterior act distinguishing it from 
other possible exterior acts.  
 Finally, though the human act understood from this second perspective can be 
decomposed into distinct acts of the will, St. Thomas also believed that these two acts 
come together as form and matter to compose a integral unity: “That which is on the part 
of the will is formal to that which is on the part of the exterior action for the will uses the 
limbs to act as instruments.”30 In the same response, and as we will discuss in greater 
detail below, he will also relate the object of the interior act to the object of the exterior 
act as form to matter: 
Therefore just as the exterior action has its species from the object upon 
which it bears, so the interior act of the will has its species from the end, as 
its own proper object. Now that which is on the part of the will is formal to 
that which is on the part of the exterior action…Consequently the species 
of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but 
materially with regard to the object of the exterior act.31 
This hylomorphic relationship between the interior act of the will and the exterior act and 
their corresponding objects must figure prominently in any discussion of the Thomistic 
specification of the human act. This should not be surprising since both the end and the 
exterior act, understood as desirable goods, function as objects of the will: Our student 
                                                
30 STh I-II.18.6: “Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est 
ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis.” 
31 Ibid.: “Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est; ita actus 
interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio obiecto. Ita autem quod est ex 
parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus…Et ideo 
actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem 
secundum obiectum exterioris actus.” 
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who desires nutritious food, the end of her act, also desires the buying and eating of the 
PB&J, the exterior act that will allow her to obtain that food.  
In closing, it is important to point out that we can relate these descriptions of the 
human act to the Aristotelian description of causality described in Chapter One. Indeed, 
as we will see below, the moral specification of the human act – especially the 
specification of the exterior act – involves not only identifying how the human agent as 
an efficient cause realizes some form in some matter to attain some end, but also 
determining how and if these causal principles are in accord or not in accord with both 
right reason and the eternal law. 
 
The Moral Specification of a Human Act: Specification 
 The moral specification of a human act involves the identification of that act as 
being either a good or an evil act. At the top of this chapter, I framed the contemporary 
bioethical debate over the use of a placentectomy to resolve a crisis pregnancy as one 
involving a dispute over the proper moral specification of this medical intervention: Is a 
placentectomy to resolve a crisis pregnancy, a good or an evil act? However, before we 
can answer this specific question, we will need to address the more general concern of 
how one morally specifies a human act more generally. 
 Moral specification involves two interdependent steps that follow the specification 
of an act according to its natural species. Thus, after determining that this human act is 
an act of killing a man rather than an act of killing a deer, one has to specify an act of 
killing a man according to its moral species. Is this act of killing a man, an act of murder, 
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an act of self-defense, or an act of public execution? Next, one has to determine the moral 
character of that specified act. Is this act of murder, a good or an evil act? Or, is this act 
of public execution, a good or an evil act? Note that these steps are interdependent 
because in specifying an act of killing a man, either as an act of murder or an act of self-
defense, one is already undertaking a moral specification of the act because, as we will see 
below, an act of murder, by definition, is evil while an act of self-defense, by definition, is 
good. Importantly, the specification of the human act has to be undertaken from the 
perspective of the human agent who is using his practical reason to understand a human 
act precisely as a good act that will allow him to realize some real or apparent good. 
Human agents always choose their acts as specified by moral objects because they think 
that both the ends and the exterior acts that together constitute these moral objects – 
truly or falsely – will perfect them. 
 As we saw in Chapter One, the specification of a substance of a natural kind is 
attributed to its form, which in turn determines its telos. A kangaroo is specified by the 
kangaroo form, which also orders it towards its telos as a mature, reproducing, hopping 
marsupial. In comparison, however, a human act does not have a form properly so called, 
but it does have a telos. Recall St. Thomas’s comparison, cited above, between the 
movement of the will towards its desired end understood as an intelligible good, and the 
natural movement of a body from its original location to its final place, called its term. 
Both movements have a telos that distinguishes them from other similar movements. A 
flight from Providence to London can be distinguished from a flight from Providence to 
Seattle, by simply specifying the passenger’s destination. Therefore, it is not surprising 
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that St. Thomas will teach that a human act is specified by its telos, which he will call its 
object: 
Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of being seems to be that 
which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species 
from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement 
from its terminus.32 
Joseph Pilsner notes that St. Thomas uses the object of a human act to explain its 
specification in numerous places in his writings and refers to it more frequently as the 
primary determinant than to any other possible moral determinant of a human act.33 
However, there are also instances where St. Thomas refers to the telos of the human act as 
its end:  
In so far as each thing is assigned to a species according to act and not 
according to potentiality, things composed of matter and form are 
established in their respective species by their own forms…Human acts, 
whether they are considered as actions or as passions, are assigned to their 
species by the end.34 
Thus, to specify a human act, we must properly identify the object that distinguishes this 
act from a human act of another kind.  
                                                
32 STh I-II.18.2: “Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id 
quod dat rei speciem. Sicut autem res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio 
habet speciem ex obiecto; sicut et motus ex termino.” 
33 Pilsner, The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 71. 
34 STh I-II.1.3: “Unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum 
potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis 
speciebus per proprias formas…Actus humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, 
sive per modum passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur.” 
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 How then does one identify the object of a human act, an object which I will 
designate as objecthuman act? Recall that the human act is constituted most fundamentally by 
an act of the will that is informed by the intellect. Thus, it should not be surprising that 
for St. Thomas, the object of the human act, objecthuman act is the object of the will.35 It is the 
intelligible good that initiates, unifies, and integrates the movement of the will. Notably, 
since a human act often consists of many ordered ends that are ordered to each other as 
means to an end, it is the most proximate end chosen by the will that specifies a particular 
human act. As St. Thomas explains, “An act, in so far as it proceeds from the agent, is 
ordained to one proximate end from which it has its species, but it can be ordained to 
several remote ends where one is the end of the other.”36 The proximate end is the telos 
that is the specific motivation and cause of this particular act of the will. 
 As I explained earlier, the will is specified by the end, more precisely, by the 
proximate end, which is the immediate intelligible good presented to it by the intellect as 
desirable. This intelligible good is not just a thing or an act. It is a thing or an act desired 
under a particular formality presented to it by the intellect. This obtains because 
particular things and particular acts, understood as goods, can be desired by the will 
under different formalities:  
It is possible, however, that an act which is one in respect of its natural 
species can be ordained to several ends of the will as “to kill a man,” which 
is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an 
                                                
35 STh I-II.19.1. 
36 STh I-II.1.3 ad 3: “Actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non 
ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem, sed potest ordinari ad 
plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis alterius.” 
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end, to the safeguarding of justice and to the satisfying of anger. From this 
there are diverse acts according to moral species for in one way there will 
be an act of virtue, and in another, an act of vice. For a movement does not 
receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only 
from that which is its terminus essentially.37 
In our example, eating a PB&J can be ordered towards the satiating of one’s hunger where 
nutritious food is desired, or the killing of oneself, if our student is allergic to peanuts, 
where poisonous food is desired. It is the intellect that presents a good to the will under a 
particular formality: “Now the will's object is proposed to it by reason…Therefore the 
goodness of the will depends upon reason.”38 Thus, as we will see shortly, the goodness or 
malice of the will, and thus, of the human act, depends on the conformity of the end to 
right reason.  
However, the human agent does not simply desire the proximate end. The student 
does not simply desire the nutritious food. She must also desire and choose those 
commanded means that will allow her to actually obtain the food. She must desire and 
choose the buying and eating of the PB&J. Thus, as we noted above, the will also has the 
exterior act as an object, but this is an object that is desired precisely as a means to 
attaining the object of the interior act of the will, which is the proximate end.  
                                                
37 STh I-II.1.3 ad 3: “Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum speciem naturae, 
ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hoc ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod 
est idem secundum speciem naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem ad conservationem 
iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus secundum speciem moris, 
quia uno modo erit actus virtutis, alio modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit 
speciem ab eo quod est terminus per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per se.” 
38 STh I-II.19.3: “Obiectum autem voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem… Et ideo 
bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione.” 
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 As an object of the will, the exterior act has to be desired precisely as an intelligible 
good presented to it by the intellect, precisely as it is understood and ordered by the 
intellect. Therefore, a particular exterior act needs to be distinguished from all other 
possible exterior acts. Otherwise, the intellect would not be able to present it to the will as 
this intelligible good rather than that intelligible good. Thus, the exterior act too must 
have an object that specifies it. As we discussed above, for St. Thomas, this object, the 
objectexterior act is the matter about which (materia circa quam) or simply, the matter 
(materia) of that exterior act, matterexterior act. The matterexterior act is the exterior act’s object 
because it is the terminus of the movement of the exterior act that is chosen and 
commanded by the will. Or to put it another way, it is that non-action, that reality, upon 
which the commanded powers of the soul act during the exercise of the exterior act. As 
such, the matterexterior act as terminus of the exterior act can distinguish one exterior act 
from another. In our example, the matterexterior act is the PB&J itself, because the act of 
eating a PB&J is distinguished from the act of eating a cheeseburger by the term of this 
particular act of eating. 
 To recap then, a human act is constituted by two acts of the will linked to each 
other as form and matter. The interior act is specified by the proximate end, which is the 
intelligible good presented to it by the intellect. This is the formal principle of the human 
act, formhuman act. The proximate end unifies and integrates the movement of the will. The 
exterior act is specified by its matterexterior act, which is the terminus of the commanded 
action of the will that is elicited from one or more of the soul’s other powers. This is the 
material principle of the human act, matterhuman act. The matterexterior act distinguishes one 
exterior act from another. Both the exterior act and the proximate end can serve as 
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objects of the will because both are desired by the will, the former as means to the latter, 
in the execution of the human act: “The end, considered as a thing, and those things that 
are ordered towards that end are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the reason for 
willing that which is ordered towards the end is the end, they are one and the same 
object.”39 This hylomorphic relationship between the proximate end and the exterior act 
will figure prominently in our analysis of the moral object of the human act below.  
 
The Moral Specification of a Human Act: Moral Specification 
 Once a human act is specified by its moral object, it is now amenable to further 
moral analysis. (Though as I noted earlier, I do not think that the specification of a 
human act can be disentangled from its moral analysis since human agents always choose 
their acts as specified by moral objects because they think that both the ends and the 
exterior acts that constitute these moral objects – truly or falsely – will perfect them.) For 
St. Thomas – as it is for the Catholic tradition more generally40 – there are three 
determinants of morality, which are the object chosen, the end intended, and the 
circumstances of the action.41 However, it is clear that for the Angelic Doctor, the object 
of the human act is its primary moral determinant: “Consequently good and evil will are 
different acts according to species. Now the specific difference in acts is according to 
objects…Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will depends properly upon the 
                                                
39 STh I-II.12.4 ad 2: “Finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud voluntatis obiectum 
quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est 
unum et idem obiectum.” 
40 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 1750. 
41 STh I-II.18 aa 2-4. 
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objects.”42 Or again: “Just as the primary goodness of a natural thing depends upon its 
form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action depends upon 
its suitable object.”43 This truth remains the teaching of the Catholic Church.44 As we will 
see below, the two other moral determinants of the human act mentioned by St. Thomas, 
its end and its circumstances, only specify an act as good or evil, as they participate in the 
object of that act.  
But what exactly is the object of the human act? As we discussed above, both the 
proximate end of the interior act of the will, which is the objectinterior act, and the exterior 
act in itself as desired and chosen as a means towards attaining the end, are both objects 
of the will because both are desired by the will in the execution of the act, albeit in 
different ways. Thus, both play a role in moral specification, a truth that is captured by 
the claim that these two objects, the proximate end and the exterior act, are the formal 
and the material principles respectively, which constitute the single moral object of that 
act, properly so called, and designated here as objecthuman act, which specifies the act as 
either good or evil.  
 How does the moral object of a human act, the objecthuman act, specify that act as 
good or evil? As St. Thomas explains, the goodness of a human act depends upon the 
fullness of being of that act: “We must therefore say that action, in so far as it has being, 
                                                
42 STh I-II.19.1: “Unde voluntas bona et mala sunt actus differentes secundum speciem. 
Differentia autem speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta…Et ideo bonum et malum in 
actibus voluntatis proprie attenditur secundum obiecta.” 
43 STh I-II.18.2: “Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat 
speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti.” 
44 John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, no. 78: “The morality of the human act depends 
primarily and fundamentally on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is 
borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas (cf. STh I-
II.18.6).” 
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has goodness, whereas in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of 
being, it is lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil, as for example, if it lacks that 
quantity according to reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.”45 This fullness or 
defect in being in the human act is constituted by the fullness or the defect in its moral 
object:  
Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good 
and evil of themselves pertain to the will; just as truth and falsehood 
pertain to reason…Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in 
species. Now the specific difference in acts depends upon objects. 
Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is properly according to 
objects.46  
Thus, for a human act to be good, both the proximate end and the exterior act, which are 
the formal and material principles of the act’s moral object respectively, must each 
possess the fullness of being. Both of them individually and together as a hylomorphic 
reality must be good. 
Next, whether the human act is full or defective in its being is determined by right 
reason: “Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will…therefore 
                                                
45 STh I-II.18.1: “Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de 
esse, intantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi 
quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala, puta si 
deficiat ei vel determinata quantitas secundum rationem, vel debitus locus, vel aliquid 
huiusmodi.” 
46 STh I-II.19.1: “Bonum et malum sunt per se differentiae actus voluntatis. Nam bonum 
et malum per se ad voluntatem pertinent; sicut verum et falsum ad rationem…Unde 
voluntas bona et mala sunt actus differentes secundum speciem. Differentia autem speciei 
in actibus est secundum obiecta…Et ideo bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie 
attenditur secundum obiecta.” 
  72 
the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way that it depends upon the 
object.”47 It is right reason that dictates the suitability of a particular objecthuman act for a 
particular action. To put it another way, it is reason that determines an intelligible good, 
but it is right reason that determines if that intelligible good is a real or just an apparent 
good with respect to the human agent who is ordered by nature towards his perfection in 
God.   
Lastly, the rightness of human reason depends on its conformity to the eternal 
law: “For human reason is the rule of the human will, from which it derives from 
goodness, from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason.”48 Since it is the eternal law 
that determines human nature and therefore its perfection, it is eternal law that is the 
measure by which we identify those acts that will allow us to realize our happiness and 
those acts that will prevent us from realizing it. Putting this all together, a human act is 
good if its being, as determined by its moral object, the objecthuman act, is in accord with 
right reason, and therefore, with the eternal law.  
Recall once again, however, that the single moral object of a human act, the 
objecthuman act, is constituted by two objects of the will, the proximate end and the exterior 
act, related to each other as form and matter. Therefore, for an act to be good, both 
objects of the will, its proximate end and its commanded exterior act have to be in accord 
with right reason. Both of them need to have the fullness of being due to them. Both of 
                                                
47 STh I-II.19.3: “Obiectum autem voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem…Et ideo bonitas 
voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.” 
48 STh I-II.19.4: “Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius 
bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege aeterna, quae est ratio divina….Unde manifestum est 
quod multo magis dependet bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna, quam a ratione 
humana, et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam recurrere.” 
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them have to be good. As St. Thomas clearly teaches, a defect in one leads to a defect in 
the whole: “For an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all ways since evil results 
from any single defect, but good from the complete cause.”49 The proximate end is 
specified as good or evil in one way, which is its conformity to right reason and therefore 
to the eternal law. However, and this is significant, for St. Thomas, the exterior act is 
specified as good or evil in two ways: 
Exterior actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. Firstly, 
according to their genus and the circumstances connected with them as 
the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be 
good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the 
end as the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end 
is the proper object of the will, it is manifest that this aspect of good or evil, 
which the exterior action derives from its relation to the end, depends first 
of all in the act of the will, upon which the exterior action depends. On the 
other hand, the goodness or malice which the exterior action has of itself, 
on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due 
circumstances is not derived from the will but rather from the reason.50  
                                                
49 STh I-II.18.4 ad 3: “Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates 
concurrant, quia quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex 
integra causa.” 
 
50 STh I-II.20.1: “Aliqui actus exteriores possunt dici boni vel mali dupliciter. Uno modo, 
secundum genus suum, et secundum circumstantias in ipsis consideratas, sicut dare 
eleemosynam, servatis debitis circumstantiis, dicitur esse bonum. Alio modo dicitur 
aliquid esse bonum vel malum ex ordine ad finem, sicut dare eleemosynam propter 
inanem gloriam, dicitur esse malum. Cum autem finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, 
manifestum est quod ista ratio boni vel mali quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad 
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Or again: 
We may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the exterior action, one 
according to due matter and circumstances, and the other according to the 
order to the end. And that which is according to the order to the end, 
depends entirely on the will while that which is according to due matter or 
circumstances, depends on the reason, and on this goodness depends the 
goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.51 
Therefore, the morality of the integral act depends on the goodness of the proximate end, 
on the goodness of the exterior act in itself, i.e., “in respect of due matter and 
circumstances,” and on the goodness of the exterior act in relation to the end, i.e., “in 
respect of the order to the end.” These three sources of goodness together constitute the 
goodness of the moral object of the act, the objecthuman act, understood in its fullness. A 
defect in any one of these parts of the moral object is a defect in the whole. Why? Because 
each is an object of the will. As such, each can order or disorder the will as an object of 
the will’s desire. 
To illustrate the importance of these three-fold sources of goodness or of badness 
of the act, consider the three following scenarios. In the first case, already described 
above, our student buys and eats a PB&J to satisfy her hunger. Here her proximate end is 
                                                                                                                                            
finem, per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum exteriorem. 
Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se, propter debitam 
materiam et debitas circumstantias, non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione.” 
51 STh I-II.20.2: “In actu exteriori potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia, una 
secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa 
quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate. Illa autem 
quae est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione, et ex hac dependet 
bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur.” 
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the nutritious food that will satisfy her hunger. It is good. The exterior act that she has 
deliberately chosen is the eating of a PB&J. It is also good. (Notice that acknowledging 
this source of goodness in our action theory allows us to ask our student for her reason(s) 
in choosing a PB&J over a cheeseburger. Why did she think that eating the PB&J is a 
better act than eating the cheeseburger? She must have these reasons because her choice 
of the former over the latter suggests that she has judged that the former is better than the 
latter.) Finally, the exterior act in relation to the proximate end, eating a PB&J to obtain 
the nutritious food to satisfy her hunger, is also good. Her act is a good one in the fullness 
of its being. 
In the second case, a suicidal student who knows that she is allergic to peanuts 
buys and eats a PB&J to kill herself. Here her proximate end that she desires, the 
poisonous food that will end her own life, is contrary to right reason which grasps that 
her life is an authentic good that needs to be preserved. We can therefore conclude that 
poisonous food that will end one’s life is an evil end that makes any particular human act 
chosen to attain this end, an evil one regardless of the exterior act and its relationship to 
the end. Poisonous food constitutes one possible proximate end that specifies the human 
act we call suicide. A defect in the proximate end detracts from the perfection of the 
human act. Again, “for an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all ways since evil 
results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause.”52 
In the third case, our student takes a PB&J from her classmate’s lunchbox without 
her friend’s permission and eats it. Here, her proximate end, nutritious food that will 
                                                
52 STh I-II.18.4 ad 3: “Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates 
concurrant, quia quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex 
integra causa.” 
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satisfy her hunger, is a good one. However, her exterior act would be repugnant to right 
reason. It would be an evil act specified by an evil object, the objectexterior act, which in this 
case is its matterexterior act, which is the alienated PB&J: “For an action is said to be evil in its 
species, not because it does not have an object, but because it has an object in disaccord 
with reason, for instance, to appropriate another’s property.”53 The objectexterior act is evil 
because someone else’s sandwich taken without his permission is not apt matter in the 
moral order to be the term for an act of eating to nourish oneself. As an act in itself, i.e., 
“in respect of due matter and circumstances,” eating a stolen sandwich is evil. As an act in 
relation to the end, i.e., “in respect of the order to the end,” eating a stolen sandwich to 
nourish oneself is also evil because it is contrary to right reason to eat a stolen sandwich 
to satisfy one’s hunger. In this example, the exterior act of eating a stolen PB&J has a two-
fold malice, though a defect in only one would be enough to detract not only from the 
perfection of the exterior act but also from the perfection of the human act as a whole. 
The defect in the exterior act makes the integral human act defective in its being. It too is 
evil. 
To summarize: A human act is morally good if has the fullness of being due to it. 
This perfection is realized when the end of the interior act, the exterior act in itself, and 
the exterior act in relation to the end, are all in accord with right reason, and therefore 
with the eternal law. A defect in any one of these sources of goodness for the moral object, 
the objecthuman act, is enough to mar the perfection of the whole. 
                                                
53 STh I-II.18.5 ad 2: “Dicitur enim malus actus secundum suam speciem, non ex eo quod 
nullum habeat obiectum; sed quia habet obiectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere 
aliena.” 
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  But what about the two other determinants of morality mentioned above? Recall 
that for St. Thomas, there are three determinants of morality, which are the object 
chosen, the end intended, and the circumstances of the action. In response, these are 
moral determinants that give species to human acts, because each is desired by the will in 
some way as an intelligible good. Therefore, it should not be surprising that for St. 
Thomas, the proximate end and the circumstances only act as moral determinants when 
they participate in either one of the two objects of the will, the proximate end and the 
commanded exterior act, which are the two hylomorphic principles of the moral object of 
the human act, the objecthuman act, described above.   
First, as we have already seen, the proximate end intended, as the object of the 
interior act of the will, the objectinterior act, specifies the moral character of the will as the 
formal principle of the moral object of the human act, the objecthuman act.54 The proximate 
end determines the morality of the human act because it initiates, attracts, and integrates 
the movements of the will. Next, the circumstances are the conditions surrounding a 
human act that can contribute to increasing or diminishing its goodness or its malice and 
the degree of our responsibility for it. 55  These conditions include answers to the 
questions: Who, What, When, Where, Why, How, and By which means.56 For St. 
Thomas, a condition only specifies the goodness or malice of an act when the intellect 
judges that it is constitutive of the objecthumn act as a specific difference:  
A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, 
as it is compared to reason, and then it can specify a moral act. And it 
                                                
54 STh I-II.18.6. 
55 STh I-II.18.11. 
56 STh I-II.7.3. 
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must be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to 
evil for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through it 
being repugnant to reason.57  
Or again: “A circumstance, as long as it is a a circumstance, when it is a mere accident, 
does not specify an action, but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, when 
it is this, does specify the action.”58 In these scenarios where a condition participates in 
the moral specification of the act, it is not a circumstance properly so called. 
Circumstances properly so-called are not involved in the essential specification of the act. 
However, as St. Thomas points out, there are times when a circumstance may add or 
detract from the goodness of an act. Thus, it can aggravate or diminish the sin.59 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the act of describing the moral object of 
the human act, the objecthuman act, is an act that is proper to the intellect. It is the intellect 
that presents objects to the will under the formality of an intelligible good. In our 
example, the food, as proximate end, is grasped as something desirable by the will, 
because it is presented to it as nutritious by the intellect. The stolen PB&J, as the matter of 
the exterior act, is grasped as something that does not belong to me, again by the intellect. 
And the act of eating a stolen sandwich is grasped as something repugnant to right 
reason, again by the intellect. Lastly, it is the intellect that judges whether or not a 
                                                
57 STh I-II.18.5 ad 4: “Quod circumstantia quandoque sumitur ut differentia essentialis 
obiecti, secundum quod ad rationem comparatur, et tunc potest dare speciem actui 
morali. Et hoc oportet esse, quandocumque circumstantia transmutat actum de bonitate 
in malitiam, non enim circumstantia faceret actum malum, nisi per hoc quod rationi 
repugnat.” 
58 STh I-II.18.10 ad 2: “Circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum habeat 
rationem accidentis, non dat speciem, sed inquantum mutatur in principalem 
conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem.” 
59 STh I-II.18.11. 
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particular condition is accidental to the moral object of the act or is essential to it. Hence, 
for St. Thomas, the fact that a stolen object is a consecrated vessel stolen from a church 
adds a circumstance that specifies the act because it adds “an additional repugnance to the 
order of reason.”60 The condition that the stolen object is sacred specifies the act as not 
only an act of theft but also an act of sacrilege.  
 
The Moral Specification of a Human Act: Specifying Simple and Complex Acts 
 In the articuli that deal with the moral specification of the human act, St. Thomas 
includes a substantial discussion of the relationship between the two objects of the will, 
the proximate end and the exterior act, that constitute the moral object of the human act 
as form and matter. This discussion of the source of goodness or malice of the exterior act 
as “that which is in respect of the order to the end,” is at the heart of the distinction 
between simple and complex human acts, properly so called. 
St. Thomas begins by pointing out that the object of the exterior act can stand in a 
two-fold relation to the object of the interior act.61 First, the object of the exterior act, 
which is the matter upon which the commanded powers of the soul act, the objectexterior act, 
can be ordained by its nature to the object of the interior act, objectinterior act, which is the 
proximate end of the will. This is called a per se ordering. St. Thomas uses a battle 
example to illustrate his point: “Thus to fight well is ordained in itself to victory.”62 In our 
example, the two possible items the student considers as matter for her exterior act, the 
cheeseburger and the PB&J, are ordained by their very nature to the object of the 
                                                
60 Ibid. 
61 STh I-II.18.7. 
62 Ibid.: “Sicut bene pugnare per se ordinatur ad victoria.” 
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student’s interior act, the nutritious food she desires to satiate her hunger. This is a per se 
ordering that is grasped by the intellect as it considers the nature of a cheeseburger and a 
PB&J: A sandwich of any kind is ordered towards being nutritious as matter receives 
form. As such, to make the parallel to St. Thomas’s example, eating a cheeseburger or a 
PB&J is of itself ordered towards nutrition.  
In contrast, the object of the exterior act can be ordained to the object of the 
interior act, not by nature, but only by intention. This is called a per accidens ordering. St. 
Thomas explains this with the following example: “Thus to take what belongs to another 
is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms.”63 To parallel his example, we could 
imagine our student selling her watch to get the cash she needs to buy the PB&J. The 
watch as matter is not ordered towards receiving the form of nutritious food. Thus, 
selling the watch is of itself not ordered towards obtaining nutrition. One could imagine 
doing the former without it leading to the latter, or vice versa. This is only an accidental 
per accidens relationship between the two objects and the two acts they specify, imposed 
on them by the human agent’s intellect as she strives to attain her end. 
At this point, I would like to underscore that one cannot ascertain the nature of 
relationship between the object of the interior act and the object of the exterior act in the 
order of reason without first specifying the exterior act in itself. A human agent can only 
know the matter of this particular exterior act, matterexterior act, after he has distinguished a 
particular exterior act from all the other possible exterior acts that could be commanded 
by the soul. This judgment involves the intellect first grasping the exterior act as an 
                                                
63 Ibid.: “Sicut accipere rem alienam per accidens ordinatur ad dandum eleemosynam.” 
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intelligible good. Once this judgment has been made, the agent’s intellect can then 
discern whether the relationship between the object of the exterior act and the object of 
the interior act is per se or per accidens. This dynamic will figure prominently in our 
analysis below.  
 How does the hylomorphic relationship between the two objects of the will, the 
proximate end and the exterior act, understood as the hylomorphic principles of the one 
moral object, the objecthuman act, influence the specification of a human act? For St. 
Thomas, when the objects of the will are essentially ordered to each other, then the 
human act is specified by the object of the interior act, i.e., the proximate end, which 
directs the object of the exterior act as form orders matter in the determination of a 
substance.64 Thus, our student who buys a PB&J and eats it to nourish herself is eating a 
PB&J. It is a simple act because the matter of the exterior act, the PB&J, is apt to receive 
the form imposed on it by the end, nutritious food, because the former is ordered to the 
latter by its very nature. Here, the end gives species. It integrates the buying and eating 
into the one simple act of eating. 
In contrast, when the objects of the will are only accidentally ordered to each 
other, then the objects specify two independent acts that in themselves are only 
accidentally related to the other. Our student selling her watch to get the cash she needs 
to buy food is performing two acts – she sells the watch, and then she eats food – which 
she accidentally relates to each other as matter and form. Therefore, we say that she sells 
the watch so that she can eat food. It is a complex act of two simple acts that are ordered 
to each other by the human agent as a means to an end. From a hylomorphic perspective, 
                                                
64 STh I-II.18.7. 
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it is a complex act because the matter of the first simple act, which is the watch, is not apt 
to receive the form impressed upon it by the end, nutritious food, because the former is 
not ordered by nature to the latter.  
In situations of complex acts like this, St. Thomas explains that the object of the 
interior act, i.e., the proximate end of the will, takes precedence over the object of the 
exterior act in specifying the actions of the human subject: “And therefore the species of a 
human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the 
object of the exterior act. Hence the Philosopher says…that ‘he who steals so that he may 
commit adultery, is essentially speaking, more adulterer than thief’.”65 Thus, our student 
who stole the PB&J is more “hungry-student” than thief. Notice, however, that St. 
Thomas is not saying that the adulterer is not a thief. He simply says that the adulterer is 
more adulterer than thief. Thus, in my view, for St. Thomas, there are two still two acts, 
an act of theft, and an act of adultery, though the former is ordered accidentally to the 
latter by the intellect. This relationship establishes a hierarchy between the two where the 
object of the rational appetite – having sex with someone other than one’s spouse for the 
sake of pleasure – take precedence over the object of the locomotive power, the taking of 
another’s property without his permission.66 Lastly and once again, I emphasize that the 
human agent must first specify his exterior act of theft before he can discern its 
relationship to his end.  
 
                                                
65 STh I-II.18.6: “Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, 
materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde philosophus dicit…quod 
ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur.” 
66 Cf. STh II-II.18.7. 
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The Moral Specification of the Human Act and the Virtue of Prudence 
 What should be included within the object of the human act? In recent years, 
there has been much debate among Catholic moralists regarding those moral objects that 
are direct from those that are indirect, where the former are those objects that are 
intended and the latter are those objects that are not intended but only foreseen by the 
human agent. Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle have argued that the 
human agent and the human agent alone can properly specify the objects of his act.67 It is 
the agent’s self-description that is paramount in specifying his intentions because this is 
the only perspective that can take into consideration the complex interior acts that specify 
and qualify human action. 
 In response, I think that St. Thomas had it right when he noted that the human 
agent needs the virtue of prudence to act rightly. Prudence is the virtue that capacitates 
the human agent so that he is capable of taking good counsel, where counsel is about 
things that we have to do in relation to some end.68 Prudence is that virtue that 
determines whether a particular act is in accord with right reason. It does this by 
appointing the mean in the passions and the operations of the human agent.69 Thus, in 
specifying an act, a prudent individual would specify and evaluate the object of his act, 
and more precisely the hylomorphic principles of that object, i.e., the proximate end of 
                                                
67 For details, see their essay, “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A Reply to Critics of our Action 
Theory,” The Thomist 65 (2001): 1-44. For representative criticisms of their action theory, 
see Jean Porter, “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’ in Grisez’s Moral Theory,” Theological Studies 57 
(1996): 611-632; and Kevin Flannery, S.J., “What is Included in a Means to an End?” 
Gregorianum 74 (1993): 499-513; and Matthew B. O’Brien and Robert C. Koons, “Objects 
of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2012): 655-703.  
68 STh II-II.47.2. 
69 STh II-II.47.7 ad 2.  
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the will and the exterior act, as they engage not only the powers of the soul but also the 
moral virtues that form them: 
The end does not pertain to the moral virtues as though they appointed 
the end but because they tend to the end that is predetermined by natural 
reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares their way, by 
disposing that which is ordered to the end, i.e., the means.70 
To put it another way, the prudent individual morally specifies his act by describing his 
proximate end and his exterior act in a way that acknowledges that they necessarily 
engage each of the powers of his soul.  
 Therefore, in our example, a college student allergic to peanuts who says that her 
act is good because she does not directly intend her ill health when she knowingly eats a 
PB&J would be imprudent and unreasonable. She should have considered how her eating 
of the PB&J is beneficial or detrimental to her health because it engages her nutritive 
power. In truth, it is an evil act because it is imprudent, even if she says that she did not 
directly intend her ill health. In another disputed example, a surgeon who crushes an 
infant’s skull who says that it is a good act because he does not directly intend the killing 
of the child would also be imprudent and unreasonable. He should have considered how 
his crushing of an infant person’s head is a just or an unjust act with regard to the child 
because the child’s skull engages his rational appetite, i.e., the will. In truth, therefore, a 
craniotomy is an evil act because it is an imprudent act even if the surgeon says that he 
                                                
70 STh II-II.47.6 ad 3: “Finis non pertinet ad virtutes morales tanquam ipsae praestituant 
finem, sed quia tendunt in finem a ratione naturali praestitutum. Ad quod iuvantur per 
prudentiam, quae eis viam parat, disponendo ea quae sunt ad finem.” 
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did not directly intend the death of the child.71 It is not surprising, therefore, that for St. 
Thomas, the objects of the commanded powers of the soul are included under the object 
of the will as some particular good:  
The will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use 
of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every 
other power is included under the object of the will as some particular 
good since the art or power to which the universal end belongs moves to 
their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included 
in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common 
good, namely, the order of the whole army, by his command moves one of 
the captains, who intends the order of one company.72 
In the end, the human agent – to be prudent – needs to evaluate and to include within the 
description of his exterior act, i.e., he needs to intend, all those circumstances of the act 
that engage the powers of the soul and the moral virtues that inform them. 
 
 
                                                
71 As I have argued elsewhere, a craniotomy is also a gravely unjust act because it is unjust 
for anyone to amputate, mutilate, or dismember anyone else’s body, let alone the body of 
a fetal child, unless the procedure is being done specifically for the welfare of that person. 
See my “The Injustice of a D&C or D&E Procedure to Resolve a Crisis Pregnancy,” 
National Catholic Bioethics Quartery 15 (2015): 13-14. 
72 STh I-II.9.1: “Voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis 
potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum 
comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem 
ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel 
potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux 
exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo 
imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.” 
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Applying this Thomistic Theory of Action: The Act of Self-Defense  
To illustrate this Thomistic theory of action and of moral specification, I would 
like to apply it to the disputed question of self-defense that is discussed in the Summa 
theologiae (II-II.64.7). Before we do so, however, I will need to preface this analysis by 
first noting St. Thomas’s absolute rejection of all killing of the innocent: 
An individual man may be considered in two ways. First, in himself; 
secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it 
is unlawful to kill anyone, since in each one, even the sinner, we have to 
love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying 
him. Nevertheless…the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to 
the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of 
the righteous preserves and promotes the common good, since they are 
the chief part of the multitude. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the 
innocent.73  
Though the killing of a criminal by the public authority can be justified to protect the 
common good, for St. Thomas, the deliberate killing of an innocent is always illicit. It is 
an act contrary to right reason because we are called to love every human being as made 
in the imago Dei. Or to put it more metaphysically, the innocent human being is not apt 
matter for the act of deliberate killing.  
                                                
73 STh II-II.64.6: “Aliquis homo dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum se; 
alio modo, per comparationem ad aliud. Secundum se quidem considerando hominem, 
nullum occidere licet, quia in quolibet, etiam peccatore, debemus amare naturam, quam 
Deus fecit, quae per occisionem corrumpitur. Sed…occisio peccatoris fit licita per 
comparationem ad bonum commune, quod per peccatum corrumpitur. Vita autem 
iustorum est conservativa et promotiva boni communis, quia ipsi sunt principalior pars 
multitudinis. Et ideo nullo modo licet occidere innocentem.” 
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 Turning to self-defense in STh II-II.64.7, St. Thomas begins with a distinction: 
“Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while 
the other is beside the intention (praeter intentionem).”74 He continues with a definition 
of what is praeter intentionem: “Now moral acts take their species according to what is 
intended, and not according to what is beside the intention.”75 As we discussed above, 
however, moral acts are specified by their objects. For St. Thomas then, what is beside the 
intention (praeter intentionem) are those elements of the moral act that are not included 
in its object. We would call these the circumstances, properly so called. They are the 
unintended, i.e., falling outside the moral object, consequences of the act.  
Returning to STh II-II.64.7, the article then moves to a full description of the 
moral specification of an act of self-defense:  
Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the 
preservation of one's life, while another is the killing of the aggressor. 
Therefore an act of this kind, coming from an intention to preserve one’s 
life, is not unlawful, as it is natural to preserve oneself in existence as far as 
possible. And yet, an act even if it proceeds from a good intention may be 
rendered unlawful if it is out of proportion to the end. Therefore if a man, 
in preserving his life, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful 
whereas if he repels the violence with moderation, it will be lawful.76 
                                                
74 STh II-II.64.7. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid.: “Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest, unus 
quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis. Actus igitur huiusmodi 
ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae, non habet rationem illiciti, cum hoc sit 
cuilibet naturale quod se conservet in esse quantum potest. Potest tamen aliquis actus ex 
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For a legitimate act of self-defense to obtain, therefore, St. Thomas teaches that the 
innocent victim needs to have the preservation of his own life as his end. Recall that the 
end in itself is the first of three sources of goodness in the human act. 
 In addition to choosing a good end, the innocent victim must also choose a good 
exterior act. Thus, he must also choose a particular exterior act that is proportionate to 
attaining this end. But what does it mean to say that the exterior act as a means is 
proportionate rather than disproportionate to the end? Later in the response, St. Thomas 
will add: 
Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-
defense in order to avoid killing the other, for one is obliged to take 
provide for one’s own life more than for another’s. However, as it is not 
lawful to kill a man, except by a public authority for the common good, it 
is unlawful for a man to intend to kill another in self-defense, unless he is a 
public authority who, while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refers 
this to the public good, as a soldier fighting against the foe and a minister 
of the judge fighting against robbers do. Even these individuals, however, 
sin if they are moved by private animosity. 77 
                                                                                                                                            
bona intentione proveniens illicitus reddi si non sit proportionatus fini. Et ideo si aliquis 
ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat, erit illicitum. Si 
vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio.” 
77 Ibid.: “Nec est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelae praetermittat 
ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere quam 
vitae alienae. Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter 
bonum commune…illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum 
defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad 
sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra 
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This text suggests that a proportionate act of self-defense is one that can save one’s life 
without necessarily killing one’s assailant. If several means were available to the innocent 
victim, for example, it would involve his choosing the least lethal means that could still 
effect the saving of one’s life. (Note that the chosen means could still be lethal means if 
those are the only means available to the victim, since St. Thomas does not rule out the 
praeter intentionem slaying of the attacker in a legitimate act of self-defense.) This is the 
goodness of the exterior act determined “in respect of due matter and circumstances,” 
which is the second source of goodness of a human act. Additionally, an act of self-
defense is an act where the death of the assailant is never desired by the innocent victim’s 
will even as a means to saving his life. It can only be ordered towards the preservation of 
one’s own life. This is the goodness of the act determined “in respect of the order to the 
end,” which is the third source of goodness of a human act. Otherwise, the act’s 
specification would be altered from an act of self-defense to an act of voluntary 
manslaughter, if it killed the attacker. In the end, an act of self-defense needs to be good 
in the fullness of its being. 
 Finally, to restate St. Thomas’s teaching, if the means were proportionate to the 
end, then the act of the innocent victim would remain a simple act where the exterior act 
is essentially ordered towards the end of preserving one’s life. It would be a legitimate act 
of self-defense. In contrast, if the means were disproportionate to the end, then this act 
would be a complex act where the exterior act would be an act of voluntary manslaughter 
now ordered only accidentally to self-preservation. This exterior act in itself would be 
                                                                                                                                            
hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones. Quamvis et isti etiam peccent si 
privata libidine moveantur.” 
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contrary to right reason and would be inherently disordered regardless of the further 
legitimate end to which it was directed. 
 
Objections to this Thomistic Theory of Action: Fr. Martin Rhonheimer 
 To further deepen our analysis of moral specification in St. Thomas, we now 
consider objections to the Thomistic theory of action outlined in this chapter. Here, I will 
describe and respond to the criticisms proffered by two contemporary Thomists, Fr. 
Martin Rhonheimer and Steven A. Long. Rhonheimer is representative of those moralists 
today who emphasize the primacy of the end in the moral specification of a human act, 
while Long is representative of one of two groups of moral theologians opposed to this 
view.78   
 First, we consider Fr. Rhonheimer’s objections. Rhonheimer has written 
numerous works over the past twenty years describing his Thomistic theory of action.79 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will focus on his most recent restatement and 
                                                
78 Fr. Stephen Brock, Fr. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., Steven Jensen, and I, are representative 
of the other group of Rhonheimer’s critics. 
79 For example, see the following books and essays: The Perspective of the Acting Person 
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008); Vital Conflicts in Medical 
Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and Tubal Pregnancies (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2009); The Perspective of Morality (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011); and “‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’ and the 
Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a Central Teaching of Veritatis Splendor,” The Thomist 58 
(1994): 1-39; “Intentional Actions and the Meaning of the Object: A Reply to Richard 
McCormick,” The Thomist 59 (1995): 279-311; “The Perspective of the Acting Person and 
the Nature of Practical Reason: The ‘Object of the Human Act’ in Thomistic 
Anthropology of Action,” Nova et Vetera 2 (2004): 461-516; “On the Use of Condoms to 
Prevent Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 
5 (2005): 37-48; “A Nonexisting ‘False Theory’,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9 
(2009): 11-16.   
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defense of his views.80 This essay has the added advantage in that it is an extensive work 
that explicitly considers and responds to the alternative accounts of St. Thomas’s action 
theory proposed by Rhonheimer’s critics, including the work of Steven Jensen, who holds 
to a reading of St. Thomas similar to the one reconstructed in this chapter.  
 For Rhonheimer, the moral specification of a human act must be done from the 
perspective of the acting person. Thus, in his view, “[w]hat we are looking for, then, when 
we talk about the ‘moral object,’ is what specifies human acts, considered as acts that 
proceed from a deliberate will.”81 Therefore, he concludes, “what is called the ‘moral 
object’ must be some form of ‘good’ that is an end for the choosing will and is embodied 
in the act proceeding from it. The good a human act aims at, gives that act a definite 
moral species.”82 
 To illustrate his theory, Rhonheimer describes the moral specification of an act of 
killing a man: 
What, morally considered, is the physical act of “killing a man”? It may be 
a homicide, an execution of capital punishment, a killing in a just war, an 
act of self-defense: these acts, physically identical and all involving the 
physical killing of a human being, have nonetheless different moral species 
according to their objects. They are not in each case the same human act, 
simply carried out for different (further) ends; rather they are already 
                                                
80 Martin Rhonheimer, “The Moral Object of Human Acts and the Role of Reason 
According to Aquinas: A Restatement and Defense of My View,” Josephinum Journal of 
Theology 18 (2011): 454-506. [Though included in an issue originally slated to appear in 
2011, this essay was actually published in 2013.] 
81 Ibid., p. 456. 
82 Ibid. 
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different kinds of human acts at the level of their most basic moral 
specification, by their objects.83 
What is clear from this text is that for Rhonheimer, the moral object is the proximate end 
which specifies the human act. In his own words, “the morally specifying object of human 
acts is ‘the end of a deliberately willed act’ or ‘the end of an act proceeding from deliberate 
will’.”84 Later he will emphasize the role of reason in the moral specification of the object: 
“This is Aquinas’s constant teaching: reason is the measure of the goodness of human 
acts…Reason ‘conceives’ the object. This is also why Aquinas says: ‘Just as the species of 
natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are 
constituted by forms as conceived by the reason’ [STh I-II.18.10].” For Rhonheimer, in 
the moral order, the exterior act cannot be grasped properly by reason unless it is 
conceived as an end. The end specifies both the exterior act as a part, and the human act 
as a whole. 
 Rhonheimer raises at least three major conceptual objections to Thomistic 
theories of action like the one described in this chapter. First, he distinguishes his own 
account from Jensen’s and Dewan’s accounts – two readings of St. Thomas which belong 
to the same family of theories as the one described in this chapter – by claiming that his 
Thomistic theory properly equates objects to acts and not to things, an error he attributes 
to his critics: 
Jensen himself – like Dewan, to whom he refers – focuses on my view that 
moral objects are not the things that actions relate to (for example, 
                                                
83 Ibid., p. 458. 
84 Ibid., pp. 457-458. 
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“another person’s watch,” “a man or woman who is not my spouse,”) but 
acts relating to these “things” (e.g. “appropriating another person’s watch,” 
“having sexual intercourse with a man or woman who is not my spouse”). 
So in my view, the object that makes a given action fall under the moral 
species of “theft” is “appropriating another person’s property”; and the 
object that makes an action fall under the moral species of “fornication” 
(or if the person is married “adultery”) is “having sex with a person I am 
not married to.” Thus, according to my view, the object is what is called 
the “exterior act,” that is, the act that is chosen and commanded by the will 
for the sake of the good it realizes; which is, therefore, itself the object of 
the so called “interior act” of the will.85 
This alternative view, according to Rhonheimer, is erroneous because “to attribute to 
‘things’ a kind of goodness that is able to specify human acts morally is simply untenable. 
On this account, stealing a car would be a morally good action provided a car is 
something good; in fact, the better the car, the better and more praiseworthy the act of 
stealing it would become.”86 Therefore, he concludes that acts and not things must be the 
object of the moral act: “(1) the human act, as proceeding from deliberate will is morally 
specified by (2) the exterior act presented to the will as a ‘good apprehended and ordered 
by reason’.”87 
 In response, Rhonheimer is correct when he claims that the exterior act is the 
moral object of the human act. As we discussed above, the exterior act understood as a 
                                                
85 Ibid., p. 461. 
86 Ibid., p. 463. 
87 Ibid., p. 466. (original emphasis). 
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good apprehended and ordered by reason is indeed one of the two proper objects of the 
will that hylomorphically constitute the object of the act. However, pace Rhonheimer, I 
have argued that the exterior act cannot be presented to the will by the intellect unless it is 
first specified in itself as an intelligible good. As St. Thomas explains: “The exterior action 
is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good 
apprehended and ordained by the reason.” 88  Moreover, I have proposed that this 
specification of the exterior act is accomplished by the intellect, not by examining its 
relationship to the end, as Rhonheimer proposes, but by examining its relationship to its 
terminus, which is its matter. In our example, eating a PB&J is distinguished from eating 
a cheeseburger by the term of the act of eating, the kind of sandwich involved, and not by 
the proximate end, the nutritious food that will satiate the agent’s hunger, which attracts 
the will. If Rhonheimer’s proposal were true, i.e., if an exterior act is distinguished only 
with reference to the end of the acting person, then the two exterior acts considered by 
our hungry student during her deliberation would be indistinguishable from each other. 
They would both be specified as the same exterior act, the act of eating nutritious food.89 
Including a description of the exterior act specified by its matter in the moral object 
allows the intellect to present the exterior act to the will precisely as this intelligible good 
rather than that one. As St. Thomas explains, “[w]hen many actions, differing in species, 
                                                
88 STh I-II.20.1 ad 1. 
89 In the same way, the act of conjugal love – having sexual intercourse with one’s spouse 
– is distinguished from the act of fornication – having sexual intercourse with someone 
other than one’s spouse – by the term of the sexual act, and not by the end, which could 
be a pleasurable good or a reproductive good, among other attractive intelligible goods. If 
Rhonheimer’s insistence that human actions must include an intention for some end 
beyond what is contained in the description of the exterior act were true, then both of 
these sexual acts could simply be described as having sex with another for pleasure. 
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are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the 
exterior actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.”90 In our example, 
our student has chosen to eat a PB&J, and not just to eat nutritious food.  
With this distinction in place, I would adjust Rhonheimer’s definition of the 
moral object of the human act as follows: The human act as proceeding from deliberate 
will is morally specified by a specified exterior act presented to the will as a good 
apprehended and ordered by reason. In my view, this is a restatement of St. Thomas’s 
claim, already discussed above, that the exterior act is specified as good or evil “in respect 
of due matter and circumstances” and “in respect of the order to the end.”91 The former 
involves the moral specification of the exterior act in itself, and the latter involves the 
moral specification of the exterior act with respect to the agent’s motives. Both have to be 
good for the object to be good because both are willed by the will in executing the act. In 
our example, the moral object is the eating of a PB&J as nutritious food. This is good. In 
contrast, knowingly eating a stolen PB&J as nutritious food, or knowingly eating a PB&J 
as poisonous food, would be contrary to right reason. These are different evil acts whose 
repugnance to right reason is determined in different ways by the two distinct sources of 
goodness and malice in the exterior act, where the former act has a defect in the goodness 
of the exterior act and the latter has a defect in the goodness of the end. 92 This is why St. 
                                                
90 STh I-II.18.6 ad 3. 
91 STh I-II.20.2. Indeed, even though, Rhonheimer explicitly cites this text from St. 
Thomas that identifies a twofold goodness or malice in the exterior action (“The Moral 
Object of Human Acts,” pp. 467-468), it is striking that he does not include a discussion 
of these two sources of good or evil in the exterior act within his Thomistic theory of 
action. An accurate reconstruction of St. Thomas’s teaching would have to do so. 
92 Rhonheimer cites Fr. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., as someone who would advocate his 
reconstruction of St. Thomas’s theory of action, when Pinckaers writes: “But it would be a 
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Thomas can conclude: “Someone sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end, but 
also when he wills an evil act.”93 
 Next, Rhonheimer is critical of theories – like the one in this chapter – that posit 
that there are two moral objects, the object of the interior act of the will, and the object of 
the exterior act, “which would be the ‘thing’ to which this act relates or in which it 
terminates.”94 He argues that the existence of two moral objects would undermine the 
integrity and identity of a human act: 
Provided the moral object is what primarily and fundamentally gives the 
moral species to a human act, there cannot be two (or multiple, as at least 
one of these critics claim) moral objects. This is impossible in the same 
way as a being cannot have two substantial forms and a living organism 
cannot have two souls; because substantial forms establish a determinate 
being’s or a determinate organism’s species. The same applies to the 
fundamental specification of human acts: on the level of its primary and 
                                                                                                                                            
mistake to stop there, since the moral act only exists fully in its existential duality of 
interior act-exterior act; a moralist’s judgment would remain seriously incomplete if he 
were to neglect the contribution of the personal interior act.” (“The Moral Object of 
Human Acts,” p. 481). I disagree with Rhonheimer’s assessment. In this text, Pinckaers 
emphasizes the need for both the end and the specified exterior act in the moral 
specification of the human act. In contrast to those moralists who neglect the interior act 
– properly criticized by Pinckaers – Rhonheimer makes the complementary error when 
he neglects the fullness of the exterior act that is distinguished by its matter and morally 
specified by two sources of goodness and malice.  
93 STh I-II.20.2 ad 2: “Non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum finem; sed 
etiam quando vult malum actum.” 
94 Rhonheimer, “The Moral Object of Human Acts,” p. 472. 
  97 
fundamental specification it cannot simultaneously belong to two different 
species.95 
Like St. Thomas, Rhonheimer is opposed to any theory that posits the plurality of forms 
in a substance, in the natural order, or in a human act, in the moral order. 
 In response, Rhonheimer is correct when he affirms that a human act must be 
specified by a single moral object. However, though he does acknowledge the formal and 
material aspects of the moral object96, he fails to appreciate the full ramifications of the 
hylomorphic framework for St. Thomas’s theory of action. For Rhonheimer, the form of 
the moral object is the formality of intelligible good that makes it desirable, while its 
matter is the exterior act in itself, understood as the moral object desired by the will. 
Thus, in his view, the moral object of an act of theft – and thus its matter – is “the 
appropriation of another’s possession,” while the motive for the act of theft – and thus its 
form – is the thief’s desire to possess it:  
Ralph McInerny, commenting on the same passage of the Summa, simply 
states: “The object of the action is that which the agent sets out to do, to 
effect.” This, of course, is the appropriation of another’s possession. The 
formal aspect of the object, the ratio of its being good (to be chosen), is not 
the “being another’s” because the thief does not steal because a thing is 
another’s; the rationale of his desiring it is not its being another’s property, 
                                                
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., pp. 482-489. 
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but to appropriate, to possess and use it. This, therefore, is the object 
formally considered.97 
As we will discuss in greater detail below, the fatal difficulty with this explanation is that it 
is unable to distinguish similar acts undertaken for the same intention. It cannot 
distinguish appropriating another’s PB&J to possess it, from appropriating another’s 
cheeseburger to possess it. In contrast, as we discussed above, the two objects of the will, 
the end, and the specified exterior act, come together as form and matter to constitute a 
single moral object that specifies the human act. This added complexity allows the human 
agent to properly describe what he is doing with respect not only to the commanded act 
but also to the proximate end as well. Thus, in one scenario the student is stealing a 
hamburger (specified exterior act) to possess it (end), while in the other the student is 
stealing a cheeseburger (specified exterior act), also to possess it (end). Though this 
difference may not appear significant here, there are cases where the distinction becomes 
morally probative. Consider the two acts: A student knowingly eats a PB&J (specified 
exterior act) to nourish herself (end), and a student knowingly eats cyanide (specified 
exterior act) to nourish herself (end). Here the difference in specified exterior acts is 
incredibly important, lethally so! The former act is good, while the latter is evil (though 
we would have to wonder if the second student was either ignorant of the nature of 
cyanide or duplicitous about her true intentions in wanting to consume it.98) In his 
                                                
97 Ibid., pp. 486-487 (original emphasis). 
98 In an earlier essay, I noted that the human actions of reasonable agents have a narrative 
intelligibility to them. Including the specified exterior act within the moral object of the 
human act allows us to properly appreciate this intelligibility, or lack of it! It 
acknowledges that human agents meticulously undertake a means to end analysis that 
presupposes knowledge of the causal relationships of things with specified natures. For 
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theory, Rhonheimer conflates what needs to be distinguished for any accurate description 
of human action.  
 Finally, Rhonheimer argues, “if the exterior act had its own species-giving object – 
a ‘thing’ – which would precede the apprehension and ordering of reason, then we could 
no longer say, with Aquinas, that the morality of human acts is determined by reason. 
Nor would it be possible to accept Thomas’s teachings that reason is the measure of the 
goodness of human acts or that it presents the exterior act as ‘a good apprehended and 
ordered by reason’.”99 Significantly, he claims, “[o]ne could not hold these Thomistic 
doctrines, since the exterior act is already thought to be morally specified by the ‘obje[c]t 
of the exterior act’; thus, such an apprehension and ordering by reason would be entirely 
superfluous, simply ‘arriving too late’.”100 
 In response, Rhonheimer is correct to affirm the crucial role of the intellect in the 
moral specification of the human act. As we discussed above, the intellect does have this 
role in St. Thomas’s theory of action as we have reconstructed it in this chapter. However, 
Rhonheimer does not properly appreciate that the intellect can only apprehend the 
exterior act and present it to the will as an intelligible good, i.e., after it has been specified 
in itself. The role of object of the exterior act, i.e., its matter, is to specify it as this kind of 
exterior act rather than that kind of exterior act. This is an act of the intellect as it seeks to 
understand the exterior act. The goodness or malice of the exterior act is then morally 
specified, as St. Thomas explains, in reference to itself, i.e., “in respect of due matter and 
                                                                                                                                            
details, see my “On Reshaping Skulls and Unintelligible Intentions,” Nova et Vetera 2 
(2004): 81-100. In a way I did not see before, I now understand that this analysis 
presupposes and involves the virtue of prudence. 
99 Rhonheimer, “The Moral Object of Human Acts,” p. 472 (original emphasis). 
100 Ibid. 
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circumstances,” and in reference to the agent’s intention or motivation, i.e., “in respect of 
the order to the end.” This too is an act of the intellect as it examines the act of the will 
that has related this particular exterior act to this particular end. This is why St. Thomas 
will say in the already much cited quote regarding the two-fold goodness of the exterior 
act [my emphasis]: “And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely 
on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the 
reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends 
towards it.”101 It is inaccurate therefore for Rhonheimer to claim that for theories like the 
one described in this chapter, “[t]he morally specifying object of the will would be simply 
and directly that supposed ‘object of the exterior act’.”102 Rather, the morally specifying 
object of the will is the specified exterior act that has been apprehended and distinguished 
by the intellect as an intelligible good. The theory described here is neither a physicalist 
nor an intentionalist account. It is a realist one. 
 In sum, none of Rhonheimer’s objections are lethal blows to the Thomistic 
account of moral specification described here. Moreover, an examination of these 
objections reveals at least two major lacunae in his own reading of St. Thomas. First, his 
theory is not able to account for St. Thomas’s claim that there are two sources of good or 
evil for the exterior act and that these are important for the moral specification of the 
human act as a whole (cf. STh I-II.20.1). Second, Rhonheimer’s theory is not able to 
distinguish similar acts like eating a PB&J and eating a cheeseburger undertaken for an 
identical proximate end, i.e., for the same motive. It is not able to specify acts that have 
                                                
101 STh I-II.20.2. 
102 Rhonheimer, “The Moral Object of Human Acts,” p. 472. 
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been specified from the perspective of the acting person: Our student had to distinguish 
eating the PB&J from eating the cheeseburger before she could decide which one she 
would do as a means towards attaining her end of satiating her hunger with nourishing 
food. An accurate reconstruction of St. Thomas’s theory, indeed, of any true theory of the 
structure and the moral specification of the human act, would have to do both of these 
things. 
 
Objections to this Thomistic Theory of Action: Steven A. Long 
 Moving to Professor Steven Long’s objections. Like Rhonheimer, Long has an 
extensive bibliography of work dedicated to Thomistic action theory. I have chosen to 
focus on two, his book, The Theological Grammar of the Moral Act, which is his most 
extensive discussion of his action theory103, and a more recent essay published in Nova et 
Vetera, “Engaging Thomist Interlocutors,” where he responds to criticisms of his account, 
including criticisms from other scholars who hold to a reading of Thomistic moral 
specification similar to the one described in this chapter.104 
 Unlike Rhonheimer, Long affirms the hylomorphic structure of the moral object 
in a manner similar to the theory described here. The moral object is one composed of a 
formal component, which he calls the act’s “relation to reason, which is to say that which 
makes an act choiceworthy to the agent,” and a material component, which he describes 
as “the act itself and its integral nature.”105 He explains – correctly in my view – that one 
                                                
103 Steven A. Long, The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act (Naples, FL: Sapientia 
Press, 2007).  
104 Steven A. Long, “Engaging Thomist Interlocutors,” Nova et Vetera 9 (2011): 267-295. 
105 Long, Teleological Grammar, p. 12. 
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must include the integral nature of the act, what I have called “the specified exterior act,” 
into the moral object because not doing results in the reducing the object to the intention 
of the agent as he arbitrarily chooses to describe it:  
[S]ince the relation to reason is chiefly a relation to the end in relation to 
which the agent finds an act choiceworthy, by reducing the object to the 
relation reason, we reduce absolutely everything to the end principally 
sought by the agent…Were this to be true, then the object of the act could 
be altered merely by redescribing the act performed: “I’m not really 
strangling a child to death, I’m preventing dynastic civil war.”106 
For Long, the moral object must consider and include the specified exterior act in the 
moral specification of the human act. 
 Long raises a single conceptual objection to Thomistic theories of action like the 
one described in this chapter. But it is a significant one! In his view, for simple acts – 
recall that these are acts where the object of the exterior act, which is its matter, is 
ordained per se to the object of the interior act, which is the end – the goodness or malice 
of the act as a whole is determined not by its matter and the end together, but by the end 
alone: “[W]hether the end sought by the agent is the good and proper end, or is defective 
owing to the unrectified appetite of the agent, the determination of moral species requires 
that we understand the teleological relation of the object and end. For only in the case 
wherein the object is naturally, essentially, per se ordered to the end, is the most formal, 
containing, and defining species derived from the end.”107 Or again: “According to the 
                                                
106 Ibid., p. 15. (original emphasis). 
107 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
  103 
teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, we cannot so much as determine the moral species of an 
action unless we first know the answer to this question: is the object of this action 
naturally ordered to the end? If the object is ordered to the end then, whatever else may 
ensue on the part of the object, we will know that the most defining species is derived 
from the end willed.”108 
 To support his reading of St. Thomas, Long makes two arguments, an exegetical 
one and a pragmatic one. First, based upon a textual analysis of numerous passages in the 
Summa, especially STh I-II.18.7 and STh II-II.64.7, he claims that for St. Thomas, 
intention is chiefly of the end, and as such, it is the end and not the exterior act that 
specifies. Briefly, the dispute between Long and his Thomist interlocutors over the proper 
understanding of St. Thomas’s teaching in STh I-II.18.7 regards the proper relationship 
between a genus and its species in the moral order. Usually, the specific difference that 
distinguishes things of different natural kinds is thought of as most formal and therefore 
most determinative in the natural order. For example, as a rational animal, the human 
being is defined by the specific difference, being rational, and not by the formal 
difference, being an animal. Therefore, Kevin Keiser and Steven Jensen have argued that 
the object of the exterior act most properly gives species, because it is the object that 
confers the specific difference in an act.109 In our example, the PB&J distinguishes an act 
of eating a PB&J from an act of eating a cheeseburger, both of which are acts of eating 
nutritious food.  
                                                
108 Ibid., p. 30. 
109 Kevin Keiser, “The Moral Act in St. Thomas: A Fresh Look,” p. 277; and Steven Jensen, 
Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The 
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In response, Long argues that what is true in the natural order – that the specific 
difference is more determining than the formal difference – is reversed in the moral 
order:  
Normally, that which is formal is viewed as most defining, and as the 
specific difference derives from the form, we think of the specific 
difference as “most formal” and most actualizing. Thomas does not deny 
any of this here. But he does re-direct the intelligence, in a way that he 
often does with respect to the difference between understanding natural 
moral order and understanding the nature of substances.110 
Citing St. Thomas in STh I-II.18.7 ad 3, Long argues that “the genus is more formal than 
the species, inasmuch as it is more absolute and less contracted – it is not limited merely 
to any particular specific modality.”111 Thus he concludes: 
Now, in moral order, in the case wherein the object is per se ordained to the 
end, the most formal (this is expressly St. Thomas’s designation) species, 
which is also the most containing (as Thomas puts it in his respondeo, 
“Unde una istarum specierum continebitur sub altera,” and he makes quite 
clear that it is the species derived from the object that is contained by the 
species derived by the end), is derived from the end.112 
As justification for this reading, Long notes that in a per se ordering, the end acts as final 
cause that adds a further perfection to the exterior act:  
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Insofar as object is per se ordered toward end, the supremacy of the end is 
precisely what is reflected even in the further determination of the species 
derived from the object, for the added quantum of perfection, 
determinacy, and act reflected in that species is wholly for the sake of the 
end and is contained within the most formal species derived from it, as 
reflecting the optimal path of the agent to the end. In the case of per se 
order, everything that constitutes the added determinacy and act of the 
species derived from the object vis-à-vis the species derived from the end, 
exists for the sake of the end and as interiorly ordered to it and proceeding 
from its intention.113 
In sum, for Long, the end and the end alone specifies a simple act regardless of the 
goodness or malice of the object, as long as the object is in a per se ordering to the end. 
 Next, Long makes a pragmatic argument using several examples to illustrate his 
claim that the end specifies a simple act. Using a clinical example in support of his claim, 
he writes: 
In the case of surgery, accordingly, we do not say that there are two simple 
acts with two distinct moral species: We do not say that first there is an act 
of opening the chest cavity (with the moral species of butchery) followed 
by an act of surgery (with the moral species is that of a medicinal or 
healing act)—but only one act, with one medicinal species…Since the end 
is medical, and since the object is naturally ordered to it (in this instance, 
naturally ordered in the sense that absolutely speaking one cannot gain 
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access to the heart for the purposes of surgical repair without opening the 
chest cavity), the most formal species is derived from the end, and the 
moral species derived from the object is contained within the species of the 
end, that is, this opening of the chest cavity is medical.114   
Long also uses several examples of self-defense in support of his theory. To appreciate 
these scenarios, we need to briefly summarize Long’s reading of St. Thomas’s text that we 
have already discussed above (STh II-II.64.7). For Long, the innocent victim may 
deliberately choose lethal means precisely as lethal means to attain his end of moderate 
self-defense. This obtains, according to Long, because the end – moderate self-defense – 
specifies the goodness of the exterior act even if that exterior act involves lethal means 
deliberately chosen as such in itself: 
Because the act itself and its integral nature are always included in the 
object of the moral act, we must say that this is indeed a lethal act, but 
because the lethality here is chosen under the ratio of defense, to which it is 
per se ordered, the most formal, defining, and containing moral species is 
derived from the end. Hence we say this is fundamentally a defensive act 
and the difference (accidental with respect to this fundamental species from 
the end) which is introduced by the object is: homicidal or lethal: this is a 
defensive homicide.115 
As an example, Long explains that the lethal shooting of an axe-bearing felon in the head 
just as he is about to decapitate one’s child is a justifiable act. To give this case more force, 
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he further stipulates that in this scenario, “none other but a shot to the head will so 
incapacitate the nervous system as to assure that the axe does not slay or maim one’s 
daughter” and that “one knows that such a shot to the head is by its nature, per se, 
ordered to kill.”116 Despite these conditions, according to Long, this killing is still a 
justifiable act of self-defense, a defensive homicide. In response to those who would deny 
his theory of moral specification, Long claims that contrary accounts of moral 
specification, including the reading of St. Thomas described in this chapter, would deny 
the commonsense moral intuition that one can shoot an assailant in the head to save 
one’s self. 
 In response, I have to admit that I hesitate to participate in an exegetical dispute 
over the proper reading of a single article in St. Thomas’s corpus, especially a text that 
involves a potential inversion, as Long would have it, of the standard rules of logic. From 
my experience as a scientist, it is hard to argue for or against any theory, including a 
theory of textual interpretation, with a single data point. However, I do want to bring up 
the additional text – a critical text to which I have already referred – as an additional data 
point to help us draw a line. Recall that St. Thomas teaches the following: “[W]e may 
consider a twofold goodness or malice in the exterior action: one in respect of due matter 
and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end.”117 In my view, Long’s 
account – ironically, like his opponent, Rhonheimer’s – focuses solely on the second 
source of goodness, i.e., its relationship to the end. As I said in my respondeo to 
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Rhonheimer, any accurate reconstruction of St. Thomas’s theory needs to bring both 
sources of goodness into view.  
 To illustrate how we can do this, let us return to Long’s clinical example. In his 
view, this example supports his theory that the end alone specifies a simple act. 
Otherwise, according to Long, the act of opening the chest cavity during an open-heart 
surgery would be specified as an act of butchery, putting it immediately under negative 
precept. Clearly this cannot be true.  
In response, as I pointed out above, the human agent can only discern the 
relationship between the object of the exterior act and the end, if he has already specified 
the exterior act in itself. Thus, in my view, a surgeon would have to specify his exterior act 
in itself first without referring to the end. Furthermore, I do not think that the surgeon 
would specify his exterior act as Long would have him do it. Indeed, I do not think that 
any reasonable person observing a surgeon opening up his patient’s chest cavity would 
specify that act as an act of “opening the chest cavity”! Rather, he would specify it as the 
“opening the chest cavity of a patient by his surgeon.” This specification includes 
circumstances “of a patient” and “by his surgeon” that, in my view, properly and 
necessarily participate in the specification of the exterior act. As such, they are not 
circumstances properly so called but constitutive elements of the act’s object. Long 
himself acknowledges that circumstances can specify: “[M]orally, a circumstance can 
introduce a new object, because the object is what the act is about in relation to reason, 
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and by way of the circumstance’s direct effect on what the act is about in relation to 
reason, it can change the objective nature of the act.”118 
Thus, the act of the surgeon would never be specified as an act of butchery as 
Long would have it. It is specified precisely as an act of thoracic surgery, described as the 
act of opening the chest cavity of a patient by his surgeon, that is further ordered towards 
the end of healing. It is a simple act where the exterior act is per se ordered towards 
healing. Therefore it is a medicinal act that is in accord with right reason. (Note that an 
act of thoracic surgery, though good in itself, could be further ordered towards the death 
of the patient by a malicious surgeon. This would be an act of murder that is repugnant to 
right reason where the defect obtains because of a disorder in the exterior act’s relation to 
the end.) In my view, all simple acts can be analyzed and specified as I have just done 
because exterior acts can be specified as good or evil in themselves, as St. Thomas teaches, 
“in respect to due matter and circumstances.” Notice that with this reading, simple acts 
are still specified by the end – as Long would claim from his reading of STh I-II.18.7 – but 
only after the exterior act has been determined in itself (cf. STh I-II.20.2), a judgment that 
has to be undertaken before the intellect can determine if it is ordered per se or per 
accidens with regards to the end. Two texts justify an interpretation. Two points specify a 
line.  
In my view, Long falls into error, because he ignores the common everyday 
experience of human agents who have to evaluate the morality of all of their exterior acts 
in themselves, even when they are executed within the context of a simple act. Returning 
to Long’s example of the surgeon. During the planning of a surgery to effect the healing of 
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the patient, a surgeon considers all the possible surgical interventions that he could 
undertake to effect a particular cure. Simplistically, he could ask himself: Should I open 
the chest cavity at the level of the third or of the fourth rib? (Notice that he is specifying 
each possible surgical act by distinguishing the matter of one act from the matter of 
another act, where the matter is that reality upon which the commanded powers of the 
soul act.) In doing so, however, he inevitably evaluates each for its goodness or for its 
malice, not only in itself – is this surgical act a good act? – but also in relation to the end – 
will this surgical act heal my patient? This is how he decides what he is going to do in the 
operating room. This is why a reasonable surgeon would never consider using a chainsaw 
during surgery! It may open the chest cavity, and it may even bring about the healing of 
the patient (because it allows the surgeon to correct the valve defect,) but it would be 
messy! It would be messy in itself. It would lack the fullness of being. It would be evil. All 
things being equal, a human chest is not apt matter for being acted upon by a chainsaw. 
 Turning now to Long’s argument involving the moral specification of acts of self-
defense. As I described above, for a legitimate act of self-defense to obtain, St. Thomas 
teaches that the innocent victim needs to have the preservation of his own life as his end. 
He must also choose a particular exterior act that is proportionate to attaining this end. 
Moreover, according to my reading, the text suggests that a proportionate act of self-
defense is one that can save one’s life without necessarily killing one’s assailant, though 
the chosen means could still be lethal means since St. Thomas does not rule out the 
praeter intentionem slaying of the attacker in a legitimate act of self-defense. However, 
what distinguishes my account from Long’s theory is that I believe that for St. Thomas, an 
act of self-defense is an act where the death of the assailant is never included within the 
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moral object of the innocent victim’s will. Thus, I think that it is legitimate for an 
innocent victim to shoot his assailant in the head with a .45 Magnum if that were the only 
weapon available to him and if that were the only thing that he could do at that particular 
moment to save his own life. However, I would add that the innocent victim would not 
and could not deliberately intend the death of his assailant as a means of warding him off.   
 Long is critical of this account because he believes that this account involves a 
slight-of-hand re-description of an act of defensive homicide that is “deeply confused and 
indeed, taken as an account of some uncontrovertibly moral defensive killings, simply 
contrary to fact.”119 For Long, there are clear cases where essentially lethal means are 
chosen precisely as lethal because there are no other means available. In these cases, he is 
convinced that one’s choice of these means necessarily involves including the death of 
one’s assailant, and that to say otherwise, is “a simple re-description of the act which 
could risk certain of the implications of intentionalism to which Fr. Dewan’s [who holds 
to a reading of St. Thomas similar to the one described in this chapter] analysis is on the 
whole opposed.”120 He argues that permitting this type of re-description would open the 
Pandora’s box of moral specification unhinged from any anchor in reality:  
Why, for instance, ought not the HIV spouses using condoms to say: We 
do not intend to contracept, but only to protect a spouse from viral 
contamination without sparing the material occurrence of contraception? 
Just as one might say: We do not intend to kill, but only to defend 
ourselves without sparing the material occurrence of killing? 
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Long counters this dangerous perspective by once again noting that “sed contra: the 
integral nature of the act and its per se effects are included in the object.”121 Thus, he 
concludes:  
It seems to me that for St. Thomas, the matter of the act—its integral nature 
and per se effects—are always included in the object of the moral act. 
Hence, some defensive acts are defensive homicides, and some of these 
homicides are purely accidental, and some are actually chosen under the 
ratio of defense. These defenses do not happen without choice: that is 
certainly in the order of fact. And it is also, I believe, incontrovertible that 
some defenses can be made only through lethal means. Since these lethal 
means do not apply themselves to act, they must be chosen. The ratio of the 
choice is defense, but the lethal act is chosen.122 
For Long, the choice of lethal means as one’s exterior act necessarily leads to one’s 
choosing the death of one’s assailant. Otherwise, this would lead to a theory of action that 
is intentional in its perspective and as such open to subjective re-descriptions that are not 
constrained by reality. 
 In response, Long is correct to reject an intentionalist account of human action 
that specifies acts solely by reference to the end that is intended. But does this rejection 
necessarily entail the negation of the reading of St. Thomas described here? I do not think 
so. Consider the case of the innocent victim who shoots his assailant in the head with a 
.45 Magnum, the only weapon available to him at the time. Long imagines that this is a 
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person who has gone through a process of deliberation that can be described as follows: 
“Someone is going to kill me. I need to stop him. I only have this .45 Magnum to stop 
him. I cannot shoot him anywhere but in the head. However, I know that shooting him in 
the head will kill him. But that is the only way for me to save my life. I know that I will kill 
him, but I will shoot him.” The victim shoots.  
I dispute this analysis. I do not think that it is realistic. Consider two alternative 
scenarios. First, consider the following monologue from the perspective of the acting 
person who is being attacked by an unjust assailant: “Someone is going to kill me. I am 
scared. I am frightened. I do not know what to do. He is getting closer. I am going to die. 
Here is a gun. I can use it to stop him. I will shoot him.” The victim shoots. Next, consider 
this alternative monologue: “Someone is going to kill me. I have shot him in the leg. He is 
still coming. I have shot him in the chest. He is still coming. He is going to kill me. I have 
to shoot him in the head. That is the only way I will be able to stop this berserker.” The 
victim shoots. 
Long presupposes that the choosing of lethal means necessarily means that one 
has chosen to deliberately will the death of one’s assailant, including his death in the 
object of the exterior act. However, as I tried to indicate in my victim’s alternative 
monologues, I do not think that this is the case. In a highly charged and emotional 
scenario – a scenario of self-defense when one’s life is threatened by another certainly 
qualifies as such a case – I claim that it is reasonable to think that a victim can choose 
whatever means is available to stop the attack under the ratio of warding off the attacker. 
If the only means are lethal means, so be it, but this does not entail that the victim 
necessarily desires the death of his assailant.  
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Returning to our first monologue, while the victim shoots at the head while he is 
shooting his attacker, it does not mean that he is intending to kill, because in this first 
scenario, the victim did not intend to shoot his assailant in the head at all. He simply 
wants to shoot because he knows that shooting the assailant will ward off the attack. 
Therefore, I propose that the exterior act should not be described as “shooting a bullet 
into the head of one’s assailant,” but simply “shooting a bullet at one’s assailant.” The 
matter of the exterior act is the unjust assailant who receives the innocent victim’s 
shooting of the bullet as the term. “With respect to due matter and circumstances,” this 
would be a good act because an unjust attacker is apt matter to receive a bullet that has 
been shot to stop the attack. “In respect of the order to the end,” this too would be a good 
act because it is a shooting of the assailant to defend one’s life. This specifies the shooting 
as an act of self-defense.  
In the second scenario, while the victim shoots at the head intentionally, he does 
so without deliberately willing the assailant’s death. Rather he shoots at the head because 
it is the only way that he sees himself stopping the assailant. Therefore, I propose that the 
exterior act should not be described as “shooting a bullet into the head of one’s assailant,” 
but “shooting a bullet into the head of one’s assailant when this is the only available 
means to stop his attack.” This description, in my view, better respects the perspective of 
this terrified acting person. The matter of the exterior act is the head of the unjust 
assailant that receives the innocent victim’s shooting of the bullet as the term. “With 
respect to due matter and circumstances,” this would be a good act because the head of an 
unjust attacker is apt matter to receive a bullet when this is the only means to stopping 
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the assailant’s attack. It is in accord with right reason. “In respect of the order to the end,” 
this too would be a good act. Once again, it is an act of self-defense. 123 
Finally, I should point out that in my view, self-defense cases are particularly 
difficult to specify because of their highly emotional and charged nature, which is why I 
do not think that they should be used to make or break a Thomistic theory of action. As 
we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, the passions can move the intellect and 
the will in ways that are inimical to right reason. 
But what about Long’s concern that this analysis opens up moral theology to an 
intentionalism that permits the agent to propose subjective re-descriptions that justify 
condom use (to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS) or the murder of a royal heir (to 
prevent dynastic civil war)? His fears are not warranted. In both these cases, according to 
the reading of St. Thomas proposed here, the exterior acts are specified as “depositing 
one’s semen into a condom”, and “choking a child”. Both of these acts are repugnant to 
right reason since a condom is not apt to be the matter for the depositing of semen, and a 
child is not apt matter for choking. As such these acts are defective “with respect to due 
matter and circumstances.” They lack the perfection of goodness proper to a good act, 
regardless of the further end to which they are ordered. As such they are intrinsically evil.  
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 In summary, I propose that a Thomistic theory of action that acknowledges the 
three sources of goodness for the moral object, i.e., the end, the exterior act in itself, and 
the exterior act in relation to the end, and the hylomorphic relationship between the 
object of the exterior act and the object of the interior act that constitutes the moral object 
in its fullness, can account for the commonsense intuitions of everyday moral agents. 
Professor Long affirms the latter, but like Fr. Rhonheimer, he rejects the former. One 
needs both for a faithful reconstruction of St. Thomas’s theory of action. 
 
The Moral Specification of a Placentectomy to Resolve a Crisis Pregnancy 
 Returning now to the controversial Phoenix abortion case. In her analysis, 
Lysaught begins with a summary of the crisis pregnancy case that occasioned the 
controversial placentectomy at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Phoenix. In brief, an 11-week 
pregnant woman with a history of moderate but well-controlled pulmonary hypertension 
developed a “severe, life-threatening pulmonary hypertension” with a risk of mortality 
“near 100 percent.”124 Two additional pathologies emerged, the pathology of right side 
heart failure and cardiogenic shock. Together, these conditions threatened the life of both 
the mother and her fetal child. In response to this crisis pregnancy, the women’s 
physicians performed an ethics committee-approved “dilation and curettage to detach the 
placenta” 125 , which was the immediate cause of the life-threatening pathological 
conditions described above.  
                                                
124 Lysaught, “Moral Analysis,” p. 538.  
125 Ibid., p. 546. As any obstetrician will tell you, however, a dilation and curettage 
procedure on an 11-week pregnant woman whose fetal child is only 1.5 inches long 
cannot physically disrupt the placenta without simultaneously disrupting the small body 
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 Moving to her moral analysis proper, Lysaught explicitly relies on the arguments 
of Fr. Martin Rhonheimer and of Germain Grisez to justify the placentectomy performed 
in Phoenix. Though they are not identical, these theories are similar in that both specify a 
moral act with reference to the end alone.126 Lysaught captures the central claim of both 
these accounts as follows: “A proper description of the moral object, then, certainly 
includes the ‘exterior act — since it is a necessary part of the moral action as a whole — 
but it derives its properly moral content first and foremost from the proximate end 
deliberately chosen by the will.” 127  Not surprisingly, therefore, she argues that a 
placentectomy to resolve a crisis pregnancy should be specified not as a direct killing of 
the child at the moral level but as the “saving the life of the mother.”128 Lysaught 
concludes: 
Following the opinions of [Rhonheimer and Grisez], I would argue that 
the intervention that occurred at St. Joseph’s Hospital on Nov. 5, 2009, 
cannot properly be described as an “abortion,” in terms of its moral object. 
At most, the effect on the child can only be categorized as “indirect,” 
which is morally permitted by the Catholic tradition. Most important, the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the fetal child. Thus, it is erroneous for Lysaught and for the Hospital to argue that this 
medical intervention targeted the placenta alone without simultaneously targeting the 
fetal child. Nonetheless, I will ignore this very significant error and will conclude this 
chapter by considering her moral analysis on her own terms.  
126 For two recent papers that defend Germain Grisez’s account of moral specification, as 
it has been appropriated by those philosophers who argue for the New Natural Law 
Theory, see the following: Christopher Tollefsen, “Is a purely first person account of 
human action defensible?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2006): 441-460; and 
Christopher Tollefsen, “Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien’s ‘Objects of 
Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory’,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2013): 751-778. 
127 Lysaught, “Moral Analysis,” p. 542. 
128 Ibid., p. 546. 
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death of the child was not willed, either by the mother or the medical staff; 
the child was a deeply wanted child. Effecting the death of the child would 
not achieve any medical or ancillary end. Therefore the death of the child 
was not the means to any end in this case…The moral object of the 
intervention was to save the life of the mother. The death of the fetus was, 
at maximum, nondirect and praeter intentionem. 129 
It should be clear that Lysaught’s moral analysis is not a novel account. Rather, in her 
view, it is a specific application of Rhonheimer’s (and Grisez’s) theory of moral 
specification to a particular medical intervention undertaken to resolve a crisis 
pregnancy.130 
 In response, I will not rehash my objections to Rhonheimer’s account discussed 
above. They apply to Lysaught’s analysis as well. Instead, I will focus on applying the 
theory described in this chapter to the medical intervention of a placentectomy to resolve 
a crisis pregnancy. Is it a virtuous act?  
As I have already discussed several times above, the first step in this process 
involves specifying the exterior act that is chosen. Based on the medical narrative, this is 
properly described as “disrupting the placenta of a fetal child with a D&C,” where the 
matter of act is the fetal child’s placenta. When she entered the operating room, this is 
what the obstetrician willed to do as a means to the end of resolving the pathologies of the 
critically ill pregnant woman. Note that Lysaught chose to disregard the critical specifying 
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action theory. See his essay, “Vital Conflicts, Direct Killing, and Justice,” pp. 534-535. 
[Footnote 26] 
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condition that the placenta, in the most part, belongs to the fetal child as an organ that 
provides him with essential gases and nutrients from his mother. As I have explained in 
greater detail elsewhere, the placenta is a predominantly fetal organ constituted primarily 
by cells of fetal origin.131 As we will see shortly, this is a specifying condition for the 
matter of the exterior act because “belonging to the fetal child” will necessarily influence 
our moral evaluation of the act in the same way that “belonging to a church” is also a 
specifying condition for a the cup that we call a chalice. 
Next, the second step involves evaluating the goodness of this act. In itself, 
disrupting the placenta of a fetal child is repugnant to right reason because the placenta of 
a fetal child – a vital organ for the child in utero – is not apt matter to receive an act of 
physical disruption. It would constitute an attack on the child in the same way that 
disrupting the heart of a teenager – a vital organ for the young man – would constitute an 
attack on him. “With respect to due matter and circumstances,” disrupting the placenta of 
the fetal child would be intrinsically evil regardless of its further ordering to the end of 
saving the life of the pregnant woman.  
In sum, a placentectomy undertaken to resolve a crisis pregnancy lacks the 
fullness of being and thus of goodness that it should have. It is the killing of an innocent 
fetal child and as such is a direct abortion. Contrary to Lysaught’s conclusions, it can 
never be justified. It can never be a virtuous act. 
                                                
131 Austriaco, “Abortion in a Case of Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension,” p. 517. 
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Finally, as a post-script, I would like to propose that a virtuous alternative to the 
placentectomy is the pre-viable induction of labor to resolve a crisis pregnancy.132 Here, 
the physicians induce labor by giving the pregnant woman a drug that acts on the uterus 
to trigger contractions. The exterior act would involve the chemical alteration of the 
gravid uterus so that it will contract. Note that a gravid uterus is apt matter for the 
chemical alteration that triggers labor. This is done routinely in labor and delivery rooms 
around the planet. In the context of a crisis pregnancy, it is ordered by the physician to 
the end of expulsion of a placenta that is the immediate cause of a life-threatening 
pathological condition. As such, in my view, this human act is in accord with right 
reason. It would be good. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described a theory of action that I believe is faithful to the 
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is a reading that acknowledges that human acts are 
willed causal events with a hylomorphic structure composed of both material and formal 
principles. It is a reading that illustrates well how an understanding of hylomorphic 
theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s moral theology can allow us to clarify and to 
resolve contemporary ethical disputes among theologians working within the Thomistic 
tradition today. In the next chapter, we will extend this analysis to St. Thomas’s theory of 
human emotion and to its application to conceptual problems in contemporary 
                                                
132 Meredith White and Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., “The Use of Pre-term Induction in 
Crisis Pregnancies: The Drowning Lifeguard-Drowning Swimmer Case,” Angelicum, in 
press. Also see my, “Resolving Crisis Pregnancies: Acting on the Mother versus Acting on 
the Fetal Child,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15 (2015): 207-208. 
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neuroscience that impact moral theology because of the influence of the passions on the 
intellect and the will. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Is There a Non-Dualist Definition for Pavlovian “Learned” Fear? 
A Hylomorphic Investigation of the Passions 
 
Introduction  
 In a recent and comprehensive scientific review summarizing the state-of-the-
science of the biology of fear, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences (USA), world-renowned neuroscientist and expert on the biology of fear, Joseph 
LeDoux acknowledges that he and his colleagues are struggling to define fear.1 For some 
neuroscientists, fear has been associated with the unconscious responses elicited by 
threats to an organism’s well being, while for others working in the same field, fear 
necessarily includes the conscious felt experience that we associate with what we call the 
“feeling” of fear. The former definition of fear locates fear in the species-typical, 
presumably innate, behavioral, and physiological responses in response to a threat, while 
the latter definition attributes subjective states to organisms in the “state of fear,” which 
are said to cause fearful behavior.  
 LeDoux notes that neuroscientists today are prone to blend these two perspectives 
of fear leading them to assume that “some emotional feelings are innately wired in brain 
circuits and others are psychologically or socially determined.” 2  However, LeDoux 
personally rejects this “dualistic” account “where fear is a bottom-up state that is 
unleashed in a prepackaged pure form of experience stored in a hardwired circuit, and 
                                                
1 Joseph E. LeDoux, “Coming to terms with fear,” Proc. Natl Acad. Sci USA 111 (2014): 
2871-2878. The two paragraphs that follow is much indebted to this systematic review.  
2 Ibid., p. 2876. 
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other feelings are cognitively constructed.”3 Instead, LeDoux seeks to restrict the term 
fear to the conscious experience that occurs when an organism is threatened. He proposes 
the following definition: “Fear is what happens when the sentient brain is aware that its 
personal well-being (physical, mental, social, cultural, existential) is challenged or may be 
at some point. What ties together all instances of fear is an awareness, based on the raw 
materials available, that danger is near or possible.”4 Strikingly, however, this definition 
leads LeDoux to reject the commonly held view that human infants and animals feel fear.  
 In this chapter, I investigate the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas to 
understand the passions and their relationship to the intellect and to the will in order to 
bring his account into conversation with our present-day biological understanding of the 
emotions.5 I begin with his description of a human passion as a hylomorphic reality of an 
appetitive movement as form, and of a bodily reaction as matter, situating it within his 
anthropological understanding of the human person as a hylomorphic whole. To better 
illustrate St. Thomas’s hylomorphic understanding of the passions, we then turn to his 
account of a specific passion, the passion of fear (timor). I conclude my investigation of 
St. Thomas’s treatise on the passions with his treatment of the relationship between acts 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 There is been much recent debate over the similarities and differences between the 
passions and the emotions. As I will propose in this chapter, I think that St. Thomas’s 
definition of a passion can be used to describe the emotions investigated by Joseph 
LeDoux and other neuroscientists. For a sense of this debate comparing passions and 
emotions, compare the following texts: Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and 
the Meaning of Life, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993); and 
Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological 
Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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of the higher powers, our acts of knowing and of willing, and acts of the lower powers, 
our acts of feeling. They relate to each other too as form relates to matter. 
 I then propose that this hylomorphic understanding of the passions is an solution 
to the current problem faced by neuroscientists, accurately described by LeDoux, of 
defining fear without falling victim to a dualistic understanding of the emotions. To 
demonstrate its explanatory power, I illustrate how this hylomorphic theory of the 
passions can explain the phenomenology of fear in a manner that is compatible with the 
best data of contemporary neuroscience. This chapter will illustrate how an 
understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s moral 
theology can clarify contemporary questions extending beyond theology, in this case in 
the neuroscience of emotions, which have a direct impact on moral theology because of 
the impact that passions have on our intellect and on our will. 
 
The Hylomorphic Structure of Thomistic Passion 
 Everyone feels. Everyone experiences what St. Thomas and his contemporaries 
called, the passions of the soul (passiones animae).6 To explain this very human activity, 
the Angelic Doctor wrote three extended treatments of the passions during his career: In 
                                                
6 For recent discussions on the passions/emotions in St. Thomas Aquinas, see Robert 
Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); and Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., The Logic of 
Desire: Aquinas on the Passions (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2011). I am also indebted to the discussion found in the following chapters: Kevin 
White, “The Passions of the Soul (Ia IIae, qq. 22-48)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 103-115; 
and Peter King, “Aquinas on the Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. 
Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 209-226. 
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Sent. III.15.2.26.1 and III.15.2.27.1, written between 1252-12567; De veritate q.25-26, 
written between 1256-1259; and STh I-II.22-48, written around 1271, the last of which is 
universally acknowledged as one of the most sustained and sophisticated investigations of 
the emotions ever written.8 Notably, the Angelic Doctor situated his treatment of the 
passions within the Secunda pars of the Summa, which today would be considered the 
part of the text dealing with his moral theology. This follows from St. Thomas’s 
observation and from our everyday experience that the passions can anticipate to or 
proceed from acts of the intellect and the will as the human agent acts to attain a real or 
an apparent good. 
Recall from Chapter One that the human agent is best described, according to St. 
Thomas, as a hylomorphic substance of prime matter and of substantial form, a body-
soul composite. The human rational soul has five basic powers, where each power is a 
potency in the soul to some perfection of the form.  
First, it has vegetative powers ordered towards its secondary matter, which is the 
human body itself. These are the powers responsible for the organism’s biological 
capacities to nourish itself, to grow, and to reproduce.9 Next, the rational soul has sense 
powers ordered toward the proper and common sensibles, five exterior senses actualized 
by those qualities like color, sound, odor, flavor, and tangibility that allow the human 
                                                
7 Dates are taken from Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 1: The 
Person and His Work, Trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2005). 
8 For representative scholars who profess this view of the treatise of the passions in the 
Summa, see the following texts: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., ”Les passions et la morale,” Revue 
des sciences philosophiques and theologiques 74 (1990): 379-391, p. 379; Peter King, 
“Aquinas on the Emotions,” p. 209; and Brian Davies, O.P., Thomas Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 170. 
9 STh I.78.2. 
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organism to perceive his surroundings10, and five interior senses actualized by integrated 
sense data, by particular forms, by phantasms, by memories, and by non-sensible 
intentions (intentiones) that indicate if the sensible object is good or evil for the person. 
Third, the rational soul has a locomotive power ordered to the term of the body’s 
operation and movement. This is the power that allows a man to move his body not only 
in place but also from one place to another. These sense and locomotive powers are 
shared with the souls of the other animals.  
Fourth, the rational soul has appetitive powers that move the organism towards 
realities that it apprehends as desirable.11 The human agent has three of these appetitive 
inclinations. First, there is the intellective appetite or the will, considered in detail in the 
previous chapter, which moves the human organism towards intelligible goods and away 
from intelligible evils.12 Next, there are the two sensitive appetitive inclinations, first, the 
concupiscible appetite that moves the agent towards the beneficial and away from the 
harmful, simply and particularly considered, and second, the irascible appetite that moves 
him towards the beneficial that is hard to attain and away from the harmful that is hard to 
avoid, again, simply and particularly considered.13 Lastly, the rational soul has powers of 
intellective cognition, composed of the active and the passive intellects, that are ordered 
towards those universal concepts that are knowable.14  
                                                
10 STh I.78.3. 
11 STh I.80.1. 
12 STh I.82.1-2. 
13 STh I.81.2. 
14 STh I.79.1. 
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 Within this anthropological context, St. Thomas defines a passion as a 
hylomorphic reality involving a movement of the sensitive appetite as formal, and a 
proportionate physiological change in the body, as material:  
In the passions of the soul, the formal aspect is the movement of the 
appetitive power, while the material aspect is the bodily change, both of 
which are proportionate to each other.15  
Or again: 
As applied to love, with respect to its formal aspect, it is on the part of the 
appetite. But with respect to the material aspect of the passion of love, 
which is a bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful if this change is 
excessive.16 
Despite its hylomorphic constitution, however, a passion remains an integral reality. 
When we fall in love, we experience the attraction to the beloved – the formal aspect of 
the passion – the pulse-racing, the knees-going-weak, and the butterflies-in-the-stomach 
sensation – the material aspect of the passion – as multi-faceted dimensions of the single 
passion we associate with love, in this case, romantic love. 
 For St. Thomas, the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive 
powers because they incline the human agent towards realities in the world, a outward 
motion associated more with the appetitive rather than with the apprehensive powers. 
                                                
15 STh I-II.44.1: “In passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, 
sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri proportionatur.”  
16 STh I-II.28.5: “Dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est 
scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, 
quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum 
immutationis.” 
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Love, for instance, moves the human agent toward his beloved. Passions, for St. Thomas, 
must then be in the soul’s powers that move the agent towards realities in the world. 
These are the appetitive powers. As St. Thomas explains: 
The name “passion” implies that the patient is drawn to that which is the 
agent’s. Now the soul is drawn to a thing through the appetitive power 
rather than by the apprehensive power because the soul has, through its 
appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves…On the 
other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; 
but knows it by reason of a non-sensible intentions (intentiones) of the 
thing, which it has in itself, or receives in its own way.17 
Next, the passions are in the sensitive appetites rather than in the intellective appetite, i.e., 
the will, because they involve physiological changes. Fear, for instance, is accompanied by 
rapid heart rate, increased blood pressure, tightening of the muscles, dilation of the pupils 
and increased sweating. Passions, for St. Thomas, must then be in the soul’s powers that 
are intimately associated to the body. These are the sensitive appetites. As St. Thomas 
explains:  
A passion is properly to found where there is bodily change, which is 
found in the act of the sensitive appetite…Now there is no need for bodily 
change in the act of the intellectual appetite because this appetite does not 
                                                
17 STh I-II.22.2: “In nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est 
agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim 
apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in 
seipsis sunt…Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est 
sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum 
proprium modum.” 
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involve a power of any bodily organ. It is therefore evident that a passion is 
more properly found in the act of the sensitive rather than of the 
intellective appetite.18 
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that because of their hylomorphic structure, for St. 
Thomas, a passion is experienced neither by the soul nor by the body but by the soul-
body composite: “And passion is not found in the soul except accidently but in the 
composite essentially.”19 Or again: “If passion is strictly taken it is impossible for anything 
incorporeal to suffer. Therefore, in a passion properly so called, it is the body that suffers 
essentially. If we say that a passion properly pertains to the soul, this is only as it is united 
to the body, and as such it [only pertains to the soul] indirectly.”20 It is the human agent 
who loves. It is the human agent who fears. It is the human agent who feels. 
 
The Hylomorphic Structure of Fear According to St. Thomas Aquinas 
 To illustrate St. Thomas’s hylomorphic understanding of the passions in more 
detail, we now turn to his account of a specific passion, the passion of fear (timor). The 
Angelic Doctor devotes four quaestiones in the Summa theologiae to this passion.  
                                                
18 STh I-II.22.3: “Passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem 
invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitive…In actu autem appetitus intellectivi non 
requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus 
alicuius organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus 
sensitivi quam intellectivi.” 
19 STh I-II.22.1 ad 3: “Et huiusmodi passio animae convenire non potest nisi per accidens, 
per se autem convenit composito.” 
20  De veritate 26.2: “Quod proprie accipiendo passionem, impossibile est aliquod 
incorporeum pati, ut supra, art. praec., dictum est. Illud ergo quod per se patitur passione 
propria, corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc 
non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens.” 
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 In the first question that deals with fear in itself, he begins by explaining why fear 
is properly a passion: It is a movement in the appetitive power that is accompanied by 
bodily responses, which the human agent experiences as a reality that acts upon him as a 
passive subject.21 As such, for St. Thomas, fear chiefly has the character of a passion after 
sorrow.22 He then defines fear as that special passion with a future evil, difficult and 
irresistible (malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest), as its object.23 A passion is 
distinguished from all the other passions by its object, in the same way that a virtue is 
distinguished from all the other virtues by its object. St. Thomas explains that living 
organisms that shrink from corruptive evils that they apprehend can be said to experience 
fear on account of their natural desire to exist.24 The quaestio ends with a taxonomy of 
fear, distinguished by proper divisions of the object of fear itself.25 St. Thomas affirms six 
species of fear, namely laziness (segnities), bashfulness (erubescentia), shame (verecundia), 
amazement (admiratio), stupor (stupor), and anxiety (agonia).  
  Turning to the next question in the quartet of quaestiones on fear, St. Thomas 
investigates the object of the passion. First, according to the Angelic Doctor, an object of 
fear must be perceived by the agent as something evil in itself, namely as something that 
deprives the agent of the good that he loves.26 As such, properly speaking, fear is the 
passion that the agent experiences when he recoils from the possibility that he will lose a 
good that he loves. St. Thomas then explains that the proper object of fear is not just an 
                                                
21 STh I-II.41.1. 
22 Ibid. 
23 STh I-II.41.2. 
24 STh I-II.41.3. 
25 STh I-II.41.4. 
26 STh I-II.42.1. 
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evil, but is more specifically, a future evil that is threatening to the agent. As he observes, 
citing Aristotle, fear is diminished when the future evil is perceived as present: “Hence the 
Philosopher says…that those who are about to be decapitated are not afraid, seeing that 
their death is imminent, but for someone to be afraid, there must be some hope of 
salvation for him.”27 In the remaining articles of this question, St. Thomas makes several 
distinctions regarding the object of fear, which are not relevant for the arguments I make 
in this thesis. 
 In his third, rather brief quaestio on fear, with only two articles, St. Thomas 
explores the cause of fear. Here, he investigates those things that predispose the human 
agent to perceive a particular reality as a threatening evil that evokes fear. He begins by 
noting that objects relate to passions in the same way that forms relate to natural or 
artificial things: Objects and forms specify passions and substances respectively.28 St. 
Thomas then explains that just as whatever causes a form is a cause of the substance, 
whatever causes the object of a passion is also a cause for the passion itself. Two species of 
causes fall under this description, namely efficient causes that cause the object (per 
modum causae efficientis) and dispositive causes that dispose the subject to the object (per 
modum dispositionis materialis). As such, in St. Thomas’s view, with regards to fear, that 
which can inflict a future evil and that which disposes the human agent to perceive the 
evil precisely as an evil are both causes for fear. One of these dispositive causes, if not the 
most important dispositive cause, is love: “In this way love is a cause of fear, for it is from 
                                                
27 STh I-II.42.2: “Unde philosophus dicit…quod illi qui iam decapitantur non timent, 
videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet 
adesse aliquam spem salutis.” 
28 STh I-II.43.1. 
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loving a certain good that whatever deprives that good from someone is an evil for him. 
Consequently, he fears it as an evil.”29 In the second article, St. Thomas proposes that 
deficiency (defectus) is a cause for fear.30 With respect to the mode of dispositive cause, 
deficiency causes fear when some deficiency in the agent prevents him from properly 
repelling a threatening future evil. With respect to the mode of efficient causality, 
however, deficiency can cause fear only accidentally, as when some defect, say some 
moral defect in another, makes someone fear him.  
 Finally, in the fourth quaestio, St. Thomas lists the effects of fear. The 
hylomorphic structure of the passion is most evident here. The formal element of the 
passion of fear is the movement of the sensitive appetite – called a “contraction” by the 
Angelic Doctor – when it is presented with a future evil that is difficult and irresistible.31 
This is the recoiling that the fearful agent experiences when he realizes that he is being 
confronted with an evil that he could still possibly repel. The material element involves 
the bodily changes that accompany this movement of the sensitive appetite, catalogued by 
the Angelic Doctor to include, for fear, among other things, trembling and paralysis.32 It 
is striking that St. Thomas grounds his analysis of the passions on his (now, antiquated!) 
                                                
29 STh I-II.43.1: “Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat 
aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod 
timeat ipsum tanquam malum.” 
30 STh I-II.43.2. 
31 STh I-II.44.1. 
32 STh I-II.44.3-4. 
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biology that he inherited from Galen: He attributes these corporeal changes to 
movements of innate heat within the body, especially around the human heart.33 
 
The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Human Knowing and Human Feeling 
 In addition to conceptualizing the essential constitution of the passions using 
matter-form language, St. Thomas also construed the relationship between our acts of 
feeling these passions and our acts of knowing and of willing as hylomorphic in nature. 
He explains:  
In the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and of form, 
as the human being who is soul and body is one natural thing though he 
has many parts. In the same way, in human acts, the act of the lower power 
is matter with regard to the act of the higher power in so far as the lower 
power acts in virtue of the higher power.34 
For St. Thomas, the superior acts of knowing and of desiring are to the inferior act of 
feeling as form is to matter and soul is to body. 
 In this section of the chapter, we will investigate the hylomorphic relationship 
between acts of the sensitive appetite, i.e., the passions, and acts of cognition, to answer 
two questions. First, what is the role of cognition, if any, in the arousal of a particular 
                                                
33 For discussion of the physiology that St. Thomas takes as a given in his theological 
synthesis, see Armelle Debru, “Physiology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. 
R.J. Hankinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 263-282. 
34 STh I-II.17.4: “In genere rerum naturalium, aliquod totum componitur ex materia et 
forma, ut homo ex anima et corpore, qui est unum ens naturale, licet habeat 
multitudinem partium; ita etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae 
materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute 
superioris moventis ipsam.” 
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passion, and second, to what extent can cognition regulate and alter a passion. In the 
following section of this chapter, we will move to a parallel analysis to explore the 
hylomorphic relationship between acts of sensitive appetite, i.e., the passions, and acts of 
the will. Recall from the previous chapter that the intellect and the will necessarily 
cooperate with each other in every human act. As such, properly speaking, the human 
agent acts on his passions, as he does in every human act, with both his intellect and his 
will engaged and working together. 
 To begin with our first question, to identify the role of cognition in the arousal of 
a passion, we need to grasp the link between apprehension and passion. Though the 
sensitive appetites are properly the subjects of passion, for St. Thomas, the human agent 
cannot experience a passion unless he is able to apprehend the object of that passion: 
“The lower appetite does not naturally tend to anything until a thing is proposed to it 
under the aspect of its proper object.”35 This is confirmed by our ordinary everyday 
experience: One can only fear a snake if one perceives a snake in some way.  
 But how does the human agent perceive an object of a passion, say a rattler on the 
hiking path? Recall that the human agent, according to St. Thomas, has both sensitive and 
intellective cogitative powers. Sensitive cognition has for its object an individual form as 
it exists in corporeal matter.36 In human beings, it involves our exterior and our interior 
senses. When the human agent is confronted with an object of fear in the here and the 
now, the exterior senses are actualized by the proper and common sensibles of the object, 
the common sense compares and combines these qualities to generate a phantasm of the 
                                                
35 De veritate 25.4 ad 4: “Appetitiva inferior non naturaliter tendit in rem aliam, nisi 
postquam proponitur sibi sub ratione proprii obiecti.” 
36 STh I.85.1. 
  135 
object as a singular individual, and the cogitative sense intuits non-sensible intentions 
(intentiones) that indicate if the object is a particular good or a particular evil.37 When the 
human agent imagines or remembers the object, then the memorative and the 
imaginative powers are actualized as well. In contrast, intellective cognition, as its name 
suggests, involves the intellect, which is able to abstract the intelligible species from the 
phantasms. It is through the intellect that we are able to grasp the essential natures of 
things, so as to transcend the particular and attain the universal. It is through his intellect 
that the hiker is able to understand that he has come across not just a snake, but a snake 
of a particular kind, in this case, the rattler kind. 
 Given that we have two different modes of knowing, it should not be surprising 
that we can apprehend an object of a passion with either one or with both modes of 
cognition together. Apprehension of the object can occur at the level of sensitive 
cognition, specifically at the level of the cogitative “instinctual” sense, also called the 
particular reason, where the agent perceives a threat that he cannot really explain using 
conceptual terms. Think of a lone pedestrian who experiences an inarticulate fear as she 
walks down a darkened alleyway without being able to explain why she is afraid. 
Apprehension of the object can also occur at the level of intellectual cognition, also called 
                                                
37 As I will discuss in greater detail at the close of this chapter, though human sense 
cognition resembles animal sense cognition, it should not be surprising that for St. 
Thomas, sensitive cognition in human beings is “intellectualized” in that it is permeated 
through and influenced by the power of the intellect. This obtains because the human 
agent is a hylomorphic substance where spirit and body come together as an integral 
whole. For a discussion of St. Thomas’s account of the internal senses within its medieval 
context, see Deborah L. Black, “Imagination, Particular Reason, and Memory: The Role of 
the Internal Senses in Human Cognition,” Presented at the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, February 19, 2010. Available at http://individual.utoronto.ca/dlblack/articles/ 
ImagPartRweb.pdf. Last accessed on August 23, 2015. 
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the universal reason, probably in partnership with the particular reason, where the agent 
can somewhat comprehend and explain the threat that he perceives. Think here of the 
infantryman wading ashore on Omaha Beach on the morning of June 6, 1944, who can 
point to the German artillery on the hillside to explain his terror. Clearly, apprehending a 
threat, either intuitively and/or intellectually, can arouse fear. The importance of this 
point will become clearer below when I bring St. Thomas’s account of fear into 
conversation with Joseph LeDoux’s understanding of the same passion. 
 Moving to our next question, to what extent can cognition regulate and influence 
the passions, we should first acknowledge what St. Thomas observes and what our 
everyday experience confirms: Our passions precede the judgment of reason and as such 
are not completely under in our control.38 Often despite our best efforts, passions are 
unruly and resist all attempts to control them:  
It happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is 
aroused unexpectedly because of the apprehension of the imagination or 
of the sense. Such a movement is outside the command of reason although 
reason  could have prevented it if it had foreseen it. Hence the Philosopher 
says…that reason governs the irascible and the concupiscible appetites not 
by tyrannical rule, which is that of a master and a slave, but by political 
and royal rule, which is how the free who are not completely subjugated to 
command, are governed.39 
                                                
38 STh I-II.74.3-4. Cf. De veritate 25.5. 
39  STh I-II.17.7: “Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito 
concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter 
imperium rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset. Unde 
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The recalcitrant and disorderly character of the passions arises from their subject. Since 
the sensitive appetite is a power of the soul that necessarily uses the body as an 
instrument, it is influenced not only by the intellect but also by the dispositions of the 
body, which are beyond the control of reason.40 Hence the need for actual graces that help 
the human agent to order the movements of his sensitive appetites. 
 However, for St. Thomas, our intellects can and still do influence the passions in 
two ways. First, the intellect can present the object of a passion to the human agent under 
different formalities influencing the particular passion that is aroused: 
The lower appetite does not naturally tend to anything until a thing is 
proposed to it under the aspect of its proper object…Since it is in the 
power of reason to propose one and the same things under different 
aspects, as some food is either delicious or deadly, reason is able to move 
sensuality under different formalities.41  
Thus, the wife who is confronted by her adulterous husband, to alleviate her anger, can 
choose to see a betrayer who needs to be divorced or a sinner who needs to be forgiven. 
 Second, the intellect can present the human agent with general considerations that 
alter the way he understands a particular situation. This can alter the passion that has 
been aroused. St. Thomas explains: “For anyone can experience for himself that by the 
                                                                                                                                            
philosophus dicit…quod ratio praeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu 
despotico, qui est domini ad servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, 
qui non totaliter subduntur imperio.” Cf. STh I.81.3 ad 2. 
40 De veritate 25.4. ad 5. 
41 De veritate 25.4: “Appetitiva inferior non naturaliter tendit in rem aliam, nisi postquam 
proponitur sibi sub ratione proprii obiecti…Unde, cum in potestate rationis sit sub 
diversis rationibus unam et eamdem rem proponere, utpote cibum aliquem ut 
delectabilem et ut mortiferum, potest in diversa ratio sensualitatem movere.” 
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application of some universal considerations, anger or fear or the like, may be mitigated 
or instigated.”42 Thus, a passenger who is afraid of flying, to alleviate her fear, can remind 
herself that flying in a plane is safer than riding in a car. Hopefully, this universal 
consideration alters her perception of the dangers of flying. 
 As our everyday experience confirms, however, these intellectual strategies are not 
always successful. Therefore, we must now consider the role of the intellective appetite, 
namely, the will, in the control of the passions, remembering that properly speaking, the 
human agent acts on his passions, as he does in every human act, with both his intellect 
and his will working together. 
 
The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Human Willing and Human Feeling 
 In this section of the chapter, we will explore the hylomorphic relationship 
between acts of sensitive appetite, i.e., the passions, and acts of the will. To what extent 
can the will influence a passion? St. Thomas describes three ways this could happen, 
again, because of the superiority of the will to the sensitive appetite. Recall that the 
superior act of willing is to the inferior act of feeling as form is to matter and soul is to 
body. 
 First, the will can direct, though it cannot dictate, the sensitive appetite leading the 
arousal of certain passions consequent to the will’s choice: 
On the part of the will: In the case of powers that are ordered to one 
another and as such are connected, it happens that an intense movement 
                                                
42 STh I.81.3: “Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas 
universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam 
instigator.” 
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in one, and especially in the higher one, overflows to the other. Thus, 
when the movement of the will is directed to something through choice, 
the irascible and concupiscible appetites follow this movement of the 
will.43 
Thus, when a young man finally makes a commitment to pursue a vocation to the holy 
priesthood, it is not surprising that his decision can be immediately followed by delight 
and hope.  
 Next, the will governs the human agent’s consent for or against the movements of 
the sensitive appetite, i.e., his passions: 
The sensitive appetite is also subject to the will with regards to execution, 
which is accomplished through the motive force…The human being is not 
moved immediately according to the irascible and the concupiscible 
appetites but awaits the command of the will, which is a superior appetite. 
For wherever there is order among all the motive powers, the moved is not 
moved except through the power of the mover: The lower appetite is not 
sufficient for movement unless the higher appetite consents.44  
                                                
43 De veritate 25.4: “Secundo ex parte voluntatis. In viribus enim ordinatis ad invicem et 
connexis ita se habet, quod motus intensus in una earum, et praecipue in superiori, 
redundat in aliam. Unde, cum motus voluntatis per electionem intenditur circa aliquid, 
irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequitur motum voluntatis.” 
44 STh I.81.3: “Voluntati etiam subiacet appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, 
quae fit per vim motivam…Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum 
irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus 
superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi 
virtute primi moventis, unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus 
superior consentiat.” 
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Thus, the married man who experiences an attraction to his gorgeous secretary can 
endorse or reject his feelings towards her. 
 Finally, the will can directly affect the motive power that executes motion so that 
the members of the body may obey an appetite.45 As St. Thomas explains: 
[The lower appetites are subject to the higher powers] on the part of the 
motive power that executes. For just as in an army, progress to war hangs 
on the command of the duke, so in us, the motive power moves the 
members of the body only at the command of that which rules us, which is 
the reason, whatever any kind of movement may occur in the lower 
powers.46 
Thus, a Christian confronted by a lion in a Roman amphitheater naturally experiences 
fear. However, he can choose either to stand his ground, blocking his animal instinct to 
flee, or to apostatize and renounce his faith. This he can do by commanding the motive 
power to execute or to rescind the movements that naturally follow from fear.  
 To close this discussion of how the acts of the higher powers are related to those 
of the lower powers, I should acknowledge without further discussion that for St. 
Thomas, the passions are neither praiseworthy nor contemptible in themselves. 47 
However, they do become meritorious or detrimental to our salvation in so far as these 
                                                
45 STh I.75.3 ad 3. 
46 De veritate 25.4: “Ex parte motivae exequentis. Sicut enim in exercitu progressio ad 
bellum pendet ex imperio ducis, ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad 
imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis, qualiscumque motus fiat in 
inferioribus viribus.” 
47 STh I-II.24.1. 
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passions anticipate or proceed from judgments of reason and choice of the will. 48 This is 
why passions play such an important role in our moral deliberations. 
 
The Emotion of Fear According to Joseph LeDoux49 
 At the top of the chapter, I described Joseph LeDoux’s (and contemporary 
neuroscience’s) conundrum: How can neuroscientists define the emotion of fear in a way 
that incorporates both the unconscious and the conscious dimensions of the emotional 
experience without falling victim to a dualism that separates biology from psychology? In 
the end, LeDoux concludes that they cannot. Here, I will summarize his argument for 
restricting the definition of fear to only the conscious experience that we ordinarily call 
fear.  
 LeDoux’s narrative begins with a genealogical account that traces two rival but 
parallel research traditions within 20th century neuroscience. The first tradition, which 
LeDoux traces back to John Watson, the father of behaviorism, wants to banish all 
appeals to consciousness from psychology.50 Emphasizing a single all-purpose account of 
learning called classical conditioning, the behaviorists conceived of behavior as the 
reinforced consequences of previous behaviors. They were opposed to assumptions about 
unobservable events like mental or institutional states inside a subject’s head. Instead, 
they chose to focus on observable and quantifiable events that could be measured and 
                                                
48 Cf. STh I-II.77.3-8. 
49 This section is heavily indebted to LeDoux’s seminal review and commentary in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA: “Coming to terms with fear,” Proc. 
Natl Acad. Sci USA 111 (2014): 2871-2878. 
50 LeDoux, “Coming to terms with fear,” p. 2872. 
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described in the laboratory. Within this tradition, fear is understood to be a conditional 
reflex elicited by an external trigger. 
 In contrast, the second tradition, which LeDoux traces back to Sigmund Freud, is 
willing to posit the existence of psychological states that intervene between stimuli and 
responses to explain behavior. Within this tradition, fear is often understood as a learned 
drive state or a brain motive state. However, leading figures working within this research 
tradition – LeDoux explicitly attributes this mortal sin to prominent neuroscientist, O. 
Hobart Mowrer,  – openly endowed the state of fear with subjective properties that were 
said to “cause” behavior. Even authors who seemingly adhered to empirically based 
approaches, according to LeDoux, wrote about fear in a way that could easily be 
interpreted to mean that it is a mere subjective feeling. For instance, Mowrer wrote that, 
“Consciously experienced fear…must invariably be present, in some degree, as the cause 
of the observed behavior.”51 Not surprisingly, therefore, these “intervening variables” or 
“learned drive states” became associated with conscious experiences or feelings that were 
said to motivate or to cause agents to act in particular ways. 
 In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, researchers working began using a simple 
experimental protocol called Pavlovian fear conditioning to study fear networks. In 
Pavlovian fear conditioning, an emotionally neutral conditioned stimulus (CS), usually a 
sound, is presented in conjunction with a noxious unconditioned stimulus (US), usually a 
footshock for the rat. After one or several pairings, the CS acquires the capacity to elicit 
physiological responses usually associated with dangerous threats. These responses 
                                                
51 O.H. Mowrer and R.R. Lamoreaux, “Fear as an intervening variable in avoidance 
conditioning,” J Comp Psychol 39 (1946): 29-50. Cited by LeDoux, “Coming to terms with 
fear,” p. 2872. 
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include defensive behaviors like paralyzing and/or flight responses, and autonomic 
nervous system responses like increases in blood pressure and/or in heart rate. As 
LeDoux points out: “The responses are not learned and are not voluntary. They are 
innate, species-typical responses to threats and are expressed autonomically in the 
presence of appropriate stimuli.”52 Not surprisingly, according to LeDoux, both research 
traditions interpreted the learned fear that was at the heart of fear conditioning according 
to their own paradigms. The behaviorists understood learned fear to be an empirically 
verifiable construct absent any feeling, while their rivals understood learned fear as an 
emotional state that caused the conditioned response. Siding with the behaviorists, 
LeDoux is dismissive of these alleged emotional states because as subjective experiences 
they are not empirically verifiable.   
 A critic of this fear-is-a-conscious-feeling tradition, LeDoux argues that we need 
“to see why this view is neither necessary nor desirable.”53 Fundamentally, he is convinced 
that “problems arise when we conflate terms that refer to conscious experiences with 
those that refer to the processing of stimuli and control of responses and assume that the 
brain mechanisms that underlie the two kinds of processes are the same.”54 Or again, “as 
long as we use the term fear to refer to the neural mechanisms underlying both conscious 
feelings and non-conscious threat processing, confusion will occur.”55 Thus, LeDoux 
proposes that we need to properly define fear so that the subjective conscious feelings we 
                                                
52 Joseph LeDoux, “The Emotional Brian, Fear, and the Amygdala,” Cell Mol Neurobiol 23 
(2003): 727-738, p. 728. 
53 LeDoux, “Coming to terms with fear,” p. 2872. 
54 Ibid., p. 2974. 
55 Ibid., p. 2873. 
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associate with fear are distinguished and isolated from the objective often-unconscious 
physiological responses we associate with fear.  
 To justify this proposal to distinguish and to isolate “objective” physiological 
responses from “subjective” conscious feelings, LeDoux appeals to empirical studies that 
indicate that the brain circuits that govern the physiological response to fear and the 
conscious feeling of fear are distinct.  
 First, there are the experiments done with brain-damaged patients that have 
revealed that fear conditioning creates implicit (nonconscious) memories that are distinct 
from explicit/declarative (conscious) memory. 56  They showed that damage to the 
hippocampus in humans can disrupt explicit conscious memory of having been 
conditioned without having an effect on fear conditioning itself. In these scenarios, 
patients who are conditioned to fear certain triggers respond fearfully to these triggers 
without being able to explicitly identify the triggers that elicit that fear. In contrast, they 
also showed that damage to the amygdala can disrupt fear conditioning without affecting 
the agent’s conscious memory of having been conditioned.57 In these scenarios, patients 
who are conditioned to fear certain triggers are able to explicitly identify the triggers that 
they had been conditioned to fear, though they do not respond fearfully to these triggers.  
                                                
56 LeDoux cites the following books in support of this claim: Neal J. Cohen and Howard 
Eichenbaum, Memory, Amnesia, and the Hippocampal System (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1993); and Larry R. Squire, Memory and Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987). 
57 LeDoux cites the following studies in support of this claim: A. Bechara et al., “Double 
dissociation of conditioning and declarative knowledge relative to the amygdala and 
hippocampus in humans,” Science 269 (1995): 1115-1118; and K.S. LaBar et al., “Impaired 
fear conditioning following unilateral temporal lobectomy in humans,” J Neurosci 15 
(1995): 6846-6855. 
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 Next, there are behavioral studies in healthy humans that have found that 
conditioned threats presented subliminally can elicit changes in the agent’s future 
behavioral responses without the person being aware of the stimulus and without the 
person reporting any particular feeling of fear, even when he is explicitly instructed to try 
to uncover those feelings.58  
 Finally, there is work with individuals with blindness attributable to damage of the 
visual cortex – their eyes can see light though they cannot see because they are “brain 
blind” – that have indicated that visual threats can still elicit body responses and 
amygdala activation in these patients without their being aware either of the stimulus or 
of any feeling of fear.59  
 For LeDoux, these experiments reveal that human agents can experience the 
physiological responses associated with fear, without their being consciously aware that 
they had been exposed to the fear trigger. These studies suggest that the “mechanisms that 
                                                
58 LeDoux cites the following studies in support of this claim: R.S. Lazarus and R.A. 
McCleary, “Autonomic discrimination without awareness: A study of subception,” 
Psychol Rev 58 (1951): 113-122; A. Ohman and J.J.F. Soares, “Unconscious anxiety”: 
Phobic responses to masked stimuli,” J Abnorm Psychol 103 (1994): 231-240; A. Olsson 
and E.A. Phelps, “Learned fear of ‘unseen’ faces after Pavlovian, observational, and 
instructed fear,” Psychol Sci 15 (2004): 822-828; B. Bornemann, P. Winkielman, and E. 
van der Meer, “Can you feel what you do not see? Using internal feedback to detect 
briefly presented emotional stimuli.” Int J Psycholphysiol 85 (2012): 116-124; and S. 
Mineka and A. Ohman, “Phobias and preparedness: The selective, automatic, and 
encapsulated nature of fear,” Biol Psychiatry 52 (2002): 927-937. 
59  LeDoux cites the following studies in support of this claim: J.S. Morris et al., 
“Differential extrageniculostriate and amygdala responses to presentation of emotional 
faces in a cortically blind field,” Brain 124 (2001): 1241-1252; P. Vuilleumier et al., 
“Neural response to emotional faces with and without awareness: Event-related fMRI in a 
parietal patient with visual extinction and spatial neglect,” Neuropsychologia 40 (2002): 
2156-2166; A.O. Hamm et al., “Affective blindsight: Intact fear conditioning to a visual 
cue in a cortically blind patient,” Brain 126 (2003): 267-275; and C. Bertini, R. Cecere, 
and E. Làdavas, “I am blind, but I ‘see’ fear,” Cortex 49 (2013): 985-993. 
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detect and respond to threats are not the same as those that give rise to conscious fear.”60 
Therefore, in LeDoux’s mind, they indicate that an accurate definition for fear should 
distinguish our unconscious physiological responses to fear from our conscious feelings 
of that same emotion, because an accurate definition would acknowledge that different 
neural circuits drive each phenomenon. As a result, he formally proposes that the 
conscious feelings we think of as fear should be defined properly as fear, and that the 
physiological responses associated with fear should be defined and distinguished from 
fear properly so called, as “a defensive organismic state.”61  
 
Responding to LeDoux: A Hylomorphic Definition of Pavlovian Learned Fear 
 Joseph LeDoux has proposed that we should restrict our definition of fear to 
encompass only those conscious experiences that we ordinarily call a feeling of fear. He 
thinks that this strategy is robust because it seeks to be faithful to the discoveries of 
neuroscientists that distinct brain circuits are responsible for the feelings and for the 
physiological responses that were associated with fear in the past. This may be so, but in 
my view, his definition leads to other conceptual difficulties. Most significantly, for 
LeDoux, infants and animals cannot “feel” fear, though they can react in an “fearful” 
manner, since fear “can only happen in organisms that have the capacity to be aware of 
brain representations of internal and external events, and may also require the ability to 
know in a personal, autobiographical senses that the even is happening to them.”62 This 
corollary of LeDoux’s definition of fear is counter-intuitive and in my view, problematic: 
                                                
60 LeDoux, “Coming to terms with fear,” p. 2871. 
61 Ibid., p. 2875. 
62 Ibid., p. 2876. 
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Why is it not reasonable to think that a two-year old recoiling from a cobra in Bangkok is 
“feeling” the same emotion as a twenty-year old recoiling from a rattler on a hiking trail 
in Colorado? 
 In response to LeDoux’s definition that limits fear to those conscious feelings 
linked to the passion, I propose that St. Thomas’s hylomorphic account would give 
LeDoux and his fellow neuroscientists an alternative definition for Pavlovian learned fear 
that does justice not only to the findings of contemporary neuroscience but also to our 
lived experience as feeling agents. From my perspective, the fundamental difference 
between this alternative account and LeDoux’s account is that the former emerges from a 
desire to explain the phenomenology of fear while the latter arises from a desire to explain 
the biological mechanism of the same emotion. 63 This latter approach is reductionist and 
fails to account for all the dimensions of fear that we experience as persons. As we will see 
in Chapter Seven, this is not unexpected given the move from a substantial to a 
mechanistic view of living organisms that has taken place over the past four centuries.  
 LeDoux is looking for a definition of learned fear that is empirically verifiable. For 
St. Thomas, a passion is defined not by referring to the presence or to the absence of 
subjective feelings but by looking to the presence or to the absence of objective appetitive 
movements and physiological responses that are related to each other as form and matter. 
With fear, the fearful sheep runs away from the threatening wolf. Flight is an empirically 
verifiable act of the locomotive power that is caused by an act of the sensitive appetite, 
mediated by the motive force.  
                                                
63 A similar observation has been made by Robert C. Roberts in his book, Emotions: An 
Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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 But is there any scientific evidence for St. Thomas’s proposition that a passion is 
formally, a movement of sensitive appetite in response to a perceived threat, and 
materially, a physiological response? Is this claim compatibly with 21st century 
neuroscience? If it were, we would expect that both this appetitive movement and the 
accompanying physiological response, which by definition are corporeal in nature, would 
be localized to and mediated by distinct neuronal circuits in the brain. With regard to 
fear, neuroscientists have identified brain circuits that mediate the human repulsion from 
a perceived threat, and other circuits, linked to the autonomous nervous system, that 
govern the body’s response to that threat.64 This finding supports St. Thomas’s view. 
 LeDoux is looking for a definition that can explain the phenomenology of learned 
fear, especially the data that suggests that it can be learned both unconsciously and 
consciously, without falling victim to dualism. For St. Thomas fear can only be elicited by 
the apprehension of some object that is perceived by the human agent as some 
threatening evil. This is confirmed by our everyday experience. Because of his 
hylomorphic understanding of the human agent, however, St. Thomas can explain that 
some evils would be perceived by the particular reason – it would be an act of sensitive 
cognition without the conscious involvement of the intellect, while other evils would be 
perceived by both the particular and the universal reason together – it would be an act of 
intellectual cognition with the full awareness of the acting person. Learned fear can be 
learned in two distinct ways without either being less of a fear than the other.   
 But again, is there scientific evidence for a hylomorphic account of human 
knowing? Do we know consciously and unconsciously? From the experience of non-
                                                
64 LeDoux, “The Emotional Brain,” pp. 730-731. 
  149 
rational animals, it is clear that St. Thomas’s estimative sense – again, it is called the 
cogitative sense in human agents – can function in the absence of intellectual cognition. 
Thus, today we would expect that this cognitive sense, if it exists in humans, should be 
able to function without the involvement of the higher functions of the human brain 
centered in the neocortex. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that corroborates this 
expectation. For example, one study has shown that 5-month old human infants are born 
with innate, evolved spider detection mechanisms, which may have allowed our ancestors 
to avoid lethal bites. 65  This attentional bias for the detection of spiders has been 
confirmed in young children and adults.66 Intriguingly, there is also data that suggests 
that evolution has molded primate brains – in fact, individual primate neurons – to 
render them particularly sensitive to snakes.67  
 In toto, this evidence suggests that like their primate cousins, human beings have 
inherited evolved neuronal circuits that are sensitive to predator detection. Moreover, 
since these neuronal circuits are already present and functioning in young infants, the 
scientific evidence suggests that we have a spider-snake avoidance/fear response that 
operates in the absence of higher cognitive functioning. We can fear spider and snakes 
intuitively and reflexively! Neuronal circuits like these one would be the physiological 
basis for St. Thomas’s cogitative sense that is able to perceive threatening evils without the 
involvement of the intellect. And yet, of course, we also have a spider-snake 
                                                
65 D.H. Rakison and J.L. Derringer, “Do infants possess an evolved spider-detection 
mechanism?” Cognition 107 (2008): 381-393. 
66 Vanessa LoBue, “And along came a spider: An attentional bias for the detection of 
spiders in young children and adults,” J Exp Child Psychol 107 (2010): 59-66. 
67 L. Van et al., “Pulvinar neurons reveal neurobiological evidence of past selection for 
rapid detection of snakes,” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 110 (2013): 19000-19005. 
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avoidance/fear response that operates with our complete self-awareness. Thus, we can 
also fear spiders and snakes consciously. We have two distinct ways of knowing and of 
learning fear, but one integral way of responding in fear.68 
 Next, though LeDoux is not looking for a definition of learned fear that would be 
able to explain how human fear and animal fear are similar and different, a hylomorphic 
definition would be able to do this. For St. Thomas, human agents are rational animals. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, they would be able to know and to experience fear as animals 
do. Because they are animals, they would instinctively flee from perceived threats, and 
they would experience physiological changes in response to this threat. This would be 
mediated by the particular reason. This would justify our everyday view that animals 
experience fear in the way that we do. Because human agents are rational animals, 
however, they would be able to regulate their fear with their intellects and their will. This 
would be mediated by both the particular and the universal reason.  
 Finally, it is likely that LeDoux would be worried that aligning animal fear and 
human fear would allow neuroscientists to smuggle consciousness into their research 
program. He is already suspicious of the ambiguous claims of those investigators who 
think that consciousness motivates fear. However, making the hylomorphic claim that 
there are similarities between human and animal learned fear does not mean that 
conditioned human agents and conditioned animal models are conscious of their fear in 
                                                
68 One possibility is that the memory of the knowing is located in the hippocampus while 
the response to the knowing is located in the amygdala. This would explain the 
experiments in brain-damaged patients summarized above that seem to dissociate the 
memory of the conditioning from the fear conditioning itself. 
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the same way. It simply states that they both objectively respond to threats in a similar but 
not identical manner.  
 
Postscript: Reconceptualizing the Cogitative Sense in Light of Neuroscientific Data 
 My discussion of sense cognition and its relationship to the passion of fear relies 
heavily on my claim that the human agent can know a threat intuitively as the sheep 
intuitively knows the wolf. It is not clear if St. Thomas would hold this view. He makes a 
strong distinction between the estimative sense of the animals and the cogitative sense of 
the human agent, where the former knows intuitively and the latter knows not intuitively 
but through some collation of ideas (per quandam collationem): 
As to sensible forms, there is no difference between human beings and 
other animals for they are similarly altered by external sensibles. But as to 
the intentions, there is a difference for other animals perceive them solely 
according to the natural instinct while human beings perceive them 
through a collation of ideas.69 
The human cogitative sense differs radically from the animal estimative sense because the 
former, in St. Thomas’s view, is “intellectualized” in that it is permeated through and 
influenced by the power of the intellect. The Angelic Doctor explains: “The cogitative and 
memorative powers in the human being are eminent not because of what is proper to the 
sensitive part but through a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, 
                                                
69 STh I.78.4: “Quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia 
animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad 
intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi 
intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam 
collationem.” 
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according to some sort of overflow. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, 
and yet they are more perfect than in the other animals.”70  
 A recent commentator in the Thomistic tradition, Robert Miner imagines that the 
particular reason is able to arrive at estimations of utility or of danger “by associating 
sensible forms, neutral in themselves, with stored images that are charged with pleasure 
or pain.”71 Notably, however, it is clear that for Miner, this process of association involves 
learning. It is not intuitive. Describing a child’s learning of the danger of fire, he describes 
it this way:  
Unlike the sheep who avoids the wolf by instinct, Louisa has no instinct 
that leads her to avoid touching the fire. On the contrary, she learns this by 
collation of the sensible forms attached to the fire with other sensible 
images that have previously caused by pain. Through this process of 
discovery by the particular reason, Louisa has learned to protect herself 
from some significant dangers, well before her universal reason has 
developed in any significant way.72 
For Miner, cogitative sense learns. And if it learns, it cannot intuit knowledge. 
 Another contemporary commentator, Robert Pasnau would agree. He points out 
that for St. Thomas, the cogitative sense “lies at the boundary of sense and intellect, 
capable of intellect’s rational comparisons and contrasts, but incapable of intellect’s 
                                                
70 STh I.78.4 ad 5: “Illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per 
id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad 
rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed 
eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.” 
71 Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, p. 78. 
72 Ibid., p. 79. 
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universality.” 73  It has a particularly important role in human reasoning, especially 
practical reasoning, because it directly apprehends particulars in order to prepare 
phantasms for the intellect.74 For Pasnau, the particular reason does not know anything 
intuitively. 
 As I discussed above, however, there is data from neuroscience that suggests that 
human beings do have innate predator-detection systems that can grasp that threat of a 
snake or a spider at first encounter. In my view, this information should move us to 
reconceptualize St. Thomas’s understanding of the cogitative power. I propose that 
cogitative power, like the locomotive power, can act both alone and together with the 
intellect. As we saw in the previous chapter, St. Thomas distinguishes acts of the 
locomotive power into acts that are an act of a man (actus hominis) and acts that are 
properly a human act (actus humanus), where the former occurs reflexively and the latter 
occurs with the full participation of the intellect and of the will. In the same manner, I 
propose that acts of the cogitative power can be distinguished in the same way. There 
would be acts of the cogitative power that are intuitive – as the acts of the estimative 
power in the brute animals are – and then there would be acts of the cogitative power that 
are collative. Learned fear can be learned in two distinct ways because the cogitative 
power can know in two distinct modes. 
 
 
 
                                                
73 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 254. 
74 STh I-II.50.4 ad 3. 
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have used a hylomorphic reconstruction of St. Thomas’s account 
of the passions, in themselves, and in their relationship to human knowing and to human 
choosing, to propose a solution to a disputed question in contemporary neuroscience. In 
doing so, I have also proposed revisions to St. Thomas’s synthesis that allows it to be 
brought into conversation with 21st century science. In the next chapter, I return to a 
more classical discussion, this time of the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas to 
understand the virtues. It will illustrate how an understanding of hylomorphic theory and 
its analogous use in St. Thomas’s moral theology can clarify and resolve another disputed 
contemporary moral questions as well as illuminate other dimensions of St. Thomas’s 
theological synthesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
How is the Human Intellect Transformed in the Life of Grace? 
A Hylomorphic Investigation of the Acquired and the Infused Virtues 
 
Introduction 
As a Catholic priest serving as a faculty member at a Catholic liberal arts college, I 
have had the privilege of witnessing the conversions of several undergraduate students 
that were accompanied by radical changes in their behavior. Moreover, given their ages 
and their cultural environment, it should not be surprising that these behavioral changes 
were most evident in their sexual practices: I have seen students addicted for many of 
their teenage years to unchaste acts become continent overnight! They unanimously 
attribute this unexpected (and liberating!) change in themselves to the power of God’s 
grace. But does this change to the life of grace also alter these students’ intellects? Does it 
transform the life of the mind? 
How does the Catholic moral theologian explain these transformations from vice 
to virtue in the Christian who begins to live the life of grace? To help account for this 
transformation, St. Thomas famously proposed that infused moral virtues were given to 
the believer along with habitual grace, gratuitous grace, the theological virtues, and the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit.1 However, this theory has also raised novel philosophical and 
                                                
1 Other theologians, including most prominently, Duns Scotus, have rejected the doctrine 
of infused moral virtuous as superfluous, proposing instead that the giving of the 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, can sufficiently explain the new life of 
grace. For discussion of Scotus’s alternative account of the virtues in the life of grace see, 
Bonnie Kent, “Rethinking Moral Dispositions: Scotus on the Virtues,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 352-376. 
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theological questions regarding the cooperative relationship or lack thereof between these 
infused moral virtues and the acquired moral virtues that exist in all human beings to a 
greater or a lesser degree. 
In this chapter, I investigate the hylomorphic framework used by St. Thomas to 
understand the virtues. I begin with a narrative of St. Thomas’s hylomorphic account of 
the essence of virtue and of the species of virtues. I will focus on his categorization of the 
virtues according to their material cause and then of their efficient cause. I then move to a 
hylomorphic investigation of the relationship between individual virtues before turning 
to an exploration of the cooperative interaction between the acquired and the infused 
moral virtues. For the latter analysis, I will summarize and evaluate two proposals by Fr. 
George Klubertanz, S.J., and Sr. Renée Mirkes, O.S.F., who use matter-form language to 
describe this cooperative interaction and conclude that the first account is the better of 
the two. I also consider the genealogical relationship between the infused virtues and their 
acquired counterparts: Does an infused virtue necessarily presuppose the existence of its 
natural correlate? 
Finally, I build on this analysis and conclude this chapter by exploring the 
relationship between the acquired and the infused intellectual virtues, precisely to 
determine how grace alters the life of the mind. I propose that the theological virtue of 
faith, informed by the theological virtue of charity, and capacitated by the gifts of 
understanding, of sure knowledge, and of wisdom, takes their place as the infused 
counterpart for acquired understanding, acquired sure knowledge, and acquired wisdom. 
Therefore, I argue that only a Christian in the state of grace can do theology, properly 
understood. Moreover, given the dynamic relationship between the infused virtues and 
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their acquired counterparts, my proposal also suggests that theological reasoning can 
facilitate philosophical reasoning in the practice of Christian philosophy without 
violating its proper autonomy. This is one way of understanding the Catholic Church’s 
firm conviction that faith can legitimately assist reason without violating the proper 
autonomy of each. Like Chapter Two, this chapter will illustrate how an understanding of 
hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s moral theology can allow us to 
clarify and to resolve disputed questions in contemporary theology. 
 
The Hylomorphic Structure of Thomistic Virtue 
As we saw in Chapter Two, in St. Thomas’s view, the human being is created with 
spiritual powers of intellect and will that are ordered towards the universal true and the 
universal good respectively, who is God alone.2 Thus, in this life, these spiritual powers 
have an indeterminate potency to a potentially infinite number of human acts: “But the 
rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one, but are inclined 
indeterminately to many.”3 In this way they are akin to prime matter, which as we saw in 
Chapter One, has a radical potency to a potentially infinite number of substantial forms.  
However, given that the good is unique and evil manifold, one consequence of 
this indetermination within the human agent’s spiritual powers is that it is more likely 
than not that he will do what is wrong rather than what is right since it is easier to miss 
the target than to score a bulls-eye. To remedy this metaphysical weakness in the human 
creature absent grace, St. Thomas posited the existence of virtues that would dispose the 
                                                
2 STh I-II.2.8. 
3  STh I-II.55.1: “Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt 
determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa.” Also, STh I-II.49.4 ad 2. 
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powers of the soul of the human agent towards the good, where a virtue is defined as an 
operative habitus4 in a power of the soul that disposes that power to the production of 
good acts.5 An operative habitus is a habitus that is directed towards activity. Thus, the 
virtue of justice predisposes the agent to acts of justice, while the virtue of fortitude 
predisposes him to acts of courage. Moreover, as all virtues do, these virtues predispose 
the agent so that he can act justly and courageously in a spontaneous, easy, and joyful 
manner.  
To comprehend St. Thomas’s definition of virtue further, we have to return to 
Aristotle, who categorized a habitus as “a disposition whereby that which is disposed is 
disposed to good or to evil, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another.”6 It 
is a disposition that belongs to the metaphysical category of a quality, which is an 
accidental mode of substantial being. Acquired over time through the repetition of acts of 
an appropriate kind, a habitus can become a second nature for the individual that 
predisposes the powers of his soul to further acts of that same kind. To put it another 
way, a virtue is a habitus standing midway between the potency and the act of a soul’s 
power that orients it towards good acts. In this way, a virtue is akin to a form, which as we 
saw in Chapter One, gives specification to prime matter. 
                                                
4 STh I-II.55.2. Though habitus is often translated with the English word, ‘habit’, I have 
chosen to retain the Latin term here because the English word can suggest that a habitus 
is a routine or mechanical or non-intentional but repetitive performance of a trivial act, 
which it is not. Rather it is a stable disposition that orders the agent towards acts of good 
or of evil. For discussion, see Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Virtue is Not a Habit,” Trans. 
Bernard Gilligan, Cross Currents 12 (1962): 65-81.  
5 Cf. STh I-II.55.1-3. 
6 STh I-II.49.1: “Dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum et aut 
secundum se aut ad aliud.” [Quoting Aristotle’s Metaphysics V.] 
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As a habitus, a virtue disposes a spiritual power to different operations. Since the 
same power is capable of distinct operations, there may be several virtues in the one 
power. This follows from St. Thomas’s hylomorphic account of the virtues: 
For a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any one species, 
as matter to form, because, just as matter is determinate to one form by 
one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one 
active object to an act specifically one. Hence, just as several objects can 
move one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several 
acts or specifically diverse perfections. Now habits are qualities or forms 
adhering inherently to a power, and inclining that power to determinate 
acts according to species. Consequently several habits can belong to one 
power, even as several specifically different acts.7 
Thus, distinct virtues in the same power must be distinguished from each other by their 
objects, which are those particular realities to which the virtue orders a power of the soul. 
As an example, the object of the virtue of sobriety is concerned with drink, not any kind 
of drink, but only those that are intoxicating by their nature.8 Significantly, for St. 
                                                
7  STh I-II.54.1: “Potentia autem passiva comparatur ad actum determinatum unius 
speciei, sicut materia ad formam, eo quod, sicut materia determinatur ad unam formam 
per unum agens, ita etiam potentia passiva a ratione unius obiecti activi determinatur ad 
unum actum secundum speciem. Unde sicut plura obiecta possunt movere unam 
potentiam passivam, ita una potentia passiva potest esse subiectum diversorum actuum 
vel perfectionum secundum speciem. Habitus autem sunt quaedam qualitates aut formae 
inhaerentes potentiae, quibus inclinatur potentia ad determinatos actus secundum 
speciem. Unde ad unam potentiam possunt plures habitus pertinere, sicut et plures actus 
specie differentes.” 
8 STh II-II.149.1. 
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Thomas, the objects of virtue are the objects, i.e., the ends, of the internal acts of the will 
described in Chapter Two: 
As the Philosopher says…the end is, in practical matters, what the 
principle is in speculative matters. Consequently a diversity of ends 
demands a diversity of virtues, even as a diversity of active principles does. 
Moreover the ends are objects of the interior acts, with which, above all, 
the virtues are concerned.9 
Recall from Chapter Two that the human act is a hylomorphic composite with an interior 
act as formal principle and with an exterior act as material principle. Virtues dispose the 
powers of the agent cause so that his interior acts are always ordered according to right 
reason. 
In the end, and I emphasize it again here for the purposes of this dissertation, for 
St. Thomas, a virtue can be understood hylomorphically – in an analogous manner, of 
course – as a form that informs a spiritual power of the soul. As we will see below, this 
conceptual framework will be the basis for the other hylomorphic relationships that relate 
not only individual virtues to each other but also individual categories of virtues to each 
other. 
 
 
 
                                                
9  STh I-II.54.2: “Sicut philosophus dicit…ita se habet finis in operabilibus, sicut 
principium in demonstrativis. Et ideo diversitas finium diversificat virtutes sicut et 
diversitas activorum principiorum. Sunt etiam ipsi fines obiecta actuum interiorum, qui 
maxime pertinent ad virtutes, ut ex supradictis patet.” 
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An Aristotelian Characterization of Thomistic Virtue 
As an Aristotelian is apt to do, the Angelic Doctor decomposed a virtue into its 
four causes by examining the definition of virtue offered by St. Augustine, who taught: 
“Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live rightly, of which no one can make 
bad use, which God works in us, without us.”10 It is an illuminating look at St. Thomas’s 
hylomorphic understanding of virtue. 
First, as a habitus that disposes a spiritual power towards good acts, a virtue in 
itself is a formal cause:  
For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus 
and difference, when it is defined as a good quality, for quality is the genus 
of virtue, and the difference, good. But the definition would be more 
suitable if in place of quality, we substitute habit, which is the proximate 
genus.11 
As a form, a virtue determines and orients a spiritual power towards its proper operation 
according to the rule of reason. This will be important below when we consider the 
differences between the acquired and the infused virtues.  
Next, though virtue does not have matter “out of which” it is formed, St. Thomas 
will acknowledge that it has matter “about which” it is concerned, and matter “in which” 
it exists. The matter “about which,” the materia circa quam, is the object of a virtue, i.e., 
                                                
10 STh I-II.55.4 ob 1: “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male 
utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.” 
11 STh I-II.55.4: “Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius 
genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, 
differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus 
poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.” 
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that to which the virtue relates: “Now virtue has no matter ‘out of which’, as neither has 
any other accident, but it has matter ‘about which’, and matter ‘in which’, namely, the 
subject. The matter ‘about which’ is the object of virtue.”12 Thus, as noted earlier, the 
object of the virtue of sobriety is concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but only 
those that are intoxicating by their nature; the object of the virtue of justice is that which 
is due to another; and the object of the virtue of fortitude is the fear of difficult things, 
especially the dread of death.  
The matter “in which,” the materia in qua, is the subject of the virtue, which is the 
spiritual power that it predisposes: “And so for material cause we have the subject, which 
is mentioned when we say that [virtue] is a good quality of the mind.”13 Later in the 
Summa theologiae, the Angelic Doctor will specify that the subject of a virtue is properly 
the will or some other power of the soul insofar as it is moved by the will.14 Thus, the will, 
the intellect, and the sensitive appetites of the soul are the human faculties that can be 
subjects of virtue in the same way that prime matter can be subject of form.15  
Third, according to the Angelic Doctor, the final cause of virtue since it is an 
operative habit, is its operation, which for a virtue, is the good, “by which we live rightly.” 
Thus, the final cause of sobriety is the moderate drinking of intoxicating drink, the final 
cause of justice is the giving to another what is due, and the final cause of fortitude is the 
enduring of great dangers especially death. 
                                                
12 Ibid.: “Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet 
materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam 
est obiectum virtutis.” 
13 Ibid.: “Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona 
qualitas mentis.” 
14 STh. I-II.56.3. 
15 STh. I-II.56.3-6. 
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Lastly, as for the efficient cause, St. Thomas will make the distinction between the 
acquired and infused virtues, a distinction we will examine in greater detail below. For the 
acquired virtues, the efficient cause is the agent himself, who in performing good acts 
acquires the virtues, while for the infused virtues, the efficient cause is God, who in freely 
giving us the infused virtues, works “in us, without us.”  
 
Categorizing the Thomistic Virtues According to their Material Cause 
 Turning from the essence of virtue to the species of virtues, St. Thomas 
categorized the virtues in at least four ways.16 They can be classified (1) according to their 
material cause, specifically the materia in qua, i.e., according to whether they are 
intellectual or moral virtues; (2) according to their efficient cause, who is either the 
human agent himself or the God who has redeemed him in the blood of the Lamb, i.e., 
whether they are acquired or infused virtues; (3) according to their object, i.e., whether 
they are theological or non-theological virtues; or (4) according to their final cause, i.e., 
whether they are natural or supernatural virtues. The first two schemas will be 
emphasized here because they are, in my view, the more fundamental categories of 
Thomistic virtue. 
In the first schema, the virtues are categorized according to their material cause, 
specifically the materia in qua, i.e., the subject of the virtues. This distinction has roots in 
Aristotle’s division, made in Book IV of his Nicomachean Ethics between virtues that 
enhance the agent’s expertise in his scientific, artistic, and technical endeavors, called the 
                                                
16 For helpful discussion and background, see William C. Mattison, III, “Thomas’s 
Categorizations of Virtue: Historical Background and Contemporary Significance,” The 
Thomist 74 (2010): 189-235. 
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intellectual virtues, and those that rectify his desires, his emotions, and his choices, called 
the moral virtues.17  
The virtues that inform the speculative intellect are called the intellectual virtues.18 
They perfect it so it is better predisposed towards the grasping of and reasoning to truth, 
which is its good work, i.e., its operation.19 St. Thomas calls these five intellectual virtues, 
understanding, sure knowledge, speculative wisdom, art, and prudence.20 Understanding 
or intuitive insight, intellectus in Latin, is that virtue that perfects the intellect so that the 
thinking agent can spontaneously, easily, and joyfully grasp the first principles of 
knowledge, such as the whole is greater than its parts. Sure knowledge, scientia in Latin, is 
that virtue that perfects the intellect so that the thinking agent can reason from first 
principles to sure conclusions. Wisdom, sapientia in Latin, is that virtue that perfects the 
intellect so that it can order and understand all knowledge from the perspective of the 
first cause who is God. Finally, the intellectual virtues of art, ars in Latin, and of prudence, 
prudentia in Latin, perfect the intellect and predispose the thinking agent either to craft 
works of skill well or to act well, respectively.  
                                                
17 STh I-II.58.3. 
18 For discussion, see Gregory M. Reichberg, “The Intellectual Virtues IIa IIae, qq.57-58)” 
in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2002), pp. 131-150. 
19 STh Ι-ΙΙ.57.1-2. Strikingly, St. Thomas posits that the intellectual virtues are only virtues 
in a qualified sense because they only fulfill the first of two necessary conditions for a 
virtue, i.e., a virtue confers aptness on a power in doing good, and a virtue confers the 
right use of that power. The intellectual virtues only fulfill the former but not the latter 
condition for a true virtue. As such, they are virtues, but only in a qualified sense.  
20 STh I-II.57.2-4. 
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Next, those virtues that inform the spiritual appetite and the sensitive appetites are 
called the moral virtues.21 They order our desires so that we spontaneously, easily, and 
joyfully desire the good and then act to attain it.22 They are also important because they 
help the acting person to regulate his emotions, which as we saw in greater detail in 
Chapter Three, are those bodily movements classically called the passions of the soul.23 As 
Etienne Gilson, the distinguished 20th century Thomist and medievalist, observed: “When 
the moralist comes to discuss concrete cases, he comes up against the fundamental fact 
that man is moved by his passions. The study of the passions, therefore, must precede any 
discussion of moral problems.”24  
Given their function to build the character of the acting person, St. Thomas thinks 
that each of the moral virtues can be described hylomorphically. Each of them has a 
formal and a material element that emerges from their role in ordering the appetites: 
In these [moral] virtues there is a formal principle, and a quasi-material 
principle. The material principle in these virtues is a certain inclination of 
the appetitive part to the passions or operations according to a certain 
                                                
21 STh I-II.58.1. 
22 STh I-II.58.2. 
23 For an extensive discussion of the nature of the passions in the Thomist tradition, see 
Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-
48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., The 
Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America, 2011).  
24 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans. L.K. Shook, 
C.S.B. (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 271. 
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mode. But since this mode is determined by reason, the formal principle in 
all virtues is precisely this order of reason.25 
Understood analogously, the order of reason habituates an appetite and directs it to its 
proper end in the same way that a substantial form determines a being and orders it 
towards its specific telos. 
A handful of the moral virtues, namely, prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance, are called cardinal virtues because they are those principal virtues upon 
which the moral life pivots. 26 They imply rectitude of appetite. Prudence, prudentia in 
Latin, is the virtue that disposes the individual, not only to discern the true good in every 
circumstance, but also to choose the right means of achieving it.27 It is the virtue that 
facilitates good human acts. It allows the acting person to intend, to deliberate, to decide, 
and to execute this particular act well, here and now, with his and his community’s 
authentic good in mind. Next, justice, iustitia in Latin, is the virtue that disposes the 
individual to give to God and to neighbor that which is properly due to both of them.28 
Fortitude, fortitudine in Latin, is the virtue that disposes the individual to remain firm in 
the face of difficulty and to remain constant in the pursuit of good.29 It moderates the 
passion of fear allowing the individual to act in a morally upright manner even when he is 
frightened. Fortitude strengthens his resolve to do the good even in the face of 
                                                
25 STh I-II.67.1: “In huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. 
Materiale quidem est in his virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones 
vel operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus determinatur a ratione, 
ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse ordo rationis.” 
26 STh I-II.61.1. 
27 STh I-II.47.4. 
28 STh I-II.58.1. 
29 STh I-II.123.1. 
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temptations or of strong emotions that may dispose him to do otherwise. Fourth and 
finally, temperance, temperantia is Latin, is the virtue that disposes the individual to 
moderate the attraction of bodily pleasures.30 It steels his will, allowing him to master his 
instincts and to keep his desires within the limits of what is reasonable and honorable.  
To summarize, this first schema of Thomistic virtues distinguishes the virtues 
according to the spiritual power that they inform and according to the operation to which 
they are ordered. As I noted earlier, this is a schema closely aligned to the pagan schema 
of virtues proposed by the ancient Greeks. Not surprisingly, however, Christian 
theologians seeking to accommodate this pagan account had to transform it to explain 
the reality of grace, where God works “in us, without us.”31 
 
Categorizing the Thomistic Virtues According to their Efficient Causes 
  In his second, more explicitly Christian, schema, St. Thomas proposed that the 
virtues can be distinguished according to their efficient cause, which is either the human 
agent himself or the God who redeemed him in the blood of the Lamb. The former 
virtues are designated the acquired virtues, while the latter are called the infused virtues.  
First, we consider the acquired virtues. Recall from Chapter One that for St. 
Thomas, substantial form is the metaphysical principle of finality that explains the 
directedness, the teleology, of things. As he explained in his commentary on Aristotle's De 
Anima, the soul is the final cause of the body: “As the intellect works for an end, so does 
nature. But the intellect in its constructions orders and arranges matter according to 
                                                
30 STh I-II.141.1. 
31 STh I-II.55.4. 
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form, so also does nature. If the soul is the form of a living body, it follows that it is also 
its final cause.”32 Or again, “a soul is not only the form and mover of its body, but also its 
end.”33 Thus, the human soul and therefore also its powers, which are in themselves the 
soul’s potencies to particular acts, are inherently disposed, i.e., inherently inclined, to 
ends that are connatural to the soul’s nature. St. Thomas itemizes these natural 
inclinations as those ordered towards the good, towards self-preservation, towards true 
and certain knowledge of the world, towards life in society, and towards God, among 
others.34 These proper objects of the natural inclinations constitute the ends perfective of 
human nature. 
As we explained above, however, regardless of their connatural inclinations, the 
powers of the soul have an indeterminate potency to a potentially infinite number of 
human acts. To put it another way, absent the Beatific vision, the soul has an 
indetermination within itself that predisposes it to different ways of acting. Thus, a 
human agent needs to acquire virtues – aptly named the acquired virtues, both 
intellectual and moral – that properly direct and dispose him towards good acts that are 
                                                
32 In DA, Bk 2. Lect. 7. no. 13: “Sicut enim intellectus operatur propter finem, ita et 
natura, ut probatur in secundo physicorum. Sed intellectus in his quae fiunt per artem, 
materiam ordinat et disponit propter formam: ergo et natura. Cum igitur anima sit forma 
viventis corporis, sequitur quod sit finis eius.” 
33 DA, Q8: “Anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis.” 
34 STh I-II.94.2. 
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rightly ordered towards those ends that by nature are perfective of him.35 These are 
virtues that direct the human agent towards life in human society.36  
 How does a human agent acquire the acquired virtues? As St. Thomas explains, a 
habitus can be caused in an agent whose acts have both an active and a passive principle.37 
Once active and passive principles are present in an agent, repetitive acts by the agent 
working from these principles engender the habitus so that the passive principle is more 
or less disposed towards those ends that perfect it.38 According to the Angelic Doctor, in 
the case of the intellectual virtues, a habitus is caused in the intellect as a passive principle 
when it is moved by self-evident first propositions working as active principles, while in 
the case of the moral virtues, a habitus is caused in the rational and sense appetites as 
passive principles when they are moved by the intellect working as the active principle.39 
These natural potencies, called the “seeds of virtues” by St. Thomas,40 are the basis of the 
acquisition of any human virtue. In both kinds of acquired virtue, it is the human agent 
who engenders the specific virtues in himself by undertaking repetitive good acts that are 
in accord with right reason. 
                                                
35 For insightful discussion on the function of moral virtue, see Jeffrey Hause, “Aquinas 
on the Function of Moral Virtue,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007): 
1-20. 
36 For recent scholarly debate on the nature of the acquired or pagan virtues and whether 
the pagan could acquire genuine virtues, see the following representative papers: Brian 
Shanley, O.P., “Pagan Virtue,” The Thomist 63 (1999): 553-577; Thomas Osborne, 
“Aquinas’s Augustinian Moral Theory,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 279-305; Angela McKay, 
“Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,” The Thomist 69 (2005): 535-555; Thomas 
Osborne, “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” The Thomist 71 (2007): 39-64; and 
Angela McKay Knobel, “Aquinas and the Pagan Virtues,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly 51 (2011): 339-354. 
37 STh I-II.51.2. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 STh I-II.51.1. Also see STh I-II.63.1. 
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In my view, one can bring this analysis together and describe the acquisition of an 
acquired virtue, in this case of an acquired moral virtue, as follows: First, the agent’s 
intellect operating by the natural habitus of synderesis comprehends the connatural ends 
to which the appetitive powers of his soul are inclined, and grasps them as the first 
principles of practical reasoning. 41  In this way, he perceives and understands the 
fundaments of the natural law.42 Through repetitive good acts ordered towards these ends 
by the virtue of prudence, he then causes particular moral virtues within his appetitive 
powers, which habituates them towards those ends perfective of their nature.43 In this 
way, his future acts, which by nature are rooted in and emerge from the powers of his 
soul, are more spontaneously, more easily, and more joyfully ordered towards the 
realization of these ends determined by right reason. The human being has to habituate 
his nature so that he is predisposed to attain those proper objects that naturally perfect 
him. 
To illustrate this narrative, consider a specific example. James is a college student 
seeking virtue. Using his intellect, he comes to understand the connatural ends that are 
perfective of his sexual appetite, which are the unitive and procreative ends of marriage. 
He then acquires the virtue of chastity by prudentially and repetitively acting in such a 
way that his carnal power is ordered according to right reason. From an Aristotelian 
                                                
41 For a recent discussion of synderesis and its role in grasping the first practical principles 
of natural law, see Tobias Hoffman, “Conscience and Synderesis,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), pp. 255-264. 
42 STh I-II.94.2. 
43 STh I-II.94.3. For the augmentation of acquired virtue by repeated actions, see STh I-
II.51.2-3. For discussion, see Angela M. McKay, “Synderesis, Law, and Virtue,” in The 
Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing, ed. 
Mark J. Cherry (Austin, TX: Springer, 2009), pp. 33-44. 
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perspective, the intellect of the college student seeking virtue would be acting as the 
efficient cause to cause the virtue of chastity, as a formal cause, in the appetitive power, as 
the material cause, in order to realize the perfection of the appetite, not only in itself but 
in the student’s future acts, which would be the final cause. 
Note that for St. Thomas, the acquired virtues not only have reason as their cause 
but they also have it as their rule. It is their cause because the intellect causes the virtues to 
come to be in the powers of his soul through repetitive action. And it is their rule – 
understood here as the standard which virtue brings the human being into conformity 
with44 – because it is reason that grasps the proper ends that are perfective of the powers 
of the agent, thus determining if an act is perfective or disruptive of that power.45 It is 
reason that specifies and fixes the mean of the virtue.46 As St. Thomas points out: “The 
good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a 
measure.”47 We can therefore say that the acquired virtues, both intellectual and moral, 
                                                
44 Recall that for St. Thomas, a virtue is a habitus that is a certain mode of substance called 
a quality. However, one cannot speak of a mode of a substance without referring to some 
standard that that substance can be brought into conformity with. Cf. STh I-II.49.2. 
45 STh I-II.63.2. 
46 STh I-II.63.4. 
47 STh I-II.64.4 ad 1: “Bonum virtutum intellectualium et moralium consistit in medio per 
conformitatem ad regulam.” St. Thomas also writes: “The nature of virtue is that it should 
direct the human being to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the 
appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter. The measure or rule of 
the appetitive movement in respect of appetible things is reason itself…Hence it is 
evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now 
it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. 
Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.” STh I-II.64.1: Virtus de sui 
ratione ordinat hominem ad bonum. Moralis autem virtus proprie est perfectiva 
appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam determinatam materiam. Mensura autem et 
regula appetitivi motus circa appetibilia, est ipsa ratio…Et ideo patet quod bonum virtutis 
moralis consistit in adaequatione ad mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod 
  172 
are stable and lasting dispositions in the powers of the soul that habituate it to follow the 
dictates of right reason so that the human agent may attain those ends that are perfective 
of his nature.  
 We now move to consider the infused virtues.48 As we noted earlier in this 
chapter, St. Thomas famously proposed that the infused virtues were also given to the 
Christian believer along with the habitual grace that justifies him. To understand the 
Angelic Doctor’s argument for the necessary existence of these infused virtues in the life 
of grace, we must begin with his teaching that habitual grace (gratia gratum faciens) is 
akin to a habitus that comes to be in a person’s soul so that he may be ordered towards 
the eternal good who is God:  
Now [God] so provides for natural creatures, not only as He moves them 
to their natural acts, but also as He bestows upon them certain forms and 
powers, which are the principles of acts, so that they may themselves be 
inclined to these movements. Thus the movements whereby they are 
moved by God become connatural and easy to creatures, according to 
Wisdom 8:1: “She . . . orders all things sweetly.” Much more therefore does 
He infuse into them as He moves them towards the acquisition of a 
supernatural eternal good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, 
                                                                                                                                            
inter excessum et defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste 
apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit. 
48 For a contemporary defense of the infused virtues, see Michael Sherwin, O.P., “Infused 
virtue and the effects of acquired vice: A test case for the Thomistic theory of infused 
cardinal virtues,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 29-52. 
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according to which they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to 
acquire eternal good. Thus the gift of grace is a quality.49 
Analogously understood, therefore, habitual grace is a form.50 It is not a substantial, but 
an accidental determination. However, in contrast to a virtue, which is a form in a power 
of the soul, for St. Thomas, habitual grace is a form in the essence of the soul.51 It allows 
the Christian believer to participate albeit inchoately in the divine nature.52 Thus, it would 
not be inaccurate for us to say that if the virtues are “accidental” forms of the soul, then 
habitual grace is a “substantial” form of the soul, analogously understood, of course. 
Recall, however, that the substantial form is the metaphysical principle of finality that 
explains the directedness, the teleology, of things. Thus, by definition, the new 
supernatural “substantial” form in the soul, i.e., the habitual grace that is given to justify 
the Christian believer, needs to order the soul to a new end unlike the end specified by the 
natural substantial form, which is the soul itself. For St. Thomas, this new end is the 
supernatural end that is the beatific vision of the Triune God.53  
 As I explained above, the acquired virtues are those virtues that properly dispose 
the human agent towards good acts that are rightly ordered to attaining those ends that 
                                                
49 STh I-II.110.2: “Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet ut non solum moveat eas ad 
actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia 
actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad huiusmodi motus. Et sic motus quibus a Deo 
moventur, fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles; secundum illud Sap. VIII, et disponit 
omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum 
supernaturale aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum 
quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum. Et sic 
donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est.” 
50 STh I-II.110.2 ad 1. 
51 STh I-II.110.4. The later scholastics would call a virtue (and a vice) an operative habitus 
and habitual grace an entitative habitus to make this distinction even clearer. 
52 STh I-II.110.4. 
53 STh I-II.5.1. 
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by nature are perfective of him. By definition, therefore, these virtues can only attain the 
human agent’s natural ends. Hence, for St. Thomas, the gift of habitual grace, as a form 
that orders the soul to supernatural ends that far transcend the natural ends uncovered in 
the principles of natural law, needs to be accompanied by infused virtues that dispose the 
Christian believer towards supernatural acts that are rightly ordered to attaining those 
supernatural ends that by grace are truly perfective of him.54 Indeed, for the Angelic 
Doctor, the acquired virtues, ordered as they are towards the temporal perfection of 
human society, from the supernatural horizon of the beatific vision, can now properly be 
regarded as only imperfect simulacrums of the infused virtues, ordered as they are 
towards the true and eternal perfection of the heavenly Kingdom.55 
 How does a human agent acquire the infused virtues? He does not. Recall that the 
principles of the acquired virtues and of the repetitive acts that engender them are the 
natural dispositions and the natural powers, both intellectual and appetitive, present in 
the human soul at its creation. These principles are ordered towards the human agent’s 
natural end. They can engender human acts that are connatural to his created nature. As 
such, these principles are metaphysically incapable of causing supernatural virtues that 
would dispose the Christian believer towards supernatural acts that would allow him to 
attain his supernatural end. They simply do not have any potency for acts of this kind. Or 
to put it in more technical language, they are not proportionate to supernatural acts as 
certain causes are not proportionate to certain effects.56 One could say that human nature 
                                                
54 De virt. in com. a. 10. 
55 De virt. in com. a. 10 ad 1. 
56 Thus, for example, St. Thomas will note that the human will is unable by its nature to 
engender the supernatural good to which it is not inclined. Cf. De virt. in com. a.10. 
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is not proportionate to supernatural God-like acts in the same way that chimpanzee 
nature is not proportionate to the human-like acts of reasoning and of free choice. 
Accordingly, for St. Thomas, God has to infuse supernatural dispositions, supernatural 
powers, and supernatural virtues along with habitual grace in order to capacitate the 
Christian believer so that he can transcend his nature and act in a divine way, by 
participation.   
 As a supernatural parallel for the natural inclinations in the powers of the soul to 
its natural end, St. Thomas posits the existence of infused dispositions in the soul that 
incline its powers to their supernatural end who is God. These are the theological virtues 
of faith, hope, and charity.57 As a supernatural parallel for the natural powers of the soul 
themselves, which by nature are capacitated to respond to reason, he posits the existence 
of infused dispositions in the soul that capacitate it so that it can respond to the Holy 
Spirit.58 These are the gifts of the Holy Spirit.59 Finally, as a supernatural parallel for the 
                                                
57 For example, St. Thomas will explain that the theological virtue of faith disposes the 
intellect towards the knowledge of God who is first truth. Cf. STh II-II.1.1. 
58 Here my account of the gifts differs from the common interpretation given by the 
classical Thomists who propose that the infused virtues and the gifts ground two different 
modes of action. For a representative instance of this tradition, see Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, O.P., The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Vol. 1 (St. Louis: B. Herder Books, 
1947), pp. 66-82. However, as Angela McKay-Knobel has convincingly argued, this 
common interpretation does not do justice either to the texts of St. Thomas or to his 
conviction that the human agent is incapable of performing supernatural acts without the 
continuous aid of God’s auxilium. For details, see her dissertation, “The Infused and 
Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre 
Dame, 2004. (ProQuest Document ID 305138977), pp. 41-50. Also see the discussion in 
Markus Christoph, S.J.M., “Justice as an Infused Virtue in the Secunda Secundae and Its 
Implications for Our Understanding of the Moral Life,” S.T.D. Dissertation, University of 
Fribourg (Switzerland), 2011, pp. 44-49; and in James W. Stroud, “Thomas Aquinas’ 
Exposition of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Developments in His Thought and Rival 
Interpretations,” S.T.D. Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 2012, pp. 69-
111. 
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acquired virtues in the intellect and in the appetites, he posits the existence of infused 
virtues, also in the intellect and in the appetites. These are the infused intellectual virtue 
of faith and of prudence, and the infused appetitive virtues of hope, of charity, and of the 
other moral virtues.   
 With this framework in mind, one can describe the acquisition of an infused 
virtue, in this case of an infused moral virtue, as follows: At the moment of justification 
and through the merits of the Son, the human agent is given habitual grace, the 
theological virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the infused moral virtues, with God as 
the efficient cause. These supernatural endowments transform and elevate the human 
agent’s entire nature. Disposed to God by the theological virtues, capacitated by the gifts 
of understanding, of knowledge, and of wisdom, and guided by the Holy Spirit, his 
intellect is now able to comprehend the supernatural end to which he is now inclined and 
to understand certain goods unknowable by natural synderesis. In this way, he perceives 
and grasps the fundaments of the eternal law that establishes his friendship with God.60 
Through repetitive supernatural acts ordered towards these supernatural ends by infused 
prudence, capacitated by the supernatural gifts, and engendered by the supernatural 
virtues, he is then able to partake more fully in the infused virtues that he has received. 
Through his meritorious acts, he is able to cooperate with God in the working out of his 
salvation. 
                                                                                                                                            
59 Thus, according to St. Thomas, the gift of understanding capacitates the intellect, which 
is inclined to the knowledge of God by the theological virtue of faith, to penetrate that 
knowledge of God easily and well under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Cf. STh II-II.8.2. 
60 STh I-II.99.2. 
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This dynamic is a process of deification that allows us to grow in holiness so that 
we will become perfect, as God is perfect (cf. Matt 5:48). The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church formulates this revealed truth, citing sources from both the Eastern and Western 
theological traditions, as follows: “‘For this is why the Word became man, and the Son of 
God became the Son of man: so that man, by entering into communion with the Word 
and thus receiving divine sonship, might become a son of God.’ ‘For the Son of God 
became man so that we might become God.’ ‘The only-begotten Son of God, wanting to 
make us sharers in his divinity, assumed our nature, so that he, made man, might make 
men gods’.”61 The infused virtues allow human beings to become like-God. 
Note that in contrast to the acquired virtues that have human reason as their cause 
and rule, the infused virtues have divine reason, which is the eternal law62, as their cause 
and their rule.63 It is their cause because divine reason and not human reason causes the 
infused virtues to come to be in the human agent’s powers. And it is their rule because 
once again, it is the human intellect, now transformed and elevated by the theological 
virtues and capacitated by the gifts of understanding, of knowledge, and of wisdom, that 
specifies and fixes the mean of the infused moral virtues according to the rule of the 
eternal law.64 Or to put it another way, the divine reason is the rule for the infused virtues 
because when the human agent performs a supernatural act, it is God who moves the 
                                                
61 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 460. Citing St. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 3, 19, 
1: PG 7/1, 939; St. Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi Dei, 54, 3: PG 25, 192B; and St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Opusculum, 57, 1-4. 
62 STh I-II.93.1. 
63 STh II-II.8.3 ad 3. 
64 STh I-II.63.4. However, it is significant that St. Thomas also teaches that the theological 
virtues do not have a mean in themselves because God is their object. However, they do 
have a mean if we look at them from the perspective of the human creature. See STh I-
II.64.4. 
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intellect of the human agent through the gifts of the Holy Spirit so that it can grasp and 
act in accordance with the eternal law that reveals the proper supernatural ends that are 
perfective of the Christian believer.65 
To summarize, this second schema of Thomistic virtues distinguishes the virtues 
according to their efficient cause. Here the infused virtues play an integral and necessary 
role within St. Thomas’s understanding of the life of grace. Once one accepts that grace is 
akin to a form that radically alters and elevates the end of the Christian believer, then one 
needs to posit infused dispositions, infused powers, and infused virtues, analogously 
speaking, of course, to explain how the human agent in the state of grace is capable of 
performing supernatural acts that are God-like in nature. However, as we will see shortly, 
this schema also raises questions of how the acquired and the infused virtues relate to 
each other in the life of the saint and of the sinner. 
 
Categorizing the Thomistic Virtues According to their Object and to their Final Cause 
 The third and fourth schemas have already been alluded to in the discussion of the 
second schema, just completed, that categorizes the virtues according to their efficient 
cause, and so I will only summarize them here. According to their object, the virtues can 
be distinguished into the theological virtues on the one hand, and the moral and 
intellectual virtues, on the other. As we saw above, the theological virtues of faith, hope, 
and charity, predispose the believer to God. They do this because their object is God 
Himself, immediately. They are a participation in His very essence. In contrast, the 
intellectual and the moral virtues, whether acquired or infused, do not concern God 
                                                
65 STh I-II.63.2. 
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immediately but are ordered towards created things in relation to God as an end, 
discerned either by unaided reason or by reason illuminated by grace and the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit.  
Finally, according to their final cause, the virtues can be distinguished into the 
natural and the supernatural virtues. As we saw above, the former kind include those 
virtues that direct the human agent to his natural end, which is his life in a political 
community, while the latter kind include those virtues that direct him to his supernatural 
end, which is his life in the Kingdom. Thus, the acquired intellectual and the acquired 
moral virtues are natural virtues, while the infused theological and the infused moral 
virtues are supernatural. As we will see towards the end of this chapter, I do not think that 
the parallel structure implied in the previous sentence is coincidental, because I think that 
there is an infused counterpart for the acquired intellectual virtues, which is the infused 
intellectual virtue we call the theological virtue of faith. 
 
 
The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Individual Virtues 
 
 Turning from an Aristotelian consideration of the essence of virtue and then of 
the species of virtue, we now move to the relationship between individual virtues. Once 
again, St. Thomas deploys hylomorphic language here. For example, he claims that 
prudence is a form of the moral virtues.66 More famously, St. Thomas teaches that charity 
is a form of all virtues, caritas forma virtutum, in Latin.67 Correlatively, of course, if one 
virtue can be a form for another virtue, then a virtue can be matter for another virtue. But 
                                                
66 De veritate 27.5 ad 5. 
67 STh II-II.23.8. 
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what exactly does this mean? What does it mean to say that one virtue is the form of 
another, or that one virtue is the matter of another? 
 Recall from Chapter One that that form not only determines matter but also 
specifies its end. Also recall from Chapter Two that when applied to the architecture of a 
complex human act, this principle reveals that the command determines the species of a 
commanded act such that an act of theft for the sake of adultery is formally an act of 
adultery and only materially an act of theft. Analogously, the moral object is the form of 
the will in the same way that the intelligible is the form of the intellect. The governing 
rule in this analysis is that the formal principle specifies the end of the material principle. 
Beginning with the acquired virtue of prudence, St. Thomas proposed early in his 
career that prudence is the form of the acquired moral virtues: “Prudence is the form of 
the other moral virtues in so far as the imprint of prudence on the inferior powers gives 
to the habits the nature of virtue.”68 In the same text, he explains that this obtains because 
prudence directs the moral virtues towards the ends specified by the order of reason: 
Except in so far as it participates in the perfection of a higher power, an 
inferior power does not have the perfection of a virtue just as a habit in the 
irascible power does not have the nature of a virtue…except in so far as it 
receives understanding and discretion from reason, which is perfected by 
                                                
68  In Sent. III.27.2.4 qc3 ad 1: “Prudentia est forma aliarum virtutum moralium, 
inquantum sigillatio quedam prudentiae in inferioribus viribus dat habitibus qui ibi sunt, 
rationem virtutis.” 
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prudence. In this respect, prudence places a mode and a form in all the 
other moral virtues.69 
In his more mature work, St. Thomas will explain again: “Prudence directs the moral 
virtues not only in the choice of those things directed towards the end, but also in 
appointing the end. For the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the proper 
matter whose mean is determine according to the right rule of prudence.”70 Prudence can 
be said to be a form of the moral virtues because it directs them according to the order of 
reason. It does this by inquiring, by judging, and by commanding acts that cause a 
habitus to form within the an agent cause’s appetites so that they are properly ordered 
towards their connatural ends, which are the ends that are grasped by synderesis. 
 Turning now to the infused virtue of charity, the analysis is the same. St. Thomas 
explains that charity is the form of the virtues because it directs the acts of all the virtues 
towards their ultimate end in the same way that the form of a human act determines its 
end71:  
                                                
69 In Sent. III.27.2.4 qc3: “Inferior enim potentia non habet perfectionem virtutis nisi 
secundum quod participat perfectionem potentiae superioris; sicut habitus qui est in 
irascibili, non habet rationem virtutis…nisi inquantum intellectum et discretionem 
recipit a ratione, quam perficit prudentia; et secundum hoc prudentia ponit modum et 
formam in omnibus aliis virtutibus moralibus.” 
70 STh I-II.66.3 ad 3: “Prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in eligendo ea quae 
sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis 
moralis attingere medium in propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur 
secundum rectam rationem prudentiae.” 
71 St. Thomas’s understanding of how charity is the form of the virtues is one of those 
areas of his thought that evolved during his intellectual lifetime. In his earlier writings, 
charity is a quasi-formal cause of the virtues while in his mature work, as we will see 
below, charity is the form of the virtues only in that it is their efficient cause. For 
discussion, see Michael Sherwin, O.P., By Knowledge and By Love (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), pp. 192-202. 
  182 
In morals the form of an act depends primarily from the end…Now it is 
evident…that it is charity that directs the acts of all other virtues to their 
ultimate end. And as such, it also gives the form to all other acts of virtue, 
and in this way it is called the form of the virtues.72 
As a specific example, St. Thomas will teach:  
It should be noted in the acts of the soul that an act that is essential to 
some power or habit receives a form or a species from a superior power or 
habit, as an inferior power is ordained by a superior power, for if one were 
to perform an act of fortitude for love of God, that act is materially an act 
of fortitude but is formally an act of charity.73  
The act of a more superior virtue is related to the act of the inferior virtue as form is 
related to matter.   
In imprinting a form on the acts of the virtues, charity acts as an efficient cause: 
“Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar nor their 
essential form, but more as their efficient cause, in so far as it is the form of all.”74 It is 
important to note, however, that this directing function of charity occurs in concert with 
                                                
72 STh II-II.23.8: “In moralibus forma actus attenditur principaliter ex parte finis… 
Manifestum est autem…quod per caritatem ordinantur actus omnium aliarum virtutum 
ad ultimum finem. Et secundum hoc ipsa dat formam actibus omnium aliarum virtutum. 
Et pro tanto dicitur esse forma virtutum.” 
73  STh I-II.13.1: “Est autem considerandum in actibus animae, quod actus qui est 
essentialiter unius potentiae vel habitus, recipit formam et speciem a superiori potentia 
vel habitu, secundum quod ordinatur inferius a superiori, si enim aliquis actum 
fortitudinis exerceat propter Dei amorem, actus quidem ille materialiter est fortitudinis, 
formaliter vero caritatis.” 
74  STh II-II.23.8 ad 1: “Caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum non quidem 
exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective, inquantum scilicet omnibus formam 
imponit.” 
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infused prudence and with infused grace. They work together to bring both the intellect 
and the will to bear on the acts of the infused moral virtues so that they are ordered 
towards the attainment of the ultimate end that is the eternal glory of the beatific vision:    
An act of virtue is given form in three ways. First of all, this is done in so 
far as the due conditions for the substance of the act are placed, setting 
limits to it and establishing it in the mean of virtue. The act of virtue has 
this from prudence for the mean of virtue is determined by right 
reason…And in this way, prudence is called the form of all the moral 
virtues. But the act of virtue is constituted in the mean as it is ordered to 
the ultimate end. This order is conferred upon the act of virtue by the 
command of charity. Thus charity is said to be the form of all the other 
virtues. Furthermore, however, grace contributes efficacy for meriting for 
no one would be counted worthy of eternal glory unless divine acceptance 
were presupposed. In this sense grace is said to be the form both of charity 
and of the other virtues.75 
In the end, infused prudence determines the proximate end, i.e., the means of attaining 
the ultimate end, of the act of the moral virtues, infused charity determines its ultimate 
                                                
75 De veritate 27.5 ad 5: “Informatur autem actus virtutis tripliciter. Uno modo in 
quantum circa substantiam actus apponuntur debitae conditiones, per quarum 
limitationem in medio virtutis constituitur. Et hoc habet actus virtutis a prudentia; nam 
medium virtutis accipitur secundum rationem rectam…Et sic prudentia dicitur forma 
omnium virtutum moralium. Actus autem virtutis sic constitutus in medio, est quasi 
materialis respectu ordinis in finem ultimum, qui quidem ordo apponitur actui virtutis ex 
imperio caritatis; et sic caritas dicitur esse forma omnium aliarum virtutum. Ulterius vero 
efficaciam merendi adhibet gratia: nullus enim operum nostrorum valor reputatur dignus 
aeternae gloriae, nisi praesupposita acceptatione divina; et sic gratia dicitur esse forma et 
caritatis et aliarum virtutum.” 
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end, and infused grace actualizes its performance so that the act can merit achieving that 
ultimate end, which is eternal life. These two examples reveal that for St. Thomas, two 
virtues can relate to each other as matter and form when the end of one virtue, acting as 
matter analogously understood, can be directed to the end of a second virtue, acting as 
form analogously understood. Form is all about that which determines the end of 
another. 
 
The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Categories of Virtues 
St. Thomas never explicitly addressed the issue of how the acquired and the 
infused virtues are related to, and work with, each other in any of his writings, though it is 
clear that he thought that an individual may have both kinds of virtue at the same time, 
and that they cooperate in some way.76 Therefore, it is not surprising that over the past 
                                                
76 For instance, in describing the prudence that is in the Christian believer, the Angelic 
Doctor writes: “Diligence is twofold: one is sufficient with regards to those things 
necessary for salvation and such diligence is given to all those who have been given grace, 
those whom his anointing teaches all things (1 Jn. 2:27). There is another diligence that is 
more than sufficient whereby one is able to make provision for himself and for others, not 
only in those things necessary for salvation but also in those things necessary for human 
life. Such diligence is not in all who have grace.” (STh II-II.47.14 ad 1): “Duplex est 
industria. Una quidem quae est sufficiens ad ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis. Et talis 
industria datur omnibus habentibus gratiam, quos unctio docet de omnibus, ut dicitur I 
Ioan. II. Est autem alia industria plenior, per quam aliquis sibi et aliis potest providere, 
non solum de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem sed etiam de quibuscumque 
pertinentibus ad humanam vitam. Et talis industria non est in omnibus habentibus 
gratiam.”  
 This text and there are others demonstrate that St. Thomas had no conceptual 
problem with positing the co-existence of the acquired and the infused virtues in the 
believer. For a recent study that suggests otherwise, see William C. Mattison III, “Can 
Christians Possess the Acquired Cardinal Virtues?” Theological Studies 72 (2011): 558-
585.  
 As for the cooperation between the two categories of virtues, St. Thomas writes: 
“The other virtues are infused along with charity. Hence, the act of the acquired virtue 
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eight hundred years, his intellectual heirs have provided many, and often-contradictory 
explanations, for how these two kinds of accidental dispositions in the soul relate to each 
other, a questione disputata that Brian Shanley, O.P., calls “perennially thorny.”77 Two 
interrelated issues are contested. The first deals with how these two categories of virtues, 
especially the acquired and infused moral virtues, coexist within the Christian believer 
living in grace – I will call this the metaphysical issue – while the second considers how 
they determine the moral character and actions, whether natural or supernatural, of the 
believer – I will call this the cooperation issue. 
Though a complete and comprehensive treatment of this disputed question lies 
beyond the scope of this dissertation,78 I examine two hylomorphic solutions that have 
been proposed more recently by Fr. George Klubertanz, S.J., and Sr. Renée Mirkes, O.S.F., 
to resolve this questio, to determine if they are successful. I chose these accounts because 
each attempts to answer the metaphysical issue by referring to the analogy of matter and 
form. As we have already seen several times in this dissertation, St. Thomas frequently 
avers to hylomorphism when he wants to describe the relationship between two related 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot be meritorious if not for the mediation of the infused virtue.” (De virt. in com. q 
10 ad 4): “Cum caritate autem simul infunduntur aliae virtutes; unde actus virtutis 
acquisitae non potest esse meritorius nisi mediante virtute infusa.” 
77 Shanley, “Aquinas on Pagan Virtue,” p. 555. For a historical summary of the theological 
positions put forward to respond to the metaphysical and facility questions, see Robert 
Coerver, “The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues,” S.T.D. Dissertation, The Catholic 
University of America, 1946; John F. Harvey, “The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,” 
in Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of 
America, June 27-29, 1955 (New York: Catholic Theological Society of America, 1955), 
pp. 172-221; and Renée Mirkes, “Moral Virtue and Facility,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 189-
218. 
78  For incisive analysis, extensive discussion, and references to the vast secondary 
literature, see Markus Christoph, S.J.M. “Justice as an Infused Virtue in the Secunda 
Secundae and Its Implications for Our Understanding of the Moral Life,” pp. 151-228. 
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and complementary realities. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that he would 
have used the matter-form analogy here as well, had he chosen to address this question 
more directly in his work.  
Moreover, as we will see shortly, each of the hylomorphic solutions considered 
here attempts to answer the cooperation issue with an account representative of two of 
the three possible categories of theories of cooperation. (As I explain below, the third 
category of theories of cooperation is not amenable to matter-form analysis by its very 
nature.) As such, each of these two hylomorphic accounts from Klubertanz and Mirkes 
will help us better understand the broader landscape of all the possible solutions to the 
question of how the acquired and the infused virtues could possibly interact and 
cooperate within a Thomistic schema.  
 
Theories of Cooperation Between the Acquired and the Infused Virtues 
 In his dissertation, Markus Christoph, S.J.M., makes a convincing case that the 
critical and distinctive feature of a theory of cooperation between the acquired and the 
infused virtues is its account of how the infused virtues either influence or do not 
influence the activity and the development of their acquired counterparts.79 He has shown 
that a consensus has emerged in the tradition that the acquired virtues more or less 
influence the activity and the development of their infused counterparts by providing or 
by impeding an extrinsic facility for the practice of infused virtues and the performance of 
supernatural acts. What is not clear is how this is accomplished, and if the reverse 
dynamic exists in the believer as well. Thus, in Christoph’s view, all the proposed theories 
                                                
79 Ibid., pp. 153-162. 
  187 
of cooperation within the Thomistic tradition can be classified, more or less, into three 
fundamental categories, depending upon how they understand, what I will call, this 
“inter-vertual” dynamic, from the Middle English term, vertu, for virtue, between an 
infused virtue and its acquired counterpart. 
First, the non-cooperative theories – Christoph calls them exclusive-order 
theories, but I find his terminology less than helpful – posit that there is no interaction 
and thus no cooperation between the acquired and the infused virtues, because these 
categories of virtues belong to different orders of reality.80 According to this view, the 
Christian believer in the state of grace is able to perform purely supernatural acts from his 
infused virtues and purely natural acts from his acquired virtues. Neither kind of virtue 
and neither kind of acts influences the activity or development of the other kind of virtue 
or kind of acts.  
Next, the accidentally-cooperative theories – Christoph calls them accidental 
relation theories – posit that the infused virtues may influence the activity and 
development of their acquired counterparts, depending on the particular circumstances. 
For instance, some proponents of these theories suggest that supernatural acts can lead to 
the acquisition of natural virtue if the agent intends both the supernatural and natural 
perfections when he acts. Thus, a monk who uses the supernatural virtue of temperance 
to fast not only in penance for his sins but also for the prevention of diabetes would 
acquire the natural virtue of temperance.  
                                                
80 This paragraph is based upon the analysis of Christoph, “Justice as an Infused Virtue in 
the Secunda Secundae and Its Implications for Our Understanding of the Moral Life,” pp. 
162-204.  
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Finally, the essentially-cooperative theories – Christoph calls them inclusive-order 
theories – posit that the infused virtues necessarily influence and impact the activity of 
their acquired counterparts. Proponents of these theories think that every act of an 
infused virtue contains the perfection of the corresponding natural act. Or to put it 
another way, they believe that a supernatural act has to align in a certain way to the 
measure of reason, regardless of the presence or absence of the corresponding acquired 
virtue. 
How do we determine which theory among these many accounts is the true one? 
One criterion is to determine which is the most faithful to the theological insights of St. 
Thomas. This is the criterion most often used by Thomists in their analysis, but there are 
few pertinent and determinative texts available here.81 Thus, a complementary approach, 
which I will emphasize here, is to test each theory for its ability to explain, or to fail to 
explain, the actual everyday experience of Christian believers who are struggling to work 
out their salvation in fear and trembling (cf. Phil 2:12). The assumption is that the theory 
with the most explanatory power is often the one closest to the truth of the matter.82 The 
four case studies I will use to evaluate the theories under investigation, verifiable in the 
confessional and in everyday life, will be the cases of the lax seminarian, the diabetic 
Trappist monk, the converted Zumba instructor, and the revert couch potato. The first is 
                                                
81 Christoph has identified just three indirect texts from the corpus of St. Thomas that 
deal with how the acts of the infused virtues impact the development of the acquired 
virtues: De veritate 17.1 ad sed contra 4; STh I-II.51.4 ad 3; and De virt. in com. q 10 ad 19. 
As he convincingly shows, however, they are underdetermined and cannot be used to 
resolve the question definitively. See Christoph, “Justice as an Infused Virtue in the 
Secunda Secundae and Its Implications for Our Understanding of the Moral Life,” pp. 
162-164. 
82 For a classic exposition and defense of this claim in the philosophy of science, see Peter 
Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
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a classic example in the secondary literature83 while the latter three are based on the 
experience of individuals I have met in my priestly apostolate with alterations in the 
narrative to maintain their anonymity. These cases involve the acquired virtue of 
temperance and its infused counterpart. The former is a virtue ordered towards the health 
of the body as determined by reason, while the latter is ordered towards the chastisement 
and subjection of the body for the sake of the Kingdom.84 
First, the lax seminarian is the case of the seminarian who regularly receives the 
sacraments and practices acts of infused virtue during his years of formation, but who 
does not undertake acts to strengthen his acquired virtues. More concretely, he fasts and 
abstains on Fridays and during Lent and Advent, but does not regulate his diet otherwise. 
His lack of zeal manifests itself in disordered attachments to creaturely goods and in 
repetitive acts of venial sin including gluttonous acts in front of the cable television. Here, 
the lax seminarian’s use of the infused virtues to perform supernatural acts does not 
redound to the acquisition of natural virtues. Not surprisingly, the lax seminarian 
becomes a lax priest. 
Next, the pre-diabetic Trappist monk is the case of the monk who has spent a 
lifetime abstaining and fasting as part of his monastic observances. Late in life, an annual 
health examination reveals that he is genetically predisposed to diabetes so he is asked to 
remove all salt from his diet. He discovers that his decades-long practice of the 
supernatural virtue of temperance has made it easy for him to embrace a cholesterol-free 
                                                
83 For example, see Harvey, “The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,” p. 196. 
84 Cf. STh I-II.63.4. For a discussion of the importance of temperance in the life of the 
Christian, see Stephen Loughlin, “Thomas Aquinas and the Importance of Fasting to the 
Christian Life,” Proecclesia 17 (2008): 343-361. 
  190 
and salt-free diet for his own benefit, even in a state of mortal sin. Here, the pre-diabetic 
Trappist monk’s use of the infused virtues to perform supernatural acts redounded to the 
acquisition of natural virtues in the absence of repetitive natural acts ordered towards his 
own good. 
Third, there is the case of the converted Zumba instructor who is baptized in 
college after being raised in a secular family. After her conversion, she continues living a 
healthy lifestyle involving regular dieting. Later that year, she discovers the Church’s 
practice of fasting for the Kingdom while on a sophomore retreat and begins fasting 
regularly on Wednesdays and Fridays. Not surprisingly, she discovers that her healthy 
heating habits facilitate her fasting schedule during the week. Here, the converted Zumba 
instructor’s use of the natural virtues – in this case the acquired virtue of temperance – to 
perform natural acts of dieting predates her use of its infused counterpart, because of her 
ignorance, even in the state of grace. 
Finally, the revert couch potato is the case of a man who experiences a mid-life 
crisis that returns him not only to the Church of his childhood but also to the gym of his 
college years. He begins to diet to lose his beer belly and to fast for his salvation. He 
Surprisingly, he discovers that fasting helps him to diet and vice versa. Here, the revert 
couch potato’s use of the infused virtues to perform supernatural acts redounded to the 
acquisition of natural virtues.  
 
Evaluating a Hylomorphic/Non-cooperative Theory of Cooperation 
 Given the basic premise of all non-cooperative theories that there is no interaction 
and thus no cooperation between the acquired and the infused virtues, it should not be 
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surprising that no one has proposed a hylomorphic variant for this category of theories. 
No such theory is proposable. As we discussed in Chapter One, the guiding principle for 
St. Thomas’s analogical use of hylomorphic terminology is succinctly summarized in his 
observation cited earlier that “whenever two things concur to make one, one of them is 
formal in regard to the other.”85 Thus, if two things can never concur – as the non-
cooperative theorists propose for the inter-vertual dynamic between the acquired virtues 
and their infused counterparts – then matter-form language cannot be used, even 
analogically, to describe the relationship between them.  
 Nonetheless, I would like to raise an objection to non-cooperative theories of 
cooperation taken as a whole. In my view, the most significant problem with these 
accounts is that they fail to explain the case of the pre-diabetic Trappist monk and other 
cases like it. While in the state of grace, the monk performed supernatural acts of 
temperance for love of God and His Most Holy Mother. These acts of temperance were 
not done because the man was concerned about his health. They were done because he 
loved the Mother of God. As such, I would propose that the diabetic monk did not 
perform natural acts of temperance in religious life. He certainly did not intend to. In 
fact, he was aware that his fasting and abstinence could later impact his health 
detrimentally. And yet, this Christian believer discovered that he had acquired a natural 
virtue from what appeared to be the repetitive acts of infused virtue. If the non-
cooperative theories of cooperation between the acquired and the infused virtues were 
                                                
85  STh I-II.13.1: “Quandocumque autem duo concurrunt ad aliquid unum 
constituendum, unum eorum est ut formale respectu alterius.” 
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true, then this would not be possible: Supernatural acts should not be able to influence the 
growth of natural virtue. And yet the empirical data suggests that they do.  
 
Evaluating a Hylomorphic/Accidentally-Cooperative Theory of Cooperation 
 Turning to a hylomorphic/accidentally-cooperative theory of inter-vertual 
cooperation, Fr. George Klubertanz, S.J., has proposed that a matter-form analogy best 
explains the relationship between the acquired and the infused virtues: “Here in brief is 
this theory. The habits which are in the same power or in distinct powers may be one to 
the other like matter and form.”86 In his view, the two categories of virtue have a 
relationship where the acquired virtue is determinable and the infused virtue is 
determining. They come together as matter and form as a single principle of operation for 
all the agent’s acts in the life of grace. How they interact and cooperate with each other 
depends on the explicit motives chosen by the agent when he acts. 
Using the acquired and infused virtues of prudence as an example, Klubertanz 
explains that when the agent in the state of grace acts prudentially, his act is a 
supernatural act of prudence in conformity with the divine law that emerges from both 
the acquired and the infused virtue of prudence relating to each other as principles of 
matter and form.87 However, for Klubertanz, this supernatural act must also be an act in 
accordance with the law of reason because the principles of the divine law includes the 
principles of the natural law. Thus, he concludes, “far from being opposed or from being 
                                                
86“Voici en bref ce qu’est cette théorie. Les habitus, qu’ils soient dans une même puissance 
ou dans plusieurs puissances distinctes, peuvent être l’un pour l’autre comme matière et 
forme.” George Klubertanz, S.J., “Une theorie sur les vertus morales ‘naturelles’ et 
‘surnaturelles’,” Revue Thomiste 59 (1959): 565-575, p. 570. 
87 Ibid., 571. 
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incompatible, these principles [of acquired and infused virtue in the state of grace] are 
mutually complementary.”88 
 How does Klubertanz explain the cooperation of the two kinds of virtue? By 
definition, natural acts cannot give rise to supernatural virtue. They belong to different 
orders of reality where the supernatural far exceeds the natural not only in degree but also 
in kind. But can supernatural acts give rise to natural virtue? For Klubertanz, it depends. 
If a person in the state of grace makes a prudential judgment based upon the divine law, 
solely upon the authority of God, then his act of prudence, because it only contains the 
supernatural perfection of the virtue, does not redound to the growth of natural virtue.89 
However, if the same agent cause makes a prudential judgment based not only upon the 
divine law but also upon right reason, then this supernatural act contains formally the 
perfection of the supernatural virtue and materially the perfection of its natural 
counterpart. This supernatural act would then be able to cause or to enhance the acquired 
virtue of prudence. The reverse is also true. If a person in the state of grace makes a 
prudential judgment based solely on right reason without considering the divine law, 
then his act would remain a natural act that would lead to an increase of acquired virtue 
without involving either supernatural virtues or supernatural acts.90  
To evaluate Klubertanz’s hylomorphic/accidentally-cooperative theory of 
cooperation, I would like to explore its ability to explain the experiential data 
encapsulated in the four case studies described above. At the outset, note that his theory is 
                                                
88 “[B]ien loin de s'opposer, ou de s'exclure comme incompatibles, ces principes sont 
mutuellement complémentaires.” Klubertanz, “Une theorie,” p. 571. 
89 Klubertanz, “Une theorie,” p. 572. 
90 Ibid. 
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accidentally-cooperative in nature because of Klubertanz’s conviction that an agent’s 
natural and supernatural acts can be distinguished from each other or can be unified as 
one act as determinable to determining depending upon the agent’s motives. As such, 
they are only accidentally related to each other when they do cooperate in the life of 
grace. 
 First, there is the case of the lax seminarian who regularly receives the sacraments 
and practices acts of infused virtue during his years of formation, but who does not 
undertake acts to strengthen his acquired virtues. He fasts, but he does not diet. He finds 
dieting hard, even in the state of mortal sin. Here, the Christian believer’s supernatural 
acts are not accompanied by corresponding natural acts and thus they do not lead to 
natural virtue. Can Klubertanz’s theory explain this scenario? Yes, it can. His theory 
would say that when the seminarian chose to fast, he did so only with the divine law in 
mind. He did not consider the law of reason when he acted. As such, his supernatural 
actions did not redound to the growth of natural virtue.   
Next, there is the case of the pre-diabetic Trappist monks who discovers that his 
lifetime of fasting and abstinence has facilitated his living out of a cholesterol-free and 
salt-free diet, even in the state of mortal sin. Here, the monk’s use of the infused virtues to 
perform supernatural acts of temperance has facilitated the acquisition of its natural 
counterpart. Here, Klubertanz’s theory is weak. If the monk did not consider the rule of 
reason in his monastic observance, then we would not have expected him to develop the 
corresponding acquired virtue of temperance. This scenario would be comparable to the 
lax seminarian case. And yet, it appears that in this particular life, the exercise of the 
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supernatural virtues in the life-long practice of supernatural acts does lead to the growth 
of their acquired counterparts, probably by altering the monk’s bodily dispositions. 
Third, there is the case of the converted Zumba instructor who continues to 
maintain a healthy diet after her baptism months before she discovers the Church’s 
practice of fasting for the Kingdom. Here, the trainer’s use of her natural virtues appears 
to predate her use of her supernatural virtues. Though her natural acts of temperance do 
facilitate her supernatural acts of fasting, what is important here is that it appears that she 
is able to perform natural acts of virtue without simultaneously performing supernatural 
acts from the infused counterpart. Once again, Klubertanz’s theory can explain this 
Christian’s experience. Here the Zumba instructor, even in the state of grace, chose to diet 
based solely on right reason without considering the divine law. Therefore, her act would 
remain a natural act that would lead to an increase of acquired virtue without involving 
either supernatural virtues or supernatural acts 
Finally, there is the case of the revert couch potato who experiences a mid-life 
crisis that returns him not only to the Church of his childhood but also to the gym of his 
college years. He begins to diet to lose his beer belly and to fast for his salvation. 
Surprisingly, he discovers that fasting helps him to diet and vice versa. Here, the revert 
couch potato’s use of the infused virtues to perform supernatural acts redounded to the 
acquisition of natural virtues. Again, Klubertanz’s theory provides an excellent account of 
this Christian’s experience. In exercising the supernatural virtue of temperance, the revert 
couch potato acquires the corresponding natural virtue because his supernatural act was 
undertaken with both the divine law and the natural law in mind. As such his act contains 
the perfections of both the supernatural virtue and its acquired counterpart.  
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In summary, Klubertanz’s hylomorphic/accidentally-cooperative theory of 
cooperation appears to explain most of the experiential data taken from Christians living 
the life of grace. Its one weakness is that it appears to fail in cases where Christians like 
the pre-diabetic monk who choose to perform supernatural acts alone, appear to acquire 
the corresponding natural virtue. We will return to this data point after we consider an 
alternative hylomorphic account to explain the cooperation of the acquired and the 
infused virtues. 
  
Evaluating a Hylomorphic/Essentially-Cooperative Theory of Cooperation 
Moving to the final category of theories of cooperation, the essentially-cooperative 
theories, Sr. Renée Mirkes, O.S.F., has proposed that the two categories of virtue, acquired 
and infused, come together as matter and form to become a perfect whole.91 As we will 
see in greater detail below, in contrast to Klubertanz’s proposal discussed above, her 
hylomorphic account is representative of those essentially-cooperative theories of virtue 
that posit that the infused virtues necessarily influence and impact the activity of their 
acquired counterparts. 
Metaphysically, for Mirkes, St. Thomas taught that a Christian in the state of grace 
has supernatural virtues, perfect moral virtues that are composed of an acquired virtue 
and an infused virtue understood as principles of matter and of form. She writes: “[I]n the 
                                                
91 Renée Mirkes, O.S.F. “Aquinas’s Doctrine of Moral Virtue and its Significance for 
Theories of Facility,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 189-218. Also see her, “Aquinas on the 
Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1998): 
589-605. Both of these published essays were based on her dissertation, “Aquinas on the 
Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue and its Significance for the Nature-Grace Question,” Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Marquette University, 1995. 
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Christian who also possesses the acquired moral virtues, each acquired virtue and its 
infused counterpart are the material and formal principles, respectively, of the perfect 
realization of that particular moral virtue and constitute a unified virtue that is 
supernaturally transformed.” 92  Or again: “Moral virtue in the Christian, though 
composed of acquired and infused moral virtue, is an indivisible but composite virtue 
that is formally an infused moral virtue and materially an acquired moral virtue.”93 Or 
again: “In the Christian moral life, a perfect moral act directed to a single material object 
but performed from two ordered motives, natural and supernatural, is able to realized a 
created good that is a means to attaining the absolutely ultimate end.”94 The acquired and 
the infused virtues are the matter and the form of the perfect moral virtues. 
 To justify her reconstruction of St Thomas’s theory of virtue, Mirkes makes an 
argument of three steps. First, from the Angelic Doctor’s teaching that a habitus is an 
active principle that not only orients a power of the soul to perform a certain operation 
with ease, promptness, and enjoyment, but is also capable of further perfection from a 
superior habitus95, Mirkes – correctly, in my view – establishes a Thomistic hierarchy of 
virtues where the acquired intellectual virtues are inferior to the acquired moral virtues, 
and both kinds are inferior to their infused counterparts. Next, from St. Thomas’s 
teaching that the inferior can be perfected by the superior, Mirkes proposes, “[j]ust as 
natural dispositions are the perfectible of the acquired intellectual and moral virtues, so it 
is reasonable to argue that acquired moral virtue is the perfectible or material principle of 
                                                
92 Mirkes, “Aquinas’s Doctrine,” p. 191. 
93 Ibid., p. 199. 
94 Ibid., p. 191. 
95 Ibid., p. 192. 
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infused virtue, which is superior to it.”96 Finally, from her reading of St. Thomas’s 
teaching that perfect moral virtue is materially an acquired moral virtue and formally a 
virtue of prudence, she concludes that “through the unity of charity, [St. Thomas] defines 
absolutely perfect moral virtue as a virtue that is formally an infused virtue and materially 
an acquired virtue.” 97  For Mirkes, what is presupposed here “is the act-potency 
relationship that is constitutive of matter and form.”98 Thus, she concludes that “each 
acquired moral virtue is related to its infused counterpart as a determinable or perfectible 
principle, that is, that which is in potency to the actualization by its infused analogate.”99 
As precedent for her hylomorphic account of perfect moral virtue, Mirkes points to 
hylomorphic examples of the structure of the human act, the structure of the human 
person, the structure of Christ, and the structure of the divine law.100 
Cooperatively, for Mirkes, St. Thomas taught that the Christian in the state of 
grace is only capable of acts that are simultaneously natural and supernatural in character 
because of the way the infused and acquired virtues cooperate with each other to cause 
perfect moral virtue. She writes:  
A moral virtue, in its absolutely perfect state, is formally speaking 
supernatural or an infused virtue and materially speaking natural or an 
acquired moral virtue…The formal cause is the supernatural perfection 
that determines the composite virtue to be the kind that it is; the material 
cause is the natural perfection that is in potency to the perfecting formal 
                                                
96 Ibid., p. 195. 
97 Ibid., p. 196. 
98 Mirkes, “Aquinas on the Unity,” p. 591. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., pp. 600-601. 
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cause and is able to be determined by it, while at the same time exercising 
its own reciprocal causality.101 
Or again: “[A]n infused moral virtue having received its perfect form from charity, is also 
able to effect, produce, and create its own form or perfection in its acquired counterpart, 
enabling the acquired virtue to function just like the infused.”102  
Given all this, for Mirkes, the acquired virtues confer or impede an extrinsic 
facility to the practice of their infused counterparts in the same way that matter is 
predisposed to greater or lesser degrees to form: “The reason that the person still suffers a 
lack of ease in the performance of infused virtues after their restoral following 
sacramental penance, for example, is that the infused virtue is still linked with the 
material component of an acquired vice or a vicious disposition.”103 In a complementary 
manner, the infused virtues are able to direct their acquired counterparts, as form directs 
matter in the substance, so that they are both ordered towards the same end, in this case 
the supernatural end specified by the formal principle. Note that the infused virtue adds a 
further determination to the acquired virtue that does not supplant the latter’s essential 
nature. Grace perfects nature: “[G]race could never detract from nature. Rather, 
witnessing to the dignity of the human person as an imago Dei who is open to and fit for 
grace, the supernatural life of God confers on human nature the very completion toward 
which it tends.”104  
                                                
101 Mirkes, “Aquinas’s Doctrine,” pp. 204-205. 
102 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
103 Ibid., p. 205. 
104 Mirkes, “Aquinas on the Unity,” p. 605. 
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Finally, in Mirkes’s view, the human faculties in the state of grace are specified so 
that they are ordered towards both their natural and their supernatural perfections, where 
the former is ordered towards the latter. Two things follow from this. First, in Mirkes’s 
view, the Christian believer is unable to perform either a purely natural or a purely 
supernatural act of virtue. An act of supernatural virtue is always both natural and 
supernatural: “[S]ince intention responds to both a final and a proximate end, it is 
possible to do one and the same act for both a natural and supernatural end. As a result, 
an act of temperance following from a perfect virtue of temperance is a single act 
performed from two ordered motives and for two ordered ends.”105 Or again, “The 
justified person who possesses the acquired virtues and who performs a supernatural act 
of prudence, for example, also performs an act of acquired prudence.”106 This claim of the 
unity of the virtues has to be understood with Mirkes conviction that “[b]ecause of the 
ordered relationship of imperfect to perfect principles, Aquinas demonstrates that the 
motive and end of acquired moral virtue is included within, or is the material component, 
of, the motive and end of infused moral virtue.”107 A correlate of this proposal that the 
virtues are unified is that, for Mirkes, the Christian believer is unable to perform purely 
natural acts of virtue. She writes: “There is no evidence in Aquinas, then, to support the 
claim that, in the life of the Christian who also possesses the acquired virtues, there is the 
possibility of performing purely natural acts of acquired virtue. One could argue that 
                                                
105 Ibid., p. 198. 
106 Mirkes, “Aquinas on the Unity,” Ph.D Dissertation, p. 218. 
107 Mirkes, “Aquinas’s Doctrine,” p. 197. 
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there might be Christian acts of moral virtue that are performed predominantly from 
natural motives, but…even these acts would be formally supernatural.”108  
Next, in Mirkes’s view, supernatural acts necessarily redound to the spiritual 
power to generate acquired virtue: “If the act of prudential judgment of the mature 
baptized person includes a natural act of acquired prudence, the repetition of this will 
eventually account for the acquisition of the human virtue of prudence.”109 For Mirkes, 
this dynamic occurs when the acting person chooses to act with his natural good in mind:  
To acquire a natural virtue of prudence…the person needs repeatedly to 
perform acts that contain the perfection of right reason until the 
accumulated effect of these acts brings the power from a state of potency 
to actuality, and the person is able consistently and with ease to judge 
rightly about what is to be done in the here and now. It is the perfection or 
the goodness of the repeated act in which the agent wills the good as a 
good for himself that is responsible for the formation of the virtue.110 
Supernatural virtues give rise to supernatural acts, which give rise to natural virtues when 
the agent acts supernaturally with his natural end in mind.  
 Like we did with Klubertanz’s account, I would like to evaluate Mirkes’s theory by 
investigating its ability to explain the experiential data encapsulated in the four case 
studies described earlier. In contrast to his theory, hers is essentially-cooperative because 
of her belief that an act of perfect moral virtue is always both natural and supernatural in 
character. One cannot separate the natural act of acquired virtue and the supernatural act 
                                                
108 Ibid., p. 205. 
109 Mirkes, “Aquinas on the Unity,” Ph.D Dissertation, p. 217.  
110 Mirkes, “Aquinas’s Doctrine,” p. 214. 
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of infused virtue within the act of perfect moral virtue, because one cannot separate 
matter and form without destroying the substance. As such, the two kinds of virtue 
necessarily and essentially cooperate with each other in the life of grace. 
 First, there is the case of the lax seminarian. Can Mirkes’s theory explain this 
scenario? It appears not. As an essentially-cooperative theory, her proposal conjectures 
that supernatural acts necessarily redound to the spiritual power to give rise to acquired 
virtue. The lax seminarian does not develop acquired virtue despite his frequent and 
repetitive acts of infused virtue. Given everything that Mirkes has said about the unity 
between a supernatural and a natural virtue within a perfect moral virtue, it would be 
hard for her to explain the lax seminarian’s experience in the life of grace.  
Next, there is the case of the pre-diabetic Trappist monks. Here, Mirkes’s theory 
provides an excellent account of this Christian’s experience. In practicing the 
supernatural virtue of temperance, the pre-diabetic monk acquired the corresponding 
natural virtue because each supernatural act is both natural and supernatural in character. 
This inter-vertual dynamic is an essential one that does not require the acting person’s 
intending his own natural good. 
Third, there is the case of the converted Zumba instructor. Once again, Mirkes’s 
theory cannot explain this Christian’s experience. Recall that for Mirkes, the Christian 
believer is unable to perform purely natural acts of virtue. As we noted above, she claims: 
“One could argue that there might be Christian acts of moral virtue that are performed 
predominantly from natural motives, but…even these acts would be formally 
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supernatural.”111 Thus, in her view, the converted Zumba instructor who was dieting was 
actually fasting even before she knew that she could fast. To put it another way, for 
Mirkes, once she was baptized, the Zumba instructor was actually fasting for the sake of 
the Kingdom when she was dieting, even without her explicitly intending to fast. In my 
view, this is erroneous because it would suggest that there is no real difference between 
the Zumba instructor’s acts when she was dieting and when she was explicitly fasting. But 
there was a difference! The fasting helped the Zumba instructor to pray in a way that the 
dieting did not.  
Finally, there is the case of the revert couch potato. Again, Mirkes’s theory 
provides an excellent account of this Christian’s experience. In practicing the 
supernatural virtue of temperance, the revert couch potato acquires the corresponding 
natural virtue because each supernatural act is both natural and supernatural in character, 
especially when the human agent intends both his natural and his supernatural end 
simultaneously.  
In sum, Mirkes’s theory – and I would add, all essentially-cooperative theories of 
virtue by their very nature have the same problem – is unable to explain all the 
experiential evidence of the Christian life. Its basic flaw is that it is unable to account for 
those experiences where Christians in the state of grace are able to exercise acts of natural 
and supernatural virtue independently of each other. More concretely, it is unable to 
account for how a Christian can fast without concern for his health, how a Christian can 
diet without concern for his salvation, or how a Christian can simultaneously diet for 
                                                
111 Mirkes, “Aquinas’s Doctrine,” p. 205. 
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health and fast for the Kingdom depending upon how she chooses to understand what 
she is doing. 
 
A Summary Evaluation of Hylomorphic Theories of Cooperation 
At the top of the chapter, I pointed out that one challenge facing Catholic moral 
theologians today is to properly explain those transformations from vice to virtue in the 
Christian who begins to live the life of grace. For theologians working within the 
Thomistic tradition, this will necessarily involve a discussion of how the acquired and the 
infused virtues cooperate, if they even do so, with each other in the acts of the believer.  
We have now explored the three broad categories of theories of cooperation 
between the acquired and the infused virtues concentration of their hylomorphic 
variants. Why? Because as we have already seen several times in this dissertation, St. 
Thomas frequently avers to hylomorphism when he wants to describe the relationship 
between two related and complementary realities. Thus, it is not unreasonable to think 
that he would have used the matter-form analogy to address this perennially thorny 
question had he chosen to explicitly do so. 
As we discussed above, non-cooperative theories of cooperation fail because they 
cannot explain the experiences of Christians who appear to develop acquired natural 
virtues through the performance of supernatural acts. Next, essentially-cooperative 
theories fail because they are unable to account for those experiences where Christians in 
the state of grace are able to exercise acts of natural and supernatural virtue 
independently of each other. Moreover, as Angela McKay-Knobel has shown – 
convincingly, in my view – there are texts from St. Thomas that suggest that he thought 
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that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural ends that distinguish the 
categories of acquired and infused virtue require that the Christian in the state of grace 
needs to have distinct virtues that can give rise to distinct kinds of acts, natural or 
supernatural.112  
This leaves us with the accidentally-cooperative theories of virtue where an agent’s 
natural and supernatural acts can either be distinguished from each other as distinct acts, 
or be unified into one act. Here the agent cause in the state of grace possesses both the 
acquired and the infused virtues as forms informing the same appetitive power. For 
Klubertanz, the Christian can perform a distinct natural act, a distinct supernatural act, or 
a mixed act that is materially natural and formally supernatural, depending upon his 
motives. Natural acts would lead to the growth of acquired virtues while supernatural acts 
would redound to the development of their supernatural counterparts. As we noted 
above, however, this theory is able to explain most of the data. However, it has an 
apparent weakness: It fails to explain cases where Christians like the pre-diabetic monk 
who choose to perform supernatural acts alone, appear to acquire the corresponding 
natural virtue, though it can explain the obverse cases where Christians like the lax 
seminarian who choose to perform supernatural acts alone do not acquire the 
corresponding natural virtue.  
How do we address this failing in the theory? I propose tweaking Klubertanz’s 
theory in the following way. In addition to all that he has proposed, I submit that the 
repetitious acts of supernatural virtue – pace Klubertanz – do facilitate the acquisition of 
                                                
112 Angela McKay Knobel, “Can Aquinas’s Infused and Acquired Virtues Coexist in the 
Christian Life,” Studies in Christian Ethics 23 (2010): 381-396. 
  206 
their natural counterparts, even in the absence of the agent’s explicit motive to regard the 
law of reason. Take the pre-diabetic monk. In my view, five decades of self-denial and 
self-mastery with respect to food and drink for the Kingdom of God would inevitably 
redound to the dispositive character of the monk’s concupiscible appetite. In other words, 
after fifty years of abstinence and fasting, the monk’s ability to deny himself of food 
regardless of motive should be easier for him now than it was when he was a novice. Not 
surprisingly, this would enhance his facility to acquire the natural virtue of temperance 
when he is encouraged to do so by his physician. This would explain the case of the pre-
diabetic monk.  
But what about the lax seminarian? Why do his acts of supernatural virtue – his 
fasting and abstaining on Fridays and in Advent and in Lent – not redound to the 
acquisition of natural virtue as it did for the pre-diabetic monk? Note that the asking of 
this question presupposes that the two cases are comparable. I would suggest, however, 
that they are not. They are different because the pre-diabetic monk practiced acts of 
supernatural virtue without practicing acts of natural vice opposed to that virtue. He was 
always fasting and abstaining in the monastery, and there were few to no opportunities 
for him to indulge in excess food or drink. That is the advantage of monastic observance 
within the context of a monastic community. In contrast, the lax seminarian would fast 
and abstain when he had to in the seminary, but would then indulge in venial acts of 
intemperance when he could. In fact, these are the venial acts that make him a lax rather 
than an observant seminarian. These are also the venial acts of vice that prevent him from 
acquiring any facility to natural virtue from the practice of supernatural acts of 
temperance.  
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Thus, to correct the weakness in Klubertanz’s theory, I would modify it by 
proposing that supernatural acts of virtue can in fact facilitate the acquisition of natural 
virtues even if the Christian does not refer those acts to right reason. However, this can 
only happen if the Christian in the state of grace does not engage in acts of vice that are 
opposed to the growth of that natural virtue. With this amendment, I think that 
Klubertanz’s theory is now able to explain all the experiential data of the life of the 
Christian in the state of grace. It would be able to explain how the acquired and the 
infused virtues interact – as matter and form – and how they facilitate or impede the 
practice of natural and supernatural acts proceeding from their counterpart virtue. It is 
one proposal to account for the dynamic movements within life of grace. 
 
The Genealogy of the Infused Virtues and their Acquired Counterparts 
The discussion in this chapter has focused so far on the relationship between the 
acquired and the infused virtues when they co-exist in the life of the graced individual. 
Now we turn to a related question: Do the infused virtues necessarily presuppose the 
existence of their acquired counterparts? Or to put it another way, does the genealogy of 
the infused virtues necessarily include their acquired counterparts? 
In his essay, “The Nature-Grace Question in the Context of Fortitude,” Lee 
Yearley makes two arguments for the claim that the infused virtues “presuppose” their 
acquired counterparts. First, he proposes that a supernatural act of martyrdom would be 
vitiated or even destroyed by the absence of acquired fortitude.113 For Yearley, a martyr 
                                                
113 Lee H. Yearley, “The Nature-Grace Question in the Context of Fortitude,” The Thomist 
35 (1971): 557-580; p. 573. 
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who does not value or love worldly goods enough because he lacks natural fortitude 
would not find it difficult to give them up, diminishing the excellence of his heroic act of 
renunciation. In his view, a martyr of this kind would suffer an act of martyrdom that 
“would instead be characterized by ease.” 114  Second, Yearley contends that the 
development of natural fortitude is a “necessary first step” in “the sequential development 
of man.”115 Here, he proposes that a human being cannot order himself to heavenly things 
unless he first puts himself into an ordered relation according to right reason to natural 
things, which requires natural fortitude.  
In response, Angela McKay-Knobel rightfully points out that Yearley’s first 
argument is contradicted by the experiential data of the Christian martyrs of history who 
appear to have lacked acquired fortitude, at least in the sense that Yearley defines it, as 
properly possessing and valuing all of this world’s goods.116 For instance, given their vow 
of poverty and the rigor of their vowed life, it is unlikely that all of the Dominican friars 
who were martyred in China, Vietnam, and Japan, in the 17th and 18th centuries would 
have loved the things of the world as Yearley imagines they would have. In fact, there is 
evidence that days and months before their martyrdom in Vietnam, the friars preachers 
were willing to forego food rather than renounce their faith.117  As McKay-Knobel 
correctly notes, therefore, to explain their heroism, we have to look, not at their natural 
                                                
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., p. 574. 
116 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy,” p. 193. 
117 For historical details, see the narrative in Valentine de Berrio-Ochoa, “From a Letter of 
Saint Valentine de Berrio-Ochoa, Vicar Apostolic of Central Tonkin. Alternative Second 
Reading for the Memorial of Sts. Francis de Capillas and Alfonsus Navarrette, Friars and 
Priests, and Companions, January 15,” in Supplement to the Liturgy of the Hours for the 
Order of Preachers, 2nd ed. (Manila: Commission on Liturgy and Prayer, Dominican 
Province of the Philippines, 2012), pp. 89-92. 
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fortitude, but at their supernatural charity, for it is supernatural charity that motivates 
martyrdom. And since there is no necessary correlation between the intensity of the 
martyrs’ charity and the presence or absence of their natural virtue, she rightly argues that 
there is no need to think that supernatural acts of martyrdom necessarily presuppose 
natural fortitude.118 This is certainly correct. Nonetheless, I do want to add that it is 
striking that the martyrdom of a coward, a man who unreasonably clings to his life and to 
his world in the face of death – I am thinking here of the Apostle Peter who denied his 
Lord before eventually embracing crucifixion upside down – is considered a more 
excellent act of martyrdom precisely because his supernatural act of fortitude appears to 
have transformed him in spite of his having its natural contrary vice. Therefore, in 
opposition to Yearley’s claims, the absence of natural fortitude does not necessarily make 
martyrdom easy. It may even make it more difficult.  
As for Yearley’s second argument that natural fortitude is necessary for the 
natural development of the virtuous human agent, McKay-Knobel makes a distinction: 
For St. Thomas, it is true that the cultivation of an acquired virtue disposes the pagan for 
its infused counterpart. In this sense, natural fortitude is a “first step” for its infused 
correlate. However, in her view, it is also clear that Yearley’s proposal does not apply to 
the justified Christian who is called to live the meritorious life of grace: “If [Yearley] 
means that the individual in the state of grace should not even attempt to perform 
                                                
118 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy,” pp. 193-
194. 
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supernatural acts until he first acquires the virtues, then his claim is certainly false.”119 
McKay-Knobel is certainly correct.  
However, I would also add that as I explained above, in my view, acts of 
supernatural virtue actually predispose the Christian to natural virtue as long as he does 
not engage in contrary acts of vice. Recall the pre-diabetic Trappist monk who after 
spending a life abstaining and fasting as part of his monastic observances was then 
predisposed to a life without cholesterol and salt in his diet. Thus, there is no need for the 
Christian believer to practice natural acts of virtue instead of their supernatural 
counterparts. By performing acts of a supernatural virtue, he can predispose himself to its 
acquired counterpart, again, as long as he is not simultaneously engaging in contrary acts 
of natural vice. 
 
Faith as the Infused Counterpart for the Acquired Speculative Virtues 
Much has been written on the infused moral virtues and on their relationship to 
their acquired counterparts. In contrast, relatively little has been written on the infused 
intellectual virtues, other than the infused intellectual virtue of faith. In fact, to the best of 
my knowledge, St. Thomas never mentions infused counterparts for the acquired 
speculative virtues of understanding, of sure knowledge, and of wisdom. Because of this, 
John Rziha, a contemporary Thomistic commentator, has recently proposed that 
                                                
119 Ibid., p. 195. 
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“[h]umans are able to reason from propositions of faith by means of their naturally 
acquired virtues of [sure knowledge] and wisdom.”120  
I would like to conclude this chapter by proposing that St. Thomas does not 
mention the infused speculative virtues because they do not and cannot exist within his 
hylomorphic schema of the virtues. Rather, the theological virtue of faith, informed by the 
theological virtue of charity, and capacitated by the gifts of understanding, of sure 
knowledge, and of wisdom, takes their place as the infused counterpart for acquired 
understanding, acquired sure knowledge, and acquired wisdom. Thus, pace Rziha, in my 
view, only a Christian in the state of grace can properly reason from propositions of faith 
to their conclusions. Only a Christian in the state of grace can do theology, properly 
understood. Moreover, given the link discussed above between the acquired virtues and 
their infused counterparts, this account suggests that theological reasoning can facilitate 
philosophical reasoning in the practice of Christian philosophy. This is one way of 
understanding the Catholic Church’s firm conviction that faith can legitimately assist 
reason without violating the proper autonomy of each.  
So why does St. Thomas not mention the infused speculative virtues of 
understanding, of sure knowledge, and of wisdom? In my view, he does not because they 
do not and cannot exist within his hylomorphic schema of the virtues. Recall that for St. 
Thomas, the virtues are specified by their object. Thus, though all the moral virtues are 
associated in one way or another with justice, which is in respect of something due to 
another, they differ in that: 
                                                
120 John Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in 
Eternal Law (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), p. 237. 
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The debt is not of the same kind in all these virtues for something is due to 
an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet 
another, and the nature of a debt from a contract, a promise, or a favor, 
differs. Corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various 
virtues including religion through which we pay our debt to God, piety 
through which we pay our debt to our parents or to our country, and 
gratitude through which we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so 
forth.121 
Virtues are specified and distinguished by their objects. Recall also that the acquired 
speculative virtue of understanding regards the knowing of those self-evident first 
principles of knowledge; that the acquired speculative virtue of sure knowledge regards 
the knowing of different kinds of knowable matter; and that the acquired speculative 
virtue of wisdom regards the first cause of knowable matter.122 Given these acquired 
virtues, what would their corresponding infused counterparts look like? How would we 
specify each one of them? 
 Recall again that one can distinguish an acquired and an infused virtue by their 
final cause where the former is ordered towards a natural end and the latter is ordered 
towards a supernatural one. Therefore, the difference between the acquired and the 
infused speculative virtues would be such that the latter would have “supernaturalized” 
                                                
121 STh I-II.60.3: “Debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter enim debetur aliquid 
aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio 
suscepto. Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes, puta 
religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum 
parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de 
aliis.” 
122 STh I-II.57.2. 
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objects of the former as their end. Thus, the infused speculative virtue of understanding 
would have to concern itself with the knowing of those  “supernaturalized” self-evident 
first principles of knowledge, i.e., knowledge of God in Himself. But this is already the 
object of the theological virtue of faith:  
Accordingly the object of faith can be considered in two ways. In one way, 
on the part of thing itself that is believed, and thus the object of faith is 
something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith. In 
the second way, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of 
faith is something complex by way of a proposition.123  
Without distinct objects to differentiate them, the infused speculative virtue of 
understanding would be indistinguishable from the infused theological virtue of faith.  
In the same way, the infused speculative virtue of sure knowledge would have to 
concern itself with the knowing of “supernaturalized” conclusions derived by the intellect 
from the first “supernaturalized” principles of faith. However, since the first 
“supernaturalized” principles grasped by the intellect under grace concern God in 
Himself and everything in relation to Him, these conclusions of infused sure knowledge 
would also be about God in Himself. It would be a sure knowledge (scientia) about God. 
It would be sacra doctrina, which “is established on principles revealed by God.”124 
However, as such, they would fall within the object of the theological virtue of faith, 
which regards “not only God in Himself, but also many other things, which, however, do 
                                                
123 STh II-II.1.2: “Sic igitur obiectum fidei dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, ex 
parte ipsius rei creditae, et sic obiectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, scilicet res ipsa de 
qua fides habetur. Alio modo, ex parte credentis, et secundum hoc obiectum fidei est 
aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis.” 
124 STh I.1.2: “Credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.” 
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not fall under the assent of faith, except as they are ordered to God, in so far as a man is 
helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God through the effects of God’s 
work.” 125  Once again, the infused speculative virtue of sure knowledge would be 
indistinguishable from the infused theological virtue of faith. 
Finally, the infused speculative virtue of wisdom would have to concern itself with 
the knowing of the “supernaturalized” first cause, which of course is God as He knows 
Himself. This wisdom above all human wisdom is once again the wisdom of sacra 
doctrina, whose “principles do not stand upon principles from human knowledge but 
from the divine knowledge, through which, as the highest wisdom, all our learning is set 
in order.”126 Once again, however, this object for an infused speculative virtue of wisdom 
would be identical to the object of the theological virtue of faith, especially faith informed 
by charity, which gives the agent cause an affective knowledge of his Beloved. Thus, St. 
Thomas can and will say: “The wisdom which the Philosopher includes as an intellectual 
virtue, considers Divine things in so far as they are able to be investigated by human 
reason. But theological virtue is about those same things in so far as they exceed human 
reason.”127 But why does St. Thomas refer to the theological virtues together here rather 
than to the theological virtue of faith alone? Because for the Angelic Doctor, the 
                                                
125 STh II-II.1.1: “Non solum est ipse Deus, sed etiam multa alia. Quae tamen sub assensu 
fidei non cadunt nisi secundum quod habent aliquem ordinem ad Deum, prout scilicet 
per aliquos divinitatis effectus homo adiuvatur ad tendendum in divinam fruitionem.” 
126 STh I.1.6: “Non supponit sua principia ab aliqua scientia humana, sed a scientia divina, 
a qua, sicut a summa sapientia, omnis nostra cognitio ordinatur.” 
127 STh I-II.62.2 ad 2: “Sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis virtus, considerat 
divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa 
ea secundum quod rationem humanam excedunt.” 
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theological virtues all have the same object, who is God, but under different formal 
aspects (rationes): 
Accordingly charity makes human beings adhere to God for His own sake, 
uniting their minds to God through the affect of love…Accordingly faith 
makes human beings adhere to God, as He is the principle of our knowing 
truth. As such we believe those things God has told us to be true.128 
Nonetheless, we would have to conclude again that the infused speculative virtue of 
wisdom is not distinguishable from the infused theological virtue of faith. Both would 
have God as first truth as their objects.129 
In light of this analysis, I propose that St. Thomas does not speak about the 
infused speculative virtues because they do not and cannot exist within his hylomorphic 
schema of the virtues. They would be indistinguishable from the theological virtue of 
faith. However, this does not mean that human agents are able to reason from 
propositions of faith by means of their naturally acquired virtues of sure knowledge and 
wisdom, as Rziha has proposed. Instead, I suggest that human agents would only be able 
                                                
128 STh II-II.17.6: “Caritas igitur facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem 
hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris…Fides ergo facit hominem Deo inhaerere 
inquantum est nobis principium cognoscendi veritatem, credimus enim ea vera esse quae 
nobis a Deo dicuntur.” 
129 It is striking that when St. Thomas wants to distinguish faith and vision both of which 
appear to have God as First Truth as their object, he distinguishes them by more precisely 
distinguishing their objects: “First truth, in so far as it appears in its proper species, is the 
object of the vision of heaven. But, in so far as it does not appear, it is of faith. Therefore, 
although the object of both acts is the same thing in reality, it differs according to reason. 
Thus the formally different object diversifies the species of the act different.” De veritate q 
14 a 8 ad 3: “Veritas prima est obiectum visionis patriae ut in sua specie apparens, fidei 
autem ut non apparens; unde etsi idem sit re utriusque actus obiectum, non tamen est 
idem ratione. Et sic formaliter differens obiectum diversam speciem actus facit.” I 
contend that it would not be possible to do the same between the infused speculative 
virtue of wisdom and the theological virtue of faith. 
  216 
to do this – to do theology understood as sacra doctrina – in the state of grace. With 
grace, the theologian  – or even the old woman with simple faith – is able to perform 
supernaturalized intellectual acts from the theological virtue of faith infused by the 
theological virtue of charity that is capacitated by distinct gifts of the Holy Spirit. When 
he grasps the first principles of the Catholic faith, it is a supernatural act of informed 
theological faith capacitated by the infused gift of understanding. When he reasons from 
these first principles to the conclusions of sacra doctrina, it is a supernatural act of 
informed theological faith capacitated by the infused gift of sure knowledge. When he 
seeks to understand the highest wisdom, which is a participation in God’s own 
knowledge, it is a supernatural act of informed theological faith capacitated by the infused 
gift of wisdom. These three acts are different supernatural acts, but they are acts of the 
same virtue, the infused theological virtue of faith, which I propose is the infused 
counterpart of the three acquired speculative virtues.130 
Finally, given everything that we have discussed about the dynamic relationship 
between the infused virtues and their acquired counterparts, my proposal also suggests 
that theological reasoning should facilitate philosophical reasoning in the practice of 
Christian philosophy without violating the proper autonomy of each. It would do this in 
two ways. First, supernatural acts of faith should facilitate the intellects ability to exercise 
natural acts of acquired understanding, sure knowledge, and wisdom, in the same way 
that supernatural acts of temperance facility the exercise of natural acts of the 
                                                
130 In light of this analysis, one could propose that the infused speculative virtues of 
understand, of sure knowledge, and of wisdom, are sub-virtues of the theological virtues 
of faith. However, a more extensive discussion of this proposal would be beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
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corresponding acquired virtue. Second, the intellect elevated by grace can grasp revealed 
truths that it can now reason to using its own natural capacity. It is akin to the detective 
who uses his investigative skills to build a case against a suspected criminal whose identity 
had been revealed to him by an informant. His knowing the suspect’s identity does not 
supplant or obviate the need for his detective skills. In the same way, the Christian 
philosopher who knows that the Triune God created the world via divine revelation can 
still reason to this conclusion using philosophical methods that maintain the autonomy 
between philosophy and theology. 
 
Conclusion 
I opened this chapter by acknowledging the need for Catholic moral theologians 
to explain those experiential transformations in the Christian believer that are effected by 
grace. As many had done before me, I have proposed that St. Thomas’s account of how 
God infuses virtues to complement the believer’s acquired counterparts is one model of 
this transformation, though strikingly, he does not – and as I have argued above, could 
not – include infused counterparts for the acquired speculative virtues.  
Unfortunately for his successors, the Angelic Doctor did not explicitly address the 
relationship between these two categories of habits. As we have already seen several times 
in this dissertation, however, St. Thomas frequently avers to hylomorphism when he 
wants to describe the relationship between two related and complementary realities. 
Therefore, in my view, it is not unreasonable to think that he would have used the matter-
form analogy here as well, had he chosen to address this question more directly in his 
work. If he had done so, I have argued that he would have chosen to use, what I have 
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called, an accidentally-cooperative theory of cooperation to describe the interaction 
between the acquired and infused virtues because this account has the most explanatory 
power.  
In sum, like Chapter Two, this chapter illustrates how an understanding of 
hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s moral theology can allow us to 
clarify and to resolve a perennial disputed question in his theological synthesis. In the 
next chapter, we move to a hylomorphic investigation of human speech acts to illustrate 
how this same perspective can allow us to update St. Thomas’s moral theology so that it 
can incorporate novel insights from comparative physiology and analytic philosophy.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Is Every Deliberately Willed Spoken Falsehood, a Lie? 
A Hylomorphic Investigation of Sinful Speech Acts 
 
Introduction 
When I first arrived in the United States as an undergraduate, I did not know that 
the colloquial American greeting, “How are you doing?” is not a question asking me 
about how I was truly feeling. In fact, I remember stopping in front of the university 
library to tell a fellow student who had just addressed me with that greeting, that I was not 
well. The perplexed and uncomfortable look I received in response to my admission of 
illness made me realize that I had misspoken when I had answered his greeting truthfully. 
At that moment, I discovered that his four-word utterance was not a question. I also 
discovered that there is only one proper response to this utterance, and that this is to 
affirm that one is well, regardless of how one is truly feeling: “How are you doing? Pretty 
good, thank you.” It was the first time that I realized that some utterances that sound like 
questions are not bona fide inquiries seeking information. Rather they function in other 
ways, in this case, as a greeting that invited me into a social exchange of vocalizations that 
is determined by social convention.  
Many years later, I was taught that for St. Thomas, responding to a greeting asking 
how you are, in any way other than to truly reveal your well-being or lack thereof, would 
involve your committing a sin, albeit a venial one. For the Angelic Doctor, every 
intentionally spoken falsehood is a lie because it disorders speech from its unique and 
proper end, which is to reveal the content of the speaker’s mind: “Since, therefore, speech 
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was established in order to express the conception of the heart, whenever someone speaks 
that which is not in the heart, he speaks that which he should not. This however happens 
in every lie. As such, every lie is a sin, even if someone lies for a good reason.”1 In my 
pastoral experience, however, the everyday intuitions of many faithful Christian believers 
reject this Thomistic conclusion with regards to commonplace everyday greetings. I think 
that they are correct in doing so.2 
In this chapter of my thesis, I undertake a hylomorphic investigation of the 
structure of human speech acts to argue that not all spoken falsehoods constitute lies 
because not all spoken falsehoods involve disordered speech. Because of this, I assert that 
greetings do not have to be answered with truthful self-revelations. I begin with a detailed 
analysis of St. Thomas’s understanding of lying as a vice contrary to truth with a 
particular focus on the hylomorphic description of speech acts that he uses to evaluate 
their morality. At the heart of his claim that all intentionally spoken falsehoods are lies is 
his belief that speech has only one function, and that this is its declarative function. In 
other words, for the Angelic Doctor, speech must signify. In response to this claim, I 
propose that St. Thomas failed to appreciate that human vocalizations have multiple ends 
in the order of nature, including functions that do not involve signification, a claim 
                                                
1  See Thomas Aquinas, In Sent. III.38.1.3 co.: “Cum autem locutio inventa sit ad 
exprimendam conceptionem cordis, quandocumque aliquis loquitur quod in corde non 
habet, loquitur quod non debet. Hoc autem contingit in omni mendacio; unde omne 
mendacium est peccatum, quantumcumque aliquis propter bonum mentiatur.” 
2 The contemporary scholarly literature on lying is vast. In addition to the other works 
cited in this chapter, recent books in contemporary and analytic philosophy that deal with 
lying that have helped me contextualize the discussion in this chapter include the 
following: Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Thomas L. Carson, Lying and Deception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and 
Jennifer Mather Saul, Lying, Misleading & What is Said (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
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supported by evidence from studies of primate vocalization and by evidence from studies 
of contemporary speech act theory in the philosophy of language.  
To reconcile the Angelic Doctor’s philosophical and theological synthesis with 
recent developments in the linguistic study of context-dependent meaning known as 
pragmatics, I then propose that to properly investigate the morality of human speech acts 
from the perspective of the Thomistic tradition, we must recognize that the human 
speaker is an efficient cause who is capable of informing the same material cause of the 
speech act (in the terminology of speech act theory, the locutionary act) with numerous 
formal causes (the illocutionary acts) to attain a particular final cause (the perlocutionary 
act).  
Finally, I close by using this Thomistic theory of speech acts to grapple with three 
disputed questions in contemporary moral theology, the perennial lying-during-
espionage case, the classic lying-to-the-Gestapo case and the recent lying-to-Planned-
Parenthood case that has perplexed Catholic moralists. This chapter will illustrate how an 
understanding of hylomorphic theory and its analogous use in St. Thomas’s theory of 
speech acts can allow us to develop his moral theology so that it can incorporate insights 
from comparative physiology and analytic philosophy. 
 
An Aristotelian Characterization of a Lie 
 In the Summa theologiae, St. Thomas’s questio on lying as a vice contrary to truth 
is found within the treatise on justice (STh II-II.110). For the Angelic Doctor, this is 
intentional, for lying, in his view, is an unjust act where the liar does not give to his hearer 
what is due to him, which is the truth, defined by St. Thomas as that virtue that adequates 
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a sign to the thing that it signifies.3 He begins his analysis with a description of the lie as a 
human act that can be specified by its four Aristotelian causes that make up its 
ontological structure. Not surprisingly, his use of matter-form language is particularly 
striking here.  
 For St. Thomas, the defining characteristic of a lie is the nonconformity between 
what is spoken and what is in the speaker’s mind: “The essential notion of a lie is taken 
from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person has a will to say a falsehood. 
Thus the word, a lie, [mendacium] is derived from its being contrary to the mind.”4 Here 
he echoes St. Augustine who had defined sins as those spoken words that are contrary to 
one’s mind, i.e., contra mentem: “But all lies must be called a sin, because a man, not only 
when he knows the truth, but even when he is mistaken and deceived, as a man may be, 
ought to say what he has in his mind, whether it is true, or whether he only thinks it to be 
true. But every one who lies says the opposite of what he thinks in his mind, with a will to 
deceive.”5 
 As an Aristotelian, St. Thomas decomposed the lie into its four causal principles.6 
First, the liar is the efficient cause of the lie. He is the agent cause who crafts the lie. A lie 
cannot be a lie without a liar. Next, the falsehood itself, the nonconformity between what 
                                                
3 STh II-II.109.3. 
4 STh II-II.110.1: “Sed tamen ratio mendacii sumitur a formali falsitate, ex hoc scilicet 
quod aliquis habet voluntatem falsum enuntiandi. Unde et mendacium nominatur ex eo 
quod contra mentem dicitur.” 
5 St. Augustine, Enchiridion, no. 22: “Porro autem omne mendacium ideo dicendum est 
esse peccatum quia homo, non solum quando scit ipse quid verum sit sed etiam si quando 
errat et fallitur sicut homo, hoc debet loqui quod animo gerit, sive illud verum sit sive 
putetur et non sit. Omnis autem qui mentitur, contra id quod animo sentit loquitur, 
voluntate fallendi.”  
6 STh II-II.110.1. 
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is spoken and what is in the mind, is the material cause of a lie. However, the falsehood in 
itself is not enough for a speech act to be a lie. A person who utters a falsehood without 
realizing that he is speaking falsely – say a man who mistakenly tells his office colleague 
that it is sunny because he had been outside earlier, when it has in fact begun to drizzle – 
cannot be lying. To account for this, St. Thomas thought that in order for the speaking of 
the falsehood to be an act of lying, the agent as an efficient cause must be willing to speak 
the falsehood precisely as an untruth, i.e., as an utterance contra mentem. He must 
actualize the potency in his speech by giving his words the specific form of an untruth. 
Thus, the willingness of the liar to speak the falsehood, his intention to speak contra 
mentem, constitutes the formal cause of the lie. Finally, the final cause of the lie is the 
intention to deceive the listener. Or to put it another way, the deception of the listener is 
the telos of a lie. In the same way that an efficient cause imposes a form upon matter in 
order to attain an end, a liar wills to utter an untruth precisely as a false utterance contra 
mentem in order to deceive his listener. Notably, for St. Thomas, the intention to deceive, 
the final cause of the lie, is not an essential constituent of a lie for it is the form and not 
the end that specifies every action, making it an action of this kind rather than that kind: 
“The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, even as an 
effect does not belong to the species of its cause.”7 In this way, he appears to differ from 
St. Augustine who had believed that the intent to deceive was a necessary component for 
a lie to be a lie: “A lie is false signification together with an intent to deceive.”8  
                                                
7 STh II-II.110.1 ad 3: “Cupiditas fallendi pertinet ad perfectionem mendacii, non autem 
ad speciem ipsius, sicut nec aliquis effectus pertinet ad speciem suae causae.” 
8 St. Augustine, Contra mendacium, no. 26: “Mendacium est quippe falsa significatio cum 
voluntate fallendi.” However, Paul J. Griffiths proposes that this definition should not be 
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In light of this hylomorphic analysis of a lie, St. Thomas will be able to make two 
additional distinctions to further characterize the speaking of falsehoods. First, there are 
spoken falsehoods that are false materially but not formally. This obtains, for the Angelic 
Doctor, in the following scenario: “If someone says what is false, thinking it to be true, it 
is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is outside the intention of the 
speaker. Hence, it is not a perfect lie, since what is outside the speaker’s intention is 
accidental and as such cannot be a specific difference.”9 The example described above of 
the man who mistakenly tells his office colleague that it is sunny because he had been 
outside earlier, when it has in fact begun to drizzle, is an instance of a material falsehood. 
It is not a lie properly so called. Rather it is an utterance that is simply erroneous.  
In contrast, there are spoken falsehoods that are false formally but not materially. 
This obtains in the following scenario: “If, however, someone utters’ falsehood formally, 
having the will to speak falsely, even if what he says is true, inasmuch as this is a voluntary 
                                                                                                                                            
taken literally: “Duplicity is, to say it again, the evil proper to lying, and I read Augustine 
as claiming that this is both necessary and sufficient for the lie. That the lie is usually also 
accompanied by an intention to deceive is true and of interest, but it does not pick out 
what is most deeply characteristic of the lie, and is not relevant to the exceptionless ban 
on the lie that Augustine advocates.” Paul J. Griffiths, Lying: An Augustinian Theology of 
Duplicity (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2004), p. 29. Regardless of Griffith’s arguments, it 
is clear that St. Thomas thought that St. Augustine had included the intent to deceive 
within the definition of a lie: “Further, Augustine says that the liar’s sin is the desire to 
deceive.” (STh. II-II.110.1 Obj 3: “Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, 
quod culpa mentientis est fallendi cupiditas.”) More recently, Chisholm and Feehan have 
included the intent to deceive as a necessary condition for an utterance to be a lie. See 
their paper, R. Chisholm and T. Feehan, “The intent to deceive,” Journal of Philosophy 74 
(1977): 143-159. In contrast, Thomas L. Carson has made a strong case against the 
requirement that lying include the intention to deceive. See his “The Definition of Lying,” 
Noûs 40 (2006): 284-306. 
9 STh II-II.110.1: “Et ideo si quis falsum enuntiet credens illud verum esse, est quidem 
falsum materialiter, sed non formaliter, quia falsitas est praeter intentionem dicentis. 
Unde non habet perfectam rationem mendacii, id enim quod praeter intentionem est, per 
accidens est; unde non potest esse specifica differentia.” 
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and moral act, his speech contains falsehood essentially and truth accidentally.”10 An 
example would be a man who tells his office colleague that it is raining outside to delay 
her from going home, though he thinks that it is sunny because he had been outside 
earlier, when it has in fact begun to drizzle. For St. Thomas, an utterance of this kind 
“attains the specific nature of a lie.”11 Hence, according to the Angelic Doctor, “lying is 
directly and formally opposed to the virtue of truth.”12 
Finally, I should note that for St. Thomas, the speaking of words is not a necessary 
aspect of lying. One can lie with other signs as well: “And so when it is said that ‘a lie is a 
false signification by words,’ the term ‘words’ denotes every kind of sign. Consequently, 
he who intended to signify something false by means of signs would not be excused from 
lying.”13 The deaf and the dumb like the hearing and speaking are capable of lying as well. 
 
A Thomistic Taxonomy of Lies 
St. Thomas then moves to distinguish lies by dividing them in three different 
ways.14 First, as Aristotle had done before him, he distinguishes lies that exceed the mean, 
which is the truth, and these are called boasts, from lies that fall short of the truth, and 
these are called ironies. As St. Thomas explains, this division “is an essential division of 
lying, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as has been stated, and truth is a kind of 
                                                
10 Ibid: “Si vero formaliter aliquis falsum dicat, habens voluntatem falsum dicendi, licet sit 
verum id quod dicitur, inquantum tamen huiusmodi actus est voluntarius et moralis, 
habet per se falsitatem, et per accidens veritatem.” 
11 Ibid.: “Unde ad speciem mendacii pertingit.” 
12 Ibid.: “Sic ergo patet quod mendacium directe et formaliter opponitur virtuti veritatis.” 
13 STh II-II.110.1 ad 1: “Et ideo cum dicitur quod mendacium est falsa vocis significatio, 
nomine vocis intelligitur omne signum. Unde ille qui aliquod falsum nutibus significare 
intenderet, non esset a mendacio immunis.” 
14 STh II-II.110.2. 
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equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.”15 In other words, for St. 
Thomas, declarative utterances can be more or less truthful, more or less false. As the 
virtue that adequates a sign to the thing that it signifies, truth is a matter of degree. 
Next, the Angelic Doctor distinguishes lies by their gravity as sins, “with regard to 
those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended.”16 
Here, there are three kinds of lies. There are lies that are intended to injure, and these are 
mischievous lies; there are lies that are intended to amuse, and these are jocose lies; and 
then there are lies that are intended to benefit somebody, and these are officious lies.  
Finally, St. Thomas divides these three broad categories into eight further kinds of 
lies, “with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increases or 
diminishes the culpability of lying.”17 Four kinds aggravate the sin of lying including 
mischievous lies against God, which are lies “in religious doctrine.” In contrast, four 
kinds diminish the gravity of the sin, including jocose lies, which are told “with a desire to 
please” and officious lies, “which saves a man from death.” Here, the guiding principle for 
St. Thomas is a straightforward one: “the greater the good intended, the more diminished 
is the culpability of the sin of lying.”18  
 
 
                                                
15 Ibid: “Haec autem divisio ideo per se est ipsius mendacii, quia mendacium, inquantum 
huiusmodi, opponitur veritati, ut dictum est, veritas autem aequalitas quaedam est, cui 
per se opponitur maius et minus.” 
16  Ibid.: “Alio modo potest dividi mendacium inquantum habet rationem culpae, 
secundum ea quae aggravant vel diminuunt culpam mendacii ex parte finis intenti.” 
17 Ibid.: “Tertio modo dividitur mendacium universalius secundum ordinem ad finem, 
sive ex hoc addatur vel diminuatur ad culpam mendacii, sive non.” 
18 Ibid.: “Patet autem quod quanto bonum intentum est melius, tanto magis minuitur 
culpa mendacii.” 
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The Moral Structure of a Lie 
 At the conclusion of his investigation of lying as a vice contrary to truth, St. 
Thomas examines the lie under the category of sin. In his view, a lie is a sin, i.e., it is evil, 
because “it is an action bearing on undue matter.”19 He explains that the material 
principle of speech acts, the words as natural signs of intellectual acts, have to be 
specified, i.e., they have to be informed by the truth that conforms words to thoughts, if 
they are to be ordered rightly: “For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is 
unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words that which he does not have in his 
mind.”20 The defect in the formal cause of the lie as a speech act makes it evil, “since in 
order for an action to be good, it must be right in every respect, because good results from 
a complete cause, while evil results from a single defect.”21 Recall from Chapter One that 
for St. Thomas, an evil act obtains when an agent causes a form to come to be that leads 
to the privation of a proper form in a thing, where a proper form is that form that is 
perfective of that thing’s nature. Lies are evil because they deprive spoken words of their 
proper formality, which is the signification of what is in the speaker’s mind, i.e., the truth. 
Importantly, for St. Thomas, a lie is a sin primarily because it is inordinate as a 
speech act and not because it injures one’s neighbors. Thus, in his view, a spoken 
falsehood can never be justified even if it benefits another:  
Now it is not lawful to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward 
off injury or defects from another just as it is not lawful to steal in order to 
                                                
19 STh II-II.110.3-4: “Est enim actus cadens super indebitam materiam.” 
20 STh II-II.110.3: “Cum enim voces sint signa naturaliter intellectuum, innaturale est et 
indebitum quod aliquis voce significet id quod non habet in mente.” 
21 Ibid.: “Quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit bonum, requiritur quod omnia recte concurrant; 
bonum enim est ex integra causa, malum autem est ex singularibus defectibus.” 
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give alms (except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are 
common). Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another 
from any danger whatsoever.22 
Like St. Augustine before him, St. Thomas held an absolute view that all intentional 
speech acts spoken contra mentem are lies. 
As we discussed above, however, the Angelic Doctor recognized that the gravity of 
a lie admits of degrees where “the greater the good intended, the more diminished is the 
culpability of the sin of lying.”23 Here, he begins his analysis by making clear that a mortal 
sin, by definition is a human act that is contrary to charity, “whereby the soul lives in 
union with God.”24 St. Thomas then distinguishes between lies that are contrary to charity 
essentially in themselves, i.e., in respect of the evil end intended, and those that are 
contrary to charity only accidentally. Lies of the first kind are those lies that are contrary 
to charity by reason of their false signification. Of these, those lies whose falsehood are 
contrary to a divine truth and those lies whose falsehoods are contrary to human truths 
that injure another, are mortal sins. In contrast, those lies whose falsehood is contrary to 
human truths that do not harm another would not be mortal sins.  
Next, lies of the second kind are those lies that are contrary to charity because of 
their intended purpose. Those lies that are said to injure God and those lies that are said 
                                                
22 STh II-II.110.3 ad 4: “Non licet autem aliqua illicita inordinatione uti ad impediendum 
nocumenta et defectus aliorum, sicut non licet furari ad hoc quod homo eleemosynam 
faciat (nisi forte in casu necessitatis, in quo omnia sunt communia). Et ideo non est 
licitum mendacium dicere ad hoc quod aliquis alium a quocumque periculo liberet.” 
23 STh II-II.110.2: “Patet autem quod quanto bonum intentum est melius, tanto magis 
minuitur culpa mendacii.” 
24 STh II-II.110.4: “Peccatum mortale proprie est quod repugnat caritati, per quam anima 
vivit Deo coniuncta.” 
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to injure one’s neighbor, in his person, his possessions, or his good name, are mortal sins 
because these ends are contrary to charity.  
Lastly, lies of the third kind are those lies that are not contrary to charity in 
themselves or in their end. In this category, St. Thomas includes jocose lies and officious 
lies that are spoken for the good of one’s neighbor. These are mere venial sins because 
they are not essentially but only accidentally repugnant to the order of charity. 
Finally, as I alluded to above, in St. Thomas’s view, lies are also sinful because they 
are contrary to the virtue of justice, and not only to the virtue of charity. Elsewhere in the 
Summa theologiae, he argues that when we speak to another, we owe the truth to each 
other:  
Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is 
necessary for the preservation of human society. Now it would be 
impossible for men to live together, unless they believed each another, as 
declaring the truth to each other. Hence the virtue of truth does, in some 
manner, regard something as being due.25  
St. Thomas repeats himself when he speaks of the virtue of friendliness: “Since man is a 
social animal he owes other men the manifestation of truth without which human society 
could not endure.”26 Lies are sinful because they are contrary to truth. They are more or 
less sinful because they are contrary both to charity and to justice, to varying degrees. 
                                                
25 STh II-II.109.3 ad 1: “Quia homo est animal sociale, naturaliter unus homo debet alteri 
id sine quo societas humana conservari non posset. Non autem possent homines ad 
invicem convivere nisi sibi invicem crederent, tanquam sibi invicem veritatem 
manifestantibus. Et ideo virtus veritatis aliquo modo attendit rationem debiti.” 
26 STh II-II.114.2 ad 1: “Quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, debet ex quadam 
honestate veritatis manifestationem aliis hominibus, sine qua societas hominum durare 
non posset.” 
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Indeed, they are unjust because they are uncharitable, and are uncharitable because they 
are unjust. 
 
The Single Function/Monovalent Nature of Human Speech According to St. Thomas 
 At the heart of St. Thomas’s claim that all intentionally spoken utterances contra 
mentem are lies is his belief that speech has only one function, and that this is its 
declarative or assertive function. One speaks to manifest oneself and one’s judgments. It 
is a single function theory for human speech, or what I will call a monovalent theory for 
the nature of human speech, where valence comes from the Latin, valente, or capacity. 
In his De Interpretatione, Aristotle had already acknowledged that there are 
functions of language other than the declarative one that involves propositional 
utterances:  
Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a 
physical faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet every 
sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them 
either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor 
false.27  
Indeed, St. Thomas acknowledges this reality in his commentary on the De 
Interpretatione when he echoes Aristotle, noting that there are functions of speech other 
than the one that reveals the speaker’s intellect:  
                                                
27 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 17 a1-4. [English translation by Ella Mary Edghill in The 
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 42.] 
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Therefore, only enunciative speech in which truth or falsity is found is 
called interpretation. Other kinds of speech, such as optatives and 
imperatives, are ordered rather to expressing volition than to interpreting 
what is in the intellect.28 
However, when the Angelic Doctor considers truth and falsehood in speech, he does not 
include the other non-declarative functions of speech in his analysis.29 Why? Janet Smith 
proposes – correctly in my view – that St. Thomas holds the view that speech has only 
one function, and that this is to signify, because of his view of truth, and because of his 
conviction that our speech ought to reflect the speech of God: 
[St. Thomas] holds that everything that exists in the world is a word of 
God, an expression of what is in the divine mind. Thus, when we are 
thinking about reality we are forming concepts in our minds of the speech 
that God has truthfully uttered in creation, and when we communicate by 
word or deed, we are obliged to seek to make our speech true to God’s 
speech.30 
                                                
28 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermenias, Trans. Jean T. Osterle 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962): “Et ideo sola oratio enunciativa, in qua 
verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur. Caeterae vero orationes, ut optativa et 
imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id 
quod in intellectu habetur.” 
29 However, in speaking about angelic speech, he does admit of the distinction between 
speech that communicates truth concerning God and the nature of things, properly called 
illumination, and speech that communicates merely of what depends on the will of this or 
that creature, properly called “merely speech” (cf. STh I.107.2). Both functions, of course, 
involve declarative functions for speech. 
30 Janet Smith, “Fig Leaves and Falsehoods,” First Things 23 (2011): 45-49, p. 46. St. 
Thomas writes: “A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have truth, 
in so far as they correspond to that which is the ordination of the divine intellect 
concerning them; but it is said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates truth 
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Once again, in doing this, St. Thomas echoes the tradition that he had inherited. St. 
Augustine too had believed that speech had only one function, and that this is its 
declarative function to signify what is in the speaker’s mind: 
Now it is clear that words were instituted, not so that men might deceive 
one another, but so that one man might make known his thoughts to 
another. Therefore, to use words for deception and not for their instituted 
end is a sin.31 
Paul Griffiths proposes that St. Augustine’s position on the purpose of speech follows 
from his conviction that the relation between human thought and human speech is an 
image of the relationship between the eternal divine word and the incarnate word, which 
is disrupted by a lie: 
[Speech] makes thought audible by invocation, as the divine word was 
made visible by incarnation. Duplicitous speech – the lie – divides speech 
from thought. It relates speech and thought inappropriately, improperly, 
sinfully, and in doing so ruptures God’s image in us.32 
Like St. Thomas, St. Augustine grounded his argument for the single purpose of speech 
on theological premises. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of the intellect.” STh I.16.8 ad 3: “Quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res 
aliae veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est ordinatum ab 
intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam speciali modo, inquantum 
significat veritatem intellectus.” 
31 St. Augustine, Enchiridion, no. 22: “Et utique verba propterea sunt instituta non per 
quae se homines invicem fallant sed per quae in alterius quisque notitiam cogitationes 
suas perferat. Verbis ergo uti ad fallaciam, non ad quod instituta sunt, peccatum est.” 
32 Griffiths, Lying, p. 73. 
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Evidence for the Multiple Functions/Polyvalent Nature of Human Speech 
As I had discovered while going through my initial culture shock in the United 
States, however, we use speech for different ends. We use them as greetings. We also use 
them as goodbyes, pleasantries, encouragement, and polite niceties, among others, all 
functions that facilitate social cohesion. Our everyday experiences suggest that human 
speech is multifunctional. By nature, it can be ordered towards numerous ends. It is 
polyvalent. 
Two more formal lines of evidence can be put forward to support this claim for 
the polyvalent theory for the nature of human speech. First, there is the evidence from 
nonhuman primate vocalizations. These vocalizations have numerous functions within 
the context of primate society. Given our evolutionary origins, it should not be surprising 
that human speech too has functions in human societies that correspond to functions that 
vocalizations have in animal societies. Next, there is the evidence from the philosophical 
analysis of human language, called speech act theory, which was pioneered by John L. 
Austin and developed further by his student, John Searle. These philosophers and their 
successors have amassed and have convincingly defended taxonomies of speech acts that 
testify to the many ends of human speech. 
We turn now to the evidence from the nonhuman primate vocalizations. In his 
analysis of lying, the Angelic Doctor begins his own moral investigation by pointing to 
the dumb animals who instinctively manifest themselves in their behavior.33 He then 
contrasts the dumb animals with the rational animals who voluntarily manifest 
themselves in statements that are ordered towards the true or the false. Strikingly, it 
                                                
33 STh. II-II.110.1. 
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appears that the Angelic Doctor had assumed that the dumb animals have only one end 
whenever they behave in ways that could signify, and that this is for them to manifest 
themselves in a manner analogous to human declarative speech. It is not clear why he 
thought this since it is clear that the vocalizations of the dumb animals, given their 
irrational nature, would not be able to image divine speech. One possibility is that St. 
Thomas assumed that animal speech, like all speech, since it originates in the animal’s 
cognitive power is also ordered towards the revelation of this “intellect” that is its origin.34 
However, recent discoveries have shown that the vocalizations used in nonhuman 
primate societies are not mere analogs to the human manifestations that St. Thomas had 
linked them with. Especially when combined with facial expressions, body postures, and 
manual gestures, nonhuman primate vocalizations have numerous ends, i.e., numerous 
functions, that are linked to social cohesion in these animals.35 Some vocalizations are 
alarm calls that generate an adaptive response in the animal hearers: Vervet monkeys 
produce three distinct alarm calls when encountering their three main predators, 
                                                
34 STh I.16.7: “The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an 
enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. As it is in the intellect, it has truth of 
itself but as it is in speech, it has enunciable truth as it signifies some truth of the intellect, 
not on account of any truth existing in the enunciation but as it is in the subject.” 
[“Veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. Enuntiabile enim et est in 
intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. 
Sed secundum quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod significat 
aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam veritatem in enuntiabili existentem 
sicut in subiecto.”]  
35  For overviews of the scientific literature, see the following papers: A.C. Arcadi, 
“Language evolution: what do chimpanzees have to say?” Curr Biol 15 (2005): R884-R886; 
and Pawel Fedurek and Katie E. Slocombe, “Primate Vocal Communication: A Useful 
Tool for Understanding Human Speech and Language Evolution?” Hum Biol. 83 (2011): 
153-173. 
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leopards, eagles, and snakes.36 Playback experiments have demonstrated that the monkeys 
who hear these alarm calls respond to each in a unique adaptive manner. Other 
vocalizations initiate and facilitate grooming behavior: Wild Japanese macaques have 
unique vocal sounds that are associated with an animal’s desire to groom, an animal’s 
desire to be groomed, and an animal’s acceptance of another’s offer to groom.37 And 
other vocalizations initiate and facilitate post-conflict resolution: Free-ranging female 
baboons in Botswana grunt quietly to their former opponents after conflicts, facilitating 
infant handling.38 In fact, approaches between two former baboon opponents do not serve 
a reconciliatory function unless they are accompanied by grunts. As documented in these 
examples – and there are many others not listed here – primate vocalizations promote 
social cohesion among members of the community. 
As St. Thomas had done in his own work, I propose that we can extrapolate from 
the instinctual experience of the dumb primates to the volitional lives of the rational ones. 
If nonhuman primates accomplish multiple functions that do not involve signification 
when they vocalize, is it not reasonable to posit that human primates do the same the 
same as well, though in a distinctively human way? 
But how do human beings use their vocalizations as non-significations? In a series 
of lectures first delivered at Harvard University in 1955, John L. Austin launched the 
                                                
36 R.M. Seyfarth et al., “Vervet monkey alarm calls: semantic communication in a free-
ranging primate,” Anim. Behav. 28 (1980): 1070-1094. 
37 Akio Mori, “Signals found in the grooming interactions of wild Japanese monkeys of 
the koshima troop,” Primates 16 (1975): 107-140. 
38 See the following papers: J. B. Silk et al., “The form and function of post-conflict 
interactions between female baboons,” Anim. Behav. 52 (1996): 259-268; and D.L. Cheney 
and R.M. Seyfarth, “Reconciliatory grunts by dominant female baboons influence victims’ 
behaviour,” Anim. Behav. 54 (1997): 409-418. 
  236 
intellectual movement in analytic philosophy of language now called Speech Act Theory, 
when he proposed that verbal utterances are performed primarily with some kind of 
function in mind.39 He wanted to challenge the settled view that the main function of 
language is to give a true or false description of past, present, or future reality. This, of 
course, was the view held by St. Thomas Aquinas and the majority of Western 
philosophers. Rather, the empirical evidence compelled Austin to conclude that there are 
actually numerous utterances to which one cannot ascribe any truth-value at all. When 
one greets another, apologizes, complains, or promises, he does not describe any 
preexistent state of affairs nor points to any external reality. Instead, by vocalizing a 
particular utterance, the speaker wants to do something. He wants to deploy a 
performative function of human speech. Language, in Austin’s view, should be 
considered primarily as a tool that can be used to accomplish specific things, rather than 
to simply communicate beliefs. As I see it, in pioneering speech act theory, Austin was 
beginning the process of cataloging the numerous non-significatory functions of human 
speech, i.e., speech that does not signify a concept, that correspond to the non-
significatory roles that vocalizations play in nonhuman primate communities. 
In Austin’s view, every utterance, every vocal act, is a speech act – Austin’s student 
John Searle coined the term – that could be decomposed into three actions.40 He called 
these actions, these meanings of the speech act, the locutionary or propositional act, the 
illocutionary act, and the perlocutionary act. The locutionary act is the simple and literal 
                                                
39  J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, ed. J.O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962). My presentation of Austin’s thought that follows is indebted to 
this seminal text. 
40 Austin, How to Do Things, pp. 94-108. 
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meaning of what is said. “The library is closing in fifteen minutes.” The utterance of these 
seven words by the librarian, her vocalization of the syllables involved, constitutes the 
propositional meaning of this speech act. The illocutionary act is the social function of 
what is said. “The library is closing in fifteen minutes.” This utterance informs the 
patrons of the imminent closing of the library. However, it is also an invitation for 
patrons to collect their things and to pack up in anticipation of their departure. Finally, it 
is also a request for the remaining patrons to bring any books to the circulation desk that 
they may want to borrow. The perlocutionary act is the effect of what is said. “The library 
is closing in fifteen minutes.” Here, the perlocutionary act includes all the actions of the 
library’s patrons as they get up and move towards the circulation desk or the exit.  
Building on Austin’s work, John Searle has reflected upon the different ways that 
language can be used and classified speech acts into five different kinds of illocutionary 
acts: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives.41 Assertives are 
utterances that function to manifest the speaker’s beliefs. They would correspond to the 
declarative propositions studied extensively by Aristotle and by St. Thomas. Directives 
are utterances that function to get the listener to do something. They express the 
speaker’s wish, desire, or intention that the listener perform some future action. 
Commissives are utterances that function to commit the speaker to do something. They 
express the speaker’s wish, desire, or intention that he himself perform some future 
action. Expressives are utterances that function to manifest the speaker’s feelings and 
attitudes about a certain state of affairs. They express the speaker’s apologies, greetings, 
                                                
41 John R. Searle, “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,” The Philosophical 
Reviews 77 (1968): 405-424; John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969). 
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condolences, and rejections, among others. Finally, declaratives are utterances that 
function to bring about a correspondence between the propositional content of the 
utterance and the world. Declaratives include marriage vows, consecrations, and 
christenings. They make what they say to be. Though taxonomies of the different kinds of 
speech acts have proliferated since Searle’s groundbreaking effort 42 , with subtle 
differences between the lists, the consensus is that they all reveal that human speech, like 
the vocalizations of the nonhuman primates, has numerous functions.  
 
Formulating a Thomistic Theory of Speech Acts 
How do we reconcile the basic truths of Speech Act Theory, especially its central 
insight that human speech has numerous functions, with the thought of St. Thomas? One 
possibility involves modifying the Angelic Doctor’s hylomorphic description of speech. 
Recall that for St. Thomas, a speech act can be dissected into its four Aristotelian causal 
principles. However, he assumed that there were only two formalities under which one 
could speak. If one spoke words under the formality of truth – if one willed that these 
particular words are spoken as true words that manifested the content of one’s mind – 
then the statement is a true one. If one spoke words under the formality of untruth – if 
one willed that one’s words are spoken as falsehoods contra mentem – then the utterance 
is a lie, of varying degrees of viciousness depending upon how it repugnant it is to the 
order of charity.  
                                                
42 K. Bach and R.M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1979); A. Cohen, “Speech Acts,” in Sociolinguistics and Language Teachings 
ed. S.L. McKay and N.H. Hornberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
383-420. 
  239 
In light of speech act theory and of the ethological studies of the nonhuman 
primates described above, however, I now propose that a human speaker can inform his 
words with more than the two formalities than St. Thomas had presupposed, to order 
them to different ends, specifying them as different kinds of speech acts. 
Two examples will illustrate my proposal. A physician who asks his patient, “How 
are you doing today?” is informing the material utterance of these five words (the 
locutionary meaning) with one form, that of a directive utterance (the illocutionary 
meaning) in order to obtain up-to-date medical information from his patient (the 
perlocutionary meaning). In contrast, that same physician who asks his colleague, “How 
are you doing today?” as he walks by her in the hallway later that morning is informing 
the same material utterance of these words (again, the propositional meaning) with a 
different form, this time, that of an expressive utterance (another illocutionary meaning), 
in order to greet her and reinforce their social bond (the perlocutionary meaning). Note 
that each of these speech acts is distinct in kind because each has a distinct form, i.e., the 
illocutionary meaning. As we have already seen on several occasions in this thesis, it is the 
form that specifies the matter. Each speech act is ordered towards a different end. Each 
speech act has a different connatural function. 
It is important to point out that a single speech act can be understood under 
different formalities because the actual words that are spoken as the material cause can be 
informed by numerous illocutionary meanings as distinct formal causes, in the same way 
that a single power of the soul can be informed by different virtues. The librarian 
announcing the imminent closing of the library speaks once, but her utterance can be 
described under different formalities, as distinct illocutionary acts, ordered towards 
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different ends. However, it is significant that in this case, the other illocutionary acts are 
dependent upon the assertive illocutionary act. The library patrons only leave and prepare 
to check out books because they understand that in speaking, the librarian has uttered a 
speech act with an assertive form that signifies her belief that the library is in fact about to 
close. 
Finally, I would like to address the theological arguments proffered by St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas for the monovalent nature of human speech that were 
summarized earlier. Recall that these two Doctors of the Church proposed that it is fitting 
that human speech is ordered towards the speaker’s self-revelation because it mirrors 
divine speech, which by its nature reveals God who is truth Himself. Instead, I would like 
to offer an alternative theological account for the fittingness of the polyvalent nature of 
human speech. As St. Thomas himself explained, it is fitting that God had created human 
beings as spirit-matter composites, because they stand at the nexus between the material 
and spiritual worlds and as such complete the great chain of being: 
Secondly, the same consideration can be reached from the orderly 
arrangement of things, where we cannot go from one extreme to the other 
except through intermediates…Now at the summit of things there is a 
being which is in every way simple and one, namely, God. It is not 
possible, then, for corporeal substance to be located immediately below 
God, for it is altogether composite and divisible. Instead one must posit 
many intermediates through which we must come down from the highest 
point of the divine simplicity to corporeal multiplicity. And among these 
intermediates, some are corporeal substances that are not united to bodies, 
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while others, on the contrary, are incorporeal substances that are united to 
bodies.43  
If human beings are meant to manifest characteristics of both spirit and matter in the 
hierarchy of being – and I think that they are – then, in my view, it should also be fitting 
that human beings manifest characteristics of both the brutes and the angels. Therefore, I 
propose that it is theologically fitting that they are able to speak either using vocalizations 
as the brutes do, or using speech properly so called, i.e., speech that signifies, as the angels 
do, analogously speaking of course. 
 
Defining a Lie within a Thomistic Theory of Speech Acts 
 With this Thomistic theory of speech acts in hand, we can specify a lie as a 
disordered assertive act. In other words, it is a disordered speech act that is informed by 
an illocutionary meaning that by its very nature orders the verbal utterance towards the 
exchange of truthful statements involving the signification of what is the speaker’s mind. 
Recall from Chapter One that it is the form that specifies the species of the matter that is 
in the substance. In this way, we keep the central insight of St. Thomas that a lie is a 
disordered speech act that fails to attain its proper end. However, we do so while 
simultaneously modifying his theory so that it can properly acknowledge the different 
                                                
43 De spirit. creat. q.5 co: “Secundo potest idem considerari ex ordine rerum, qui talis esse 
invenitur ut ab uno extremo ad alterum non perveniatur nisi per media/ […] Est autem 
in summo rerum vertice id quod est omnibus modis simplex et unum, scilicet Deus. Non 
igitur possibile est quod immediate sub Deo collocetur corporalis substantia, quae est 
omnino composita et divisibilis. Sed oportet ponere multa media per quae deveniatur a 
summa simplicitate divina ad corpoream multiplicitatem; quorum mediorum aliqua sunt 
substantiae incorporeae corporibus non unitae, aliqua vero substantiae incorporeae 
corporibus unitae.” 
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connatural functions of human language, i.e., the different formalities that can inform 
any spoken utterances as form informs matter. Thus, the patient who tells his doctor that 
he feels sick in response to the question, “How are you doing today?” even when he feels 
well, is lying. However, the colleague who responds to a greeting of the same five-word 
utterance from that same physician later in the day by saying that she is well, when in fact 
she is sick, is not.  
 Within the framework of this theory for the polyvalent nature of human speech, 
the challenge for every speaker striving to speak truthfully will be to identify the type of 
speech act that is called for in a particular social and linguistic context and to respond 
virtuously. Sometimes, it is relatively easy to do this. For instance, a coach who 
exaggerates his basketball team’s abilities just before their championship game in order to 
motivate and energize his men is not lying. He is encouraging. The social and linguistic 
context of his speech act reveals the formality under which the coach is speaking. 
Greetings and pleasantries and encouragements are often revealed by context, which are 
learned as the speaker is socialized, either as he grows up in a particular family living in a 
particular community, or as he is acculturated into a new society.  
Linguistic context is also created within a particular relationship or within 
particular relationships. Thus, a wife who asks her husband if she is fat, after a lifetime of 
similar verbal exchanges, is asking him to compliment her. She is looking for an 
affirmation. Thus, when he tells her, as he has done on numerous past occasions, that she 
is not fat – despite her high BMI – he is not lying. It is not even a white lie. He is verbally 
grooming and stroking his mate. However, a teenage girl who asks her girlfriend if she is 
fat just before a night on the town is in fact asking for the truth so that she will not go 
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dancing in a dress that will embarrass her. If the girlfriend does not respond truthfully, if 
she tells her friend that she is looks thin when in fact she looks fat, she would be lying.  
Finally, linguistic context can also made clear by the speaker’s speech act itself. 
When a speaker proclaims in a law court that he “swears to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth so help me God”, he is declaring that he intends all his 
utterances to be taken as assertive speech that signifies so that it can “express the 
conception of the heart.” He excludes all other possible kinds of speech acts and all other 
illocutionary meanings, and as such can be held accountable to the standard of truth and 
falsehood. 
Note that in speech acts with multiple illocutionary meanings, a lie would obtain 
if the speech act whose illocutionary meaning is assertive in nature, is spoken in a 
disordered manner. “The library is closing in fifteen minutes.” Recall that this utterance is 
spoken under different formalities. The librarian speaks in an assertive fashion to inform 
her patrons of her belief that the library is closing. This is a formality ordered towards 
true signification. She also speaks under other formalities, primarily directive in nature, to 
get the remaining patrons to prepare to leave at close of business. However, if the library 
is not in fact closing, and the librarian spoke only because she wanted the remaining 
patrons to leave, then her utterance would be a lie because she disordered the assertive 
speech act from its proper end, which is the truth. This would obtain even if the other 
directive speech acts properly attained their respective ends the patrons left. 
Incidentally, the last scenario described above raises the possibility that 
performative utterances spoken under formalities not ordered towards signification could 
themselves become disordered. A speaker could utter a greeting or an encouragement in 
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an improper manner. Austin argued that such utterances are neither true nor false but 
instead could be felicitous or infelicitous, according to a set of conditions, which he called 
felicity conditions.44 These conditions governed the context of the utterance. Thus, a 
speech act that is a declaration, i.e., an utterance like a marriage vow, which functions to 
bring about a correspondence between the propositional content of the utterance and the 
world, in Austin’s view, would only be felicitous if the utterance is spoken in a 
conventional form, the utterance is spoken by the appropriate speaker in the appropriate 
circumstances, the utterance is spoken without errors or interruptions, and the utterance 
is willingly intended as such. If any of these felicity conditions were not present, the 
utterance would fail in its function. It would be disordered. It is not a lie. It is an infelicity. 
It is striking that St. Thomas held similar views with respect to the speaking of the words 
of consecration during the holy mass, which is the form of the Sacrament of the Holy 
Eucharist.45 
 
Disputed Question: Lying to an Enemy as Spycraft in a Just War 
 May an intelligence officer lie to his enemies during a just war? During World 
War II, Operation Fortitude was the codename of the military deception strategy 
employed by the Allied nations to protect the secret of the location of the planned Allied 
landings at Normandy.46 The majority of the deception was carried out by means of false 
                                                
44 Austin, How to Do Things, pp. 14-15. 
45 STh III.78.1-6. 
46 For information on espionage during World War II, see the following books: Anthony 
Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day (Guilford, 
CT: Lyons Press, 2007); Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign 
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wireless messages and German double agents who passed on false information to their 
Nazi handlers. Speaking falsehoods is an integral part of spycraft during war. But is it 
virtuous? Can it be virtuous? 47 
 St. Thomas Aquinas does not directly address the question of lying during war-
time espionage, but in response to the questio, “Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in 
war?” he does say that it is unlawful to deceive an enemy even during war: “Now a man 
may be deceived by another’s word or deed in two ways. First, through being told 
something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. In this 
way, no one should deceive the enemy, for there are certain ‘rights of war and covenants 
that ought to be observed even among enemies’.”48 However, in the same response, St. 
Thomas does allow deception as long as this deception occurs by an act of omission 
rather than by commission:  
Second, [a man may be deceived] through what we say or do, because we 
do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always 
bound to do this, since even in sacred doctrine many things have to be 
concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to 
Mat. 7:6: “Do not give that which is holy to the dogs.” So much more 
therefore ought the strategy of a campaign be hidden from the enemy. It is 
                                                                                                                                            
(Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2000); and Joshua Levine, Operation Fortitude: 
The Story of the Spy Operation that Saved D-Day (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2011).  
47 For an interesting discussion on the morality of espionage including the role of truth 
telling in spycraft, see Darrell Cole, “Whether Spies Too Can Be Saved?” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 36 (2008): 125-154. 
48 STh II-II.40.3: “Dupliciter autem aliquis potest falli ex facto vel dicto alterius uno modo, 
ex eo quod ei dicitur falsum, vel non servatur promissum. Et istud semper est illicitum. Et 
hoc modo nullus debet hostes fallere, sunt enim quaedam iura bellorum et foedera etiam 
inter ipsos hostes servanda.” 
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for this reason, among others, that a soldier has to learn the art of 
concealing his purpose lest it come to the knowledge of his enemies, as 
stated in the Book on Strategy by Frontinus.49 
From these statements, it appears that the Angelic Doctor would consider a spy’s 
communicating false information to the enemy in order to deceive, to be an instance of 
lying that would be unjust, one that violates “the rights of war and covenants” that is due 
even to one’s enemies. However, I think that one could also argue that for St. Thomas, a 
lie uttered as part of spycraft during a just war would not constitute a mortal sin as long 
as it was being uttered for the sake of the common good and in defense of the lives of 
many. It would be another kind of officious lie “which saves a man from death.” Recall 
the guiding principle for St. Thomas discussed above: “[T]he greater the good intended, 
the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity.”  
 Working in the tradition of the New Natural Law Theory, Christopher O. 
Tollefsen appears to hold a more rigorist view than the Angelic Doctor. In an online 
essay, “Why Lying is Always Wrong,” he has called into question “the practices of 
undercover work, espionage work, and other forms of journalistic, police, and 
governmental work that might require lying.”50 He concludes: “That we have become 
                                                
49 Ibid.: “Alio modo potest aliquis falli ex dicto vel facto nostro, quia ei propositum aut 
intellectum non aperimus. Hoc autem semper facere non tenemur, quia etiam in doctrina 
sacra multa sunt occultanda, maxime infidelibus, ne irrideant, secundum illud Matth. 
VII, nolite sanctum dare canibus. Unde multo magis ea quae ad impugnandum inimicos 
paramus sunt eis occultanda. Unde inter cetera documenta rei militaris hoc praecipue 
ponitur de occultandis consiliis ne ad hostes perveniant; ut patet in libro stratagematum 
Frontini.” 
50 Christopher O. Tollefsen, “Why Lying is Always Wrong,” February 14, 2011. Available 
at http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/02/2547/. Last accessed on October 7, 2013. 
For a more extensive discussion of Tollefsen’s views, see his Lying and Christian Ethics 
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conformed in our social practice to lies as an essential part of the defense of the realm, 
and for the protection of citizens, just as in our personal lives, is a fact…But this 
participation is neither an inevitability, nor, in my view, a reflection of what is genuinely 
demanded by truth and love.”51 From these statements, it appears that for Tollefsen, lying 
done during war-time espionage would not only be sinful but gravely sinful because it 
violates the order not only of truth but also of charity. As such, in the language of St. 
Thomas, it would be a mortal sin that is uttered not only contra mentem but also contra 
caritatem. 
But what if we acknowledge the polyvalent nature of speech that is shaped by the 
social context of the speech act? Would a Thomistic speech act theory alter the classic 
analysis proffered by the Angelic Doctor? It is striking that accounts of wartime espionage 
and counter-espionage, both historical and fictional, reveal that both sides of the 
exchange, for instance the Allied and German intelligence forces during World War II, 
assume that the enemy is out to deceive them.52 The goal of their exchange is to deceive 
and not to be deceived. It is not to understand or to be understood. In other words, both 
sides implicitly agree that their speech acts are not meant to signify what is in the intellect 
of the speaker. They are not meant to reveal truth information. Rather they are directive. 
                                                                                                                                            
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). It is noteworthy that Tollefsen does 
affirm the existence of different kinds of speech acts where only assertive speech acts can 
be true or false. However, it is likely that he would disagree with my proposal that spies 
are not making assertions properly understood when engaged in spycraft because of the 
linguistic context in which they are speaking. For discussion, see his Lying and Christian 
Ethics, pp. 17-30. 
51 Ibid. 
52 For a fictitious account that reveals the intricacies of spycraft during war, in this case 
during Operation Fortitude in World War II, see Daniel Silva, The Unlikely Spy (New 
York: Penguin Putnam, 1995). 
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They are directed towards deceit. Both sides are expecting untruths from the other. Both 
sides are also trying to figure out ways to distinguish truth and untruth. Thus the context 
of the communication that occurs between intelligence forces from opposing sides during 
a war is akin to the classic bluffing game of Balderdash, where opponents try to deceive 
each other by writing false but convincing definitions for uncommon English words.53 
During gameplay, everyone expects deception from the other team. At the same time, 
everyone is trying to figure out how not to be deceived.  
Though St. Thomas may think that players speaking untruths during a game of 
Balderdash are lying, albeit venially, because they are intentionally speaking falsehoods as 
untruths contra mentem, precisely to deceive, I would submit that a Thomist aware of 
speech act theory would beg to differ. Here, the Balderdash players are not speaking 
words under the formality of a speech act ordered towards the truthful revelation of one’s 
mind. Their words do not involve true or false signification but non-signification. The 
players are speaking under the formality of a directive speech act ordered towards 
winning the bluffing game. This is a distinct kind of performative speech act that is made 
clear by the context of the vocal exchange and its social context, which is the game itself. 
By definition, these speech acts cannot be true or false. Instead they could be felicitous or 
infelicitous depending upon whether or not they are effective at deceiving the other team 
to achieve victory. By definition, therefore, Balderdash speakers cannot lie as long as they 
are playing the game. What is important is that both sides of the exchange are aware of 
                                                
53 For a description of the game of Balderdash, see the following Wikipedia entry: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balderdash. Last accessed on October 8, 2013. 
  249 
the context in which they are speaking. It is the context that helps the speakers recognize 
the formalities under which they are expected to speak to each other. 
In the same way, I propose that intelligence officers trying to deceive the enemy 
cannot lie as long as they are speaking qua spies who are trying to promote the common 
good by winning a just war and protecting the social order. Both sides acknowledge that 
they are not seeking truth. Both sides acknowledge that they are speaking to deceive. Both 
sides therefore are incapable of speaking lies, properly so called. In an analogous sense, as 
regards to speech acts, spycraft during a just war is like gamecraft during a bluffing game. 
Notice that this argument also applies outside the context of a just war as long as both 
sides are aware that they are playing the “game” of espionage.  
Finally, I propose that this analysis can be extended even further. It also applies to 
the context of undercover stings where undercover law enforcement officers and federal 
agents infiltrate an organization involved in illicit activities. Here, when the drug lord and 
her accomplices establish their network of illicit activities and engage in behavior that 
undermines the common good, they enter into a cat and mouse game with the authorities 
who they are trying to deceive so that they will not be apprehended and incarcerated. 
Once again, they are seeking to deceive and not to be deceived. They have entered into a 
bluffing game. Once again, I propose that officers of the state trying to deceive the 
members of these illicit organizations who are trying to deceive them cannot lie as long as 
they are speaking qua agents who are trying to promote the common good that is the 
proper ordering of the commonweal. Once again, as regards to speech acts, undercover 
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operations during a drug bust can be compared to the gamecraft that occurs during a 
bluffing game, in this case, the party game called Mafia.54 
 
Disputed Question: Lying to a Nazi to Save Jews 
May a conscientious Dutch citizen lie to protect the Jews that she is hiding from 
the Nazis? This of course is one of the classic questions in casuistry, a variant of the 
question of whether one may lie to a murderer who is seeking a potential victim.55 The 
clear weight of the Christian tradition lies on the opinion that one must never lie, even to 
save a life, though there is a second minority tradition, largely accepted in the Eastern 
Church, that suggests that lying may sometimes be justified, particularly if one is lying to 
an enemy who has no right to the truth, in order to protect the innocent from harm.56 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church reflects the majority tradition when it teaches that, 
“a lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving,” and that “by its 
very nature, lying is to be condemned.”57  
                                                
54 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mafia_(party_game). Last accessed on January 22, 2015. 
55 For an historical account of one instance of this classic case in casuistry, see Corrie Ten 
Boom, The Hiding Place (New York: Bantam Books, 1974). 
56 Boniface Ramsey, O.P. “Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient 
Church,” The Thomist 49 (1985): 504-533. 
57  Catechism of the Catholic Church, nos. 2482, 2485. As Christopher Kaczor has 
proposed, however, it can be argued that the final authoritative edition of the Catechism 
has taken the more probable opinion in the tradition – the one that a greater number of 
faithful theologians hold but one that is not settled doctrine – rather than ruling out the 
secondary minority tradition. For discussion, see his, “Can it be Morally Permissible to 
Assert a Falsehood in Service of a Good Cause,” American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 86 (2012): 97-109. Moreover, as Fr. Michael Sherwin, O.P., pointed out to me 
in a personal communication, the final authoritative edition of the Catechism did not 
alter two crucial paragraphs, nos. 2488 and 2489, which, amongst other things, affirm the 
following: “The right of communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must 
conform his life to the Gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete 
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As we saw above, St. Thomas is explicit about the absolute prohibition against 
lying: “Now it is not lawful to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury 
or defects from another just as it is not lawful to steal in order to give alms (except 
perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common). Therefore it is not lawful to 
tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatsoever.”58 Thus, the Dutch 
citizen may not lie to the Nazi though, as St. Thomas points out, “it is lawful to hide the 
truth prudently, by concealing it.”59 Germain Grisez takes this one step further by 
proposing that the Christian should not only remain silent but explain her silence: 
“[T]reating as neighbors both the potential victim and the enemy would require not 
giving the information and, usually, explaining why: ‘I will not answer your question and 
help you do wrong; instead, for your soul’s sake, I ask you to repent of your wicked 
intent’.”60  
Three responses have been recently proposed to this disputed question by scholars 
working with the Thomistic tradition. As a faithful interpreter of St. Thomas, Lawrence 
Dewan, O.P., proposes that the Thomistic distinction between lies that are mortal sins 
and those that are venial sins, will allow him to say the following: 
                                                                                                                                            
situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who 
asks for it” (no. 2488). This suggests that the Catechism still leaves open the possibility 
that one may refrain from speaking the truth to someone who has no right to it. 
58 STh II-II.110.3 ad 4: “Non licet autem aliqua illicita inordinatione uti ad impediendum 
nocumenta et defectus aliorum, sicut non licet furari ad hoc quod homo eleemosynam 
faciat (nisi forte in casu necessitatis, in quo omnia sunt communia). Et ideo non est 
licitum mendacium dicere ad hoc quod aliquis alium a quocumque periculo liberet.” 
59 Ibid.: “Licet tamen veritatem occultare prudenter sub aliqua dissimulatione.” 
60 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord: Living a Christian Life, Volume 2 (Quincy, IL: 
Franciscan Press, 1993), p. 407. 
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If we apply this solution to our modern question about lying to the 
Gestapo to save the Jewish family we are hiding, the answer of Thomas is 
that we should not tell a lie, even a harmless lie. To do so would be a venial 
sin, and one should never commit a venial sin, no matter what good might 
come of it. However, given the human condition, most good people, most 
saints (we might even say), will tell the lie, that is, will commit the venial 
sin. For their charity, which consists in their good will toward their 
neighbors, God will reward them with eternal life.61  
For Fr. Dewan, lies to save the life of another is sinful, but only sinful in an analogous 
sense. It would not imperil the speaker’s eternal destiny.  
Next, Alexander Pruss argues that the principle that one must always speak in his 
hearer’s language when one is communicating with him means that the conscientious 
Dutch citizen who tells the Nazi officer, “There are no Jews in my house,” is actually 
speaking the truth, because an affirmation in his language this would have meant, “Yes, 
there are some sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices in my 
house,” and this is clearly not true for her.62 In response to Pruss, Stephen Jensen observes 
that words have an inherent meaning, the intensive meaning or res significata to which 
the word refers, and extensive meanings that add to the intensive meaning.63 According to 
Jensen, even if Pruss’s analysis of Nazi language is accurate, the Nazi definition of Jews as 
                                                
61 Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 
279-300; p. 292. 
62 Alexander Pruss, “Lying and Speaking Your Interlocutor’s Language,” The Thomist 63 
(1999): 439-453. 
63 Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2010), p. 290 [Footnote 10]. 
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meaning, “sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices,” would 
only involve its extensive meaning. The Nazi meaning would still have to retain the 
intensive meaning that signifies a member of a particular religious or ethnic group to 
ensure that some communication could occur between the Dutch citizen and the Nazi. 
Thus, her response would still constitute a lie. 
Third, Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., building on Pruss’s framework described above, 
proposes that the Dutch citizen is incapable of lying to the Nazi because their verbal 
exchange does not constitute truthful human communication because it does not foster 
the mutual trust needed to live in society.64 In response to Fr. Guevin, Jensen notes that if 
Fr. Guevin is correct, then under his standard, politicians could never lie since it is clear 
to him that their communication with their constituents never fosters the mutual trust 
needed to live in society.65 Jensen also quotes St. Thomas to point out that the Angelic 
Doctor was opposed to lies even in times of war, probably the context par excellence 
where exchanges do not constitute truthful human communication because it does not 
foster mutual trust. 
 But again, what if we acknowledge the polyvalent nature of human speech that is 
shaped by the linguistic and social context of the speech act? Moralists who have tackled 
this disputed question have long assumed that the Nazi soldier asking the Dutch citizen 
about hidden Jews is asking her a simple question not unlike the Boston police officers 
who went door to door in Watertown, MA, searching for the Boston Marathon bomber. 
They see the context of this disputed question as an ordinary conversation between an 
                                                
64 Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B., “When a Lie is Not a Lie: The Importance of Ethical 
Context,” The Thomist 66 (2002): 267-274. 
65 Jensen, Good and Evil Actions, p. 290. 
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official of the commonweal and a citizen of the same. I disagree. Eyewitness testimony 
indicates that the Gestapo customarily used terror and brute force to control civilian 
populations both at home and abroad.66 They assumed that every citizen was, at a 
minimum, an untrustworthy individual who was working to oppose them. They expected 
that they were speaking to someone who was trying to deceive them, hence the need for 
the accompanying display of force and aggression. As such, in my view, the conversation 
between the Gestapo officer and the Dutch citizen is comparable to an exchange between 
two players in a game of bluff where one is trying to bluff the other, and the other is 
trying to see through that bluff. Once again, it is a context where, by definition, the 
speakers cannot lie, because it is a context where they are not expected to speak the truth. 
In a sense, my view is comparable to the one proposed by Fr. Guevin when he describes 
the exchange between Nazi and citizen as a verbal exchange that does not constitute 
truthful human communication. However, in contrast to Fr. Guevin, my account 
provides a conceptual framework for distinguishing the Gestapo-Citizen exchange from 
the Politician-constituent example discussed by Jensen. I disagree with Fr. Guevin who 
has proposed that the former conversation does not constitute truthful human 
communication, because is does not foster the mutual trust needed to live in society. This 
is a consequentialist argument, if what he means is that the conversation can be justified 
by the social outcome that it does or does not promote in the long run.67  
                                                
66 Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Horror (Chicago: Frontline Books, 2008).  
67 In a personal communication, Fr. Guevin has clarified his position. He explained that 
he believes that speaking falsehoods within the context of a Gestapo-Citizen conversation 
does not constitute lying because speaking falsehoods in this context does not go against 
the virtue of justice, but on a deeper level maintains it. Fr. Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., Email 
message to author, November 12, 2013.  
  255 
Rather, in my view, the Gestapo-Citizen conversation does not constitute truthful 
human communication because of the specific social context involved. Here, both 
interlocutors are aware that they are not speaking under formalities that are ordered 
towards truth. This is why the latter conversation, the conversation between politician 
and constituent is different. Here, at least the second member of the speaking dyad, the 
constituent, expects the first member of that vocal exchange to speak the truth, because 
constituents expect that their elected officials will speak the truth to them, especially in a 
society that strives to be a representative democracy. No such expectations existed 
between the Gestapo and the non-Nazi citizens of Germany or of the countries they 
occupied. 
 
Disputed Question: Lying to Planned Parenthood to Unmask Evil 
 May a pro-life activist lie to a staff member of Planned Parenthood to uncover the 
evil practices of the organization? Several years ago, the activists at Live Action, a media 
movement dedicated to ending abortion and building a culture of life, released several 
undercover videos that showed Planned Parenthood counselors advising their clients 
either to procure clandestine abortions and STD testing for underage sex workers or to 
procure sex-selective abortions.68 These videos were taken by Live Action investigators 
posing as pimps and pregnant mothers seeking abortions. Though these videos triggered 
a political effort to defund Planned Parenthood clinics around the United States, and as 
such, are laudable, they also generated much controversy among Catholic ethicists and 
                                                
68 For examples of these videos, news releases, and commentary, see the LiveAction 
website: http://www.liveaction.org/. Last accessed on October 2, 2013. 
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bloggers, who disagreed about the morality of lying to deceive an employee of an abortion 
clinic in order to expose the corruption of Planned Parenthood, Inc.69 On one side, there 
were moralists who condemned the actions of Live Action as violations of the natural law 
prohibition never to lie.70 Not surprisingly, the Catholic moralists opposed to all forms of 
deception appealed to the arguments made by St. Thomas Aquinas, which we have 
already discussed above. On the other side, there were ethicists who were willing to 
excuse Live Action’s deception on grounds that it could be justified because of the great 
good that it had brought about.71  
 Janet Smith has made an interesting argument to justify Live Action’s methods. At 
first glance, it is superficially similar to the one presented here because she proposes that 
human language has numerous purposes: “Now, language must serve many other 
purposes besides the conveyance of the concepts on our minds. We need to correct, 
console, encourage, and deter one another. These actions need not involve falsehoods, 
but they are a use of language that differs from the fundamental purpose of 
                                                
69 For overviews of the online debate, see the following: Phil Lawler, “Is it ever justifiable 
to lie?” March 16, 2011. http://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/otn.cfm?id=785; 
and, Thomas Peters, “LiveAction, Lies & the Truth About Abortion,” 
http://www.catholicvote.org/liveaction-lies-and-the-truth-about-abortion/.  
70 For representative views, see the following: Christopher O. Tollefsen, “Truth, Love, and 
Live Action,” February 9, 2011. http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/02/2529/; 
Christopher O. Tollefsen, “Why Lying is Always Wrong,” February 14, 2011. 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com /2011/02/2547/; and Robert George, “Life and 
Truth,” February 15, 2011. http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2011/02/the-
on-line-journal-public-discourse-under-the-brilliant-editorship-of-ryan-anderson-has-
become-a-key-site-for-people-inter.html. 
71 For representative views, see the following: Christopher Kaczor, “In Defense of Live 
Action,” February 11, 2011. http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/02/2538/; and Jim 
Russell, “Live Action, Lying, and the Catechism: Why a Good Catholic Can Support an 
Undercover Apostolate,” May 13, 2013. 
http://www.creativeminorityreport.com/2013/05/live-action-lying-and-catechism-
why.html.  
  257 
communicating truth.”72 However, Smith does not argue that the polyvalent nature of 
human language is connatural to the human primate as I have done above. Rather, she 
proposes that the multifunctional nature of human speech is a post-lapsarian reality that 
arises because of fallen and sin-prone human nature: “I believe that after the Fall, as is the 
case with words of consolation and encouragement, certain falsehoods uttered in certain 
circumstances can be fitting and morally licit uses of language.”73 She then concludes: 
“But just as destruction of life and property is now sometimes necessary and thus moral 
for the protection of what is good, false signification is sometimes necessary for the 
protection of life, property, and even truth itself. Uttering a falsehood to deceive a Nazi in 
order to save a Jew seems to be just such a case.”74 According to Smith, false signification, 
in this case the false signification of Live Action’s undercover investigators, can be 
justified by the good that it can bring about, in this case the exposition of the evil 
practices of Planned Parenthood.  
 Not surprisingly, Smith has been criticized – rightly, in my view – by Thomists 
who have argued that she has succumbed to a consequentialist morality by proposing that 
the ends can sometimes justify the means. As Thomas Petri, O.P., and Michael Wahl have 
noted, once one presupposes the veracity of the Thomistic account of speech, truth, and 
falsehood, one must also accept that “lying is not inherently ordered to saving a life.”75 
Therefore, “the action of lying is evil in its genus, and, thus, is an immoral means to 
saving life. Just as in the case of stealing to give alms, one sins and does that which is 
                                                
72 Smith, “Fig Leaves and Falsehoods,” 47. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 48. 
75 Thomas Petri, O.P., and Michael Wahl, “Live Action and Planned Parenthood: A New 
Test Case for Lying,” Nova et vetera 10 (2012): 437-462; p. 449. 
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immoral in order to do good.”76 This objection is a valid one because Smith is unable to 
move beyond the dichotomy between true and false signification. If speech has only one 
function, and that is to signify – an assumption that Smith implicit accepts by speaking 
only about true and false signification – then to justify false signification by appealing to 
the good that it bring about, is to fall into the quicksand of consequentialism.  
But what if we acknowledge the polyvalent nature of speech as a reality that is 
connatural to human nature, both before and after original sin? This alternative would 
avoid the consequentialist objection. First, it would affirm that human speech involves 
more than just two kinds of speech involving true or false signification. A third kind also 
involves non-signification. Second, it would affirm that speech acts of the third kind can 
be ordered towards other ends that in themselves could be then be ordered towards the 
saving of life without distorting the natural teleology of human speech. Therefore, as I 
argued above, the non-significatory speech uttered in the context of a bluffing game can 
be ordered towards deceit of one’s opponents without distorting its teleological ordering. 
As such, it can be justified not by appealing to good ends to justify evil means by 
affirming that this speech does not constitute evil, i.e., disordered, means in itself. 
Returning to Live Action’s undercover operations, can they be justified? One 
possible response is to propose that individuals, and especially organizations, who 
commit evil acts more generally put themselves into a similar social context for their 
speech acts as members of criminal organizations seeking to mislead the police do, 
because sin necessarily impels sinners to want to conceal themselves and their evil acts 
from those who are good. The biblical narrative of the Fall reveals this dynamic clearly: 
                                                
76 Ibid., 450. 
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After they ate of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, Adam and Eve hid 
themselves from the LORD God among the trees of the garden (cf. Gen 3:8-10). They 
wanted to conceal themselves and their sin.  
Therefore, one could say that Planned Parenthood and its agents, by promoting 
the evil practice of abortion, had placed themselves into a social context where they were 
actively trying to deceive individuals of virtue in order to conceal the evil that they were 
doing, the evil that once uncovered, triggered the Congressional investigation into their 
activities. Companies that exploit the poor or pollute the environment do the same. They 
have put themselves into the context of a social game of bluff that pitted agents of vice 
who were trying to conceal evil against agents of virtue who were trying to uncover it, for 
the sake of the common good. One could then propose that this is a linguistic context 
where, by definition, the speakers cannot lie, because it is a linguistic context where they 
are not expected to speak the truth. Rather they are speaking either to conceal or to reveal 
vice. If this were true, then Live Action’s deceptive speech could be justified as falsehoods 
that are not lies. 
However, this argument is a weak one. Unlike spying, there is no game of bluff 
here where the employees of Planned Parenthood and the investigators of Live Action 
know the rules of the game. It is not even clear if the employees of Planned Parenthood 
even realize the evil of their actions given their rhetoric of how access to abortion 
promotes and protects the reproductive rights of women. Rather, they are proud of their 
work and do all that they can to promote it. Thus, it would seem that the conditions that 
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justify espionage do not apply here.77 And yet, why do good and faithful persons “sense” 
that “lying” to Planned Parenthood is justifiable? It is the same instinct at work when 
good and faithful people “sense” that Jean Valjean did not “steal” the bread in Victor 
Hugo’s Les Misérables. 
 
Objection: Speaking Falsehoods Necessarily Corrupts Moral Character 
 One possible objection to the account of human speech acts proposed here is that 
there are seemingly realistic narratives – John le Carré’s The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold comes especially to mind – that suggest that the duplicitous nature of espionage 
corrupts the moral character of spies.78 For the objector, this would be empirical evidence 
that the speaking of falsehoods, by its very nature, hinders the moral development of the 
speaker and as such can never be justified. Petri and Wahl have even argued, “as 
necessary as the Central Intelligence Agency or National Security Agency may be, we 
would not recommend a person who is seeking to grow in virtue and holiness to join 
either of them.”79 
 In response, in my view, the vocation of a spy has to be understood precisely as a 
vocation. As such, it is profession that is not for everyone, but only for those individuals 
                                                
77 However, let me raise a conjecture: In a society that is structurally blind to and 
incapable of properly uprooting evil, can citizens of virtue assume the role of police who 
are deputed by society to eradicate evil, but as vigilantes? If so, then these citizens, like the 
police and other undercover investigators, would be immune from claims that they are 
engaged in lying to uncover vice. 
78 A similar moral damage argument has been made to criticize the practice of clandestine 
operations involved in intelligence collection by Drexel Godfrey: “Ethics and 
Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 56 (1978): 624-642. For a insightful response to Godfrey, see 
John P. Langan, S.J., “Moral Damage and the Justification of Intelligence Collection from 
Human Sources,” Studies in Intelligence 25 (1981): 57-64. 
79 Petri and Wahl, “Live Action,” p. 461. 
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who are called to that life. These are those individuals who have been given a particular 
set of personal traits that would allow them to grow in virtue and in holiness in a life of 
espionage. For example, Kevin Dutton has suggested that the best spies are individuals 
with mild psychopathic traits.80 It is not surprising that there are heroic narratives written 
by former CIA operatives that can serve as counter-examples to the stories that paint a 
dark moral portrait of the spy.81 There is also the evidence from other professions that 
routinely involve the speaking of falsehoods, especially the acting profession, that suggests 
that the practice is not inherently damaging to the moral character of many of its 
practitioners. Would Petri and Wahl discourage all Christians from the dramatic arts?  
It is clear that spies bear an unusually heavy psychological burden because of their 
profession, which could lead to moral damage if that burden is not carried virtuously. But 
this is not unique to espionage. Surgeons, grief counselors, first responders, and priests, 
among others, bear similar burdens because of their work. Indeed, in my view, moral 
theologians especially those working within the Catholic tradition have a pastoral 
responsibility to help their brothers and sisters to carry their burdens well. And for our 
brothers and sisters working in counter-intelligence in defense of the common good, 
articulating why espionage is not a sin, not even a venial sin, would be one way of doing 
this. 
 
 
                                                
80 See his book, The Wisdom of Psychopaths: What Saints, Spies, and Serial Killers Can 
Teach Us About Success (New York: Scientific American, 2012). 
81 Antonio J. Mendez, The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1999). 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has illustrated how an understanding of hylomorphic theory and its 
analogous use in St. Thomas’s theory of speech acts allows us to update his moral 
theology so that it can incorporate contemporary insights from science and philosophy. 
Recall, however, that analogical predication relates all secondary predications to a prime 
analogate, in the case of matter-form language, to the realities of prime matter and 
substantial form. But are these realities really real? If they are not real – if they do not 
exist – as many philosophers have argued for the past four centuries, then the analogous 
use of matter-form terminology in Thomistic moral theology remains metaphorical at 
best and false at worst. In the next chapter, I will identify the most significant scientific 
criticisms of hylomorphic theory put forward by the early modern scientist-philosophers 
who were instrumental in supplanting hylomorphism with mechanism, triggering the 
scientific revolution. I will then respond to their objections by bringing Thomistic 
hylomorphic theory into conversation with modern science to show that the use of 
matter-form terminology in moral theology is neither unintelligible nor antiquated, 
especially in light of recent developments in systems biology.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Rehabilitating Classical Hylomorphism with a Systems Biology 
 
 
Introduction 
How are we to talk about a “form,” “nature,” or the “disposition of matter” in the 
21st century? How are we to translate the classical hylomorphism of Aristotle and of St. 
Thomas Aquinas that we have been discussing throughout this thesis into a modern 
idiom? As we will discuss in detail in this chapter, the alleged refutation of hylomorphic 
theory during the early modern period has undermined the legitimacy of matter-form 
language, even used analogically. In my view, therefore, this rejection of classical matter-
form theory among philosophers and scientists needs to be reversed to reopen a space 
among theologians for the analogical use of hylomorphic terminology in contemporary 
sacra doctrina. 
In this chapter, I describe a theoretical framework that seeks to rehabilitate a 
classical Thomistic account of matter and form within the realm of contemporary 
biology. However, before I do this, I think that it is important to understand and to 
respond to the scientific objections to hylomorphism that were raised by the philosopher-
scientists of the early modern period, especially since these have been overlooked in the 
most part by recent authors working to justify matter-form language from within the 
analytic tradition. 1  Therefore, I begin with a historical sketch that describes the 
                                                
1 For representative works from this tradition published in the past decade, see Edward 
Feser, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005); 
Mark Johnston, “Hylomorphism” Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006): 652-698; David 
Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: Routledge, 2007); Kathrin Koslicki, The Structure 
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widespread replacement of a hylomorphic philosophy with a mechanical one in 
seventeenth century Europe. I want to examine the scientific reasons for the mechanist’s 
rejection of matter-form language by focusing on representative arguments from René 
Descartes, Robert Boyle, and John Locke. Why did these philosophers, whose lives 
spanned the seventeenth century, think that the rejection of classical hylomorphism was 
necessary for the scientific revolution that they helped to trigger?  
I then move to an overview of systems biology, an emerging field of scientific 
investigation, which in my view is inherently open to a hylomorphic account of creation 
because of its own hylomorphic structure. I close the chapter with an account of the 
human organism that is not only consonant both to classical hylomorphism and 
contemporary science but is also corrective of the scientific objections of the early 
modern philosophers. This systems account is a conceptual framework that validates the 
hylomorphic analysis in moral theology that has been the focus of the earlier chapters of 
this thesis. 
 
Marginalizing Substantial Forms with a Mechanical Biology 
Before moving to the objections to classical hylomorphism raised by the 
philosophers of the early modern period, I think that it is important to contextualize 
them within the philosophical currents of their day, specifically within the debates 
                                                                                                                                            
of Material Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); William Jaworski, 
Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 
Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic animalism,” Philosophical Studies 155 (2011): 65-81; 
Michael Rea, “Hylomorphism reconditioned,” Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 341-
358; and James D. Madden, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy 
of Mind (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2013). 
  265 
surrounding the nature of living substances.2 For my purposes in this thesis, these debates 
well illustrate the marginalization of substantial forms that occurred when the dominant 
Aristotelian philosophies of the seventeenth century were replaced by their rival 
mechanical alternatives.3 
Turning to philosophical history then, what is a living organism? For Aristotle 
and his intellectual heirs, St. Thomas included, a living organism is the paradigmatic 
example of a substance.4 As we saw in the first chapter, an organism is a substance with 
an internal principle of activity – its substantial form, which for living things is called its 
soul – that is responsible for its unity, its integrity, and its species-specific activity. Indeed, 
as Aristotle explains in his On the Parts of Animals, the study of animal nature is the study 
of animal soul: “So in this way too it will be requisite for the person studying nature to 
                                                
2 As numerous scholars have pointed out, there were numerous Aristotelianisms and 
therefore, numerous hylomorphisms during the early modern period. However, th 
differences among these philosophies were not as great as the shared similarities that 
distinguished them from their mechanist rivals. For an insightful discussion of the 
different hylomorphisms that existed during the early modern period, see Gideon 
Manning, “The History of ‘Hylomorhism,’” Journal of the History of Ideas 74 (2013): 173-
187; and Christoph Lüthy and William R. Newman, “‘Matter’ and ‘Form’: By Way of 
Preface,” Early Science and Medicine 2 (1997): 215-226. Also see, Christoph Lüthy, Cees 
Leijenhorst, and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, “The Tradition of Aristotelian Natural 
Philosophy: Two Theses and Seventeen Answers,” in The Dynamics of Aristotelian 
Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, ed. Cees Leijenhorst, 
Christoph Lüthy, and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 1-29. 
3 Parallel debates were underway in what today we would call the field of chemistry where 
early modern chymists were challenging the Aristotelian hylomorphisms and 
corpuscularisms of the late medieval alchemists. For a fascinating narrative of this 
controversy, see William R. Newman, Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the 
Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006). 
4 For an overview of Aristotle’s philosophy of biology and references to the primary 
literature, see Fernando Moya, “Epistemology of Living Organisms in Aristotle’s 
Philosophy,” Theory Biosci 119 (2000): 318-333; and L.A. Kosman, “Animals and other 
beings in Aristotle,” in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. A. Gotthelf and J.G. 
Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 360-391.  
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speak about soul more than the matter, inasmuch as it is more that the matter is nature 
because of soul than the reverse.”5 
Importantly, the Aristotelians distinguished organisms from artifacts, because 
unlike the former, the latter only have an accidental unity, an accidental integrity, and an 
“accidental” activity that are imposed on them from without.6 A wooden house built by 
Habitat for Humanity in New Orleans is only a house and can only function as a house 
because of the architect and volunteer builders who imposed a form on the wooden 
planks that they had put up in the shape of a house. In this way, a house is unlike a giraffe, 
which has its form from within. Though it is accurate to say that there was no single 
consensus view on what constituted an orthodox reading of Aristotle’s philosophy of 
nature in the early modern period, most of the scholastics still held some variant of this 
theory of matter.7 
During the scientific revolution of the early modern period, this Aristotelian 
worldview was replaced with a mechanical alternative, which, among other things, 
                                                
5 Aristotle, Parts of Animals I-IV, Trans. James G. Lennox (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), p. 5. [641a 28-31] 
6  Cf. Aristotle, Physics II.1.192b9-19, where the Philosopher makes the distinction 
between natural substances and artifacts because the former have an innate principle of 
movement whereas the latter have no such principle. For a fascinating discussion of the 
dichotomy between natural and artificial products as it was understood in the Middle 
Ages, see William R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 34-114. 
7 For an overview of the philosophies of nature at the dawn of modernity, see R. Ariew 
and M. Grene, “The Cartesian Destiny of Form and Matter,” in Descartes and the Last 
Scholastics, ed. R. Ariew (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 77-96; and 
Robert Pasnau, “Form, Substance, and Mechanism,” The Philosophical Review 113 (2004): 
31-88. 
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collapsed the distinction between living organisms and inert artifacts.8 For example, the 
French philosopher and mathematician, René Descartes (1596-1650) wrote: “I know that 
you will say that the form of the clock is only an artificial form, while the form of the sun 
is natural and substantial; but I reply that this distinction concerns only the cause of these 
forms, and not at all their nature.”9 Indeed, he is famous for comparing the human 
organism to a machine:  
In the same way, if I should consider the body of a man as a kind of 
machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, 
blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it 
would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those cases 
where movements as it now does in those cases where movement is not 
under the control of the will or, consequently, of the mind.10 
                                                
8 For different perspectives on how the Aristotelian worldview was replaced by its 
mechanical counterpart, see Helen Hattab, “The Mechanical Philosophy,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, ed. Desmond M. Clarke and Catherine 
Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 71-95; Cees Leijenhorst, The 
Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ 
Natural Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2002); and William Eaton, Boyle on Fire: The 
Mechanical Revolution in Scientific Explanation (London: Continuum, 2005). Also see the 
essays in Sophie Roux and Dan Garber, eds., The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 
9 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III The Correspondence, 
Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 122. 
10  René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II. Trans. John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), p. 58. For a fascinating and comprehensive discussion of this Cartesian 
analogy and the conceptual transformation that it heralded, see Dennis Des Chene, Spirits 
and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2000). Also see Gideon Manning, “Descartes’ Healthy Machines and the Human 
Exception,” in The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy ed. Sophie Roux and Dan Garber 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 237-262. 
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As we will see shortly, Descartes used this analogy between an organism and a clock to 
argue against the existence of substantial forms.  
 Within a generation, Robert Boyle (1627-1691), considered the father of modern 
chemistry, compared the bodies of animals to engines:  
I think also further that the wise Author of things did, by establishing the 
laws of motion among bodies, and by guiding the first motions of the 
small parts of matter, bring them to convene after the manner requisite to 
compose the world, and especially did contrive those curious and 
elaborate engines, the bodies of living creatures, endowing most of them 
with a power of propagating their species.11 
Or again, referring to the bodies of the microscopic mite, Boyle will write in his essay on 
“atomicall” philosophy: “Now though a mite seem but a moving atom, and unless there 
be diverse together is not easily discerned by the unassisted eye yet in an excellent 
microscope I have, I have several times both discovered my self and shown to others not 
only the several limbs of this little animal but the very hair growing upon his legs, now let 
us but consider what a multitude of atoms must concur to constitute the several parts 
external and internal necessary to make out this little engine.”12  
                                                
11 Robert Boyle, “On the Origin of Forms and Qualities,” in Selected Philosophical Papers 
of Robert Boyle, ed. M.A. Stewart (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979), 1-96; 
p. 19. 
12 Robert Boyle, “Essay the Of the Atomicall Philosophy,” in The Works of Robert Boyle: 
Volume 13, Unpublished Writings 1645-c.1670., ed. Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2000), 227-235; p. 229. I have revised the text so that it will 
conform to contemporary English usage and spelling. The original text is as follows: 
“Now tho a Mit seeme but a moving Atome & unles there be diverse together is not easily 
discern’d by the unassisted Eye yet in an excellent Microscope I have, I have severall times 
both discovered my selfe and showne to others not only the severall limbs of this little 
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In 1690, the English philosopher and physician, John Locke (1632-1704) would 
make an analogy between a man and a clock suggesting that knowing the real essence of a 
man would be like knowing the springs, wheels, and other inner workings of the time 
keeper: 
[W]e should have a quite other idea of his essence than what now is 
contained in our definition of that species, be it what it will: and our idea of 
any individual man would be as far different from what it is now, as is his 
who knows all the springs and wheels and other contrivances within of the 
famous clock at Strasburg, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, 
who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock strike, and 
observes only some of the outward appearances.13 
In sum, for the mechanical philosophers, the universe and all that it contains, living 
organisms included, is an intricate machine created by the divine mechanic and great 
clockmaker. The ontological distinction held by the Aristotelians for centuries between 
living substance and inanimate artifact effectively disappeared. 
With the birth of this new worldview, the scientific enterprise also changed. 
Where the Aristotelians had thought that an organism is explained by identifying its four 
causes, the mechanists became convinced that a biological system, indeed any physical 
phenomenon, is most fruitfully explained by identifying its parts and by describing how 
these parts function individually and together, using mathematics. Like geometers, 
                                                                                                                                            
Animall but the very haire growing upon his legs, now let us but consider what a 
multitude of Atomes must concurre to constitute the severall parts externall and internall 
necessary to make out this little Engine.” 
13 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III.6.3. 
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biologists would now explain why by explaining how, and preferably, with numbers.14 In 
effect, during the scientific revolution, formal explanations were replaced by structural 
ones that focus on explaining a body by characterizing its material parts according to 
qualities capable of geometrical and mathematical description.15 It is a conviction that 
continues to drive biologists today. Indeed, molecular and cellular biologists, myself 
included, seek the ideal of explaining a particular occurrence of life with a mechanism, 
i.e., with a description of how the interaction of specific molecular parts, may they be 
genes, nucleic acids, proteins, or metabolites, gives rise to that phenomenon.16 With this 
paradigm shift to a mechanical biology, it should not be surprising that substantial forms 
were jettisoned as unnecessary and unscientific vestiges of an outdated (and, in the view 
of many mechanists, false!) worldview.  
 
Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: René Descartes 
Historians of the early modern period are generally agreed that the mathematician 
René Descartes, considered the father of modern philosophy, makes his strongest case 
against substantial forms in a letter to the Dutch philosopher and physician Henricus 
                                                
14 For discussion, see William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, “Explanation: a mechanist 
alternative,” Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 36 (2005): 421-441. 
15 William R. Newman attributes structural explanations to mechanical philosophy. See 
Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, 176. For a discussion on structural explanations, see 
Ernan McMullin, “Structural Explanation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 
139-147. 
16  Lindley Darden, “Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms: Schema Instantiation, 
Modular Subassembly, Forward/Backward Chaining,” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 
S354-S365. 
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Regius (1598-1679) written in January of 1642.17 He raises several objections against 
hylomorphic theory. In my view, the most significant objections from a scientific 
perspective are three.  
First, he argues that substantial forms have no explanatory power in science: “We 
merely claim that we do not need them in order to explain the causes of natural things.”18 
Instead, Descartes proposes that his mechanical account, “on the other hand, give 
manifest and mathematical reasons for natural actions, as can be seen with regard to the 
form of common salt in my Meterology.”19  
Second, and in a related objection, he argues that substantial forms are 
explanations that explain what is not known by what is even less known: “But no natural 
action at all can be explained by these substantial forms, since their defenders admit that 
they are occult and that they do not understand them themselves. If they say that some 
action proceeds from a substantial form, it is as if they said that it proceeds from 
something they do not understand; which explains nothing.” 20  As such, they are 
meaningless. 
Finally, Descartes equates substantial forms to the “forms” of mechanical artifacts 
and then concludes that appealing to the former kind of forms is as unnecessary as 
appealing to the latter: “All the arguments to prove substantial forms can be applied to 
                                                
17 Helen Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 16.  
18 “Letter to Regius, January, 1642” in René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Volume III The Correspondence, Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, 
Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p. 207. 
19 Ibid.,p. 209. 
20 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
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the form of a clock, which nobody says is a substantial form.”21  Importantly this 
correspondence also includes his definition of a substantial form: “To prevent any 
ambiguity of expression, it must be observed that when we deny substantial forms, we 
mean by the expression a certain substance joined to matter, making up with it a merely 
corporeal whole, and which, no less than matter and even more than matter – since it is 
called an actuality and matter only a potentiality – is a true substance, of self-subsistent 
thing.”22 As we saw in Chapter One, this is not Aristotle’s or St. Thomas’s understanding 
of substantial form. Substantial form is not “a certain substance joined to matter” as 
Descartes would have it. Rather, substantial form is a principle of being, which together 
with prime matter, gives rise to a really existing substance. 
 
Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: Robert Boyle 
 Like Descartes before him, the 17th century philosopher and chemist Robert Boyle 
undertook a sustained attack on substantial forms, especially in his The Origin of Forms 
and Qualities, which is recognized as his major treatment of the subject.23 Scholars 
consider it the most sustained and influential case against scholastic essences mounted by 
a proponent of the new mechanical philosophy.24 
Boyle makes two theoretical and one experimental argument to dismiss 
substantial forms. First, like Descartes, he argued that substantial forms have no 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 208. 
22 Ibid., p. 207. 
23 Peter R. Anstey, “Essences and Kinds,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. Desmond M. Clarke and Catherine Wilson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 11-31. 
24 Ibid., p. 19. 
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explanatory power because of their occult, i.e., their hidden, nature. In his view, the 
Aristotelian scholastics were explaining the obscure by referring to realities that were 
even more obscure: 
[F]or what is wont to be taught us of qualities in the Schools is so slight 
and ill-grounded that it may be doubted whether they have not rather 
obscured than illustrated the things they should have explained. And I was 
quickly discouraged from expecting to learn much from them of the 
nature of divers particular qualities, when I found that, except some few 
which they tell you in general may be deduced (by ways they leave those to 
guess at that can) from those four qualities they are pleased to call the first, 
they confess that the rest spring from those forms of bodies whose 
particular natures the judiciousest of them acknowledge they cannot 
comprehend.25 
Thus, for Boyle, appeals to substantial forms are meaningless explanations. Later in Forms 
and Qualities, he describes an imaginary conversation with an Aristotelian scholastic to 
make the same point:  
As, if (for instance) it be demanded how snow comes to dazzle the eyes, 
they will answer that it is by a quality of whiteness that is in it, which 
makes all very white bodies produce the same effect…and if you further 
enquire what this real entity which they call a quality is, you will find, as 
we shall see anon, that they either speak of it much after the same rate that 
                                                
25 Robert Boyle, “On the Origin of Forms and Qualities,” p. 13. 
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they do of their substantial forms…or at least they will not explicate it 
more intelligibly.26 
In fact, Boyle observes that when Aristotelians speak about substantial forms, they are 
actually referring not to its substance but to its accidents: 
And if you ask men what they mean by a ruby, or nitre, or a pearl, they will 
still make you such answers that you may clearly perceive that, whatever 
me talk in theory of substantial forms, yet that upon whose account they 
really distinguish any one body from others, and refer it to this or that 
species of bodies, is nothing by an aggregate or convention of such 
accidents as most men do by a kind of agreement (for the thing is more 
arbitrary than we are aware of) think necessary or sufficient to make a 
portion of the universal matter belong to this or that determinate genus or 
species of natural bodies.27 
Therefore, Boyle concludes that one does not need to appeal to substantial forms to 
explain the behavior of material bodies. Instead, once can just posit that these qualities 
proceed from the primary or mechanical “affections” of matter, namely shape, size, 
motion, and texture:  
[S]ince an aggregate or convention of qualities is enough to make the 
portion of matter it is found in what it is, and denominate it of this or that 
determinate sort of bodies, and since those qualities, as we have seen 
already, do themselves proceed from those more primary and catholic 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 16. 
27 Ibid., p. 38. 
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affections of matter – bulk, shape, motion, or rest – and the texture thence 
resulting, why may we not say that the form of a body, being made up of 
those qualities united in one subject, doth likewise consist in such a 
convention of those newly-named mechanical affections of matter as is 
necessary to constitute a body of that determinate kind?”28 
In support of this claim, Boyle appeals to the experience and the arguments of the 
alchemists of his day proposing that substantial forms are not needed to distinguish one 
thing of a natural kind from another kind of thing. Only accidents are sufficient: 
[I]f a man could bring any parcel of matter to be yellow and malleable and 
ponderous, and fixed in the fire, and upon the test, indissoluble in aqua 
fortis [nitric acid], and in sum to have a concurrence of all those accidents 
by which men try true gold from false, they would take it for true gold 
without scruple. And in this case the generality of mankind would leave 
the School doctors to dispute whether, being a factitious body (as made by 
the chemist’s art), it have the substantial form of gold.29 
He will conclude: “For such a convention of accidents is sufficient to perform the offices 
that are necessarily required in what men call a form, since it makes the body such as it is, 
making it appertain to this or that determinate species of body.”30 
 Second, Boyle, again like Descartes, compares living bodies to machines 
suggesting that substantial forms are not needed to explain the behavior of the former in 
the same way that they are not necessary to explain the behavior of the latter:  
                                                
28 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
29 Ibid., p. 38. 
30 Ibid., p. 40. 
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And whereas it is said by some that the form also of a body ought to be the 
principle of its operations…what great things may be thereby performed 
may be somewhat guessed at by the strange things we see done by engines, 
which, being as engines undoubtedly devoid of substantial forms, must do 
those strange things they are admired for by virtue of those accidents, the 
shape, size, motion, and contrivance, of their parts.31  
This is reinforced in Boyle’s view by his observation that the boundaries between natural 
bodies of different species are unclear and appear to be grounded in convention rather 
than in nature: “[Y]et that upon whose account they really distinguish any one body from 
others, and refer it to this or that species of bodies, is nothing by an aggregate or 
convention of such accidents as most men do by a kind of agreement.”32 
 Finally, Boyle argues that hylomorphic theory cannot explain the data he has 
obtained from three experiments, empirical arguments that have been expertly outlined 
by historian of science, William Newman.33 Most fundamentally, he argues that the 
behavior of the chemical entities involved in both “redintegration” and “reduction to the 
pristine state” experiments can be explained only by appealing to the separation and 
recombination of preexistent chymical atoms and not by talking about substantial forms. 
For instance, Boyle noted that the recovery of pure silver from an alloy of gold and silver 
using aqua fortis, what today we would call nitric acid, and a process of dissolution and 
precipitation is better explained by a corpuscularian theory and not by a hylomorphic 
one. This chymical reaction is only one example of what today we would call reversible 
                                                
31 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
32 Ibid., p. 28. 
33 Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, pp. 190-216. 
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chemical reactions, reactions that are difficult to explain using an Aristotelian theory of 
mixtures that posits that mixtures do not retain the original substantial forms of the 
entities that compose them.34  
 
Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: John Locke 
 Finally, the philosopher and physician, John Locke, who had had Boyle as a tutor 
at Oxford, raised two basic arguments against the existence of substantial forms, which he 
described in several scattered texts in his Essay concerning Human Understanding. The 
first is a scientific objection based on Locke’s medical experience, while the second is a 
philosophical one that emerges from his corpuscularian theory of matter. 
 First, Locke attacks substantial forms by pointing to the birth of abnormal 
creatures, which he and his contemporaries called monsters and changelings – today, we 
would call them, animals with birth defects – that appear to straddle the species boundary 
between organisms of two distinct natural kinds. In Locke’s view, this demonstrates that 
the boundaries between species of a natural kind are indeterminate and indistinct, an 
empirical fact that is incompatible with a theory of substantial forms that distinguishes 
one species from another in a discrete manner: 
The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of 
changelings, and other strange issues of human birth, carry with them 
difficulties, not possible to consist with this hypothesis [of substantial 
forms]; since it is as impossible that two things partaking exactly of the 
                                                
34 For an extensive discussion and defense of this claim, see Newman, Atoms and 
Alchemy, pp. 157-216. 
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same real essence should have different properties, as that two figures 
partaking of the same real essence of a circle should have different 
properties.35   
Locke even believed that he had witnessed the birth of an animal that was part cat and 
part rat: “I once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain 
marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither 
sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together.”36 In Locke’s view, these chimeras 
and all abnormal creatures that are born are proof that a theory of matter that posits the 
existence of substantial forms “wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast” must be 
erroneous.37 
Next, like Descartes and Boyle before him, Locke argued that hylomorphic theory 
has no explanatory power because substantial forms have no real referent. Instead, in 
Locke’s view, the only really existing things are the qualities that are verifiable to the 
senses: 
For I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid parts in general, 
though I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of 
parts, whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced; which 
qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and 
not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But, 
when I am told that something besides the figure, size, and posture of the 
                                                
35 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III.3.17. 
36 Ibid., III.6.23. 
37 Ibid., III.3.17. 
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solid parts of that body in its essence, something called substantial form, of 
that I confess I have no idea at all.38 
Thus, for Locke, the notion of substantial forms lacks any content and as such is 
unintelligible and meaningless:  
Those, therefore, who have been taught that the several species of 
substances had their distinct internal substantial forms, and that it was 
those forms which made the distinction of substances into their true 
species and genera, were led yet further out of the way by having their 
minds set upon fruitless inquiries after “substantial forms”; wholly 
unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or 
confused conception in general.39 
Instead, Locke proposed that the real essences of substances are the corpuscular 
structures of the material objects that underlie the qualities that we can perceive when we 
sense the objects: 
[T]he nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands 
for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, 
fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible 
parts of that body, on which those qualities and all the other properties of 
gold depend. 
Note that this second objection does not really undermine hylomorphism in itself. 
Instead, Locke is simply asserting an alternative nominalist account to explain reality. It is 
                                                
38 Ibid., III.31.6. 
39 Ibid., Book III.6.10.  
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a rival to the Aristotelian matter-form framework that emerges from Locke’s corpuscular 
theory of matter.  
 
Rehabilitating Substantial Forms with a Systems Biology 
 The past decade has witnessed an emergence of a new biology, a systems biology, 
which has challenged many of the reductive assumptions of the mechanical biology.40 
Systems biologists are motivated by the conviction that we will not be able to understand 
biology until we fully appreciate what one systems biologists has called the “fifth great 
idea” in biology, summarized as follows: “Multi-scale dynamic complex systems formed 
by interacting macromolecules and metabolites, cells, organs, and organisms underlie 
most biological processes.”41 In my view, systems biology is both an approach to doing 
biology and a perspective of living beings – the systems perspective – that will facilitate 
the rehabilitation of classical hylomorphism, transforming it into a systems 
hylomorphism. 
Where the old biology focused on identifying individual biological parts like genes 
or cells or tissues to understand the whole organism, the new biology focuses on studying 
the whole organism to understand how its interacting parts give rise to phenomena that 
cannot be reduced to the behavior of those individual parts. Elsewhere, I have used the 
                                                
40 For a historical overview, see Hans V. Westerhoff and Bernhard O. Paisson, “The 
evolution of molecular biology into systems biology,” Nat Biotech 22 (2004): 1249-1252. 
41 Marc Vidal, “A unifying view of 21st century systems biology,” FEBS Letters 583 (2009): 
3891-3894; p. 3891. For a discussion of the four other great ideas in biology, see Paul 
Nurse, “The great ideas of biology,” Clin. Med 3 (2003): 560-568. 
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example of an orchestra to describe this change in perspective.42 To explain an orchestra, 
it is not enough to list and to describe the individual musicians and their instruments, 
which is the approach of the old biology. One must also understand and describe how 
they interact with each other and within the whole to make Beethoven’s “Fifth 
Symphony” come alive for the audience. This is the approach of the new systems biology.  
 
An Overview of Systems Biology 
Systems biologists want to understand the principles that give rise to the 
architecture and to the dynamics of an organism, viewed as a living and adaptive network 
of molecular parts. They have discovered that at any given moment in time, an organism 
is constituted by a multitude of physical interactions among trillions of spatially 
distributed molecules that change through time. These molecules include among others, 
an organism’s genes, its proteins, and its metabolites, which are the biochemical 
intermediates and products of the set of life-sustaining chemical transformations that 
undergird the organism’s growth, development, behavior, and reproduction. The 
                                                
42 For earlier descriptions of the systems perspective that have been revised and updated 
in this chapter, see the following essays: Austriaco, N., “On Static Eggs and Dynamic 
Embryos: A Systems Perspective” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2 (2002): 659-683; 
Austriaco, N., “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 4 (2004): 719-738; and Austriaco, N., “The Soul and Its 
Inclinations: Recovering a Metaphysical Biology with the Systems Perspective,” in The 
Human Animal: Procreation, Education, and the Foundations of Society, Proceedings of 
the X Plenary Session, 18-20 June 2010, The Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas 
(Vatican City: The Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2011), pp. 48-63. 
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complete list of these interactions among these molecules has been called an organism’s 
interactome.43  
As an example, take the 1mm-long transparent worm called Caenorhabditis 
elegans that is the subject of scientific investigation in numerous genetic and molecular 
laboratories around the world. Systems biologists began by identifying the physical 
interactions among the proteins important either for making individual organs or for 
regulating particular cellular functions necessary for life, like the repair of DNA damage.44 
They then combined the individual data sets of local protein interactions to generate a 
map of the global protein interactions that give shape to the architecture of the whole 
animal. 45  Similar efforts have gone into deciphering the global interactions of the 
organism’s genes and metabolites. 46  Together, these maps highlight the molecular 
network that is the worm. They are comparable to a diagram of a symphonic orchestra 
that shows the relationships among the musicians and their instruments in the musical 
ensemble, or to an organizational chart that illustrates the relations between the people 
working in a large multinational company. They depict the architecture of the organism, 
the orchestra, and the business, by revealing the relationships among the parts that 
                                                
43 K. Venkatesan et al., “An empirical framework for binary interactome mapping,” Nat 
Methods 6 (2008): 83-90. 
44 A.J. Walhout et al., “Protein interaction mapping in C. elegans using proteins involved 
in vulval development,” Science 287 (2000): 116–122; A. Davy et al., “A protein–protein 
interaction map of the Caenorhabditis elegans 26S proteasome,” EMBO Rep. 2 (2001): 
821–828; S.J. Boulton et al., “Combined functional genomic maps of the C. elegans DNA 
damage response,” Science 295 (2002): 127–131. 
45 S. Li et al., “A map of the interactome network of the metazoan C. elegans,” Science 303 
(2004): 540–543. 
46 B. Lehner et al., “Systematic mapping of genetic interactions in Caenorhabditis elegans 
identifies common modifiers of diverse signaling pathways,” Nat Genet 38 (2006): 896-
903. For a review, see K.C. Gunsalus and K. Rhrissorrakrai, “Networks in Caenorhabditis 
elegans,” Curr Opin Genet Dev 21 (2011): 787-798. 
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compose the whole. Comprehensive genetic, protein, and metabolic interaction maps 
have also been generated for the human organism.47 
Systems biologists have made one striking observation about the architecture of 
these living networks: surprisingly, the interaction networks from different organisms 
including yeast, plants, and animals, have similar topographical features. To use the 
technical jargon of systems biology, it appears that all living systems are scale-free, small-
world networks. To explain, a network is composed of nodes and edges, where the nodes 
are the component parts of the network and the edges represent the interactions between 
the spatially distributed component parts. Take the familiar example of an airline route 
network. The airports are the nodes, and the routes between these airports are the edges. 
Scale-free networks are networks where a few nodes, called hubs, have interactions with 
many partners, while the rest of the nodes, called non-hubs, have interactions with only a 
few others.48 An airline route network is a scale-free network: A few airports like Newark, 
Chicago, and Denver, which not surprisingly are called airline hubs, are highly connected 
to numerous smaller airports like Providence, Wichita, and Bismarck, which are 
                                                
47  J.-F. Rual et al., “Towards a proteome-scale map of the human protein–protein 
interaction network.,” Nature 437 (2005): 1173–1178; U. Stelzl et al., “A human protein-
protein interaction network: a resource for annotating the proteome,” Cell 122 (2005) 
957–968; R.M. Ewing et al., “Large-scale mapping of human protein–protein interactions 
by mass spectrometry,” Mol. Syst. Biol. 3 (2007): 89; H. Ma et al., “The Edinburgh human 
metabolic network reconstruction and its functional analysis,” Mol. Syst. Biol. 3 (2007): 
135; N.C. Duarte et al., “Global reconstruction of the human metabolic network based on 
genomic and bibliomic data,” Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 104 (2007): 1777–1782. 
48 A.L. Barabási and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random networks,” Science 286 
(1999): 509–512. 
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sometimes called spokes. It appears that this hub-spoke architecture is also typical of 
living networks.49  
Living networks, like airline route networks, are also small-world networks, which 
means that there are relatively short paths between any pair of nodes, because of the 
interconnectivity of the hubs.50 In an airline route network, this means that passengers 
only have to transit through a small number of airports to travel from any one airport to 
any other destination. In a protein-protein network, this means that most proteins are 
only a few interactions away from any other protein in the organism.51 Biologists have 
suggested that the scale-free, small-world architecture of living systems facilitates their 
robustness, which we will discuss in more detail below, and their evolvability.52 
Systems biologists have also begun to explain the dynamic behavior of living 
systems. I highlight three global properties of this behavior here. First, biological systems 
are self-organizing. Self-organization is a process in which pattern at the global level of a 
system emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level components of 
the system.53 However, the rules specifying interactions among the system’s components 
are executed using only local information, without reference to the global pattern. In 
                                                
49 For a review of the scientific literature, see R. Albert, “Scale-free networks in cell 
biology,” J Cell Sci 118 (2005): 4947-4957. 
50 D. J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz, “Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks,” Nature 
393 (1998): 440-442. 
51 H. Jeong et al., “Lethality and centrality in protein networks,” Nature 411 (2001): 41-42. 
52 M. Aldana, E. Balleza, S. Kauffman, and O. Resendiz, “Robustness and evolvability in 
genetic regulatory networks,” J Theoretical Biology 245 (2007): 433-448. 
53 Scott Camazine, Jean-Louis Deneubourg, Nigel R. Franks, James Sneyd, Guy Theraula, 
and Eric Bonabeau, Self-Organization in Biological Systems (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), p. 8. 
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other words, in a self-organizing system, pattern emerges among the parts without 
reference to the whole.  
Turning to our example of the orchestra, a self-organizing orchestra would 
perform without either a conductor or a musical score. Instead, in the self-organizing 
orchestra, an individual musician would seek to play his instrument in harmony only 
with the musicians close to him. Some of these musicians would be hubs, and they would 
play with several other players, while others would be non-hubs, and they would 
harmonize their instruments with only one other musician in the group. In this way, 
music would emerge in an unorchestrated and unpredictable manner. Self-organization 
has been empirically observed in the formation, maintenance, and function of cellular 
components including the cell’s nucleus and its Golgi apparatus.54 The mammalian 
embryo too is a self-organizing system whose origin can be traced back to fertilization.55  
Next, biological systems are emergent. They manifest emergent properties, which 
are global properties of the whole that arise from the interaction of its parts in an 
unexpected or unpredictable manner given the fundamental principles that govern the 
behavior of those parts.56 In our orchestra example, the music that is generated by the 
                                                
54 For review, see Tom Misteli, “The concept of self-organization in cellular architecture,” 
J Cell Biol 155 (2001): 181-186. 
55 S. Wennekamp et al., “A self-organization framework for symmetry breaking in the 
mammalian embryo,” Nat Rev Mol Cell Biol 14 (2013): 452-459. 
56 There are two kinds of emergence described in the philosophical literature. Strong 
emergence involves emergent properties of higher-level processes that cannot in principle 
be derived from the knowledge of lower-level processes. In contrast, weak emergence 
involves emergent properties of higher-level process that in principle could be derived 
from the knowledge of lower-level processes, though it is not possible to do so at this 
point in time. Given the evidence, I do not think that we know whether life as a 
phenomenon is an instance of either strong or weak emergence. For discussion, see J. 
Chalmers, “Strong and Weak Emergence,” in The Re-emergence of Emergence ed. P. 
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self-organizing orchestra is an emergent property of the system. The music cannot be 
reduced to the music of any one single musician and his instrument. It is a product of the 
whole precisely as whole. Life itself is the most significant emergent property in biology 
though philosophers have proposed that other emergent phenomena exist in living 
systems including self-replication and multicellularity.57  
Third, biological systems are robust. Robustness is a property of a complex 
network that allows it to maintain its functionality despite internal and external 
perturbations.58 It has also been defined as the ability to maintain performance in the face 
of perturbations and uncertainty.59 In biology, robustness is that property that allows an 
organism to survive in the face of genetic and/or environmental stresses that threaten its 
life. In living systems, it is maintained by positive and negative feedback loops, redundant 
and fail-safe mechanisms, and the modularity of the network architecture.60 Recall that 
living systems are self-organizing. Once they are set in motion, the interacting parts 
generate the behavior of the whole that is unorchestrated and unpredictable. However, 
the behavior of the whole is still bounded and directed by the architecture and 
                                                                                                                                            
Clayton and P. Daves (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 244-256; and M. Bedau, “Weak 
Emergence,” Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 375-399. Also, see Jaegwon Kim, 
“Emergence: Core ideas and issues,” Synthese 151 (2006): 347-354. For a discussion of 
emergence from a scientist’s perspective, see Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: 
The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
57 For discussion, see Lynn J. Rothschild, “The Role of Emergence in Biology,” in The Re-
emergence of Emergence ed. P. Clayton and P. Daves (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 
151-165. 
58 For discussion, see Hiroaki Kitano, “Biological Robustness,” Nat Rev Genet 5 (2004): 
826-837. 
59 J. Stelling, U. Sauer, Z. Szallasi, F.J. Doyle III, and J. Doyle, “Robustness of cellular 
functions,” Cell 118 (2004): 675-685. 
60 Hiroaki Kitano, “Towards a theory of biological robustness,” Mol Syst Biol 3 (2007): 
137. 
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composition of the living system. Or to put it another way, because of the interactions 
among the molecular components, the living system generally changes over time in a 
coordinated way, and this coordination restricts the trajectories that the system may take 
in space over time. Robustness is partially responsible for this feature of biological 
systems. 
Take the mammalian embryo. The developmental trajectory of a particular 
human embryo is unpredictable because of the impact of the environment on 
mammalian development – we cannot predict whether a particular individual human 
embryo will become a thin or a fat or a tall or a short adult, traits that often depend on 
whether or not the human being grows up in a rich country or in a poor one – though its 
development is still bounded and directed – we know that a human embryo will grow up 
to become an adult human and not an adult kangaroo! Robustness is that property that 
keeps the developing embryo on its developmental trajectory, moving from one 
developmental state to another – in the technical jargon of systems theory, from one 
attractor in the state space to another – regardless of any potentially disruptive genetic 
mutations or of any potentially debilitating environmental stresses that it could 
encounter. In our example, the self-organizing orchestra can be made robust with 
redundancy and modularity. Including extra violins, extra trombones, and extra cellos 
would buffer the orchestra from potentially disruptive illnesses. The orchestra would be 
able to perform even if one or two or three of the musicians came down with the flu. 
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Finally, I should note that systems biologists are attempting to model dynamic 
living networks with sets of coupled differential or difference equations.61 In my view, 
MacArthur et al. have described the elements of this mathematical modeling process best, 
and I will quote them extensively here:  
The molecular state of a cell can be described by its state vector s(t) = 
[m1(t),m2(t),m3(t),…,mn(t)], in which mn(t) denotes the concentration of 
the ith molecular component at time t. The set of all possible molecular 
configurations is called the ‘state space’. A dynamical system is a 
mathematical description of how a system’s state vector changes over time 
based on the interactions between all the various components in the 
system (in the form of a set of coupled differential or difference equations, 
for example). Owing to the coupling between molecular components, the 
expression levels of the different components in a dynamical system 
generally change over time in a coordinated way, and this coordination 
restricts the trajectories that the system may take in state space over time. 
An attractor of a dynamical system is a minimal subset of state space A, 
such that all trajectories starting in the vicinity of A approach A 
eventually. Intuitively, attractors can be thought of as stable preferred 
states in which all the various interactions in the system are balanced and 
towards which the system is drawn over time…For a given attractor A, the 
subset of state space NA for which all trajectories starting in NA approach A 
                                                
61 Ingo Brigandt, “Systems biology and the integration of mechanistic explanation and 
mathematical explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences 44 (2013): 477-492. 
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for large time is known as the ‘basin of attraction’ of A…The basins of 
attraction of the various attractors in a multi-stable system partition the 
state space into discrete pieces. As stationary attractors can intuitively be 
associated with the minima of an ‘energy-like’ function, in the context of 
cellular differentiation this partitioning is sometimes referred to as the 
attractor landscape.”62  
I expect that this mathematical research project will yield sets of differential equations 
that will eventually describe the total sum of all the possible patterns of an organism’s 
living system, called the organism’s state space. As we will see below, these equations will 
described an organism’s substantial form, in the same way that the equations, (x-a)2 + (y-
b)2 = r2 and   (x - x0 )2 + (y – y0 )2 + ( z - z0 )2 = r2, describe the forms of the circle and the 
sphere respectively. 
 
Rehabilitating the Classical Hylomorphism of St. Thomas with the Systems Perspective 
We now turn to the recovery of matter and of form with the systems perspective. I 
focus here on the notion of substantial form since this is what gives actuality to matter, 
and it is actuality and not potentiality that is empirically verifiable by science. Once we 
have recovered a notion of substantial form in an organism, then its matter would be the 
correlative metaphysical principle that is actualized by that substantial form.  
To begin, we should note that the systems perspective, like the classical 
hylomorphic perspective of Aristotle and of St. Thomas, is a substantial perspective. The 
                                                
62 Ben D. MacArthur, Avi Ma’ayan, and Ihor R. Lemischika, “Systems biology of stem cell 
fate and cellular reprogramming,” Nat Revs Molec Cell Biol. 10 (2009): 672-681. 
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organism is a single, unified network of interacting molecules which is organized in a 
species-specific manner. Here, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. A typical 
70-kg man is made up primarily of oxygen (43-kg), carbon (16-kg), hydrogen (7-kg), 
nitrogen (1.8-kg), and calcium (1-kg). 63  However, what makes this reference man 
radically different from a 68.8-kg pile of these five elements is that in his case, the 
elements are organized and interact in a particular way, a species-specific way. Indeed, a 
snapshot of the human body at any point in time would reveal an intricate net of 
molecular interactions among a multitude of macromolecules distributed in three-
dimensional space. From the systems perspective, the total sum of all the organized 
patterns of the molecules in the human being through developmental time – in the jargon 
of systems theory, the organism’s state space or phase state – would be a manifestation of 
his substantial form.  
To see how the dynamical network of molecular interactions over time can be said 
to manifest the substantial form, note the parallels between four functions associated with 
this dynamic network and the four functions traditionally associated with the soul of an 
organism. First, the substantial form is the cause for an organism’s life. It explains how 
the organism is alive. In the same way, the network of macromolecular interactions 
changing over time is also a cause for a living thing’s emergent properties. It too provides 
an explanation for the life of the organism. Radically disrupting this network 
mechanically or pharmacologically would lead to the death of the organism. 
                                                
63 Body composition data was obtained from the following: International Commission on 
Radiological Protection, Report of the Task Group on Reference Man: A Report, ICRP 
Publication, no. 23 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1975); and International Commission on 
Radiological Protection, “Basic Anatomical and Physiological Data for Use in 
Radiological Protection: Reference Values,” Annals of the ICRP 32 (2002): 1-277.  
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Second, the substantial form makes an organism what it is. It is the ground for the 
being’s nature. From a physiological perspective, for example, the net of macromolecular 
interactions organized in a human-specific manner – the human interactome – makes a 
man what he is and distinguishes him from a kangaroo or a tomato plant or some other 
living thing. Different kinds of organisms have different species-specific interactomes. 
Different individuals within each species would also have unique interactomes specified 
not only by their genomes but also by the environment in which those genomes 
developed and unfolded. In other words, the interactomes undergird both the specific 
and the individual natures instantiated in this particular organism. From the Aristotelian 
perspective, they reveal the substantial form and, in the context of the individual, its 
relationship with matter. 
Third, the soul unifies and integrates an organism maintaining its identity 
through changes. The human body is in a constant state of molecular flux. It is said that 
every two years, nearly all of its atoms are replaced.64 However, the dynamic pattern of the 
molecular interactions of an organism remains the same pattern over time – in the jargon 
of systems theory, the system moves along a defined phase space trajectory – because  of 
its robustness, providing a ground for the substantial unity and identity of an individual 
organism with a lifespan of eighty or more years.   
Finally, the substantial form specifies the teleological end of the substance. Recall 
that organisms like all self-organizing networks, though they are unpredictable, are 
directed and robust. A developing mammalian embryo because of its interactome moves 
                                                
64 For the calculations that support this claim, see my paper, “The Pre-Implantation 
Embryo Revisited” A Two-Celled Individual or Two Individual Cells?” Linacre Quarterly 
70 (2003): 121-126. 
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along a trajectory that is specified by the initial macromolecular conditions at 
fertilization. These conditions are determined by the maternal genome, the embryonic 
genome, and the network architecture of the egg and sperm at fusion. Systems biology 
allows us to recover an organism’s final causality within the framework of contemporary 
science.  
To summarize, the systems perspective described here represents one attempt to 
reformulate the received philosophical framework of classical hylomorphism so that it 
incorporates the insights of modern biology. Here, the human animal is a substantial 
being, a dynamic network of macromolecules now existing not as independent molecules 
per se but as different virtual parts of the one human organism. This species-specific 
network, which is distributed in three-dimensional space, and which is able to interact 
over time in the robust, self-organizing process that we call human development, is a 
manifestation of the human being’s substantial form, what is commonly called his soul. 
The correlative metaphysical principle that is actualized by that substantial form would be 
its matter. 
 
Rehabilitating the Natural Ends of the Human Organism a Systems Biology 
In addition to conceptualizing the teleological ordering of living organisms, St. 
Thomas also worked to identify the natural ends of the human being. He did this by 
identifying those inclinations, called connatural inclinations by the Angelic Doctor, that 
belong to human beings by nature.65 In common with other substances, St. Thomas noted 
that we have an inclination to the good in accordance with our nature in as much as every 
                                                
65 STh I-II.94.2. 
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substance seeks preservation of its own being. Next, in common with other animals, we 
have an inclination towards procreation and the preservation of the species. Finally, in 
accordance with our rational nature, we have an inclination towards truth, especially the 
truth about God, in the context of a human society. Significantly, this list of natural 
inclinations was not meant to be exhaustive.66 Nonetheless, it is a basic taxonomy of the 
natural ends to which all human beings are inclined. 
How can we talk about the natural ends of the human organism today? The 
systems hylomorphism described above emphasizes the holism and directedness of 
animal development. However, it also provides us with a contemporary framework to 
recover the teleological orientation, and therefore the natural ends, of the human 
organism. Basically, the species-normative network of molecular interactions that 
distinguishes a man from either a lion or a dolphin, his state space, is the ontological 
foundation for human nature. It reveals his substantial form. However, this also suggests 
that the species-normative inclinations, because they are coextensive with the systems 
network that that came to be at fertilization, should predate the appearance of elicited 
desire or rational choice. Thus, we expect that we should be able to identify these 
connatural human inclinations by observing newborns and toddlers before they attain the 
age of reason.  
 What are these natural inclinations that pre-exist elicited desire or rational 
choice? Developmental cognitive psychologists have identified numerous inclinations in 
                                                
66 For discussion, see Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., “Natural Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 
90-97)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002), pp. 169-193. 
  294 
babies and infants that appear to be universal, and as such, species-normative.67 I will 
discuss four categories of these connatural inclinations here. This is not meant to be an 
exhaustive list of these inclinations.68 
First, and most basically, there is the connatural inclination towards the self-
preservation of the human organism. At birth, this inclination is manifested in numerous 
reflexes. For instance, the Moro reflex is a neonatal startle response that moves newborns 
to grab for support if they are startled by a sudden intense sound or movement.69 It 
disappears by six months of age. Two reflexes that manifest the newborn’s inclination 
towards food, and therefore to life, are the sucking reflex and the rooting reflex. The 
sucking reflex moves newborns to automatically suck any object placed in their mouths, 
while the rooting reflex moves infants to turn their heads towards the side of their mouth 
that is touched or stroked. Again, both these reflexes disappear by the time the child is 
four months olds. They are replaced by other behaviors that manifest themselves when 
                                                
67 For the discussion that follows, I am indebted to Alison Gopnik for her comprehensive 
and up-to-date overview of the developmental psychology of the very young infants: The 
Philosophical Baby (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).  
68 Most significantly, I do not discuss the connatural inclination towards sexual intimacy 
and procreation that appears later in human development, most significantly at puberty, 
nor the natural disinclinations that dispose the human being towards acts that are not 
perfective of his nature. For an analysis of these disinclinations, which I have linked to 
fallen human nature, see my essay, “A Theological Fittingness Argument for the 
Historicity of the Fall of Homo sapiens” Nova et Vetera 13 (2015): 651-667. 
69 For a summary of the reflexes in normal newborns, see T. Weggemann et al., “A Study 
of Normal Baby Movements,” Child Care Health Dev. 13 (1987): 41-58; and Y. Futagi, Y. 
Toribe, and Y. Suzuki, “The grasp reflex and more reflex in infants: hierarchy of primitive 
reflex responses,” Int J Pediatr 2012 (2012): 191562. 
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the child is hungry. There is also evidence that we are hard-wired to quickly fear spiders 
and snakes from a very early age.70 
Second, there are those connatural inclinations specifically ordered towards life in 
society. Three specific inclinations belong to this category. First, there is the inclination to 
what developmental psychologists call attachment. 71  Attachment, the craving for 
protection and care from another, is innate and universal. By the time babies are about 
one year old, they have discovered that a few people care for them in a special way, and 
that these individuals are the ones they should turn to for love. Infants soon develop what 
some developmental psychologists call an internal working model of attachment that 
guides their expectations about relationships throughout life. They are causal maps for 
care.72 Secure babies conclude that caregivers will quickly make them feel better. Avoidant 
babies think that expressing distress will only cause more misery for themselves, and so 
are stoic in their response to separation. Anxious babies are unsure that comfort will be 
effective in alleviating their discomfort. These three types of babies have acquired 
different internal working models of attachment. Notably, there is evidence that these 
                                                
70 V. LoBue et al., “Threat Perception Across the Life Span: Evidence for Multiple 
Converging Pathways,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 19 (2010): 375-379. 
71 For a comprehensive discussion of attachment, see the essays in Colin Murray Parkes, 
Joan Stevension-Hinde, and Peter Marris, eds. Attachment Across the Life Cycle (New 
York: Routledge, 1991). For one attempt to link attachment theory and neuroscience, see 
R. Hruby, J. Hasto, and P. Minarik, “Attachment in integrative neuroscientific 
perspective,” Neuro Endocrinol Lett 32 (2011): 111-120. 
72 For details and discussion, see M. Main, N. Kaplan, and J. Cassidy, “Security in Infancy, 
Childhood, and Adulthood: A Move to the Level of Representation,” Monogr Soc Res 
Child Dev. 50 (1985): 66-104; and Mary Main, “The Organized Categories of Infant, 
Child, and Adult Attachment: Flexible vs. Inflexible Attention Under Attachment-Related 
Stress,” J Am Psychoanal Assoc 48 (2000): 1175-1187.  
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internal working models impact the later psychological development or lack of 
development of adult humans.73 
Next, there is the connatural inclination towards language, and thus towards 
communication. As any parent knows, children are programmed to learn language. 
Noam Chomsky has proposed that the human brain is structured in such a way that it is 
able to learn universal linguistic principles called the universal grammar.74 This proclivity 
towards language begins in the womb as fetuses develop a preference for listening to their 
mother’s voice and the language they hear her speak. Strikingly, a recent paper has even 
shown that newborn babies cry in language specific ways.75 By five years of age, children 
have mastered the basic structure of their native language, whether spoken or manually 
signed. They have learned to communicate with themselves and with other human 
beings.   
Finally, there is the connatural inclination towards psychological knowledge, 
theories of minds that allow a human being to live in a community. Developmental 
psychologists have shown that very young children engage in pretend play with 
imaginary companions, precisely to learn how people work in counterfactual scenarios.76 
                                                
73 Thus, attachment theory may help psychologists understand human psychosis. For one 
scientific study, see A.I. Gumley, H.E. Taylor, M. Schwannauer, and A. Macbeth, “A 
systematic review of attachment and psychosis: measurement, construct validity, and 
outcomes,” Acta Psychiatr Scand. 129 (2014): 257-274. 
74 For an introduction to universal grammar, see Vivian Cook and Mark Newson, 
Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1996). For an informative overview of basic linguistic theory, see R.L. Trask, Language: 
The Basics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004). 
75 B. Mampe et al., “Newborns’ Cry Melody Is Shaped by Their Native Language,” Curr 
Biol 19 (2009): 1994-1997. 
76  For discussion, see Henry M. Wellman and Kristin H. Lagattuta, “Developing 
Understandings of Mind,” in Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from 
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Children from diverse cultures and backgrounds have imaginary companions that seem 
surprisingly resistant to adult influence. From two to six, children discover fundamental 
facts about how their own minds and the minds of others work. 77  They start to 
understand the causal connections between desires and beliefs, and emotions and actions. 
One of the central tenets of this theory of mind developed in very young children is that 
people may have different beliefs, perceptions, emotions, and desires, and that these 
differences may lead to different actions:  People behave differently because they have 
different kinds of minds. In the end, human beings are inclined towards constructing a 
map that connects mental states to one another and to the world outside them.   
Third, there are those inclinations directed towards true and sure knowledge. 
There are two distinct kinds of inclinations of significance in this category. First, there is 
the inclination towards what I will call, metaphysical or speculative knowledge. 
Experiments suggest that from infancy, children are programmed to construct causal 
graphical models that allow them to make correct predictions regarding the cause and 
effect relationships that govern the world.78 Even three-month-old babies are able to do 
experiments with mobiles attached to one of their legs. 79  They will explore the 
contingencies between various limb movements and the movements of the toy. They will 
                                                                                                                                            
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 2nd ed., ed. Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-
Flusberg, and Donald J. Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 21-49. 
77 For a review of the field, see Henry M. Wellman, “Understanding the Psychological 
World: Developing a Theory of Mind” in Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive 
Development, ed. Usha Goswami (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 167-187. 
78 For details and discussion, see the essays in Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz, eds., 
Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
79 For a review of these experiments with mobiles, see Carolyn Rovee-Collier, and Rachel 
Barr, “Infant Learning and Memory,” in Blackwell Handbook of Infant Development, ed. 
Gavin Bremner and Alan Fogel (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), pp. 139-168. 
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try kicking with one leg and then another and then try waving an arm, watching the toy’s 
responses to all of their actions. And if you take them out of the crib and then put them 
back in again, they will immediately move the correct limb to make the toy move. Finally, 
in a groundbreaking paper published in 1996, Jenny Saffran showed that babies as young 
as eight months old are sensitive to statistical patterns. 80 At least by the time they are two 
and a half, and probably earlier, children become capable of using probabilities to make 
genuine inferences.81 It appears that children, in the same way that they are programmed 
to learn language, are also programmed to learn about the metaphysical structure of the 
world.   
Next, there is the inclination towards moral or practical knowledge, which some 
have called a universal moral grammar because it seeks to describe the nature and origin 
of moral knowledge by appealing to concepts and models used in the study of linguistic 
knowledge.82 Developmental psychologists have recently discovered that the intuitive 
jurisprudence of young children is complex. For example, three to four year old children 
distinguish two acts that bring about the same end by examining the intent of the acting 
person. 83 They are also able to distinguish genuine violations of the moral code, like theft, 
                                                
80 Jenny R. Safran, Richard N. Aslin, and Elissa L. Newport, “Statistical Learning by 8-
month-old Infants,” Science 274 (1996): 1926-1928. 
81 For a recent research paper, see Alexa R. Romberg and Jenny R. Saffran, “Expectancy 
learning from probabilistic input by infants,” Front. Psychol. 3 (2013): 610.  
82 For a review, see John Mikhail, “Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the 
Future,” Trends Cogn Sci. 11 (2007): 143-152. For a critical response, see E. Dupoux and 
P. Jacob, “Universal moral grammar: a critical appraisal,” Trends Cogn Sci. 11 (2007): 373-
378. 
83 For discussion, see the following papers: T. Behne et al., “Unwilling Versus Unable: 
Infants’ Understanding of Intentional Action,” Dev Psychol 41 (2005): 328-337; M. 
Tomasello et al., “Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural 
Cognition,” Behav Brain Sci 28 (2005): 675-691; and K.M. Olineck and D. Poulin-Dubois, 
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from violations of social conventions, like wearing pajamas to school. 84 In toto, these 
discoveries suggest that human beings are born with inclinations towards sure 
knowledge, both metaphysical and moral, which facilitates their self-preservation, their 
wellbeing, and their life with others.   
Finally, and frankly, most surprising to me when I first read about it, there is data 
that suggests that infants are inclined towards knowledge of God. In other words, though 
it remains controversial, there is evidence that suggests that children are intuitive theists.85 
Experiments suggest that they are predisposed towards believing that the world is an 
artifact of non-human design. In support of this proposal, there is data that shows that 
young children have a tendency to embrace teleological explanations that reason about 
nature in terms of purpose and design. They have a default orientation towards 
creationist accounts of the origins of the world, whether or not they were raised in 
religious families. Strikingly, it appears that theists are begotten and not made.   
To summarize, the systems perspective not only allows us to recover the 
teleological dynamism of the living organism, an end-directed ordering most obvious 
during the development of the plant or the animal, but also permits us to identify those 
pre-elicited species-normative inclinations that are indicative of the natural ends of the 
                                                                                                                                            
“Infants’ understanding of intention from 10 to 14 months: Interrelations among 
violation of expectancy and imitation tasks,” Infant Behav Dev. 32 (2009): 404-415. 
84 For discussion, see Charles C. Helwig and Elliot Turiel, “Children’s Social and Moral 
Reasoning,” in Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Social Development, ed. Peter K. Smith 
and Craig H. Hart (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), pp. 475-490. For a recent review, 
see J. Perner and J. Roessler, “From infants’ to children’s appreciation of belief,” Trends 
Cogn Sci. 16 (2012): 519-525. 
85 Deborah Kelemen, “Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’?” Psychol Sci 15 (2004): 295-301. 
For extensive discussion and more references to the scientific literature, see Justin L. 
Barrett, Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief (New York: Free Press, 
2012). 
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human organism. Shaped by evolution, these connatural ends are adaptations that perfect 
the human animal.  
 
Responding to the Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: 
 As we saw earlier in this chapter, three of the most influential philosopher-
scientists of the seventeenth century raised four major objections to substantial forms. 
First, they argued that substantial forms were obscure and occult, and as such, are not 
really real. Today, systems biologists are working to mathematically describe an 
organism’s state space with a series of differential equations that can be modeled in silico. 
As such, we can respond to this early modern objection by proposing that an organism’s 
substantial form is as real as its state space is real. It is as real as the circle described by the 
equation, x2 + y2 = 5, is real. 
Second, the early modern philosopher-scientists argued that substantial forms are 
not needed for genuine scientific explanation. In their view, substantial forms do not have 
any explanatory power. Today, systems biologists have discovered that we need to 
understand the state space of an organism to properly explain its emergent properties. In 
doing so, they have denied the seventeenth century claim that organisms are like artifacts 
and that artifacts are like organisms. They are not equivalent because artifacts do not 
manifest emergent properties like organisms do. Thus, a mite is not like an engine. A 
kangaroo is not like a clock. As such, we can respond to this early modern objection by 
proposing that there is a legitimate place in scientific explanation for substantial forms 
now understood as an organism’s state space. Substantial forms are needed to explain life 
in a way they are not needed to explain clocks. 
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Third, Locke specifically argued that chimeric animals that appear to straddle 
species barriers, his “monsters” and “changelings,” undermine the doctrine of substantial 
form. Today, developmental biologists agree that each species has a distinctive 
developmental trajectory that moves an embryo from fertilization to maturity. In the 
jargon of systems theory, each species has a robust species-typical state space that 
explains the behavior of the species-typical living network. Monsters represent unstable 
systems that fall on the margins of the stable regions of an organism’s species-typical state 
space, in the jargon of systems theory, regions at the periphery of the living system’s basin 
of attraction. This is why these monsters and changelings often die at birth or soon after. 
Understood as systems, they are unstable. They are not robust. Their existence, however, 
does not threaten either the field of systems biology or the notion of a state space. As 
such, we can respond to this early modern objection by proposing that chimeric and 
deformed organisms can be easily accommodated within a substantial perspective that 
includes a robust notion of substantial forms, understood here as that organism’s state 
space.86  
Finally, Roger Bacon appeals to reversible chemical reactions to challenge the 
doctrine of substantial forms. Though a comprehensive discussion of how matter-form 
language can be rehabilitated in contemporary chemistry is beyond the scope of this 
                                                
86 Note that in an Aristotelian philosophy of nature, the perfection of a substance depends 
on the interaction between form and matter. Within this framework, a congenitally 
deformed “monster” can be accommodated not by appealing to form but by pointing to 
matter that is not properly disposed to receive its form. In the same way, death of the 
organism can be explained by pointing to matter’s loss of its predisposition to form. From 
the perspective of systems theory, death results when the system fails to maintain its 
robustness. The predisposition of Aristotelian matter is revealed in the robustness of a 
living system. 
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chapter, there is evidence that molecules have properties that cannot be attributed to the 
properties of the individual atoms – for instance, the hybrid sp3 orbitals that are found in 
organic molecules – and as such would have to be attributed to the whole. This would 
point to substantial forms in these compounds. Scientific observations like this would 
begin respond to early modern chymical objections to classical hylomorphism. 
 
Conclusion 
  The alleged refutation of classical hylomorphism during the early modern period 
has undermined the legitimacy of matter-form language, even used analogically, in 
theology. However, with the hylomorphic theory described in this chapter, we now have a 
conceptual framework that begins to validate the hylomorphic analysis in moral theology 
that was the subject of four chapters of this thesis. When theologians are asked to identify 
the prime analogate for the matter-form language used in moral discourse, they can now 
point to the actuality that is the state space of a living system and the potency that the 
living network has actualized. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The last few decades have witnessed a revival of interest in an Aristotelian and 
Thomistic virtue ethics.1 A striking characteristic of this revival, however, is its lack of 
engagement with any robust biological account of human nature.2 Why is this so? 
Though there are probably more than a few reasons for this lacuna, one of the most 
significant is the claim that developments in modern science have made a teleological 
account of human nature intellectually untenable. For instance, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
universally acknowledged as one of the most significant advocates of an Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition today, initially rejected what he called Aristotle’s metaphysical 
biology for this reason.3 Instead, he adopted a teleological account of the human agent 
that was grounded in sociology rather than in biology. Later in his career, however, 
MacIntyre admitted his mistake by acknowledging a need to recover both a metaphysics 
of and a biology of human nature: 
In After Virtue I had tried to present the case for a broadly Aristotelian 
account of the virtues without making use of or appeal to what I called 
Aristotle’s metaphysical biology…But I had not learned from Aquinas that 
                                                
1 For an introductory overview of contemporary virtue ethics, see Rosalind Hursthouse, 
“Virtue Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.). Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
Last accessed on January 1, 2015. 
2 For a recent exception, see Rosalind Hursthouse, “Human Nature and Aristotelian 
Virtue Ethics,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70 (2012): 169-188. Also see the 
insightful and influential work on ethical naturalism by Philippa Foot: Natural Goodness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2005), pp. 50-61. For discussion, see Marian Kuna, “MacIntyre’s Search for a Defensible 
Aristotelian Ethics and the Role of Metaphysics,” Analyse & Kritik 30 (2008): 103-119.  
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my attempt to provide an account of the human good purely in social 
terms, in terms of practices, traditions, and the narrative unity of human 
lives, was bound to be inadequate until I had provided it with a 
metaphysical grounding…What I also came to recognize was that my 
conception of human beings as virtuous or vicious needed not only a 
metaphysical, but also a biological grounding, although not an especially 
Aristotelian one.4 
Accordingly, in his last major work, Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre attempted 
to reground his account of a virtue ethics on the animality that we share with dolphins 
and other animals. However, in my view, it is not clear how this account of what 
MacIntyre calls the virtues of acknowledged dependence is properly a metaphysical 
biology that locates and establishes species-specific behaviors in species-specific biological 
inclinations.  
 In this thesis, I have reconstructed an account of St. Thomas’s analogical use of 
hylomorphic terminology in his moral theology because I am convinced that to be aware 
of this feature of his work is to be equipped to interrogate, to penetrate, and to advance 
his theological synthesis in conversation with other rival intellectual traditions. The four 
case studies discussed in the chapters that make up the heart of this thesis engaged with 
philosophical and theological realities – the human act, the passions, the acquired and the 
infused virtues, and the spoken falsehood – which are bound up with the moral life.  
 However, my rehabilitation and defense of St. Thomas’s hylomorphism in light of 
a 21st century systems biology would also allow virtue ethics to recover a bona fide 
                                                
4 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed., pp. x-xi. 
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metaphysical biology to explain the virtue and the vice of the human agent. Recently, 
critics of virtue ethics have unexpectedly emerged from the empirical field of social 
psychology. For example, in his book, Lack of Character, John Doris argues that recent 
findings of social psychology have revealed that there is no basis for the claim that human 
character is stable and reliable.5 According to this situationist critique, what governs 
moral behavior is the situation in which the human agent finds himself rather than his 
character.  
 In response, a systems account of human nature would allow virtue ethicists to 
respond to the situationist challenge by situating character within biology. An agent’s 
character would be an emergent property mediated by his intellect and by his will that 
flows from the connatural inclinations shaped by his state space. Or to put it in classical 
Thomistic terminology, the virtues would emerge from the soul. However, how these 
virtues are actualized in their proper acts would depend on both cognitive and sense 
knowledge that can be influenced by the agent’s surroundings, hence the influence of the 
particularities of a given situation. But expanding upon this proposal will have to be the 
subject of another work. 
                                                
5 John Doris, Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For 
selected defenses of virtue ethics against the situationist challenge posed by Doris, see 
Robert C. Solomon, “Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business,” 
Bus Ethics Q 13 (2003): 43-62; and Julia Annas, “Comments on John Doris’ Lack of 
Character,” Philos Phenomenol Res 73 (2005): 636-647. Also see, Anna Marmodoro, 
“Moral Chracter versus Situations: an Aristotelian contribution to the debate,” J Ancient 
Philosophy 5 (2011): 1-24. For a more recent recounting of the situationist critique, see 
Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
  306 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
Aquinas, Thomas St. Opera Omnia. ed. Robert Busa. S.J. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann 
 Verlag Gunther Holzboog KG, 1980). Available online: 
 http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html. Last accessed on August 23, 
 2015. 
 
Aristotle, Parts of Animals I-IV, Trans. James G. Lennox (Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 2001). 
 
________. De Interpretatione, Trans. Ella Mary Edghill in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
 ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 40-61. 
 
Augustine, Contra mendacium liber unus. S. Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia: Patrologiae 
 Latinae Elenchus. Available online:  http://www.augustinus.it/latino/contro_ 
 menzogna /index.htm. Last accessed on August 23, 2015. 
 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (Vatican City:  Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
 2000). 
 
Boyle, Robert. “On the Origin of Forms and Qualities,” in Selected Philosophical Papers 
 of Robert Boyle, ed. M.A. Stewart (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
 1979), pp. 1-96. 
 
________. “Essay the Of the Atomicall Philosophy,” in The Works of Robert Boyle: 
 Volume 13, Unpublished Writings 1645-c.1670., ed. Michael Hunter and Edward 
 B. Davis (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2000), pp. 227-235. 
 
de Berrio-Ochoa, Valentine. “From a Letter of Saint Valentine de Berrio-Ochoa, Vicar 
 Apostolic of Central Tonkin. Alternative Second Reading for the Memorial of Sts. 
 Francis de Capillas and Alfonsus Navarrette, Friars and Priests, and Companions, 
 January 15,” in Supplement to the Liturgy of the Hours for the Order of Preachers, 
 2nd ed. (Manila: Commission on Liturgy and Prayer, Dominican Province of the 
 Philippines, 2012), pp. 89-92. 
 
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II. Trans. John 
 Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1984).  
 
________. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I. Trans. John   Cottingham, 
 Robert Stoothoff, and Ougald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1985). 
  307 
 
________. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III The Correspondence, 
 Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony 
 Kenny  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 
John Paul II, Veritatis splendor (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic 
 Bishops, 1993). 
 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1979). 
 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
Albert, R. “Scale-free networks in cell biology,” J Cell Sci 118 (2005): 4947-4957. 
 
Aldana, M., E. Balleza, S. Kauffman, and O. Resendiz, “Robustness and evolvability in 
 genetic regulatory networks,” J Theoretical Biology 245 (2007): 433-448. 
 
Alfano, Mark. Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
 2013). 
 
Annas, Julia. “Comments on John Doris’ Lack of Character,” Philos Phenomenol Res 73 
 (2005): 636-647. 
 
Anstey, Peter R. “Essences and Kinds,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early 
 Modern Europe, ed. Desmond M. Clarke and Catherine Wilson (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2011), pp. 11-31. 
 
Arcadi, A.C. “Language evolution: what do chimpanzees have to say?” Curr Biol 15 
 (2005): R884-R886. 
 
Ariew, R. and M. Grene, “The Cartesian Destiny of Form and Matter,” in Descartes and 
 the Last Scholastics, ed. R. Ariew (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
 pp. 77-96. 
 
Austin, J.L. How to Do Things With Words, ed. J.O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1962). 
 
Austriaco, Nicanor, O.P. “On Static Eggs and Dynamic Embryos: A Systems 
 Perspective” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2 (2002): 659-683. 
 
________. “The Pre-Implantation Embryo Revisited” A Two-Celled Individual or Two 
 Individual Cells?” Linacre Quarterly 70 (2003): 121-126. 
 
  308 
________. “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective,” National Catholic 
 Bioethics Quarterly 4 (2004): 719-738. 
 
________.“On Reshaping Skulls and Unintelligible Intentions,” Nova et Vetera 2 (2004): 
 81-100. 
 
________. “Abortion in a Case of Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: A Test Case for 
 Two Rival Theories of Human Action,” National Catholic Bioethics 
 Quarterly 11 (2011): 503-518. 
 
________. “The Soul and Its Inclinations: Recovering a Metaphysical Biology with the 
 Systems Perspective,” in The Human Animal: Procreation, Education, and the 
 Foundations of Society, Proceedings of the X Plenary Session, 18-20 June 2010, 
 The Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Vatican City: The Pontifical 
 Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2011), pp. 48-63. 
 
________. “The Injustice of a D&C or D&E Procedure to Resolve a Crisis Pregnancy,” 
 National Catholic Bioethics Quartery 15 (2015): 13-14. 
 
________. “Resolving Crisis Pregnancies: Acting on the Mother versus Acting on the 
 Fetal Child,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15 (2015): 207-208. 
 
________. “A Theological Fittingness Argument for the Historicity of the Fall of Homo 
 sapiens” Nova et Vetera 13 (2015): 651-667. 
 
Bach, K. and R.M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge: 
 MIT Press, 1979). 
 
Barabási, A.L. and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random networks,” Science 286 
 (1999): 509–512. 
 
Barrett, Justin L. Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief (New York: 
 Free Press, 2012). 
 
Bechara, A. et al., “Double dissociation of conditioning and declarative knowledge 
 relative to the amygdala and hippocampus in humans,” Science 269 (1995): 1115-
 1118. 
 
Bechtel, William, and Adele Abrahamsen, “Explanation: a mechanist alternative,” Stud. 
 Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 36 (2005): 421-441. 
 
Bedau, M. “Weak Emergence,” Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 375-399. 
 
Behne, T. et al., “Unwilling Versus Unable: Infants’ Understanding of Intentional 
 Action,” Dev Psychol 41 (2005): 328-337. 
  309 
Bertini, C., R. Cecere, and E. Làdavas, “I am blind, but I ‘see’ fear,” Cortex 49 (2013): 985-
 993. 
 
Black, Debroah L. “Imagination, Particular Reason, and Memory: The Role of the 
 Internal Senses in Human Cognition,” Presented at the Katholieke Universiteit 
 Leuven, February 19, 2010. Available at 
 http://individual.utoronto.ca/dlblack/articles/ ImagPartRweb.pdf. Last accessed 
 on December 28, 2014. 
 
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements (Notre Dame, IN: 
 University of Notre Dame Press, 1998). 
 
Boom, Corrie Ten. The Hiding Place (New York: Bantam Books, 1974). 
 
Bornemann, B., P. Winkielman, and E. van der Meer, “Can you feel what you do not see? 
 Using internal feedback to detect briefly presented emotional stimuli.” Int J 
 Psycholphysiol 85 (2012): 116-124. 
 
Boulton, S.J., et al., “Combined functional genomic maps of the C. elegans DNA damage 
 response,” Science 295 (2002): 127–131. 
 
Brigandt, Ingo. “Systems biology and the integration of mechanistic explanation and 
 mathematical explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
 Biomedical Sciences 44 (2013): 477-492. 
 
Brock, Stephen. “Veritatis Splendor 78, St. Thomas, and (Not Merely) Physical Objects 
 of Moral Acts,” Nova et Vetera 6 (2008): 1-62. 
 
Brower, Jeffrey. “Matter, Form, and Individuation” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, 
 ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
 pp. 85-103.  
 
Brown, Anthony Cave. Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind  D-Day 
 (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2007). 
 
Burrell, David, C.S.C. Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Have: Yale 
 University Press, 1973). 
 
Callus, Daniel A., O.P. “The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,” The Thomist 
 24 (1961): 257–85. 
 
Camazine, Scott, Jean-Louis Deneubourg, Nigel R. Franks, James Sneyd, Guy Theraula, 
 and Eric Bonabeau, Self-Organization in Biological Systems (Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press, 2001). 
 
  310 
Carson, Thomas L. “The Definition of Lying,” Noûs 40 (2006): 284-306. 
 
________. Lying and Deception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Cates, Diana Fritz. Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, 
 D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009). 
 
Cavanaugh, Thomas A. “Double-Effect Reasoning, Craniotomy, and Vital Conflicts: A 
 Case of Contemporary Catholic Casuistry,” National Catholic Bioethics 
 Quarterly 11 (2011): 453-464. 
 
Chalmers, J. “Strong and Weak Emergence,” in The Re-emergence of Emergence ed. P. 
 Clayton and P. Daves (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 244-256. 
 
Cheney, D.L. and R.M. Seyfarth, “Reconciliatory grunts by dominant female baboons 
 influence victims’ behaviour,” Anim. Behav. 54 (1997): 409-418. 
 
Chisholm, R. and T. Feehan, “The intent to deceive,” Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977): 
 143-159. 
 
Christoph, Markus, S.J.M. “Justice as an Infused Virtue in the Secunda Secundae and Its 
 Implications for Our Understanding of the Moral Life,” S.T.D. Dissertation, 
 University of Fribourg (Switzerland), 2011. 
 
Coerver, Robert. “The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues,” S.T.D. Dissertation, 
 The Catholic University of America, 1946. 
 
Cohen, A. “Speech Acts,” in Sociolinguistics and Language Teachings ed. S.L. McKay 
 and N.H. Hornberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
 383-420. 
 
Cohen, Neal J. and Howard Eichenbaum, Memory, Amnesia, and the Hippocampal 
 System  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). 
 
Cole, Darrell. “Whether Spies Too Can Be Saved?” Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (2008):  
 125-154. 
 
Coleman, Gerald D. “Direct and Indirect Abortion in the Roman Catholic Tradition: A 
 Review of the Phoenix Case,” HEC Forum 25 (2013): 127-143. 
 
Cook, Vivian, and Mark Newson, Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, 2nd 
 ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 
 
Davies, Brian, O.P., Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary 
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
  311 
Davy, A. et al., “A protein–protein interaction map of the Caenorhabditis elegans 26S 
 proteasome,” EMBO Rep. 2 (2001): 821–828. 
 
Debru, Armelle. “Physiology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. R.J. Hankinson 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 263-282. 
 
Des Chene, Dennis. Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca, 
 NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
 
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., “St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 
 279-300. 
 
Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld 
 Publications, 2005). 
 
Frankfurt, Harry G. On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
 
Fritz Cates, Diana. Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, 
 D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009). 
 
Darden, Lindley. “Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms: Schema Instantiation, 
 Modular Subassembly, Forward/Backward Chaining,” Philosophy of Science 69 
 (2002): S354-S365. 
 
Davies, Brian. O.P., Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary 
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
De Boer, Sander W. The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s 
 De Anima, c. 1260-c.1360 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013). 
 
Debru, Armelle. “Physiology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. R.J. 
 Hankinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 263-282. 
 
Decaen, Christopher. “Elemental Virtual Presence in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 64 
 (2000): 271-300. 
 
Delarue, Jacques. The Gestapo: A History of Horror (Chicago: Frontline Books, 2008). 
 
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P. “St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 279-
 300. 
 
________.“St. Thomas, Rhonheimer, and the Object of the Human Act,”  Nova et Vetera 
 6 (2008): 63-112. 
 
  312 
Dixon, Thomas. From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological 
 Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
Doris, John. Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
Duarte, N.C. et al., “Global reconstruction of the human metabolic network based on 
 genomic and bibliomic data,” Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 104 (2007): 1777–1782. 
 
Dupoux, E., and P. Jacob, “Universal moral grammar: a critical appraisal,” Trends Cogn 
 Sci. 11 (2007): 373-378. 
 
Dutton, Kevin. The Wisdom of Psychopaths: What Saints, Spies and Serial Killers Can 
 Teach Us About Success (New York: Scientific American, 2012). 
 
Eaton, William. Boyle on Fire: The Mechanical Revolution in Scientific Explanation 
 (London: Continuum, 2005). 
 
Ewing, R.M. et al., “Large-scale mapping of human protein–protein interactions by mass 
 spectrometry,” Mol. Syst. Biol. 3 (2007): 89. 
 
Fabro, Cornelo. Participation et causalite selon S. Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain-Paris: 
 Publications Universitaires de Louvain,1961). 
 
Fedurek, Pawel, and Katie E. Slocombe, “Primate Vocal Communication: A Useful Tool 
 for Understanding Human Speech and Language Evolution?” Hum Biol. 83 
 (2011): 153-173. 
 
Finnis, John, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle. “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A Reply to 
 Critics of our Action Theory,” The Thomist 65 (2001): 1-44. 
 
Flannery, Kevin, S.J. “What is Included in a Means to an End?” Gregorianum 74 (1993): 
 499-513. 
 
________. “Vital Conflicts and the Catholic Magisterial Tradition,” National 
 Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (2011): 691-704. 
 
Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 
Futagi, Y., Y. Toribe, and Y. Suzuki, “The grasp reflex and more reflex in infants: 
 hierarchy of primitive reflex responses,” Int J Pediatr 2012 (2012): 191562. 
 
Gallagher, David M. “The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. 6-17)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, 
 ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 
 69-89. 
 
  313 
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. O.P., The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Vol. 1 (St. Louis: 
 B. Herder Books, 1947), pp. 66-82. 
 
Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans. L.K. Shook, 
 C.S.B. (New York: Random House, 1956). 
Godfrey, Drexel. “Ethics and Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 56 (1978): 624-642. 
 
Gopnik, Alison. The Philosophical Baby (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009). 
 
________ and Laura Schulz, eds., Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and 
 Computation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Griffiths, Paul J. Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity (Grand Rapids: Brazos 
 Press, 2004). 
 
Grisez, Germain. The Way of the Lord: Living a Christian Life, Volume 2 (Quincy, IL: 
 Franciscan Press, 1993). 
 
Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B. “When a Lie is Not a Lie: The Importance of Ethical 
 Context,” The Thomist 66 (2002): 267-274. 
 
________.“Vital Conflicts and Virtue Ethics,” National Catholic  Bioethics Quarterly 
 10 (2010): 471-480. 
 
Gumley, A.I., H.E. Taylor, M. Schwannauer, and A. Macbeth, “A systematic review of 
 attachment and psychosis: measurement, construct validity, and outcomes,” Acta 
 Psychiatr Scand 129 (2014): 257-274. 
 
Gunsalus, K.C. and K. Rhrissorrakrai, “Networks in Caenorhabditis elegans,” Curr Opin 
 Genet Dev 21 (2011): 787-798. 
 
Haldane John and Patrick Lee. “Rational Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to 
 Robert Pasnau),” Philosophy 4 (2003): 532-540. 
 
Hamm, A.O. et al., “Affective blindsight: Intact fear conditioning to a visual cue in a 
 cortically blind patient,” Brain 126 (2003): 267-275. 
 
Harvey, John F. “The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues,” in Proceedings of the Tenth 
 Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America, June 27-29, 
 1955 (New York: Catholic Theological Society of America, 1955), pp. 172-221. 
 
Hattab, Helen. Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2009). 
 
  314 
________. “The Mechanical Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in 
 Early Modern Europe, ed. Desmond M. Clarke and Catherine Wilson (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 71-95. 
 
________. “Suarez’s Last Stand for Substantial Form,” in The Philosophy of 
 Francisco Suarez, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2012), pp. 100-118. 
 
Hause, Jeffrey. “Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue,” American Catholic 
 Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007): 1-20. 
 
Helwig, Charles C., and Elliot Turiel, “Children’s Social and Moral Reasoning,” in 
 Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Social Development, ed. Peter K. Smith and 
 Craig H. Hart (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), pp. 475-490. 
 
Hendricks, Lambert. Choosing from Love: The Concept of “Electio” in the Structure of 
 the Human Act According to Thomas Aquinas (Siena: Edizioni Cantagalli, 2010). 
 
Hesketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (Woodstock, NY: The 
 Overlook Press, 2000). 
 
Hoffman, Tobias. “Conscience and Synderesis,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. 
 Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 
 255-264. 
 
Hruby, R., J. Hasto, and P. Minarik, “Attachment in integrative neuroscientific 
 perspective,” Neuro Endocrinol Lett 32 (2011): 111-120. 
 
Hughes, Christopher. “Matter and Individuation in Aquinas,” History of Philosophy 
 Quarterly 13 (1996): 1-16. 
 
Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Human Nature and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics,” Royal Institute of 
 Philosophy Supplement 70 (2012): 169-188. 
 
________.“Virtue Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall  2013 Edition), 
 Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available at 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/. Last accessed on 
 January 1, 2015. 
 
International Commission on Radiological Protection, Report of the Task Group on 
 Reference Man: A Report, ICRP Publication, no. 23 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
 1975). 
 
________. “Basic Anatomical and Physiological Data for Use in Radiological Protection: 
 Reference Values,” Annals of the ICRP 32 (2002): 1-277.  
  315 
 
Jaworski, William. Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: 
 Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
 
Jensen, Steven. “A Long Discussion regarding Steven A Long's Interpretation of the 
 Moral Species,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 623-643. 
 
________. “Do Circumstances Give Species,” The Thomist 70 (2006): 1-26. 
 
________. Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, 
 D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010). 
 
Jeong, H. et al., “Lethality and centrality in protein networks,” Nature 411 (2001): 41-42. 
 
Johnston, Mark. “Hylomorphism” Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006): 652-698. 
 
Kaczor, Christopher. “Can it be Morally Permissible to Assert a Falsehood in Service of a 
 Good Cause,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2012): 97-109. 
 
Kadanoff, Leo P. “Theories of Matter: Infinities and Renormalization,” in The Oxford 
 Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, ed. Robert Batterman (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2013), pp. 141-188. 
 
Kauffman, Stuart. At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-
 Organization and Complexity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
 
Keiser, Kevin F. “The Moral Act in St. Thomas: A Fresh Look,” The Thomist 74 (2010): 
 237-282. 
 
Kelemen, Deborah. “Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’?” Psychol Sci 15 (2004): 295-301. 
 
Kelsey, Sean. “Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics,” Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 
 107-124. 
 
Kent, Bonnie. “Rethinking Moral Dispositions: Scotus on the Virtues,” in The Cambridge 
 Companion to Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
 2003), pp. 352-376. 
 
Klubertanz, George, S.J. “Une theorie sur les vertus morales ‘naturelles’ et 
 ‘surnaturelles’,” Revue Thomiste 59 (1959): 565-575. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. “Emergence: Core ideas and issues,” Synthese 151 (2006): 347-354. 
 
  316 
King, Peter. “Aquinas on the Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian 
 Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 209-
 226. 
 
Kitano, Hiroaki. “Biological Robustness,” Nat Rev Genet 5 (2004): 826-837. 
 
________. “Towards a theory of biological robustness,” Mol Syst Biol 3 (2007): 137. 
 
Knight, David M., S.J. “Suarez’s Approach to Substantial Form,” Modern Schoolman 39 
 (1962): 219–39. 
 
Koslicki, Kathrin. The Structure of Material Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 2010). 
 
Kosman, L.A. “Animals and other beings in Aristotle,” in Philosophical Issues in 
 Aristotle’s Biology, ed. A. Gotthelf and J.G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1987), pp. 360-391. 
 
Kossel, Clifford G., S.J., “Natural Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 90-97)” in The  Ethics 
 of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown  University 
 Press, 2002), pp. 169-193. 
 
Kuna, Marian. “MacIntyre’s Search for a Defensible Aristotelian Ethics and the Role of 
 Metaphysics,” Analyse & Kritik 30 (2008): 103-119. 
 
LaBar, K.S., et al., “Impaired fear conditioning following unilateral temporal lobectomy in 
 humans,” J Neurosci 15 (1995): 6846-6855. 
 
Langan, John P., S.J., “Moral Damage and the Justification of Intelligence Collection 
 from Human Sources,” Studies in Intelligence 25 (1981): 57-64. 
 
Lazarus, R.S. and R.A. McCleary, “Autonomic discrimination without awareness: A study 
 of subception,” Psychol Rev 58 (1951): 113-122. 
 
LeDoux, Joseph E. “The Emotional Brian, Fear, and the Amygdala,” Cell Mol Neurobiol 
 23 (2003): 727-738, 
 
________. “Coming to terms with fear,” Proc. Natl Acad. Sci USA 111 (2014): 2871- 
 2878. 
 
Lehner, B. et al., “Systematic mapping of genetic interactions in Caenorhabditis elegans 
 identifies common modifiers of diverse signaling pathways,” Nat Genet 38  (2006): 
 896-903. 
 
  317 
Li, S. et al., “A map of the interactome network of the metazoan C. elegans,” Science 303 
 (2004): 540–543. 
 
Lipton, Peter. Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
 
LoBue, Vanessa. “And along came a spider: An attentional bias for the detection of 
 spiders in young children and adults,” J Exp Child Psychol 107 (2010): 59-66. 
 
LoBue, V. et al., “Threat Perception Across the Life Span: Evidence for Multiple 
 Converging Pathways,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 19 (2010): 
 375-379. 
 
Lombardo, Nicholas E., O.P. The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on the Passions  (Washington, 
 D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011). 
 
Long, Steven A. The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act (Naples, FL: Sapientia 
 Press, 2007). 
 
________. Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of  Faith 
 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2011). 
 
________. “Engaging Thomist Interlocutors,” Nova et Vetera 9 (2011): 267-295. 
 
Loughlin, Stephen. “Thomas Aquinas and the Importance of Fasting to the Christian 
 Life,” Proecclesia 17 (2008): 343-361. 
 
Lüthy, Christoph, and William R. Newman, “‘Matter’ and ‘Form’: By Way of Preface,” 
 Early Science and Medicine 2 (1997): 215-226. 
 
________, Cees Leijenhorst, and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, “The Tradition of 
 Aristotelian Natural Philosophy: Two Theses and Seventeen Answers,” in The 
 Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth 
 Century, ed. Cees Leijenhorst, Christoph Lüthy, and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen 
 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 1-29. 
 
Luyten, Norbert, O.P. “Matter as Potency,” in The Concept of Matter, ed. E. McMullin 
 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 122-133. 
 
Lysaught, M. Therese. “Moral Analysis of a Procedure at Phoenix Hospital,” Origins: 
 CNS Documentary Service 40 (2011): 537-549. 
 
Ma, H. et al., “The Edinburgh human metabolic network reconstruction and its 
 functional analysis,” Mol. Syst. Biol. 3 (2007): 135. 
 
  318 
MacArthur, Ben D., Avi Ma’ayan, and Ihor R. Lemischika, “Systems biology of stem 
 cell fate and cellular reprogramming,” Nat Revs Molec Cell Biol. 10 (2009): 672-
 681. 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
 2005).  
 
Madden, James D. Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind 
 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2013). 
 
Main, M., N. Kaplan, and J. Cassidy, “Security in Infancy, Childhood, and Adulthood: A 
 Move to the Level of Representation,” Monogr Soc Res Child Dev. 50 (1985): 66-
 104. 
 
Main, Mary. “The Organized Categories of Infant, Child, and Adult Attachment: Flexible 
 vs. Inflexible Attention Under Attachment-Related Stress,” J Am Psychoanal 
 Assoc 48 (2000): 1175-1187. 
 
Mampe, B. et al., “Newborns’ Cry Melody Is Shaped by Their Native Language,” Curr 
 Biol 19 (2009): 1994-1997. 
 
Manning, Gideon. “The History of ‘Hylomorhism,’” Journal of the History of Ideas 74 
 (2013): 173-187. 
 
________. “Descartes’ Healthy Machines and the Human Exception,” in The 
 Mechanization of Natural Philosophy ed. Sophie Roux and Dan Garber 
 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 237-262. 
 
Marmodoro, Anna. “Moral Chracter versus Situations: an Aristotelian contribution to the 
 debate,” J Ancient Phil 5 (2011): 1-24. 
 
Mattingly, Basil M., O.S.B. “De Principiis Naturae of St. Thomas Aquinas: Critical 
 Edition” (PhD Diss, University of Notre Dame, 1957). 
 
Mattison, William C. III “Thomas’s Categorizations of Virtue: Historical Background 
 and Contemporary Significance,” The Thomist 74 (2010): 189-235. 
 
________. “Can Christians Possess the Acquired Cardinal Virtues?” Theological Studies 
 72 (2011): 558-585. 
 
McCruden, Patrick. “The Moral Object in the ‘Phoenix Case’: A Defense of Sister 
 McBride’s Decision,” Christian Bioethics 18 (2012): 301-311. 
 
McInerny, Ralph. Aquinas and Analogy, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
 America Press, 1998). 
  319 
McKay-Knobel, Angela. “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral 
 Philosophy,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2004. 
 
________. “Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue,” The Thomist 69 (2005): 535-555. 
 
________. “Synderesis, Law, and Virtue,” in The Normativity of the Natural: Human 
 Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing, ed. Mark J. Cherry (Austin, TX: 
 Springer, 2009), pp. 33-44. 
 
________. “Can Aquinas’s Infused and Acquired Virtues Coexist in the Christian Life,” 
 Studies in Christian Ethics 23 (2010): 381-396. 
 
________. “Aquinas and the Pagan Virtues,” International Philosophical Quarterly 51 
 (2011): 339-354. 
 
McMahon, Francis. “Being and Principles of Being,” The New Scholasticism 17 (1943): 
 322–39. 
 
McMullin, Ernan, ed. The Concept of Matter (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
 Press, 1963). 
 
_________. “Structural Explanation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 139-
 147. 
 
Mendez, Antonio J. The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA (New York: 
 William Morrow and Company, 1999). 
 
Michael, Emily. “Averroes and the Plurality of Forms,” Franciscan Studies 52 (1992): 
 155–83. 
 
Mikhail, John. “Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future,” Trends 
 Cogn Sci. 11 (2007): 143-152. 
 
Mineka, S. and A. Ohman, “Phobias and preparedness: The selective, automatic, and 
 encapsulated nature of fear,” Biol Psychiatry 52 (2002): 927-937. 
 
Miner, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 
 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
Mirkes, Renée. “Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue and its Significance for 
 the Nature-Grace Question,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Marquette University, 1995. 
 
________. “Moral Virtue and Facility,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 189-218. 
 
  320 
________. “Aquinas’s Doctrine of Moral Virtue and its Significance for Theories of 
 Facility,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 189-218. 
 
________. “Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue,” American Catholic 
 Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1998): 589-605. 
 
Misteli, Tom. “The concept of self-organization in cellular architecture,” J Cell Biol 155 
 (2001): 181-186. 
 
Mori, Akio. “Signals found in the grooming interactions of wild Japanese monkeys of the 
 koshima troop,” Primates 16 (1975): 107-140. 
 
Morozova, Nadya and Mikhail Shubin. “The Geometry of Morphogenesis and the 
 Morphogenetic Field Concept,” in Pattern Formation in Morphogenesis, ed. 
 Vincenzo Capasso, Misha Gromov, Annick Harel-Bellan, Nadya Morozova and 
 Linda Louise Pritchard (Berlin: Springer, 2013), pp. 255-282. 
 
Morris, J.S. et al., “Differential extrageniculostriate and amygdala responses to 
 presentation of emotional faces in a cortically blind field,” Brain 124 (2001): 1241-
 1252. 
 
Mowrer, O.H. and R.R. Lamoreaux, “Fear as an intervening variable in avoidance 
 conditioning,” J Comp Psychol 39 (1946): 29-50. 
 
Moya, Fernando. “Epistemology of Living Organisms in Aristotle’s Philosophy,” Theory 
 Biosci 119 (2000): 318-333. 
 
Newman, William R. Promethean Ambitions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
 2004). 
 
________. Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the 
 Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
 
Nurse, Paul. “The great ideas of biology,” Clin. Med 3 (2003): 560-568. 
 
O’Brien, Matthew B. and Robert C. Koons. “Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic 
 Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,” American Catholic Philosophical 
 Quarterly 86 (2012): 655-703. 
 
O’Donnell, R.A. “Individuation: An Example of the Development of the Thought of St. 
 Thomas Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 49-67. 
 
Oderberg, David. Real Essentialism (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
 
  321 
Ohman, A. and J.J.F. Soares, “Unconscious anxiety”: Phobic responses to masked 
 stimuli,” J Abnorm Psychol 103 (1994): 231-240. 
 
Olineck, K.M., and D. Poulin-Dubois, “Infants’ understanding of intention from 10 to 14 
 months: Interrelations among violation of expectancy and imitation tasks,” Infant 
 Behav Dev. 32 (2009): 404-415. 
 
Olsson, A. and E.A. Phelps, “Learned fear of ‘unseen’ faces after Pavlovian, observational, 
 and instructed fear,” Psychol Sci 15 (2004): 822-828. 
 
Osborne, Thomas. “Aquinas’s Augustinian Moral Theory,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 279-
 305. 
 
________. “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” The Thomist 71 (2007): 39-64. 
 
Owens, Joseph. “Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle,” 
 Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 279-310. 
 
Parkes, Colin Murray, Joan Stevension-Hinde, and Peter Marris, eds. Attachment Across 
 the Life Cycle (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
 
Pasnau, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2002). 
 
________. “Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to Haldane and Lee),” 
 Philosophy 78 (2003): 521-531. 
 
________. “Form, Substance, and Mechanism,” The Philosophical Review 113 (2004): 
 31-88. 
Perner, J., and J. Roessler, “From infants’ to children’s appreciation of belief,” Trends 
 Cogn Sci. 16 (2012): 519-525. 
 
Peters, J.A.J. “Matter and Form in Metaphysics,” The New Scholasticism 31 (1957): 447–
 483. 
 
Petri, Thomas, O.P., and Michael Wahl, “Live Action and Planned Parenthood: A New 
 Test Case for Lying,” Nova et vetera 10 (2012): 437-462. 
 
Pilsner, Joseph. The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. “Virtue is Not a Habit,” Trans. Bernard Gilligan, Cross 
 Currents 12 (1962): 65-81. 
 
  322 
________. “Les passions et la morale,” Revue des sciences philosophiques and 
 theologiques 74 (1990): 379-391. 
 
Porter, Jean. “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’ in Grisez’s Moral Theory,” Theological Studies 57 
 (1996): 611-632. 
 
Pruss, Alexander. “Lying and Speaking Your Interlocutor’s Language,” The Thomist 63 
 (1999): 439-453. 
 
Rakison, D.H. and J.L. Derringer, “Do infants possess an evolved spider-detection 
 mechanism?” Cognition 107 (2008): 381-393. 
 
Ramsey, Boniface, O.P. “Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient 
 Church,” The Thomist 49 (1985): 504-533. 
 
Rea, Michael. “Hylomorphism reconditioned,” Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 
 341-358. 
 
Reichberg, Gregory M. “The Intellectual Virtues IIa IIae, qq.57-58)” in The Ethics of 
 Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
 2002), pp. 131-150. 
 
Rhonheimer, Martin. “‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’ and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a 
 Central Teaching of Veritatis Splendor,” The Thomist 58 (1994): 1-39. 
 
________. “The Perspective of the Acting Person and the Nature of Practical Reason: 
 The ‘Object of the Human Act’ in Thomistic Anthropology of Action,” Nova et 
 Vetera 2 (2004): 461-516. 
 
________. “On the Use of Condoms to Prevent Acquired Immune Deficiency 
 Syndrome,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5 (2005): 37-48. 
 
________. The Perspective of the Acting Person (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
 University of America Press, 2008). 
 
________. Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and 
 Tubal Pregnancies (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
 2009). 
 
________. “A Nonexisting ‘False Theory’,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9 
 (2009): 11-16.   
 
________. The Perspective of Morality (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
 America Press, 2011). 
 
  323 
________. “Vital Conflicts, Direct Killing, and Justice: A Response to Rev.  Benedict 
Guevin and Other Critics,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11  (2011): 519-
540. 
 
________. “The Moral Object of Human Acts and the Role of Reason According to 
 Aquinas: A Restatement and Defense of My View,” Josephinum Journal of 
 Theology 18 (2011): 454-506. 
 
Roberts, Robert C. Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
Rocca, Gregory, P., O.P. Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Washington, D.C.: The 
 Catholic University of America Press, 2004). 
 
Romberg, Alexa R., and Jenny R. Saffran, “Expectancy learning from probabilistic input 
 by infants,” Front. Psychol. 3 (2013): 610. 
 
Rothschild, Lynn J. “The Role of Emergence in Biology,” in The Re-emergence of 
 Emergence ed. P. Clayton and P. Daves (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 151-
 165. 
 
Roux, Sophie, and Dan Garber, eds., The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy 
 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 
 
Rovee-Collier, Carolyn, and Rachel Barr, “Infant Learning and Memory,” in Blackwell 
 Handbook of Infant Development, ed. Gavin Bremner and Alan Fogel (Malden, 
 MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), pp. 139-168. 
 
Rual, J.-F. et al., “Towards a proteome-scale map of the human protein–protein 
 interaction network.,” Nature 437 (2005): 1173–1178. 
 
Rziha, John. Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in 
 Eternal Law (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009). 
 
Safran, Jenny R., Richard N. Aslin, and Elissa L. Newport, “Statistical Learning by 8-
 month-old Infants,” Science 274 (1996): 1926-1928. 
 
Saul, Jennifer Mather. Lying, Misleading & What is Said (Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 2012). 
 
Searle, John R. “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,” The Philosophical 
 Reviews 77 (1968): 405-424. 
 
________. Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
  324 
Seyfarth, R.M. et al., “Vervet monkey alarm calls: semantic communication in a free-
 ranging primate,” Anim. Behav. 28 (1980): 1070-1094. 
 
Shanley, Brian, O.P. “Pagan Virtue,” The Thomist 63 (1999): 553-577. 
 
Sherwin, Michael, O.P., By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the  Moral 
 Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic  University of 
 America Press, 2005). 
 
________. “Infused virtue and the effects of acquired vice: A test case for  the Thomistic 
 theory of infused cardinal virtues,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 29-52. 
 
Silk, J.B. et al., “The form and function of post-conflict interactions between female 
 baboons,” Anim. Behav. 52 (1996): 259-268. 
 
Silva, Daniel. The Unlikely Spy (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1995). 
 
Smith, Janet. “Fig Leaves and Falsehoods,” First Things 23 (2011): 45-49. 
 
Solomon, Robert C. The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, 2nd ed. 
 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993). 
 
________. “Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business,” Bus 
 Ethics Q 13 (2003): 43-62. 
 
Squire, Larry R. Memory and Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
 
Stelling, J., U. Sauer, Z. Szallasi, F.J. Doyle III, and J. Doyle, “Robustness of cellular 
 functions,” Cell 118 (2004): 675-685. 
 
Stelzl, U. et al., “A human protein-protein interaction network: a resource for annotating 
 the proteome,” Cell 122 (2005) 957–968. 
 
Stroud, James W. “Thomas Aquinas’ Exposition of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit: 
 Developments in His Thought and Rival Interpretations,” S.T.D. Dissertation, 
 The Catholic University of America, 2012. 
 
Tollefsen, Christopher. “Is a purely first person account of human action defensible?” 
 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2006): 441-460. 
 
________.“Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien,” American  Catholic 
 Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2013): 751-778. 
 
________. Lying and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 
  325 
Tomasello, M. et al., “Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural 
 Cognition,” Behav Brain Sci 28 (2005): 675-691. 
 
Toner, Patrick. “Hylemorphic animalism,” Philosophical Studies 155 (2011): 65-81. 
 
Torrell, Jean-Pierre, O.P. Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume 1: The Person and His Work 
 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 
 
Trask, R.L. Language: The Basics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004). 
 
Van, L. et al., “Pulvinar neurons reveal neurobiological evidence of past selection for 
 rapid detection of snakes,” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 110 (2013): 19000-19005. 
 
Venkatesan, K. et al., “An empirical framework for binary interactome mapping,” Nat 
 Methods 6 (2008): 83-90. 
 
Vidal, Marc. “A unifying view of 21st century systems biology,” FEBS Letters 583  (2009): 
 3891-3894. 
 
Vuilleumier, P. et al., “Neural response to emotional faces with and without awareness: 
 Event-related fMRI in a parietal patient with visual extinction and spatial neglect,” 
 Neuropsychologia 40 (2002): 2156-2166. 
 
Walhout, A.J. et al., “Protein interaction mapping in C. elegans using proteins involved in 
 vulval development,” Science 287 (2000): 116–122. 
 
Watts, D.J. and S.H. Strogatz, “Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks,” Nature 
 393 (1998): 440-442. 
 
Weggemann, T. et al., “A Study of Normal Baby Movements,” Child Care Health Dev. 
 13 (1987): 41-58. 
 
Wellman, Henry M., and Kristin H. Lagattuta, “Developing Understandings of Mind,” in 
 Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Cognitive 
 Neuroscience, 2nd ed., ed. Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and 
 Donald J. Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 21-49. 
 
Wellman, Henry M. “Understanding the Psychological World: Developing a Theory of 
 Mind” in Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development, ed. Usha 
 Goswami (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 167-187. 
 
Wennekamp, S. et al., “A self-organization framework for symmetry breaking in the 
 mammalian embryo,” Nat Rev Mol Cell Biol 14 (2013): 452-459. 
 
  326 
Westberg, Daniel. “Did Aquinas Change His Mind About the Will?” The Thomist 58 
 (1994): 41-60. 
 
________. Right Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
Westerhoff, Hans V. and Bernhard O. Paisson, “The evolution of molecular biology into 
 systems biology,” Nat Biotech 22 (2004): 1249-1252. 
 
White, Kevin. “Individuation in Aquinas’s Super Boetium De Trinitate, Q.4” American 
 Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 543-556. 
 
________. “The Passions of the Soul (Ia IIae, qq. 22-48)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
 Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 
 103-115. 
 
White, Meredith and Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., “The Use of Pre-term Induction in Crisis 
 Pregnancies: The Drowning Lifeguard-Drowning Swimmer Case,” Angelicum, in 
 press. 
  
Wippel, John. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The 
 Catholic University of America Press, 2007). 
 
________. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The 
 Catholic University of America Press, 2000). 
 
Wolter, Allan B. “The Ockhamist Critique,” in The Concept of Matter in Greek and 
 Medieval Philosophy, ed. E. McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
 Dame Press, 1965), pp. 124-146. 
 
Wuellner, Bernard, S.J. Summary of Scholastic Principles (Chicago: Loyola University 
 Press, 1956). 
 
Yearley, Lee H. “The Nature-Grace Question in the Context of Fortitude,” The Thomist 
 35 (1971): 557-580. 
 FACULTÉ DE THÉOLOGIE 
DÉCANAT 
T +41 26 300 73 70 
decanat-theol@unifr.ch 
THEOLOGISCHE FAKULTÄT 
DEKANAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Déclaration sur l’honneur 
 
 
 
 
Par ma signature, j’atteste avoir rédigé personnellement ce travail écrit et n’avoir utilisé que 
les sources et moyens autorisés, et mentionné comme telles les citations et paraphrases. 
 
J’ai pris connaissance que le comportement scientifique délictueux selon les directives de 
l’Université de Fribourg* est sanctionné. 
 
 
 
 
Prénom :  Nom : 
 
Nr. SIUS : 
 
 
 
Lieu et date : Signature : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Directives de l’Université de Fribourg du 13 mai 2008 concernant la procédure de prononcé 
des sanctions disciplinaires selon l’art. 101 des Statuts du 31 mars 2000 de l’Université de 
Fribourg dans les cas de violation des règles de l’intégrité scientifique lors de la rédaction de 
travaux pendant la durée de la formation : 
http://www.unifr.ch/rectorat/reglements/pdf/1_1_15.pdf 
 
Art. 2: «Il y a comportement scientifique délictueux lorsqu’une violation des règles de 
l’intégrité scientifique est constatée, notamment quand, dans un travail écrit, l’auteur-e fait 
siens les travaux et les connaissances d’une autre personne (plagiat), lorsqu’un travail écrit 
rédigé par une tierce personne autre que l’auteur-e est déposé (ghostwriting) ou lorsque de 
fausses indications sont faites intentionnellement ou par négligence grave.» 
 
Cette déclaration doit être jointe à tout travail écrit accessible publiquement (Master, Licence, 
Doctorat, Habilitation). Sans cette déclaration le travail ne sera pas admis. 
 
 
Nicanor Pier Giorgio AUSTRIACO
1 Cunningham Square,
Providence, RI 02918
USA
March 19, 2015
Solemnity of St. Joseph
 328 
REV. NICANOR PIER GIORGIO AUSTRIACO, OP, PH.D., S.T.D. 
 
1 Cunningham Square, Providence, Rhode Island 02918 
Tel: 401-865-1823; Fax: 401-865-2959 
Email: naustria@providence.edu 
 
 
ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE   
 
Associate Professor of Biology (with Tenure), 2011 – Present. 
Providence College, Providence, RI. 
 
Instructor of Theology, 2005 – Present. 
Providence College, Providence, RI. 
 
 LAB HOMEPAGE: http://www.austriacolab.com 
 
Catholic Chaplain, 2014 – 2015 
Brown University, Providence, RI. 
 
Assistant Professor of Biology, 2005 – 2011. 
Providence College, Providence, RI. 
 
Visiting Research Scholar, April/May 2014. 
The Anscombe Centre for Bioethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. 
 
Consultant, Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Manila, 2014 – Present. 
Committee on Bioethics. 
 
Consultant, St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island, Providence, RI, 2010 – Present. 
Our Lady of Fatima Hospital Medical Ethics Committee. 
 
Consultant, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, DC, 2005 – 2007.  
Committee on Science and Human Values. 
 
Ad Hoc Consultant in Bioethics, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Vatican City. 
 
Ad Hoc Consultant in Bioethics, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, DC. 
 
Ad Hoc Consultant in Bioethics, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ottawa, Canada 
 
Ad Hoc Consultant in Bioethics, Diocese of Providence, Providence, RI. 
 
Board Member, Eastern Colleges Science Conference, 2010 – Present. 
 
Scientific Advisor, Rhode Island Right to Life, Providence, RI, 2008 – Present. 
 
Scientific Advisor, National Catholic Bioethics Center, Philadelphia, PA, 2001 – 2015. 
 
Staff Ethicist, Dominican Friars Health Care Ministry of New York, New York, NY, 2006 – 2012. 
 
 
 
 329 
Current Research Grants 
 
Principal Investigator, 2014 – 2017 
National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)  
R15 GM110578-01: “Genetic Dissection of Yeast Bax Inhibitor Function in UPR and Calcium Signaling.” 
       TOTAL AMOUNT: USD 257,049.00 
Principal Investigator, 2013 – 2015 
BioLogos Foundation Evolution and Christian Faith (ECF) Grant: “Disputed Questions in Evolutionary 
Creation: Thomistic Responses for the Catholic Faithful and Other Curious Minds” 
       TOTAL AMOUNT: USD 23,000.00 
Investigator, Summer 2015 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Grant 2 P20 GM103430 to the Rhode Island INBRE Program 
NIH-Rhode Island IDeA Network of Biomedical Research Excellence (INBRE) Program 
Summer Undergraduate Research Fellows (SURF) Program: 
 “Genetic characterization of programmed cell death in aneuploid yeast cells” 
 
 
Previous Research Grants 
 
Principal Investigator, 2010-2013 
NIGMS R15 GM094712-01: “Genetic Identification of Sulforaphane’s Mechanism of Action in Yeast Cell 
Death.”        TOTAL AMOUNT: USD 310,273.00 
 
Principal Investigator, 2010-2013 
National Science Foundation (NSF) MRI-R2: “Acquisition of a Laser Scanning Confocal Microscope for 
Research and Training in  
Biology at Providence College”     TOTAL AMOUNT: USD 266,261.00 
 
Investigator, 2005 – 2014 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Grant 2 P20 RR016457 to the Rhode Island INBRE Program 
NIH-Rhode Island IDeA Network of Biomedical Research Excellence (INBRE) Program 
Research Projects:   
“Genetic Characterization of Programmed Cell Death in the Budding Yeast, Saccharomyces”  
         [2005-2008] 
“Genetic Characterization of UTH1 and BXI1, Two Genes Involved in Yeast Programmed Cell Death”  
         [2009-2014] 
 
Journal Editor 
 
Microbial Cell (founding member of board of academic editors: www.microbialcell.com) 
 
Ad-Hoc Manuscript Reviewer 
 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly   PLoS ONE     
The Linacre Quarterly    Mechanisms of Aging and Development  
The Thomist     The Annals of Pharmacotherapy\ 
International Journal of Molecular Sciences  Science and Theology 
International Journal of Medicinal Mushrooms FEMS Yeast Research 
Nova et Vetera 
          
 
 
 
 
 330 
Textbook Reviewer 
 
• Genetics Essentials: Concepts and Connections by Benjamin Pierce, 3rd edn. (WH Freeman) 
• Biological Sciences by Scott Freeman, 4th edn. (Benjamin Cummings/Pearson) 
• Visualizing Human Biology by Kathleen Anne Ireland, 2nd edn. (Wiley) 
• Genetic Analysis: An Integrated Approach by Mark F. Sanders and John L. Bowman, 1st edn. (Pearson) 
• Lewin’s Essential GENES by Jocelyn E. Krebs, Elliott S. Goldstein, and Stephen T. Kilpatrick, 3rd edn. 
(Jones Bartlett Publishing) 
 
Courses Taught at Providence College 
 
BIO 103: General Biology I     
BIO 122: Human Biology 
BIO 127: Genes and Gender 
BIO 200: Cellular and Molecular Biology 
BIO 308: Modern Genetics 
BIO 412: Microbial Physiology 
BIO 475: Advanced Topics Seminar in the Biology of Cancer 
BIO 475: Advanced Topics Seminar in the Biology of Aging 
HON 480: Honors Colloquium – Science and Religion 
THL 240: Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas 
THL 372: Contemporary Moral Problems [Social, Sexual, and Medical Ethics] 
THL 410: Contemporary Thomistic Moral Theology 
 
EDUCATION 
University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland 
Doctorate in Sacred Theology (S.T.D.), magna cum laude, May 2015 
Dissertation Title: The Hylomorphic Structure of Thomistic Moral Theology from the Perspective  
 of a Systems Biology 
Dissertation Supervisor: Rev. Michael Sherwin, O.P., Ph.D., Professor of  Moral Theology 
 
Dominican House of Studies, Washington, DC 
Licentiate in Sacred Theology (S.T.L.), summa cum laude, May 2005. 
Thesis: Life and Death from the Systems Perspective: A Thomistic Bioethics for a Post-Genomic Age 
 
Master of Divinity, summa cum laude, May 2003 
Bachelor in Sacred Theology (S.T.B.), summa cum laude, May 2003 
 
Ludwig Institute for Cancer Research/University College London, London, UK 
Fellow of the International Human Frontier Science Program, 1996-1997 
Mentor: Parmjit Jat, Ph.D., Professor of Neurodegenerative Disease 
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 
Doctor of Philosophy (Biology), June 1996. 
Thesis:  UTH1 and the Genetic Control of Aging in the Yeast, Saccharomyces 
Mentor:  Leonard P. Guarente, Ph.D., Novartis Professor of Biology 
Pre-doctoral Fellow of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI): 1990-1996 
 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 
Bachelor of Science in Engineering (Bioengineering), summa cum laude, May 1989 
Thesis: Vertebral Body Densitometry Using Interactive Image Analysis 
Mentors: Denis S. Drummond, M.D., and John L. Williams, Ph.D. 
 
 331 
Honors and Awards 
Providence College Committee on Aid to Faculty Research (CAFR) Grant, 2006-2007; 2010-2011. 
Calihan Religion and Liberty Academic Fellowship awarded by the Acton Institute, 2004-2005 
Bishop Thomas V. Daily Vocations Scholarship from the Knights of Columbus, 2003-2004 
Second Place Press Award, Best Feature Article – Scholarly, Catholic Press Association  
of the United States and Canada, 2003 
Summer Ministry Scholarship of the Blessed Margaret Costello Guild, Columbus, OH, 2002 
International Human Frontier Science Program Long Term Fellowship, 1996-1997 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) Pre-doctoral Fellowship in the Biomedical Sciences, 1990-1995 
Dean's List, 1985-1989 
Benjamin Franklin Scholar/General Honors Program, 1985-1989 
John P. Lyet Scholarship for Academic Excellence 
Hospitality Services of the University of Pennsylvania Scholarship 
Tau Beta Pi, The National Engineering Honor Society 
Pi Mu Epsilon, The National Math Honor Society 
Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Honor Society 
1989 Nassau Grant for Undergraduate Research Award 
1987 Best Article Award from the National Association of Engineering College Magazines 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Books 
 
Austriaco, N.P.G., O.P. Biomedicine & Beatitude: An Introduction to Catholic Bioethics (Washington, DC: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2011)  
*** Named a 2012 “Outstanding Academic Title” by Choice Magazine (American Library Assn.)*** 
ACADEMIC BOOK REVIEWS: National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Theological Studies, 
Homiletics and Pastoral Review, New Blackfriars, Heythrop Journal, Catholic Social Science Review, 
The Thomist, Reviews in Religion & Theology Subject of a symposium in a special issue of Nova et 
Vetera, Volume 12, Issue 2, Spring 2014. A second edition of this monograph is in preparation.  
  
Booklet 
Austriaco, N.P.G., O.P. Understanding Stem Cell Research: Controversy and Promise (New Haven, CT: 
Knights of Columbus, 2008; updated 2010). This 30-page booklet is part of the Veritas Series published by 
the Knights of Columbus.   
Peer-Reviewed Work 
 
SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING PAPERS (Asterisks Indicate Undergraduate Co-authors) 
 
Laprade, D.*, Brown, M.*, McCarthy, M.*, Ritch, J., and Austriaco, N. (2015) “Filamentation Protects 
Candida albicans from Amphotericin B-Induced Programmed Cell Death via a Mechanism Involving the 
Yeast Metacaspase, MCA1,” Microbial Cell, manuscript in revision. 
 
Pope, W.H. et al. (2015) “Whole genome comparison of a large collection of mycobateriophages reveals a 
continuum of phage genetic diversity,” eLife 4:e06416. [Publication describing the genomes of numerous 
phages sequenced as part of the HHMI-SEA Phages Hunters Program. Several of the phages were isolated 
and characterized by me and my students at Providence College.] 
 
Chin, C.*, Donaghey, F.*, Helming, K.*, McCarthy, M.*, Rogers, S.*, and Austriaco, N. (2014) “Deletion of 
AIF1 but not of YCA1/MCA1 protects Saccharomyces cerevisiae and Candida albicans cells from 
caspofungin-induced programmed cell death,” Microbial Cell 1: 58-63. 
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Lin, S-J and Austriaco, N. (2014) “Aging and Cell Death in the Other Yeasts, Schizosaccharomyces pombe 
and Candida albicans,” FEMS Yeast Research, 14:119-135. 
 
Cascio, V.*, Gittings, D.*, Merloni, K.*, and Austriaco, N. (2013) “S-Adenosyl-L-Methionine Protects the 
Probiotic Yeast Saccharomyces boulardii, from Acid-Induced Cell Death,” BMC Microbiology 13:35. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2012) “Endoplasmic Reticulum Involvement in Yeast Cell Death,” Front. Oncol. 2:87. 
Cebulski, J.*, Malouin, J.*, Pinches, N.*, Cascio, V.*, and Austriaco, N. (2011) “Yeast Bax Inhibitor, Bxi1p, 
is an ER-localized Protein that Links the Unfolded Protein Response and Programmed Cell Death in 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae,” PLoS ONE 6(6): e20882. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020882  
 
Ritch, J.J.*, Davidson, S.M.*, Sheehan, J.*, and Austriaco, N. (2010) “The Saccharomyces SUN Gene, 
UTH1, is Involved in Cell Wall Biogenesis,” FEMS Yeast Research 10(2): 160-178. 
 
Austriaco, N.R., Jr. and L. Guarente. (1997) “Changes of telomere length cause reciprocal changes in the 
lifespan of mother cells in Saccharomyces cerevisiae,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 94: 9768-9772. 
 
Austriaco, N.R., Jr. (1996) “To Bud Until Death: The Genetics of Aging in the Yeast, Saccharomyces,” Yeast 
12: 623-630. 
 
Kennedy, B.K., Austriaco, N.R., Jr., Zhang J., and L. Guarente. (1995) “Mutation in the Silencing Gene 
SIR4 Can Delay Aging in S. cerevisiae” Cell 80: 485-496  
 
Kennedy, B.K., Austriaco, N.R., Jr., and L. Guarente. (1994) “Daughter Cells of Saccharomyces cerevisiae 
from Old Mothers Display a Reduced Life Span,” J. Cell Biol. 127: 1985-1993 
 
Austriaco, N.R. Jr., J.L.Williams, and D. S. Drummond. (1991) “Trabecular Bone Densitometry Using 
Interactive Image Analysis,” J. Biomed. Engr. 13:481-484. 
 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS & CHAPTERS 
 
Austriaco, N. “Abortion Shame, Abortion Shaming, and the Reintegrative Mercy of God (Evangelium 
vitae, §99),” Nova et Vetera, in press. 
 
Austriaco, N. “Human Nature as Normative Concept: Relevance for Health Care,” in Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Medicine, ed. Thomas Schramme and Steven Edwards (New York: Springer, in press). 
 
White, M.*, and Austriaco, N. (2015) “The Use of Pre-term Induction in Crisis Pregnancies: The Drowning 
Lifeguard-Drowning Swimmer Case,” Angelicum, in press. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2015) “The Brain Dead Patient is Still Sentient: A Further Reply to Patrick Lee and Germain 
Grisez,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, in press. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2015) “A Philosophical Assessment of TK's Autopsy Report: Implications for the Debate 
Over the Brain Death Criteria,” Linacre Quarterly, in press. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2015) “A Fittingness Argument for the Evolution of Homo sapiens,” Science and Theology, in 
press. 
 
Sullivan, E., and Austriaco, N. (2015) “A Virtue Analysis of Recreational Marijuana Use,” Linacre 
Quarterly, in press. 
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Austriaco, N. (2015) “A Fittingness Argument for the Historicity of the Fall of Homo sapiens,” Nova et 
Vetera 13: 651-667. 
 
Cataldo, Peter J., William Cusick, Becket Gremmels, Cornelia Graves, Elliott Louis Bedford, Nicanor Pier 
Giorgio Austriaco, O.P., Paul Burstein, Ron Hamel, John Hardt, Sarah Hetue Hill, Mark Repenshek, 
Cherie Sammis, John Paul Slosar, and Dan O’Brien. (2015) “Deplantation of the Placenta in Maternal-Fetal 
Vital Conflicts,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15: 241-250. 
 
Austriaco, N. et al. (2014) “Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal-Fetal Vital Conflicts: A Statement of 
Consensus,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14: 477-489. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2014) “A Response to My Colleagues,” Nova et Vetera 12: 565-574. [My contribution to a 
special issue of Nova et Vetera dedicated to my book, Biomedicine and Beatitude.] 
Austriaco, N. (2014) “Preaching Catholic Bioethics with Joy and Mercy,” National Catholic Bioethics 
Quarterly 14: 217-226. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2013) “The Specification of Sex/Gender in Human Beings: A Thomistic Analysis,” New 
Blackfriars 94 (1054): 701-715. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2012) “On Ovarian Tissue Transplantation and the Metaphysics of the Embodied Self: A 
Response to Lauritzen and Vicini,” Theological Studies 73 (2): 442-449. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2012) “Personalized Genomic Educational Testing: What Do the Undergrads Think?” 
American Journal of Bioethics 12(4): 43-45. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2011) “Abortion in a Case of Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: A Test Case for Two Rival 
Theories of Human Action,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11(3): 503-518. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2011) “Complete Moles and Parthenotes are Not Organisms,” in Is This Cell a Human 
Being? ed. Antoine Suarez and Joachim Huarte (New York: Springer), pp. 45-54. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2011) “Living the Natural Law and Respecting the Ecological Good” in Green Discipleship: 
Catholic Theological Ethics & the Environment, ed. Tobias Winright (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic), pp. 
150-162. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2011) “The Soul and Its Inclinations: Recovering a Metaphysical Biology with the Systems 
Perspective,” in The Human Animal: Procreation, Education, and the Foundations of Society, Proceedings of 
the X Plenary Session, 18-20 June 2010, The Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Vatican City: The 
Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2011), pp. 48-63. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2010) “Understanding Sexual Orientation as a Habitus: Reasoning from the Natural Law, 
Appeals to Human Experience, and the Data of Science,” in Leaving and Coming Home: New Wineskins for 
Catholic Sexual Ethics, ed. David Cloutier (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books/Wipf & Stock), pp. 101-118. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2010) “Using Morally Controversial Human Cell Lines After Dignitas Personae,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10(2): 265-272. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2009) “In Defense of the Loss of Bodily Integrity as a Criterion for Death: A Response to the 
Radical Capacity Argument,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 647-659. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2009) “Presumed Consent for Organ Procurement: A Violation of the Rule of Informed 
Consent?” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9(2): 245-252. 
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Austriaco, N. (2009) “The Intelligibility of Intelligent Design?” Angelicum 86: 103-111. 
 
Austriaco, N. and M.G. Loudin* (2008) “Understanding the Controversy Over Intelligent Design and the 
Acceptability of Intelligent Causality in Science,” Forum Teologiczne 9: 29-39. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2007) “Is Plan B an Abortifacient? A Critical Look at the Scientific Evidence,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7 (4): 703-707. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2007) “An Argument Against Embryo Adoption” in Urged On By Christ: Proceedings of the 
Twenty-First Workshop for Bishops, ed. E. Furton (Philadelphia, PA: The National Catholic Bioethics 
Center), pp. 51-60. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2006) “On the Catholic Vision of Conjugal Love and the Morality of Embryo Transfer,” in 
Human Embryo Adoption: Biotechnology, Marriage, and the Right to Life, ed. E. Furton and T. Berg, L.C., 
(Philadelphia, PA: The National Catholic Bioethics Center), pp. 115-134. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2006) “The Moral Case for ANT-Derived Pluripotent Stem Cell Lines,” National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly 6 (3): 517-537. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2006) “How to Navigate Species Boundaries:  A Reply to the American Journal of Bioethics,” 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 6 (1): 61-71. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2005) “Debating Embryonic Dignity in a Liberal Society,” Stem Cell Reviews 1 (4): 305-308. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2005) “Are Teratomas Embryos or Non-Embryos?  A Criterion for Oocyte-Assisted 
Reproduction,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5(4): 697-706. 
 
Arkes, H, Austriaco, N., et al. (2005) “Production of pluripotent stem cells by oocyte-assisted 
reprogramming: joint statement with signatories,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5(3): 579-583.  
 
Austriaco, N. (2005) “Altered Nuclear Transfer: A Critique of a Critique,” Communio 32 (2005): 172-176. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2005) “On Reshaping Skulls and Unintelligible Intentions,” Nova et Vetera, 3(1): 81-99. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2004) “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective,” National Catholic Bioethics 
Quarterly, 4(4): 719-738. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2003) “In Defense of Double Agency in Evolution: A Response to Five Modern Critics,” 
Angelicum 80: 947-966.   
 
Austriaco, N. (2003) “Is the Brain Dead Patient Really Dead?” Studia Moralia 41(2): 277-308. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2003) “The Pre-implantation Embryo Revisited: Two-celled Individual or Two Individual 
Cells?” Linacre Quarterly 70(2): 121-126. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2002) “On Static Eggs and Dynamic Embryos: A Systems Perspective” National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly 2(4): 659-683. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2001) “Genetic Engineering, Post-Genomic Ethics, and the Catholic Tradition,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1(4): 497-506. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2000) “Metaphysics and Catholic Bioethics,” Ethics and Medics 25 (11): 3-4. 
 
Austriaco, N. (1999) “Causality within complexity,” J. Interdisciplinary Studies 11: 141-156. 
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PEER-REVIEWED ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES 
 
“Homunculus” in New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy. Ed. Robert L. 
Fastiggi. Vol. 2. (Detroit: Gale, 2013), pp. 720-721. 
 
“Hylomorphism” in New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy. Ed. Robert L. 
Fastiggi. Vol. 2. (Detroit: Gale, 2013), pp. 727-728. (updated from an article written by Rev. William A. 
Wallace, O.P.) 
 
“Brain Death” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, Supplement 2009. Ed. Robert L. Fastiggi, Joseph W. Koterski, 
S.J., and Frank J. Coppa. (Detroit: Gale, 2009), pp. 109-113. 
 
“Cloning” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, Supplement 2009. Ed. Robert L. Fastiggi, Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., 
and Frank J. Coppa. (Detroit: Gale, 2009), pp. 161-164. 
  
“Assisted Suicide” in Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science, and Social Policy. Ed. Michael 
L. Coulter, Stephen M. Krason, Richard S. Myers and Joseph A. Varacalli. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 
2007), pp. 58-59.  
 
“Sterilization” in Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science, and Social Policy. Ed. Michael L. 
Coulter, Stephen M. Krason, Richard S. Myers and Joseph A. Varacalli. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 
2007), pp. 1032-1033. 
 
Scholarly Book Reviews 
 
Steven Jensen, The Ethics of Organ Transplantation (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2011) in The Thomist 77(3): 487-491. 
 
Martin Rhonheimer, Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and Tubal 
Pregnancies (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009) in National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly 10(1): 201-206. 
 
Guiseppe Buonocore and Carlo V. Bellieni, eds., Neonatal Pain: Suffering, Pain, and Risk of Brain Damage 
in the Fetus and Newborn (Milan: Springer, 2007) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9(4): 793-795. 
[Coauthored with Katherine Helming*] 
 
Michael Ruse, The Evolution-Creation Struggle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) in The 
Thomist 71(3): 487-490. [Coauthored with Michael G. Loudin*] 
 
Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Theory (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2003) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5 (4): 849-851. 
 
David F. Kelly, Contemporary Health Care Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004) in 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5 (2): 425-428. 
 
Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2002) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5(1): 203-205. 
 
Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Nature (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2001) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 3(4): 861-862 
 
Bernard Lo, Resolving Ethical Dilemmas: A Guide for Clinicians, 2nd edn. (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams 
& Wilkins, 2000) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2(2): 351-353. 
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Paul Lauritzen, ed., Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research. (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1(4): 654-656. 
 
John Paul II, Fides et Ratio: On the Relationship between Faith and Reason. (Boston, MA: Pauline Books and 
Media, 1998)  in Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 13:209-210. 
 
William E. May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life. (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 
2000) in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1(1): 113-114. 
 
Popular Essays 
 
Austriaco, N. (2012) “Will Advances in the Life Sciences Change Our Vision of Man?” Culture e Fede 20: 
23-25. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2006) “Reading Genesis with Cardinal Ratzinger,” Homiletics and Pastoral Review 106 (5): 
22-27. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2003) “The Myth of the Gay Gene,” Homiletics and Pastoral Review 104 (3): 28-31; 48-53. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2002) “Was Jesus Happy on the Cross?” Homiletics and Pastoral Review 102 (5): 24-30. 
 
Austriaco, N. (2000) “Scientific Faith,” This Rock 11(12): 8-11. 
 
 
Newspaper Commentaries 
 
“Stem Cell Order Was Immoral and Unnecessary,” Rhode Island Catholic, April 2, 2009. 
 
“Children Should Be Begotten and Not Made,” Rhode Island Catholic, March 5, 2009. 
 
“Patients Do Not Need Congressman Langevin’s Clone-to-Kill Bill,” Rhode Island Catholic, April 15, 2010. 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS 
 
Invited Speaker 
 
2015 Seminar: “Science and Religion: Strangers, Rivals, or Partners in the Search for Truth?” University 
of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, June 14-19, 2015. 
 
2015 Conference: “Libertas et conscientia,” Stiftung politische und christliche Jugend-bildung e.V., 
Rocca di Papa, Rome, Italy, April 8-12, 2015. 
 
2015 Consultation: “Mechanism of Action of Plan B,” Canadian Catholic Bioethics Institute, Toronto, 
CA, March 5, 2015. 
 
2015 Consultation: “Mechanism of Action of Plan B,” The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 
Trinity International University, Chicago, IL, February 6, 2015. 
 
2014 Schmitt Lecture: “Is the Brain-dead Patient Really Dead? A Scientific, Philosophical, and Bioethical 
Analysis,” University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, December 4, 2014.   
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2014 International Congress: “Dehumanization and Depersonalization in Medicine and the Modern 
World and the Life of St. John of Dukla,” St. John of Dukla Cancer Center, Lublin, Poland, 
October 8-12, 2014. 
 
2014 Lecture: “End of Life Care in the Catholic Tradition,” Center for Religious Studies and Ethics, 
University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines, August 13, 2014. 
 
2014 Conference: “Eugenics and Ethics Conference,” Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Cathedral of Our 
Lady of the Angels, Los Angeles, CA, July 26, 2014. 
 
2014 Conference: “Recovering Causality: Historical Sources and Systematic Challenges from a 
Thomistic Perspective,” The Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome, June 24-26, 2014. 
 
2014 John Templeton Seminar: “Science and Religion: Strangers, Rivals or Partners in the Search for 
Truth?” University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, June 15-20, 2014. 
 
2014 Symposium: “Brain Death,” The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, June 3-4, 2014. 
 
2014 Conference Keynote Speaker: “Rediscovering Joy in Health Care,” University of St. Thomas, St. 
Paul, MN, March 28-29, 2014. 
 
2014 The 2014 Carl J. Peter Lecture: “Preaching Catholic Bioethics with Joy and Mercy,” North 
American College, Vatican City, March 2, 2014. 
 
2013 Conference: “Second Vatican International Vatican Stem Cell Conference – Adult Stem Cells: 
Regenerative Medicine-A Fundamental Shift in Science and Culture,” Vatican City, April 10-13, 
2013. 
 
2013 Conference: “What is Man that You Should Keep Him in Mind?” at 7th Annual St. Thomas 
Aquinas Theological and Catechetical Forum, Aquinas College, Nashville, TN, February 15-16, 
2013. 
 
2013 Workshop: “Bioethics Through the Eyes of Faith: Serving Christ in the Sick and Vulnerable,” The 
Twenty-Fourth Workshop for Bishops, The National Catholic Bioethics Center and the Knights of 
Columbus, Dallas, TX, February 4-6, 2013. 
 
2012 The 2012 Dom Luke Childs Lecture: “What Can Human Genomics Tell Us About Adam and 
Eve?” Portsmouth Abbey School, Portsmouth, RI, October 15, 2012. 
 
2012 Conference: “What can Genomic Science Tell Us About Adam and Eve? A Catholic Perspective” 
at the Portsmouth Institute on Modern Science and Ancient Faith, Portsmouth Abbey, 
Portsmouth, RI, June 22 – 24, 2012. 
 
2012 Conference: “What can Genomic Science Tell Us About Adam and Eve? A Catholic Perspective” 
at the Thomistic Circles on Creation and Modern Science, Dominican House of Studies, 
Washington, DC, April 14, 2012. 
 
2012 Departmental Seminar: “To Die or Not to Die: Genetic Characterization of Yeast Programmed 
Cell Death,” Trinity College, Hartford, CT, March 1, 2012 
 
2011 Conference: “First Vatican International Vatican Stem Cell Conference – Adult Stem Cells: 
Science and the Future of Man and Culture,” Vatican City, November 9-11, 2011. 
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2011 Workshop: “Workshop on Adult and Non-embryonic Stem Cell Research,” University of Notre 
Dame, South Bend, IN, June 28-July 2, 2011. 
 
2010 Conference: “Dominicans and the Challenge of Thomism,” The Priory of St. Joseph, Warsaw, 
Poland, June 30-July 5, 2010. 
 
2010 Plenary Session Presentation: “The Soul and Its Inclinations: Recovering a Metaphysical Biology 
with the Systems Perspective,” Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, June 18-
20, 2010. 
 
2010 Roundtable TV Discussion: “Creating Synthetic Life: Your Questions Answered,” Science 
Channel, Premiered on June 3, 2010, at 9 P.M.  
 
2010 Aquinas Colloquium: “The Soul and its Inclinations: A Systems Perspective,” Aquinas Institute, 
Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University, Oxford, England, March 6, 2010. 
 
2010 Aquinas Seminar: “The Specification of Sex/Gender in the Human Species: A Thomistic Analysis,” 
Aquinas Institute, Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University, Oxford, England, March 3, 2010. 
 
2010 Linacre Forum: “Virtue in Bioethics,” The Linacre Center for Healthcare Ethics, London, England, 
March 2, 2010. 
 
2010 Lecture: “The Genetics of Programmed Cell Death in the Yeasts, Saccharomyces cerevisiae and 
Candida albicans,” Angeles University, Angeles City, Philippines, January 12, 2010. 
 
2009 Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family Symposium: “The Nature of 
Experience: Issues in Culture, Science, and Theology,” The Catholic University of America, 
December 3-5, 2009. 
 
2009 St. Benedict’s Institute Lecture: “Stem Cell Research – Moral Controversies and Moral 
Alternatives,” Virginia Commonwealth University, March 5, 2009. 
 
2009 Social Trends Institute Experts Meeting: “Focus on the Embryo,” Barcelona, Spain, January 23-25, 
2009. 
 
2008 Biology Department Seminar Series: “To Die or Not To Die: Genetic Studies of Programmed Cell 
Death in the Yeast, Saccharomyces,” Rhode Island College, November 5, 2008. 
 
2008 New Wine, New Wineskins Conference: “Natural Law Reasoning, Human Experience, and the 
Data of Science: The Test Case of Homosexuality,” University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, 
July 31-August 3, 2008. 
 
2007 Westchester Institute Forum: “On Defining Totipotency,” Washington, DC, May 16-18, 2007. 
 
2007  St. Catherine of Siena Lecture: “Stem Cell Research – Moral Controversies and Moral 
Alternatives,” Quinnipiac University, April 26, 2007.   
 
2007 Workshop: “Urged on by Christ: Catholic Health Care in Tension with Contemporary Culture,” 
The Twenty-First Workshop for Bishops, The National Catholic Bioethics Center and the Knights 
of Columbus, Dallas, TX, February 5-7, 2007. 
 
2006: St. Luke Lecture: “Stem Cell Research – Moral Controversies and Moral Alternatives,” Aquinas 
House, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, November 5, 2006. 
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2006: Diocesan Priestly Convocation: “Genetics 101: An Introduction and Guide for Pastoral Ministry,” 
Diocese of Grand Rapids, Grand Rapids, MI, September 25-28, 2006. 
 
2006 Conference: “The Moral Status of the Human Embryo in a Liberal Society: A Scientific and 
Philosophical Argument,” 9th Philippine Nurses Association of America Eastern Regional 
Conference, Baltimore, MD, September 22-24, 2006. 
 
2006 Conference: “The Moral Status of the Human Embryo in a Liberal Society: A Scientific and 
Philosophical Argument,” 23rd Annual Wilmer Nursing Conference, The Johns Hopkins 
University, Baltimore, MD, May 12, 2006. 
 
2006 Congressional Briefing: “Alternative Sources for Pluripotent Stem Cells,” United States Senate and 
House of Representatives, Washington, DC, April 5, 2006. 
 
2006 Westchester Institute Forum: “On the Definition of “Human Embryo’ and the Criteria for 
Distinguishing the Human Embryo from Non-Embryonic Entities,” Washington, DC, March 2-3, 
2006. 
 
2006 Lecture: “Stem Cell Research: A Dialogue,” Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, 
Berkeley, CA, February 7, 2006. 
 
2005 Westchester Institute Forum:  “The Morality of Condom Use to Prevent the Spread of HIV,” 
Washington, DC, November 3-4, 2005. 
 
2005 Westchester Institute Forum: “The Ethics of Altered Nuclear Transfer,” Washington, DC, 
 April 28-29, 2005. 
 
2005 St. Catherine of Siena Lecture: “Stem Cell Research – A Biologist Considers the Ethical 
Implications,” St. Thomas Aquinas Catholic Church, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 
April 26, 2005. 
 
2005 Conference: “Global State of Stem Cells and Cloning in Science, Ethics, and Law,” Rome, Italy,  
March 7-8, 2005. 
 
2004 Westchester Institute Forum: “The Morality of Heterologous Embryo Transfer,” Washington, DC, 
October 28-29, 2004. 
 
2004 Colloquium: “The Stem Cell Debate in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany,  
The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, October 4-5, 2004. 
 
2004 Symposium: “Stem Cells: Science, Ethics and Politics at the Crossroads,” The Science Network/  
Salk Institute for Biological Studies, San Diego, CA, October 2, 2004. 
 
2004 Conference: “Is It Possible to Say When Human Life Begins?” Center for Ethics in Science and 
Technology, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, July 14, 2004. 
 
2002 Symposium: “Stem Cell Research,” Providence College, Providence, RI, October 10, 2002. 
 
2001 Departmental Seminar Series: Department of Biology, Providence College, Providence, RI,  
March 29, 2001. 
 
1997 Conference: Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council Workshop on the Science of 
Ageing, University of Warwick, June 25-26, 1997. 
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Scientific Platform Presentations 
 
2014 10th International Meeting on Yeast Apoptosis, Gothenburg, Sweden, May 14-18, 2014. 
 
2011 8th International Meeting on Yeast Apoptosis, Canterbury, United Kingdom, May 2-6, 2011. 
 
2008 6th International Meeting on Yeast Apoptosis, Leuven, Belgium, April 30-May 4, 2008. 
 
2007 2nd Northeast Regional IDeA Meeting, Burlington, VT, August 15-17, 2007. 
 
1996 Juan March Foundation Workshop on Chromosomal Compartments: Structure and Function of 
 Telomeres and Centromeres, Madrid, Spain, September 1996. 
 
1995 Seventeenth International Conference on Yeast Genetics and Molecular Biology,  
Lisbon, Portugal, June 10-16, 1995.  
 
1991  Yeast Genetics and Molecular Biology Meeting, San Francisco, CA, May 23-27, 1994.  
 
 
Scientific Poster Presentations 
 
2015 ASBMB Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, March 28-29, 2015. [with student co-presenters] 
 
2013 FASEB Science Research Conference: From Unfolded Proteins in the ER to Disease, Saxtons River, 
VT, June 16-21, 2013. 
 
2013  ASBMB Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, April 20-24, 2013. [with student co-presenters] 
 
2012 ASCB Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, December 15-19, 2012. [with student co-presenters] 
 
2012 9th International Meeting on Yeast Apoptosis, Rome, Italy, September 16-20, 2012. [with student 
co-presenter] 
 
2012 Gordon Research Conference on Cell Death, Il Ciocco, Italy, July 15-20, 2012. 
 
2011 ASBMB Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, April 9-13, 2011. [with student co-presenters] 
 
2010 ASBMB Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, April 24-28, 2010. [with student co-presenters] 
 
2009 Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Yeast Cell Biology Meeting, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, August 12-
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